

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

34

100
IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY

MR ASPIN

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

HD/S AF D

~~HD/UND~~
HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

PS/SIR I SINCLAIR

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RKK200A

RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

mt

PP LUANDA

PP ADDIS ABABA

PP CAPE TOWN

PP WASHINGTON

PP UKMIS NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE

~~X X~~
1021

GR 150

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DESKBY FCO 231030Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 230945Z FEBRUARY 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 190 OF 23 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, GABORONE, LAGOS, MAPUTO, LUANDA, ADDIS ABABA,

CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: RHODESIA

1. MY READING OF THIS MEETING IS THAT PRESIDENT NYERE HAS FINALLY MORE OR LESS GIVEN UP ON TRYING TO INFLUENCE THINGS BEFORE THE ELECTIONS AND IS NOW CONCENTRATING ON BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR TO TRY TO ENSURE THAT MUGABE IS INCLUDED IN WHATEVER GOVT IS FORMED FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS.

2. I THINK HIS FEAR THAT IF MUGABE IS EXCLUDED THE WAR WILL CONTINUE IS SINCERE (HIS OWN BEHAVIOUR IS, OF COURSE, UNLIKELY TO DO ANYTHING TO DISCOURAGE IT). I ALSO THINK HE GENUINELY BELIEVES THAT NKOMO WILL BE DESTROYED POLITICALLY IF HE GOES INTO A COALITION WHICH EXCLUDES MUGABE. WHATEVER DISAGREEMENTS THEY HAVE HAD IN THE PAST, NKOMO MAY NOT BE ENTIRELY WISE TO APPEAR TO IGNORE NYERERE QUITE SO MUCH AS HE SEEMS TO.

3. IF NKOMO DOES BELIEVE THAT AFRICA WILL ACCEPT ANY GOVT IN WHICH HE IS INCLUDED, I SHARE MR BROWN'S DOUBTS (LAGOS TELNO 226) AS TO WHETHER THIS BELIEF IS NECESSARILY WELL-FOUNDED.

MOON

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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

RESIDENT CLERK

GR 550

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 231030Z

FM DAR ES SALAAM 230930Z FEBRUARY 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 189 OF 23 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY

INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, GABORONE, LAGOS, MAPUTO, LUANDA,
ADDIS ABABA, CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELS NOS 57 AND 58

RHODESIA:

1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE THROUGH THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE YESTERDAY 22 FEBRUARY, AND WAS CALLED TO SEE THE PRESIDENT THIS MORNING WHEN I SPOKE AS IN SALISBURY TELEGRAM NO 748.

2. NYERERE SAID HE DID NOT LIKE THE STEPS WE WERE TAKING WITH REGARD TO TRAINING ARRANGEMENTS FOR ZANLA AND ZIPRA. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY FAVOURED THE CREATION OF A JOINT ARMY BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, BUT NO ONE ELSE HAD WANTED IT. SINCE THAT HAD NOT BEEN DONE AT THE TIME, HE NOW THOUGHT IT BEST THAT WE SHOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED. I REPEATED THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS WERE BEING

FULLY DISCUSSED WITH MR NKOMO AND MR MUGABE, AND HE AGREED THAT IT WAS UP TO THEM TO DECIDE WHAT THEY WANTED. (I THINK THIS REACTION WAS JUST ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF NYERERE'S DEEP SUSPICION OF ALL WE DO).

3. NYERERE THEN TURNED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. HE EXPRESSED ASTONISHMENT THAT SUCH A MESSAGE COULD BE SENT, BUT DID NOT GO INTO IT IN DETAIL BEYOND ASKING RHETORICALLY, HOW CAN ANYONE TRY TO SAY THAT THE USE OF "THOSE THUGS" (THE AUXILIARIES) IS NOT A BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT AND THAT THEY ARE NOT ELECTIONEERING? HE SAID HE HAD HEARD THE GOVERNOR'S CALL TO THE PF FORCES TO REMAIN IN THE ASSEMBLY PLACES AFTER THE ELECTIONS; HE AGREED WITH THAT, PROVIDING THAT THE SECURITY FORCES AND THE AUXILIARIES ALSO REMAINED IN THEIR BARRACKS. NONE OF THIS WAS SAID WITH MUCH CONVICTION, AND IT WAS CLEAR HE REALISES THAT WE HAVE SAID ALL WE HAVE TO SAY.

4. NYERERE WENT ON TO SPEAK ABOUT THE POST-ELECTION ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT. WHAT WAS WANTED WAS A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD MEAN AN END TO THE WAR. THIS HAD TO BE A GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED AND ACCEPTED. BUT IF THE BRITISH GOVT "BENT OVER BACKWARDS" TO PRODUCE A GOVT ACCEPTABLE TO THE WHITES AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS THIS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED. I SAID THAT WE WOULD ACCEPT THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS, AND I ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT NKOMO AND MUGABE WOULD DO IF EACH (AND THEY BOTH APPEARED CONFIDENT) WON A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SEATS. HE DECLINED TO GIVE A DIRECT ANSWER AND EXPRESSED FEAR THAT WE WERE DETERMINED TO PREVENT THE FORMATION OF A PF GOVERNMENT, AND TO EXCLUDE MUGABE. SPEAKING WITH SOME PASSION HE WARNED THAT WE WOULD PUT NKOMO IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION AND DESTROY HIM POLITICALLY "JUST AS THE BISHOP HAD DESTROYED HIS OWN POPULARITY". HE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT NKOMO WAS ALREADY LOSING GROUND.

5. IN CONCLUSION NYERERE CAME BACK TO THE THEME OF THE OVER-RIDING NEED TO ACHIEVE PEACE. WE SHOULD ALL BE WORKING TO BRING ABOUT A PF GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THIS WOULD BRING PEACE (THOUGH HE WENT OUT OF HIS WAY, FOR THE RECORD, TO SAY THAT HE WOULD STILL ACCEPT A MUZOREWA GOVT IF IT CAME ABOUT THROUGH FAIR ELECTIONS). HE WARNED THAT WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE MISLED INTO THINKING THAT THE AFRICAN STATES WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO CONTINUE THE WAR IF FORCED TO DO SO. I SAID THAT WE WERE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH PRESIDENTS KAUNDA AND MACHEL, NO ONE WANTED PEACE MORE THAN WE DID, AND I REPEATED WE WOULD RESPECT THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS.

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6. SEVERAL TIMES NYERERE SAID WE SHOULD NOT BE FRIGHTENED OF A RADICAL GOVT COMING TO POWER IN RHODESIA. THIS COULD NOT HAPPEN. THE POLITICAL FORCES AGAINST IT WERE TOO STRONG. MUGABE COULD NOT MAKE RHODESIA A MARXIST STATE EVEN IF HE WANTED TO.

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