

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

(100)  
X-27

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/LR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR D MAITLAND  
MR DAY  
MR ASPIN

**IMMEDIATE**

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET ✓

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
MR R L WADE GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY ) CABINET  
MR GOULTY ) OFFICE  
MR W N WENBAN SMITH )  
DIO )

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D  
HD/S AF D  
HD/PUSD (2)

(Deprec)

HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/WAD  
PS/SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER FMK200A

CONFIDENTIAL

Read in full

FM SALISBURY 271328Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 842 OF 27 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA NAIROBI MAPUTO GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM LUANDA  
LAGOS MONROVIA CAPE TOWN ADDIS ABABA OTTAWA CANBERRA WELLINGTON  
WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK E E C POSTS

MEETING WITH MUGABE

1. MUGABE CALLED ON ME AT MY REQUEST YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND WE HAD ABOUT AN HOUR'S TALK TOGETHER ALONE. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS GENERALLY CONSTRUCTIVE.
2. WE SPOKE FIRST ABOUT THE PROPOSAL THAT 350 OF HIS SOLDIERS SHOULD MOVE INTO A CAMP TO TRAIN WITH RHODESIAN PARTICIPATION. HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE IMPRESSION HAD BEEN GIVEN THAT HE HAD BEEN DRAGGING HIS FEET ON THIS ISSUE FOR IN HIS VIEW HE HADN'T. I REMINDED HIM - AND HE ACCEPTED THE POINT - THAT AT OUR LAST MEETING HE HAD SAID THAT HE WANTED TO CONSIDER FURTHER THE QUESTION OF HIS FORCES EXCHANGING THEIR PRESENT ARMS FOR RHODESIAN WEAPONS. HE HAD ONLY FINALLY LET US KNOW ON 25 FEBRUARY THAT HE AGREED TO THIS.
3. HE WAS KEEN THAT HIS MEN SHOULD BE TREATED AS NEARLY AS POSSIBLE THE SAME AS THE Z I P R A FORCES: IF Z I P R A HAD MOVED 650 MEN INTO TRAINING WHY ONLY 350 OF Z A N L A? I SAID THAT THE DIFFERENCE STEMMED PARTLY FROM THE FACT THAT Z I P R A HAD A FORMED BATAILLION TO MOVE WHICH Z A N L A HAD NOT. HE COULD REST ASSURED THAT THERE WAS NO DESIRE ON OUR PART TO DISCRIMINATE AND THAT THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE WAS TO GET ELEMENTS OF ALL THREE ARMIES TOGETHER: BUT

WAS NO DESIRE ON OUR PART TO DISCRIMINATE AND THAT THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE WAS TO GET ELEMENTS OF ALL THREE ARMIES TOGETHER: BUT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT ROOM AT ESSEXVALE AND SO SOME OTHER CAMP WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND. I SUGGESTED THAT ASSEMBLY POINT BRAVO, WHICH WE WERE INTENDING TO CLOSE DOWN, COULD BE REDESIGNATED AS A TRAINING CAMP AND PROPOSED THAT HE SHOULD HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF MY STAFF TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS. (SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM).

4. I THEN SAID THAT I HOPED VERY MUCH THAT HE WOULD PERSONALLY GO ROUND THE Z A N L A ASSEMBLY AREAS ON SATURDAY AND SUNDAY WITH SENIOR OFFICERS FROM THE RHODESIAN FORCES AND THE MONITORING FORCE. THE OBJECT OF THE VISIT WOULD BE TO INSTIL CONFIDENCE IN THE MEN IN THE ASSEMBLY AREAS AND FOR MUGABE PERSONALLY TO ORDER THEM TO STAY PUT AND TO OBEY ORDERS. HE HESITATED SOMEWHAT BUT FINALLY AGREED WHEN I TOLD HIM THAT NKOMO HAD ALREADY ACCEPTED TO TOUR THE Z I P R A ASSEMBLY POINTS.

