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This is a copy. The original 2
has been extracted and
retained under Section 3(4) 3



1. Mr. Alexander

2. Prime Minister *has seen.*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 August 1979

Dear Buzan,

*GBW
30/8*

TC: PWS 31/8

Rhodesia: Approach to President Kaunda

As agreed *★* *~~~~~* *★* met President Kaunda on 27 August. I
enclose her account of the meeting.

President Kaunda was anxious to hear of our plans for the
Conference. It is very useful that we were able to secure his
support for the step by step approach we shall be adopting at
the Conference, i.e. insistence that the first stage must be
to seek agreement on the outline of the independence Constitution,
rather than engaging immediately in discussion of the
"transitional" arrangements.

The area of main concern to President Kaunda - and which
was also touched on in President Nyerere's message - is that
we should be prepared to exercise effective control over the
process for new elections in Rhodesia. President Kaunda is
also, in effect, seeking assurance that we are not excluding the
possibility of a Commonwealth force or some other neutral force
if this is needed to police an agreement. Against this background
he would be prepared to exert his influence with the Patriotic
Front to participate in elections to be held under our control.
President Kaunda added that, if genuinely impartial elections
are held and the Patriotic Front did not win, Zambia would no
longer support them.

The Secretary of State proposes that we should make
arrangements for *★* *~~~~~* *★* to continue these discussions with
President Kaunda on his return from Havana to Lusaka on 9 - 10
September. We will also be in touch with President Kaunda's
representative, Mr Mark Chona, who is coming to London before the
Constitutional Conference. In the light of these discussions,
President Kaunda may ask for a meeting with the Prime Minister
in London during the Constitutional Conference.

We shall be submitting separately advice on the manner
in which we might deal with the points raised by President Kaunda.

*Yours ever,
Stephen*

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

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The following is an account by * ~~~~~ *
of her meeting with President Kaunda:

1. I SAW PRESIDENT KAUNDA FROM 1945 to 2130 ON 27 AUGUST AND SPOKE TO THE BRIEF PROVIDED. MARK CHONA WAS PRESENT AT THE MEETING, CLEARLY BY THE WISH OF THE PRESIDENT.

2. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED RELIEF AND SATISFACTION AT THE VISIT. HE TOOK NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S POSITION AND SAID IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THAT HE TRUSTED HER ABSOLUTELY. HE ALSO AGREED SPECIFICALLY THAT THE LONDON CONFERENCE OFFERS THE VERY LAST CHANCE TO NEGOTIATE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND SHARES THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROFOUND CONCERN ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE BOTH FOR ZAMBIA AND RHODESIA. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD BECOME ANXIOUS ON TWO POINTS.

FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS

3. WHILE THE PRESIDENT FULLY ACCEPTS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS DETERMINED THAT BRITAIN SHALL CARRY OUT HER CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, HE STILL FEELS DOUBTFUL HOW AND IN WHAT WAY BRITAIN/

* ~~~~~ * Names deleted and retained
under Section 3(4)

AWayland
29 October 2009

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BRITAIN WILL ENSURE THAT THE ELECTIONS ARE INDEED FREE AND FAIR. THE INSTRUMENT TO BE USED TO SUPERVISE AND ORGANISE THE ELECTIONS - THE ADMINISTRATION IN SALISBURY - IS THE SAME AS THE INSTRUMENT WHICH PUT MUZOREWA INTO POWER, AND ITS MEMBERS ARE ONLY HUMAN. THE PRIME MINISTER, SAID THE PRESIDENT, WOULD DO WELL TO RECOGNISE THAT THERE IS GENUINE FEAR, NOT TO BE DISMISSED LIGHTLY, WITHIN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT THAT UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS THE SALISBURY ADMINISTRATION COULD NOT OPERATE IMPARTIALLY. THIS IS A POINT ON WHICH THE CONFERENCE COULD FOUNDER. THE PRESIDENT ADDED THAT ZAMBIA, SHOULD IT PROVE AFTER THE ELECTIONS SEEM TO BE VALID AND FREELY AND FAIRLY CONDUCTED, THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT DO NOT WIN, WOULD NO LONGER SUPPORT THEM. ZAMBIA IS NOT COMMITTED TO INDIVIDUALS, BUT TO THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE TO MAKE A GENUINE CHOICE. HE FELT THAT LONDON WAS FAR FROM THE SCENE. WHATEVER TRUST COULD BE PLACED AND WAS PLACED IN THE PRIME MINISTER AND IN BRITAIN'S GENUINE INTENTION, THERE IS AN EQUALLY GENUINE FEAR THAT ELECTIONS WILL NOT BE CONDUCTED WITH ADEQUATE SUPERVISION. HE REPEATED HERE THE GENUINE TRUST THAT WAS FELT AT PRESENT OF BRITAIN'S INTENTIONS, "EVEN BY NIGERIA".

THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTED THAT THE PARTICIPATION BY THE FRONT IN ELECTIONS WOULD GO FAR TO MEET DOUBTS ABOUT EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION, BUT HE REPEATED THAT THIS WAS A GENUINE ANXIETY ABOUT WHICH BRITAIN MUST BE PREPARED TO DO SOMETHING. HE ACCEPTED THAT SUPERVISION BY THE UN WAS NOT PRACTICABLE BOTH BECAUSE INEVITABLE DELAYS WOULD SLOW THE MOMENTUM AND BECAUSE SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD BE RESISTED IN SALISBURY, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE NEEDED ASSURANCE THAT BRITAIN WOULD PLAY A FULL PART IN THE SUPERVISION ON THE GROUND. SEMI COLON COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH.

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THE STEP BY STEP STRATEGY

4. THE PRESIDENT UNDERSTOOD THE REASONS FOR HMG'S INTENTION TO TAKE THE CONFERENCE IN A DEFINITE ORDER, AGREEING FIRST ON THE CONSTITUTION, PROCEEDING FROM THAT TO THE SETTING UP OF ELECTIONS AND THE MACHINERY FOR THIS, AND ONLY THEN EXAMINING THE MILITARY QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE CEASEFIRE AND SEPARATION OF FORCES ETC. HE COMMENDED THIS STRATEGY AND WOULD GIVE IT HIS FULL SUPPORT. HE WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE A SECOND GENEVA. HOWEVER, THIS BROUGHT HIM TO THE SECOND QUESTION ON WHICH HE FELT CONSIDERABLE ANXIETY.

GUARANTEES FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD: THE MILITARY QUESTION

5. PRESIDENT KAUNDA SAID THAT HE WAS SATISFIED THAT BRITAIN MEANT TO DISCHARGE HER CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN RESPECT OF THE ELECTION. HE SOUGHT, HOWEVER, SOME REASSURANCE ON THE WAY IN WHICH THE SECURITY OF THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE ENSURED, AND THE SUBSEQUENT CEASEFIRE WOULD BE SECURED. AT THIS POINT MARK CHONA INTERVENED, WITH A REFERENCE TO AN ARTICLE BY MR HEATH APPARENTLY DISCERNING THE NEED FOR COMMONWEALTH SUPERVISION, INCLUDING THE POSSIBLE USE OF A COMMONWEALTH FORCE. THE PRESIDENT COMMENTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF USING UK TROOPS. THE QUESTION AROSE WHAT MEASURES WOULD BE ENVISAGED TO ENSURE THAT EG "THE AUXILIARIES" OF SITHOLE AND OTHERS DID NOT DISRUPT THE ELECTIONS. WHILE THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTED THAT THE ISSUES FACING THE CONFERENCE MUST BE TAKEN IN THE ORDER ENVISAGED BY HMG, HE REGARDED IT AS ESSENTIAL THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE SAID AT A VERY EARLY STAGE DURING THE CONFERENCE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT HMG WAS READY TO FACE THIS PROBLEM AND, IDEALLY, HAD CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE RIGHT MOMENT.

