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TELEGRAM NUMBER 420 OF 5TH JULY

FOR INFO PRIORITY PARIS BONN WASHINGTON OTTAWA (FOR PUS).

3 TO PM NO IO DOWNING STREET

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH FRENCH AND GERMAN FOREIGN  
MINISTERS ON 5 JULY: MIDDLE EAST.

1. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO VIEWS OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S STATEMENT AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL: ONE THAT HE DISAPPROVED OF THE VENICE DECLARATION AS SUCH, AND THE OTHER THAT HE MIGHT NOT HAVE SIGNED IT BUT THAT HE ACCEPTED THAT THE TEN SHOULD GO AHEAD ON THE BASIS OF THE TWO PRINCIPLES.

2. CHEYSSON SAID IN REPLY THAT MITTERRAND AGREED WITH ALL THE PRINCIPLES IN THE VENICE DECLARATION, INCLUDING THE TWO MAIN ONES CONCERNING THE RIGHTS OF ISRAEL AND THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS. HE (CHEYSSON) HAD SAID SO IN PUBLIC AND HAD SPOKEN ACCORDINGLY TO QADDOUMI WHOM HE HAD SEEN IN PARIS ON 4 JULY. WHAT MITTERRAND DID NOT LIKE WAS THE IMPRESSION OF CONDEMNING CAMP DAVID. HE DID NOT THINK THAT CAMP DAVID AS SUCH WOULD LEAD TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT (THE FRENCH ACCEPTED THAT CAMP DAVID WOULD RUN INTO THE SAND AFTER APRIL 1982 AND MITTERRAND WAS AS SCEPTICAL AS THE REST OF US ABOUT THE AUTONOMY TALKS) BUT HE THOUGHT THAT LIMITED STEPS LIKE THAT WOULD HELP TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. THE NEXT STEPS WOULD NO DOUBT ALSO HAVE TO BE LIMITED ONES.

3. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT NONE OF US DISAGREED WITH THIS AND RECALLED THAT NEITHER WE NOR THE GERMANS HAD EVER CONDEMNED CAMP DAVID. CHEYSSON'S EXPLANATION HAD BEEN VERY HELPFUL AND WE MUST NOW THINK ABOUT THE NEXT STEPS, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITIES OF:

- I. CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHTS BY THE PLO
- II. A NEW RESOLUTION SUPPLEMENTING SC 242
- III. THE PUTTING FORWARD BY THE TEN OF A PLAN, NOT WITH THE OBJECT OF IMPOSING IT ON THE PARTIES BUT TO ILLUSTRATE OUR VIEW OF THE OBJECTIVE AND THE MEANS BY WHICH IT MIGHT BE REACHED AND
- IV. SOME CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN RELATION TO THE WEST BANK (THOUGH HE RECOGNISED THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH HOPE OF THIS WITH BEGIN).

IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE WE MUST RECOGNISE THAT THE AUTONOMY TALKS WOULD PROBABLY GO ON UNTIL APRIL AS SADAT WOULD NOT WISH TO TAKE ANY RISKS OVER THE RETURN OF SINAI. BUT WE SHOULD REFLECT AND DISCUSS AGAIN BEFORE DECIDING HOW TO TAKE THING FORWARD. THERE WAS NO POINT IN ANOTHER TOUR OF THE MIDDLE EAST BY THE PRESIDENCY,

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BUT WE SHOULD NOT ABANDON THE EUROPEAN EFFORT (WHICH AT LEAST SOME IN WASHINGTON WANTED TO SEE CONTINUED).

4. GENSCHER AGREED. CHEYSSON ADDED THE FOLLOWING:

I. IN HIS TALKS WITH QADDOUMI AND DAJANI THEY HAD BEEN "REMARKABLY REASONABLE", BUT HAD EMPHASIED TWO PROBLEMS WITH THE EUROPEAN POSITION: THE REFERENCE TO A PALESTINIAN HOMELAND INSTEAD OF A STATE, AND FAILURE TO RECOGNISE THE PLO AS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS. CHEYSSON HAD INDICATED A FRENCH WILLINGNESS TO GO FURTHER ON THE FIRST POINT (HE SPOKE OF "RIGHT TO A STATE STRUCTURE"), BUT HAD STOOD FIRM ON THE SECOND (POINTING OUT THAT DE GAULLE HAD NOT BEEN RECOGNISED AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE UNTIL POST-WAR ELECTIONS);

II. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE "LATERAL PROGRESS" IN THE LEBANON OR IN RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE OTHER ARABS. ON THE LEBANON, THERE WERE ENCOURAGING SIGNS THAT THE GULF STATES MIGHT REDUCE THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE ADF AND INCREASE IT FOR THE LEBANESE FORCES, BUT PROGRESS WOULD DEPEND ON BEGIN NOT TAKING PROVOCATIVE ACTION. ON EGYPT THERE WERE SIGNS OF IMPROVING ACTION. RELATIONS BETWEEN SADAT AND SAUDI ARABIA AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET EGYPT BACK IN THE FOLD.

5. FCO PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER AS APPROPRIATE.

KEEBLE

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