5. I ASKED HIM HOW THINGS WERE GOING. HE SAID HE HAD A LOT OF DIFFICULTIES AND THAT LITERALLY THOUSANDS OF HIS MEN HAD BEEN PICKED UP LATELY BY THE POLICE. I SAID THAT THIS WAS A GROSS EXAGGERATION AND THAT INDEED I HAD SEEN THE NUMBER OF 5,000 MENTIONED IN HIS LETTER TO YOU: THIS WAS ONE OF A NUMBER OF INACCURACIES IN THAT LETTER. WE HAD A SHORT DISAGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. I THEN TOLD HIM THAT I WAS MOST DISPLEASED WITH THE INTIMIDATION BY HIS PEOPLE IN THE EAST AND CENTRE OF THE COUNTRY. THOUGH I AGREED THAT THINGS HAD BEEN DONE BY OTHER PEOPLE AS WELL, THE HARD FACT WAS THAT INTIMIDATION BY Z A N L A WAS OF A TOTALLY DIFFERENT ORDER. BUT NEVERTHELESS I THOUGHT IT WAS IN RHODESIA'S INTEREST TO ALLOW THE ELECTIONS TO GO ON WITHOUT ANY MOVE TO PROSCRIBE ANY AREAS, ALTHOUGH I COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT LIGHTLY FORGET WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN THOSE AREAS. HE SAID THAT HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR THAT I WAS NOT GOING TO TAKE ANY ACTION ON PROSCRIPTION. HE AGREED THAT THERE HAD BEEN INTIMIDATION BY HIS PEOPLE BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE ORDER OF INTIMIDATION WAS MUZOREWA FIRST, HIMSELF SECOND AND NKOMO A CLOSE THIRD.

6. MUGABE THEN SAID THAT HE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER THE ELECTIONS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE MOST NATURAL COALITION FOR HIM WOULD BE WITH NKOMO, BUT HIS PRESENT THINKING WAS THAT HE WOULD BE PERFECTLY READY TO INVITE MUZOREWA ALSO AND SOME OF HIS PEOPLE TO JOIN THE GOVERNMENT WITH HIM. THERE WOULD BE A LOT OF CHANGES TO BRING ABOUT BUT HE REALISED THAT THIS SHOULD BE OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. HE KNEW THAT SOME PEOPLE REGARDED HIM AS AN OGRE BUT HE WASN'T. HE DID NOT WANT ANYONE TO FEEL THAT THEY HAD TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, BUT THERE WOULD NEED TO BE, AND BE SEEN TO BE, A GROWING DEGREE OF AFRICANISATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE CIVIL SERVICE. HE HAD MANY ANXIETIES ABOUT HOW HE WAS GOING TO GOVERN IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE FOR HE REALISED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE MANY PEOPLE

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EXPERIENCE OR WITH ADMINISTRATIVE SKILLS AROUND HIM.

7. HE THEN CAME TO WHAT HE SAW AS THE MOST IMPORTANT MATTER AFTER  
THE ELECTIONS, NAMELY THE DATE OF INDEPENDENCE. INDEPENDENCE SHOULD  
NOT BE GRANTED FOR MANY MONTHS AND THE BRITISH GOVERNOR AND HIS  
STAFF SHOULD STAY, CHIEFLY IN ORDER TO GIVE CONFIDENCE TO THE PEOPLE.  
I TOLD HIM THAT THIS WAS NOT IN OUR MINDS AT ALL, NOR DID I SEE  
WHAT ROLE THE GOVERNOR COULD PLAY ONCE THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN  
CHOSEN AND WAS IN THE SADDLE. BUT I PROMISED TO PASS ON HIS VIEWS  
TO H M G. HE ASKED ME HOW LONG I THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE BETWEEN THE  
FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND INDEPENDENCE. I SAID THAT IT SHOULD  
BE COUNTED IN DAYS OR PERHAPS A WEEK, BUT NOT MUCH LONGER. HE SAID  
HE HOPED IT WOULD BE AT LEAST MONTHS.

8. I TOLD HIM FINALLY THAT I WOULD BE WANTING TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH  
HIM FROM NOW ON AND THAT I HOPED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO REACH HIM  
WHENEVER WE WANTED BETWEEN NOW AND AFTER THE ELECTION RESULTS WERE  
KNOWN. HE SAID WE CERTAINLY WOULD.

FCO PASS ALL

SOAMES

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