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6. EVEN AT THE TIME OF THE ANGLO-US INITIATIVE IT HAD BEEN RECOGNISED THAT SOME MACHINERY TO MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE MUST BE AVAILABLE. THE PRESIDENT STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE OPENING SPEECH AT THE CONFERENCE STATED CLEARLY THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE CEASEFIRE WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN DUE COURSE AND THAT THE MECHANICS WOULD BE CONSIDERED BOTH FOR SUPERVISION OF THE ELECTIONS, AND FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE ELECTORAL OUTCOME AND THE CEASEFIRE. IT WAS ABSOLUTELY VITAL THAT IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR FROM THE OUTSET OF THIS CONFERENCE THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION BY HMG TO SIDESTEP THIS ISSUE. IF THIS WERE NOT MADE CLEAR THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE SUSPICION. EVERYONE RECOGNISED THAT THE MILITARY QUESTION WAS THE MOST SENSITIVE ONE AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT ASSURANCES COULD BE GIVEN THAT IT WOULD BE EXAMINED. (THE PRESIDENT ADDED LATER THAT AN ASSURANCE OF THIS KIND WOULD BE CRUCIAL IN SECURING THE GOODWILL AND CONSTRUCTIVE SUPPORT OF MR NKOMO.) IF NO SUCH ASSURANCES WERE GIVEN, WE COULD BE SURE THE QUESTION WOULD BE RAISED AT THE OUTSET. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SHOW THAT WE HAD SPECIFIC PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR A COMMONWEALTH FORCE ?

7. THE PRESIDENT WAS CLEARLY GREATLY EXERCISED ABOUT THIS ISSUE. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE TIME IT WOULD TAKE TO ASSEMBLE A COMMONWEALTH FORCE, IF THAT IS WHAT HMG ENVISAGED. AT THIS POINT, ENCOURAGED BY MARK CHONA, HE ASKED ME POINT-BLANK WHAT HMG'S PLANS WERE IN THIS REGARD. I SAID HMG WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROBLEM, WHICH HAD UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION, BUT THE FIRST REQUIREMENT WAS TO GET BOTH SIDES TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE PREPARED TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE. THE OBJECT OF MY VISIT HAD BEEN TO EXPLAIN

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AND SECURE HIS SUPPORT FOR THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH AND THE GENERAL PRELIMINARY THINKING OF HMG. THE FACT THAT I WAS NOT ABLE TO GIVE HIM ANY CATEGORIC ASSURANCES ON HOW HMG PROPOSED TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF ENFORCEMENT AND GUARANTEES DID NOT MEAN THAT SERIOUS THOUGHT WAS NOT BEING GIVEN TO THIS SEMICOLON BUT HMG WISHED ABOVE ALL NOT TO HAVE TO PREJUDGE SUCH ISSUES BEFORE THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF THE CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN RESOLVED BY ALL PARTIES.

8. HE SAID THAT HE WAS INCREASINGLY CONSCIOUS OF HOW SHORT WE WERE OF TIME. HE WISHED TO SAY TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE WOULD BE GREATLY HEARTENED IF HE COULD BE PRIVATELY ASSURED THAT SPECIFIC CONTINGENCY PLANS ON THE QUESTION OF SENDING A COMMONWEALTH FORCE WERE BEING CONSIDERED. SUCH A KNOWLEDGE WOULD MAKE ALL THE DIFFERENCE TO HIS CAPACITY TO LEAN ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SINCE HE BELIEVED THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD FOUNDER ON THIS ISSUE ALSO. HE IS SATISFIED THAT MR NKOMO'S PRESENT MOOD IS SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE. BUT HE TOO WILL BE LOOKING TO SEE HOW SERIOUS HMG IS. HE STRESSED AGAIN THAT A FRANK STATEMENT AT THE OUTSET BY HMG AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE RECOGNISING AND DEFINING THE CRITICAL ISSUES, AND ENGAGING TO DISCUSS THEM IN THEIR DUE TIME, WOULD BE CRUCIAL IN CONVINCING NKOMO OF HMG'S GOOD FAITH AND SERIOUS INTENT. SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD LARGELY DISARM NKOMO AND EVEN MUGABE.

