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TO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD

TEL NUMBER 595 OF 19 JUNE

AND TO PRIORITY DELHI KABUL JEDDA WASHINGTON MOSCOW BONN BRUSSELS  
PARIS ROME LUXEMBOURG DUBLIN THE HAGUE COPENHAGEN UKREP BRUSSELS  
ATHENS UKDEL NATO UKNIS NEW YORK

AGHA SHAHI'S VISIT TO LONDON

1. ARCHER GAVE A BRIEFING ON FOLLOWING LINES TO REPRESENTATIVES OF COMMUNITY NATIONS AND GREECE TODAY ON AGHA SHAHI'S TALKS WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE PRIME MINISTER.
  
2. AGHA SHAHI HAD SPOKEN AT BOTH THESE MEETINGS ABOUT THE BACKGROUND TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THREE BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. HABIB CHATTY, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, HAD APPROACHED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN PARIS WHOM HE KNEW AND WHOM THE COMMITTEE THOUGHT WOULD BE A SUITABLE INTERMEDIARY WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS. HE HAD EXPLAINED THE PROPOSAL FOR A THREE-MAN COMMITTEE AND THE INITIAL SOVIET RESPONSE HAD BEEN THAT THE IDEA OF A COMMITTEE WAS A GOOD ONE IF THE BASIS OF ITS WORK WOULD BE THE AFGHAN 14 MAY PROPOSALS. THE SOVIET COMMENT HAD BEEN THAT (I) IT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR THE COMMITTEE TO MEET WITH INSURGENTS: (II) THEY SHOULD SEE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BABRAK KARMAL GOVERNMENT: (III) IN THE LIGHT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS THE SOVIET UNION WOULD CONSIDER SEEING THE COMMITTEE IN MOSCOW: (IV) THE BASIS FOR THE COMMITTEE'S WORK SHOULD BE REALITIES: (V) THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF ANY SETTLEMENT IGNORING THE GOVERNMENT IN KABUL AN NOT ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO REACH AGREEMENT BEHIND THEIR BACKS: (VI) FOREIGN INTERFERENCE MUST CEASE: (VII) THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION MUST BE IRREVERSIBLE. CHATTY HAD REPLIED THAT HE AGREED DISCUSSIONS MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF REALITIES. THESE WERE (I) THE SOVIET MILITARY OCCUPATION WAS CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: (II) BABRAK KARMAL WAS CLEARLY NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN WHO WERE IN ACTIVE REBELLION: (III) NO PEACE WAS POSSIBLE IN AFGHANISTAN WITHOUT COOPERATION OF THE INSURGENTS: (IV) THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE HAD ENJOINED THE COMMITTEE NOT TO RECOGNISE THE KARMAL GOVERNMENT. CHATTY ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD SEE THE COMMITTEE. THE COMMITTEE HAD RECEIVED NO FORMAL ANSWER TO THIS FROM THE RUSSIANS BUT CRITICAL ARTICLES HAD APPEARED IN PRAVDA.
  
3. IN THERAN ON 4-6 JUNE THE COMMITTEE OF THREE HAD AGREED TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BABRAK GOVERNMENT AND THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE FIGHTERS. BUT THE COMMITTEE DID NOT

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THINK IT LIKELY THAT THE KARMAL GOVERNMENT WOULD ACCEPT THE INVITATION. THEY WOULD GO AHEAD WITH A MEETING IN GENEVA ON 20 JUNE EVEN IF ONLY THE RESISTANCE WERE REPRESENTED. THE CONDITIONS BEING LAID DOWN BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT FOR A WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN SEEMED IMPOSSIBLE TO MEET. THE POSITION OF A NUMBER OF TRIBES ACROSS THE BORDER BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN MEANT THAT THE SOVIET REQUIREMENT FOR AN END TO 'INTERFERENCE' WAS UNREALISTIC. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS NOT EASY TO ENVISAGE A FORMULA WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

4. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THREE HAD BEEN AN ADMIRABLE INITIATIVE. THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE HAD DONE WELL TO SUSTAIN POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION. SHE ASKED FOR AGHA SHAH'S VIEWS ON WHAT SORT OF GOVERNMENT THE AFGHANS WOULD CHOOSE IF FREE TO DO SO. HE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS SOME SIGN THAT THE AFGHANS WERE COOPERATING MORE CLOSELY. THE MAJOR GROUPS HAD AGREED ON REPRESENTATION IN THE IRANIAN DELEGATION AT THE CONFERENCE, AND AT BOTH ISLAMIC CONFERENCES THE AFGHANS HAD PRODUCED A SINGLE SPOKESMAN. BY AGREEING TO MEET LEADERS OF THE RESISTANCE, THE COMMITTEE OF THREE WERE CONFERRING POLITICAL STATUS ON THEM. THE BABRAK KARMAL REGIME WOULD COLLAPSE AS SOON AS SOVIET TROOPS DEPARTED. HE HAD MADE IT PLAIN TO THE RUSSIANS THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD NO INTEREST IN PROMOTING A GOVERNMENT HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION. AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS CLEAR THAT NO PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED BY INSTALLING ANOTHER PUPPET REGIME. HE FELT THAT THERE WAS NO SHORTAGE OF CANDIDATES OF GOOD STANDING WHO WOULD COMMAND WIDE RESPECT AMONGST THE AFGHANS.

