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INFO PRIORITY MODUK KATHMANDU KUWAIT UKMIS NEWYORK (PS/S OF S)  
AND WASHINGTON

SAVING INF<sup>O</sup> ABU DHABI BAGHDAD CAIRO DAMASCUS DOHA DUBAI JEDDA  
MADRID AND MUSCAT

VISIT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE TO JORDAN:

20-23 SEPTEMBER

1. MR NOTT, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE, HIS PPS MR DAVID HUNT, MAJOR-GENERAL BOORMAN (DMO) AND MOD OFFICIALS, HAS JUST COMPLETED A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO JORDAN. IN THE COURSE OF TWO FULL DAYS SPENT HERE, HE HAD SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF (AT WHICH OTHER SENIOR JORDANIAN ARMY AND AIR FORCE OFFICERS WERE PRESENT). KING HUSSEIN AND QUEEN NOOR GAVE A LUNCH FOR MR AND MRS NOTT AND BEFOREHAND MR NOTT HAD HALF-AN-HOUR'S PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH THE KING. HE SAW JORDAN'S MAIN MILITARY HOSPITAL, PAID VISITS BY HELICOPTER TO FRONT LINE ARMY UNITS IN NORTH JORDAN AND TO PETRA AND MET MANY LEADING JORDANIANS ON SOCIAL OCCASIONS AT THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S HOUSE AND MINE. I HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY ON THE WIDESPREAD PRESS COVERAGE ACCORDED TO HIS VISIT.
2. IN THEIR PRIVATE TALK, KING HUSSEIN GAVE MR NOTT THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS FEELING LEFT OUT OF THINGS IN REGARD TO THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND UNEASY THAT HE MIGHT NOT BE FULLY AWARE OF WHAT WAS GOING ON. HE SPOKE WITH RELATIVE WARMTH OF IRAQ, WAS GLOOMY ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE YAR, FAIRLY CRITICAL OF THE SAYDIS AND DAMNED THE GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL WITH FAINT PRAISE. HE SIMPLY DID NOT KNOW WHETHER OR NOT SADAT WOULD BE LIKELY TO ATTEMPT SOME SORT OF RECONCILIATIONS WITH THE OTHER ARAB STATES AFTER THE COMPLETION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI NEXT APRIL. HE DID NOT FEEL THAT THE RUSSIANS PRESENTED AN IMMEDIATE THREAT TO THE MIDDLE EAST SEMICLN HE WAS CRITICAL OF US POLICY AND OF THE DANGER THAT IT WOULD PROVOKE FURTHER POLARISATION, WITH THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION EACH SEEKING ALLIES IN THE AREA SEMICLN THERE COULD BE NO GAIN IN THIS FOR THE ARABS. IN EXPRESSING REGRET TO MR NOTT THAT HE MIGHT NOT AFTER ALL BE ABLE TO VISIT BRITAIN IN EARLY OCTOBER AS HE HAD HOPED, THE KING SAID HE FELT IT NECESSARY TO DEVOTE THE TIME UNTIL HIS PLANNED VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN EARLY NOVEMBER TO VISITING OTHER ARAB STATES. HE ALSO SPOKE ABOUT JORDAN'S FUTURE NEED FOR AN AIR SUPERIORITY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT (SEE PARAGRAPH 7.D. BELOW).
3. THE PRIME MINISTER DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN THE AREA AS VERY CRITICAL AND SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO STICK TO TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES IN THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT: COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES INCLUDING EAST JERUSALEM AND THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN

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STATE. JORDAN SUPPORTED THE VENICE DECLARATION AND EUROPEAN EFFORTS TOWARDS A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. BRITAIN HAD A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY, BOTH AS THE FORMER MANDATORY POWER IN PALESTINE AND BECAUSE IN 1948 SHE HAD PROPOSED AT THE UNITED NATIONS THE CREATION OF BOTH AN ISRAELI AND AN ARAB STATE IN PALESTINE SINCE THE SECOND HALF OF THIS PROPOSAL HAD YET TO BE FULFILLED. JORDAN DID NOT PERCEIVE ANY IMMEDIATE SOVIET THREAT TO THE AREA, WHEREAS ISRAEL REMAINED IN OCCUPATION OF ARAB LAND AND EXPANSIONIST. THE RECENT DECLARATION THAT THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL WOULD SEEK A CLOSER STRATEGIC CO-OPERATION HAD COMPLICATED AND WORSENERED THE SITUATION. WHILE HE AGREED THAT THE US DEFENCE SECRETARY HAD A LONG-STANDING INTEREST IN AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE MIDDLE EAST, HE BELIEVED THAT IN THESE MATTERS THE VIEWS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WHOSE MEMBERS DID NOT APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND THE PALESTINIAN CASE, WERE LIKELY TO PREVAIL. WHEN MR NOTT EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER JORDANIAN INTEREST IN THE PURCHASE OF SAMB MISSILES FROM THE SOVIET UNION, THE PRIME MINISTER RETORTED THAT THE SHAH HAD BOUGHT WEAPONS FROM BOTH EAST AND WEST WITHOUT AROUSING OPPOSITION AND THAT WHAT MATTERED WAS WHAT POLICIES A COUNTRY PURSUED RATHER THAN WHERE IT PURCHASED ITS WEAPONS.

4. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ALSO SPOKE OF THE NEED FOR A MORE ACTIVE EUROPEAN ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT. THE JORDANIANS HAD TRIED HARD TO CONVINCED THE AMERICANS TO TALK TO THE PLO BUT HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO PERSUADE THEM TO ABANDON THEIR EARLIER COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL NOT TO DO SO. NEW US ADMINISTRATIONS HAD AROUSED HIGH HOPES AMONG THE ARABS, BUT THESE HAD INVARIABLY BEEN DASHED AND IT SEEMED THAT EACH TIME THE LABORIOUS TASK OF EDUCATING A NEW US ADMINISTRATION HAD TO BE BEGUN AFRESH. ARAB COUNTRIES WERE BASICALLY OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM, WHICH WENT AGAINST THEIR TRADITIONS AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS. BUT US POLICY WAS PUSHING THE ARABS TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. THE ARABS WERE NOT EXPECTING THE US TO FORSAKE ISRAEL BUT WHICH KIND OF ISRAEL WERE THEY SUPPORTING: AN AGGRESSIVE AND EXPANSIONIST STATE OF ONE CONTENT TO LIVE WITHIN SECURE BORDERS? THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR INSTALLATION HAD CAUSED MORE FRUSTRATION AND ANGER IN JORDAN EVEN THAN THE EVENTS OF 1967. KING HUSSEIN HAD DONE HIS BEST TO INFLUENCE PRESIDENT REAGAN IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, TELLING HIM FRANKLY HOW JORDAN AND THE ARABS GENERALLY FELT ABOUT THESE MATTERS. INDEED IN DOING SO HE HAD AROUSED SOME US ANTAGONISM.

5. THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF WAS DISMISSIVE OF THE GULF CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS IMPOTENT, AND EXPRESSED DOUBT WHETHER THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED HAD THE CAPACITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES LET ALONG TO MEET ANY DANGER FROM THE SOVIET UNION. HE ALSO REFERRED TO THE FEAR OF IRAQ AMONG THE GULF STATES, MENTIONING IN PASSING THAT THERE WERE MANY THINGS ABOUT THE IRAQI REGIME WITH WHICH

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JORDAN COULD NOT AGREE BUT THAT HE BELIEVED IT WAS BECOMING MORE BOURGEOIS AND LOSING MUCH OF ITS PREVIOUS REVOLUTIONARY ZEAL SEMICLN IT WAS IN ANY CASE BETTER TO HAVE IRAQ ON THE SIDE OF THE MODERATE ARABS THAN IN THE EXTREMIST CAMP. THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT EGYPT UNDER SADAT HAD WISHED TO RETAIN HIS LINKS WITH THE ARAB WORLD HE WOULD NOT HAVE ACTED AS HE DID. THE JORDANIANS WANTED EGYPT BACK IN THE ARAB FOLD, BUT NOT IF THE WEIGHT IT CARRIED AS THE STRONGEST ARAB COUNTRY WERE TO BE REMOVED FROM THE ARAB SIDE.

6. GENERAL SHAKER BELIEVED THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR HAD REACHED A STALEMATE THE IRAQIS DID NOT WISH TO PUSH ANY FURTHER INTO IRAN AND THE IRANIANS WERE NOT CAPABLE OF THROWING THEM OUT. THE IRAQIS WERE BANKING ON THE REMOVAL OF KHOMEINI AND HIS REPLACEMENT BY A MORE MODERATE REGIME, BUT THIS WAS ONLY A HOPE AND THEY HAD NO MILITARY OR OTHER MEANS OF RESOLVING THEIR PROBLEMS WITH IRAN.

7. MR NOTT'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF ON DEFENCE MATTERS ARE COVERED IN GREATER DETAIL IN SEPARATE TELEGRAMS AND FELL UNDER THE FOLLOWING HEADINGS:

