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CHGM Bilateral.

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA, MR. JOE CLARK, IN THE CONFERENCE ROOM IN MULUNGUSHI HALL, LUSAKA, ON 2 AUGUST 1979 AT 1820 [as the fourth session of the CHGM ended late, the Prime Minister and Mr. Clark agreed to stay behind in the Conference Room in order to have the bilateral discussion which was to have taken place at Horizon House at 1800]

Present

The Prime Minister
Mr. B.G. Cartledge

Premier Clark
Miss Flora MacDonald

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Outlining her approach to the debate on Southern Africa on the following day, the Prime Minister stressed to Mr. Clark that she could not accept the imposition on the United Kingdom of any conditions for bringing Rhodesia back to independence. Mr. Clark said that there could well be strong pressures during the Conference to force the UK's hand. The Prime Minister made it clear that, both from a political and from a constitutional point of view, it was simply not possible for her to return to London committed to any particular course of action. Mr. Clark agreed.

The Prime Minister gave Mr. Clark a general account of the impressions which she had derived from her bilateral conversations with President Nyerere and President Kaunda. Mr. Clark said that these coincided almost exactly with those which he had from his own discussions. He had found President Nyerere, in particular, very reasonable. The question was, would these attitudes hold during the forthcoming debate? Miss MacDonald said that she thought that they would if the Prime Minister could impress on the Conference a clear sense of direction in UK policy, for example a clear indication of determination to achieve changes in the constitution and to create the conditions in which a ceasefire would be possible. The Prime Minister said that a ceasefire and the withdrawal of support for the terrorists by the Front Line States was absolutely vital. The point had to be made that, given a reasonable constitution for Rhodesia, the Patriotic Front would have nothing to fight against.

Mr. Clark asked whether the Prime Minister had given thought to the participation of the Rhodesians outside the country in the constitutional forms. His own discussions had confirmed that there was considerable

/discontent

discontent with the reserved powers of the whites in the Rhodesian Parliament and with the operation of the Commissions. He thought that the degree of support which could be achieved for a new constitution would depend on the extent to which the Patriotic Front could be involved in the new political process. The Prime Minister said that the Patriotic Front could not be given a right of veto over a constitution which was reasonable in terms of the constitutions which Britain had given to other newly independent countries. Miss MacDonald said that President Kaunda had told the Canadians that Zambia would back, even against the Patriotic Front, a constitution which was genuinely reasonable. Mr. Clark agreed that this was so but asked whether the Front Line Presidents could really deliver.

Mr. Clark went on to say that Canada wanted to be as helpful as possible to the UK in the handling of the Rhodesia issue. He had told the Canadian press that the British Prime Minister would be a model of patient understanding. He had also made it clear to the press that any solution on Rhodesia could only come after, and not during, the CHGM. He had outlined to the press five points which he thought could be the probable elements in a settlement. These were: changes to the existing constitution; participation in a settlement by the Patriotic Front; the departure of Ian Smith, who had become a symbol to the Africans; the means of assuring popular support for a settlement; and guarantees from the Front Line States of a cessation of hostilities. The Prime Minister said that these points really represented the limit to which the UK could go. Miss MacDonald said that it was important that Ian Smith should not be in a key position in the Salisbury Government, even if he were to be elected to Parliament.

The Prime Minister said that the main objections which had been raised on the Commissions under the present constitution were justified. It was, however, relevant that President Kaunda had said in a public interview that if Mr. Smith were to be elected on the basis of a democratic constitution, he would work with him. Mr. Clark agreed and added that President Nyerere had spoken in virtually identical terms.

/Mr. Clark

Mr. Clark went on to say that the real problem would be the Communique. He thought that the debate on the following day should go quite well. Miss MacDonald said that it would be important, during the debate, for the UK to give a sense of direction which could act as a point of reference during the informal discussions over the weekend. Mr. Clark told the Prime Minister that her speech at the opening session had been excellent but that President Kaunda's had been disappointing. He was hopeful that if some progress could be made towards agreement on the Communique during the coming weekend, it might be possible to avoid a continuation of the debate on Monday. It would be important, during Friday's debate, to prevent the discussion from becoming too drawn out, since this would inevitably get into too much detail. Mr. Clark said that he might suggest to Mr. Malcolm Fraser that they should both abstain from intervening in the discussion. Ideally, the UK and the Front Line States should be the only participants.

Mr. Clark made the further point that it would be important, from the point of view of subsequent leverage on the Front Line States, that it should be driven home to them that they, too, had an obligation to create the circumstances for a settlement. President Nyerere had implied in private discussion with him that he would be prepared to send his own troops into Zambia if President Kaunda needed help in dealing with the guerrillas. President Nyerere had also said categorically that, given an acceptable constitution, he would deny asylum to Mugabe.

The Prime Minister agreed with Mr. Clark that the Front Line States had to offer a quid pro quo; and they must also be made to accept that the Patriotic Front did not have a right of veto. Once a constitution had been agreed, the identity of the elected Prime Minister was a matter for the Rhodesians and was nobody else's business. Mr. Clark agreed; he said that it was clearly in Zambia's interest to achieve stability, given the current economic problems. He suggested that the Prime Minister's objective during Friday's debate should be to reassure rather than to rebut. Miss MacDonald commented that it would be difficult for President Nyerere, having spoken in virtually identical terms to at least three or four heads of government, to take an entirely different line during the debate.

The discussion ended at 1850.

B.M.

2 August 1979