

COS(Misc) 161/742/1

FALKLAND ISLANDS: US ASSISTANCE

1. The attached paper has been prepared by ACDS(Pol).
2. Unless the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee hears to the contrary by telephone (Ext 6347) by noon, 26 April 1982, it will be assumed that your Principals have taken note of the paper.

Attachment:

Falkland Islands: US Assistance (5 pages)

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- ODSA
- (1) Strip/ Evidence Cab Offm
 - (2) Supply
 - (3) Landsat photos?
 - (4) Persons: Nat Law. no cas.
 - (5) Carrier "Attacks" - what defunct? range?
 - (6) Polr. 3rd links - 200. brief

25 April 1982

OPERATION CORPORATE: US ASSISTANCEINTRODUCTION

1. It is apparent (1) that the US may be prepared to offer increased assistance to the UK should the Haig Negotiations fail. The Prime Minister has requested (2) early consideration of HMG's attitude. In accordance with instructions (3) a preliminary study has been made of areas in which the UK would benefit from increased US support for OPERATION CORPORATE.

AIM

2. The aim of this paper is to identify specific areas in which HMG might request increased US military assistance in support of OPERATION CORPORATE.

ASSUMPTIONS

3. a. The US would not commit forces to hostilities.
b. Base facilities in South America would not be available to the US for overt support of UK operations.

POTENTIAL AREAS OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE

4. The UK would benefit from increased US military assistance in the following areas:
- a. Intelligence.
 - b. Communications.
 - c. Operational Support.
 - d. Logistic Support.
 - e. Weapons, equipment and materiel supply.

Notes:

- 1. BDS Washington AAA/A2D 200100Z APR 82 WASDO 08.
- 2. MO5/21 dated 23 April 1982.
- 3. CDS 2038/1 dated 23 April 1982.

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INTELLIGENCE

5. Under existing arrangements the US is providing substantial intelligence support for OPERATION CORPORATE. Increased strategic, tactical and technical intelligence cover of Argentine strengths, dispositions, intentions and deficiencies would greatly enhance the prospects for a successful operation. Real-time tactical intelligence would be particularly valuable.
6. The US might be persuaded to:
- a. Increase satellite coverage.
 - b. Conduct U2/SF71 operations.
 - c. Deploy ELINT and additional SIGINT assets.
 - d. Provide increased surveillance and information on the South Atlantic surface and sub-surface plots.

COMMUNICATIONS

7. The most pressing communications requirement is the provision of secure speech equipment. This includes:
- a. Motorola Satellite Communications Systems (URC101) plus encryption equipment (KY57 and KOI18) for special forces.
 - b. Loan of KY8 and KY28 UHF secure speech equipment for the Task Force (request already submitted and agreed, but further requirements may arise).
 - c. KY75 (VINSON) crypto equipment for HARRIER and support helicopter tasking.

There would be no compatibility problems. The timely provision of these items would offer substantial improvements in communications security and increase the prospects for surprise.

8. Strategic communications via the US Defence Satellite Communications System is adequate and priority of access satisfactory in practice. Increased access and priority might have to be sought in due course.

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

9. The US might be prepared to offer operational support, short of direct participation in operations. The most valuable support would be:

- a. Long range Maritime Radar Reconnaissance.
- b. Air to Air Refuelling.

US assistance in both areas would relieve the pressure on UK resources and extend coverage. The level of support offered would be constrained by the capacity of Ascension Island.

10. The Air Transport Force supplemented by civil charter is at present able to meet airlift requirements. At a later date, US air transport support, especially C5A, might need to be sought.

11. The availability of US Amphibious Shipping would greatly assist the transport of any subsequent reinforcements to Ascension Island. Disembarkation would be simplified and the need to requisition Queen Elizabeth II and Sea Princess (the only passenger ships suitable for a Brigade lift) would be avoided. Sea freighting capacity is adequate.

12. US assistance with replenishment at sea for RN forces not assigned to OPERATION CORPORATE would improve the overall RN level of readiness, particularly for ships deployed in the Indian Ocean.

13. US medical support would back-up UK resources, which could be under extreme pressure during intensive operations.

14. Increased US satellite and other meteorological coverage would be of considerable value in operational planning.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT

15. Continuing US Logistic Support at Ascension Island will be crucial to OPERATION CORPORATE, especially access to aviation fuel stocks.

16. Where political constraints have allowed, US assistance from Government, military and civilian agencies under Cooperative Logistics Support and other arrangements has been prompt and generous. There appears to be no case at present for urging the US authorities to be more forthcoming.

17. As the Chileans have requested the replenishment of fuel stocks uplifted by TIDEPOOL, the US might be approached to allow access to stocks at RODMAN Naval Base, Panama, for this purpose.

WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT AND MATERIEL

18. There is a wide range of weapons, equipment and materiel which would add substantially to the OPERATION CORPORATE forces' capability. The list is necessarily tentative at this stage and compatibility problems would need to be identified and resolved. The more important requirements fall into the categories below:

19. Weapons:

- a. Harpoon for Nimrod.
- b. Vulcan/Phalanx Guns for ILLUSTRIOUS.
- c. AIM 9L Sidewinder missiles for Harrier.
- d. 76 mm Guns for CASTLE class ships.
- e. Limpet mines for SBS.
- f. M203 weapons and ammunition for SAS (request initiated).
- g. Anti ship missile for Harrier.
- h. Additional supplies of:
 - (1) Sub Harpoon.
 - (2) Mk 46 Torpedo.
 - (3) CAPTOR mines.
 - (4) Sonobuoys (Jezebel and/or Difar).
 - (5) Precision Guided munitions for Harrier, Vulcan, Victor and Nimrod.

20. Equipment.

- a. Electronic Warfare systems for Harrier and helicopters.
- b. Para point aerial delivery system for SAS.
- c. Probe Alert call-up system for SSN's.
- d. Gyro-stabilised binoculars for Nimrod crews.
- e. Passive night binoculars for SAS operations and for Harrier, Vulcan, Victor, and Nimrod crews.

21. Materiel.

- a. Temporary accommodation - medical, technical and domestic including portable aircraft shelters for use ashore.
- b. US metallic planking. Early availability would be essential if Stanley airfield runway and hardstanding extensions were to be completed in the shortest possible time.
- c. Moorings for South Georgia/Falklands Islands.

CONCLUSIONS

22. It is concluded that:

- a. An initial survey has revealed a number of areas in which US military assistance might profitably be sought; further study will be needed to identify precise requirements.
- b. US military assistance in maritime reconnaissance and air to air refuelling and in increased Intelligence gathering activities would be of particular benefit to UK operations.
- c. No particular items of support or equipment, additional to those now being supplied by the US, are presently considered crucial to the success of OPERATION CORPORATE. Requirements would need to be reviewed in the event of intensive hostilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

23. It is recommended that AUS(D Staff) should be invited to prepare a draft reply for Secretary of State to send to the Prime Minister, drawing on this paper.