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THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN HAVANA

9. REVERTING TO THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE LONDON CONFERENCE IS THE OUTCOME OF THE DECISION OF THE COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES, OF WHICH ZAMBIA IS ONE, TO TRUST HMG AND IS THE EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE TAKING THE PROSPECTS LAID OUT BY HMG SERIOUSLY. IN A REFERENCE TO THE FORTHCOMING NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE IN HAVANA, HE POINTED OUT THAT A NUMBER OF THE COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES WHO HAD BEEN AT LUSAKA WOULD BE THERE IN FORCE. HE BELIEVED THAT ANY RESOLUTIONS PASSED ON RHODESIA WOULD, AS A RESULT, BE CONDITIONAL IE THEY WOULD BE ON THE LINES OF "IF THERE ARE NO RESULTS FROM THE LONDON CONFERENCE, THEN". HE ADDED THAT EVEN OAU MEMBERS OUTSIDE THE COMMONWEALTH HAD SENT HIM MANY POSITIVE MESSAGES ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS MADE AT LUSAKA. THERE WOULD BE A STRONG BODY OF COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS AT HAVANA.

POSSIBLE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

10. THE PRESIDENT WAS CLEARLY GREATLY EXERCISED TO KNOW (EMPHASISING THAT HIS WAS FOR HIS OWN PERSONAL REASSURANCE) WHETHER HMG HAS SPECIFIC CONTINGENCY PROPOSALS TO GUARANTEE THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE AGREED RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE WITHIN RHODESIA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. HE WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO MEET THE PRIME MINISTER IF THIS WERE IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE, BUT EQUALLY CLEARLY HE WISHED TO FEEL THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE MEANINGFUL. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO POSSIBILITIES: HMG COULD EITHER DEAL WITH MARK CHONA IN LONDON (CHONA WILL NOT BE ACCOMPANYING HIM TO HAVANA BUT WILL BE COMING TO LONDON AHEAD OF TIME BEFORE THE LONDON CONFERENCE) OR HE COULD RECEIVE A SECOND VISIT FROM ME AFTER HIS OWN RETURN FROM HAVANA ON /ROUT 9/12 SEPTEMBER. IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT HMG HAD TO SAY EITHER THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF MARK CHONA OR THROUGH A SECOND VISIT

/FROM ...

FROM ME, HE WOULD BE ABLE TO DECIDE WHETHER HE OUGHT TO MAKE A SPECIAL VISIT TO LONDON HIMSELF IN ORDER TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER. IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE VERY MUCH WISHES TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF HER PROPOSED MEETING WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE, BUT WAS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BE SURE THAT HE WOULD THEN LEARN SOMETHING TO HIS ADVANTAGE. HE INDICATED THAT, ARMED WITH SOME SPECIFIC REASSURANCE ON ONE OR BOTH OF THE QUESTIONS ON WHICH HE WAS ANXIOUS, HE WOULD EXERT ALL THE INFLUENCE AT HIS DISPOSAL ON MR NKOMO. (BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF MARK CHOMA, I LAID NO SPECIFIC STRESS ON HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH MR NKOMO AND HE, TOO, SPOKE THROUGHOUT OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT NKOMO WAS MEANT.)

11. THE PRESIDENT, WHO SENT WARM MESSAGES TO "HIS DANCING PARTNER", LEAVES FOR HAVANA ON 29 AUGUST AT 2630 (LOCAL TIME). IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO GIVE HIM SOME INTERIM REPLY, THANKING HIM FOR HIS COMMENTS AND GIVING SOME ENCOURAGEMENT FOR HIS PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING, THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE A USEFUL EFFECT ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE TO HAVANA. MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT HE IS GENUINELY ANXIOUS ABOUT BOTH THE POINTS HE RAISED AND REASSURANCE ON THESE ISSUES IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AT THIS STAGE. HE WAS ALREADY ANXIOUS THAT HE HAD HAD NO PERSONAL MESSAGES SINCE THE LUSAKA CONFERENCE, A SITUATION WHICH HE CLEARLY CONTRASTED WITH THE INVITATION TO PRESIDENT NYERERE.

30 AUG 1979

