

OF 600

CONFIDENTIAL

3 - MAY 1982

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 643 OF 3 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

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MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TOLD MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AT THIS AFTERNOON'S CONSULTATIONS THAT HE HAD PRESENTED YOU AND ROCA (ARGENTINA) WITH CERTAIN IDEAS (WHICH HE DID NOT SPECIFY) AND ASKED FOR YOUR COMMENTS IN WRITING BY 5 MAY.
2. MY FIRST INSTINCT LAST NIGHT WAS THAT WE SHOULD BE IN NO HURRY TO RESPOND TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S AIDE MEMOIRE AND THAT WE SHOULD TAKE THE LINE, AS YOU DID WITH HIM, THAT IT WAS FOR THE ARGENTINES TO REPLY FIRST. ON REFLECTION, HOWEVER, I THINK THAT THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGES IN OUR LETTING HIM HAVE A REPLY, IF NOT BY 5 MAY, AT LEAST BY THE END OF THE WEEK. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF DOING SO ARE:
 - (A) WE WOULD CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE DIPLOMATIC PROPRIETIES AND MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS THE ARGENTINES AND NOT WE WHO ARE ADOPTING A NEGATIVE APPROACH TO IDEAS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.
 - (B) OUR REPLY, WHICH WOULD BE CERTAIN TO BECOME PUBLIC SOONER OR LATER, WOULD PROVIDE ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO GET OUR CASE FIRMLY ON RECORD WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE UN MEMBERSHIP AT LARGE.
 - (C) WE COULD INVITE PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO REFINE HIS IDEAS, TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS WE WOULD SET OUT IN OUR REPLY. IF HE TOOK THIS BAIT, HIS INITIATIVE (ALTHOUGH HOPELESS IN REAL TERMS) WOULD REMAIN ALIVE AND DO SOMETHING TO FILL THE DIPLOMATIC VACUUM. I AM CONSCIOUS THAT HAIG WANTS TO KEEP THE UN OUT OF THE ACT: BUT I IMAGINE THAT SIR N HENDERSON COULD PERSUADE HIM THAT IT WAS WORTH CONTINUING TO PLAY BALL WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR IN ORDER TO FORESTALL MORE DAMAGING INITIATIVES BY OTHERS IN THE UN.
3. IF YOU AGREE WITH THE ABOVE, I RECOMMEND THAT, SINCE OUR RESPONSE WOULD BE BOUND TO BECOME PUBLIC AND THE MAIN CONSIDERATIONS IN ITS DRAFTING ARE THEREFORE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ONES, THE FIRST DRAFT SHOULD BE PREPARED IN THE DEPARTMENT. WE COULD THEN OFFER COMMENTS ON ANY POINTS WHICH MIGHT NOT BE APPROPRIATE IN THE UN CONTEXT. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS MIGHT BE INCLUDED:
 - (A) A REMINDER THAT THIS CRISIS HAS ARISEN BECAUSE IT WAS THE ARGENTINES WHO ILLEGALLY USED FORCE TO PROSECUTE A CLAIM THAT WAS UNDER NEGOTIATION:

- (B) AGREEMENT THAT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT SCR 502 BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT DELAY. THIS MEANS ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. AN ASSURANCE THAT THE UK TASK FORCE WOULD DO NOTHING TO IMPEDE THAT WITHDRAWAL.
- (C) AFTER ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL THE UK WOULD LIFT THE EXCLUSION ZONES, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, ETC AND RESUME NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION OF THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE.
- (D) AS REGARDS THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, THE UK TASK FORCE COULD NOT BE WITHDRAWN UNTIL HM GOVERNMENT WAS SATISFIED THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS ENVISAGED INCLUDED ADEQUATE GUARANTEES THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RE-INVASION OF THE ISLANDS. THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD ALSO HAVE TO COVER RESTORATION OF TRADITIONAL ADMINISTRATION TO THE ISLANDS AND PROCEDURES TO ASCERTAIN THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS.
- (E) THE UK IS OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS FOR A ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND IN SUPERVISION OF THE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.
- (F) IT IS THE UK UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SG'S IDEAS RELATE ONLY TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS PROPER AND NOT TO THE DEPENDENCIES.
- (G) THE UK INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REFINE HIS IDEAS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THESE ESSENTIAL POINTS AND WILL BE HAPPY TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON THIS BASIS.

PARSONS

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