A. TRAINING.

THE JORDANIANS ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO CONTINUING TO TRAIN THEIR SERVICE PERSONNEL IN THE UK. BUT OUR CHARGES HAD BECOME PROHIBITIVE AND WERE FORCING THEM TO LOOK ELSEWHERE. GENERAL SHAKER GAVE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES, EG A STAFF GUNNERY COURSE IN THE UK COST £230,000 WHEREAS THE EQUIVALENT COURSE IN THE US COST A LITTLE OVER £5,000. MR NOTT UNDERTOOK TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO REMEDY THIS. THE C IN C ALSO ASKED IF THERE COULD BE EXCHANGES OF JORDANIAN AND BRITISH ARMY OFFICERS IN THE FIELD FOR PERIODS OF BETWEEN 2 WEEKS AND 2 MONTHS. DURING HIS VISIT TO THE ARMY MEDICAL CENTRE, A STRONG PLEA WAS MADE TO MR NOTT FOR THE ADMISSION OF A SMALL NUMBER OF ARMY MEDICAL PERSONNEL TO UNDERGRADUATE MEDICAL TRAINING COURSES IN THE UK, SO THAT THE VERY HIGH STANDARDS AND THE CENTRE'S STRONG LINKS WITH THE UK COULD BE MAINTAINED. THE C IN C ALSO REFERRED TO THE 500 JORDANIAN OFFICERS AND NCOs SERVING IN THE GULF AND TO THE MANY STUDENTS FROM THE GULF UNDERGOING TRAINING IN JORDAN.

B. TANKS

THE C IN C EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER CONTINUING TECHNICAL PROBLEMS AND THE EFFECT ON THE MORALE OF THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES IF THE TANKS GAVE SERIOUS TROUBLE AFTER ARRIVING IN JORDAN SEMICLN THEY HAD BEEN ASSURED BY KING HUSSEIN THAT THEY WERE GETTING THE BEST TANK IN THE WORLD. MOREOVER OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, NOTABLY IRAQ AND OMAN, WOULD BE CLOSELY MONITORING JORDAN'S EXPERIENCES IN INTRODUCING CHIEFTAINS INTO ITS ARMED FORCES. HE ASKED MR NOTT TO USE HIS PERSONAL INFLUENCE TO ENSURE THAT THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WERE SUCCESSFULLY OVERCOME.

C. SALE OF BRITISH DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ.

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AFTER MR NOTT HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT SOVIET ADVISERS IN IRAQ MIGHT BE ABLE TO GAIN ACCESS TO ADVANCED BRITISH EQUIPMENT, THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF REFERRED TO THE DIFFICULTIES THE JORDANIANS AND OURSELVES HAD HAD IN PERSUADING THE IRAQIS TO PERMIT THE EXAMINATION OF CAPTURED IRANIAN CHIEFTAINS WHICH HAD BEEN IN ACTION AGAINST T72S. THE IRAQIS WERE VERY SECURITY CONSCIOUS AND ON BAD TERMS WITH THE RUSSIANS SEMICLN THEY WOULD TAKE CARE TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS IN THIS MATTER. HE ADDED THAT THE IRAQIS WERE "IN LOVE" WITH THE CHIEFTAINS AND HAD CAPTURED ABOUT 200, OF WHICH PARHAPS 50 WERE BEYOND REPAIR. HE SAW ADVANTAGE IN THE REFURBISHMENT OF THE REMAINDER BEING UNDERTAKEN IN IRAQ, ALTHOUGH HE STILL HOPED THAT THE IRAQIS MIGHT EVENTUALLY HAND THE CAPTURED TANKS OVER TO JORDAN.

### D. TORNADO/P110.

WHILE JORDAN IN PRINCIPLE SUPPORTED THE TORNADO/P110, THEY COULD NOT TAKE THE DECISION ON THEIR OWN AS THE PROJECT WAS FAR BEYOND JORDAN'S FINANCIAL CAPABILITIES. THEY HOPED BRITAIN WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO CONVINCED THEIR ARAB PARTNERS AND THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED. JORDAN WAS TAKING THE LEAD IN PRESENTING TORNADO/P110 BUT WOULD ALSO BE PUTTING FORWARD THE FRENCH OPTION AT THE NEXT MEETING OF AIR FORCE COMMANDERS OF THE CONSORTIUM, WHICH WAS EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN ABOUT A MONTH IN BAGHDAD AND AT WHICH SAUDI ARABIA WOULD BE REPRESENTED. ARAB INTEREST CENTRED ON TORNADO IDS AND P110, AND HE QUESTIONED MR NOTT CLOSELY ON THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE ROYAL AIR FORCE WOULD ALSO BE ACQUIRING P110. THE JORDANIAN AIR FORCE COMMANDER SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF RAF PARTICIPATION WAS CRUCIAL TO THE PROSPECTS OF CONVINCING THE CONSORTIUM TO CHOOSE TORNADO/P110. KING HUSSEIN IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH MR NOTT CONFIRMED THAT JORDAN'S REQUIREMENT WAS FOR AN AIR SUPERIORITY FIGHTER, AND MENTIONED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH THE SPANIARDS (PRESUMABLY WITH KING JUAN CARLOS DURING HIS RECENT HOLIDAY IN SPAIN) THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SPANIARDS MIGHT BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROJECT SEMICLN HE CLAIMED THAT THE SPANIARDS HAD SHOWN SOME INTEREST IN THE IDEA. THE KING ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE SAUDIS WERE BECOMING MORE INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

URWICK

FCO WHITEHALL  
NENAD

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

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