5. ASKED ABOUT THE ABILITY OF THE AFGHANS TO CONTINUE THE FIGHT AGAINST THE SOVIET TROOPS, HE THOUGHT THAT PRESS REPORTS MIGHT BE OVER-EMPHASISING THE GROWTH IN THE INSURGENCY BUT THAT THERE WAS A MODICUM OF TRUTH IN THE REPORTS. THE INSURGENCY HAD KEPT GROWING FOR SIX MONTHS AGAINST ALL EXPECTATIONS. THE WILL TO GO ON WAS THERE BUT THE AFGHANS WERE SUFFERING GREAT HARDSHIP AND FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO COPE WITH THE M24 HELICOPTER. THEY NEEDED ANTI-HELICOPTER MISSILES. HOWEVER, THE PAKISTANIS WERE CLEARLY WORRIED THAT INCREASING SUCCESS BY THE INSURGENTS WOULD INCREASE THE DANGER OF REACTION BY THE RUSSIANS AGAINST PAKISTAN. AGHA SHAH EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT INDIAN ATTITUDES AND IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THE RECENT US DOLLARS 1.6M DEFENCE AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE MADE THE POINT THAT IF THIS WAS ASSESSED ON THE BASIS OF COST OF SUPPLY FROM ELSEWHERE THE TRUE VALUE WOULD BE MORE LIKE US DOLLARS 8M OR US DOLLARS 10M. HE WAS CRITICAL OF THE INDIAN LINE ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE ROLE THAT INDIA WAS PLAYING IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE COMMITTEE OF THREE MADE NO PROGRESS. AGHA SHAHI MENTIONED THE UN. HE FELT THAT THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD

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IN ANY MOVE TO INSCRIBE AFGHANISTAN ON THE AGENDA FOR THE UNGA. HE DOUBTED WHETHER ANYTHING POSITIVE WOULD RESULT FROM EFFORTS TO CONVENE A MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN. THE RUSSIANS WERE INTIMIDATING NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND INDIVIDUALS AND THE CUBANS AND OTHERS WOULD SUCCESSFULLY CONFUSE ISSUES AT ANY MEETING.

7. THE BRITISH SIDE HAD EXPLAINED THE IMPORTANCE THAT WE ATTACH TO MAXIMUM PUBLICITY FOR EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. AGHA SHAH APPEARED GRATIFIED AT THE COVERAGE NOW BEING ACHIEVED IN THE WESTERN PRESS.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD ASKED ABOUT IRAN. AGHA SHAHI HAD SAID THAT CRITICISM OF THE AMERICANS AT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE HAD BEEN INEVITABLE. HE THOUGHT THAT BOTH BANI SADR AND QOTBZADEH WANTED TO RESOLVE THE HOSTAGE PROBLE, BUT THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE IRANIAN PEOPLE DEMANDED SATISFACTION. THE RECENT TEHRAN CONFERENCE ON AMERICAN INTERVENTION MIGHT HAVE HELPED. HOWEVER, THE PEOPLE WERE INCLINED TO LINK THE AMERICANS WITH EVERY OTHER CONCEIVABLE ADVERSARY. THEY WERE ALLEGED TO BE .. BACKING ROYALISTS, EX -GENERALS AND TO BE IN LEAGUE WITH IRAQ.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD STRESSED THE NEED TO RESOLVE THE HOSTAGES PROBLEM. THEREAFTER IT WOULD TAKE A WHILE TO ACHIEVE ANY RETURN TO NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. BUT EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WERE IN A BETTER POSITION AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO PLAY A USEFUL ROLE.

10. AGHA SAHI HAD SAID THAT IT WAS A PITY THAT THE VENICE RESOLUTION HAD HAD TO INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO CAMP DAVID. THIS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ISLAMIC GOVERNMENTS TO WELCOME THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD STRESSED THE INHIBITIONS ON AMERICAN POLICY IN AN ELECTION YEAR AND HAD EXPLAINED THE PURPOSE OF THE VENICE RESOLUTION.

11. FULL RECORD OF TALKS WITH AGHA SHAH FOLLOWS BY BAG.

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