

NYFO 006/03


FLASH

E.R

(16)

-2 JUN 1982

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OO PEKING (DESKBY 0301030Z)  
 OO TOKYO (DESKBY 030130Z)  
 DESKBY 031230Z (HAVANA)  
 DESKBY 031300Z (PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN)  
 FM UKMIS NEW YORK 030108Z JUN 82  
 TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 913 OF 2 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, DUBLIN, MADRID, KAMPALA, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW, AMMAN, TOKYO, UKDEL NATO, HAVANA.

YOUR TELNO 492 (NOT TO ALL): FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPORTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY (2 JUNE) THAT HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO NEGOTIATE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE. THE COUNCIL MET FORMALLY AT 2000Z. SPAIN AND PANAMA TABLED A BRIEF DRAFT RESOLUTION SIMPLY CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE. STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY SPAIN, PANAMA, JORDAN, ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, MYSELF, SOVIET UNION, AND CHINA. ALL, EXCEPT MINE AND JORDAN'S WERE PRO-ARGENTINE, IN MOST CASES STRONGLY SO. PANAMA AND SPAIN PRESSED FOR A VOTE TONIGHT. BUT SOME DELEGATIONS NEEDED TIME FOR INSTRUCTIONS AND THE VOTE WILL NOT BE UNTIL 1500Z TOMORROW (3 JUNE). MY RECOMMENDATIONS ARE IN MY FOURTH IFT.

DETAIL

2. I SPOKE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TELNO 492 AT 1445Z TODAY (2 JUNE). HE SAID THAT THIS WAS WHAT HE HAD EXPECTED. HE WOULD NOW SUBMIT HIS REPORT.

3. AT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT 1500Z,

498 AT 1445Z TODAY (2 JUNE). HE SAID THAT THIS WAS WHAT HE HAD EXPECTED. HE WOULD NOW SUBMIT HIS REPORT.

3. AT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT 1 00Z, THE SECRETARY GENERAL READ OUT HIS REPORT. THE TEXT IS IN MIFT (TO YOU AND WASHINGTON ONLY). YOU WILL SEE THAT IT IS A BRIEF AND EVEN-HANDED ACCOUNT OF HIS EFFORTS DURING THE LAST SEVEN DAYS AND IT DOES NOT APPORTION BLAME FOR THEIR FAILURE. HE AFFIRMS HIS READINESS TO REMAIN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES AND TO CONTINUE TO EXERCISE HIS GOOD OFFICES. THE MANDATE HE WAS GIVEN BY SCR 505 THUS REMAINS IN BEING. PANAMA PRESSED FOR AN EARLY FORMAL MEETING AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT 2000Z, BUT PANAMA REPLIED EVASIVELY TO REPEATED QUESTIONS BY THE PRESIDENT (DE NANTEUIL, FRANCE) ABOUT WHAT RESULT HE EXPECTED FROM THE MEETING.

4. DE PINIES (SPAIN) TOLD ME DURING THE LUNCH HOUR THAT HE WAS URGENTLY SEEKING INSTRUCTIONS TO TABLE A SHORT RESOLUTION SIMPLY CALLING FOR A CEASEFIRE AND A FURTHER REPORT FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL WITHIN 72 HOURS. WE TELEPHONED THE DEPARTMENT TO ASK THAT ATTEMPTS BE MADE IN MADRID TO CALL DE PINIES OFF OR AT LEAST CONFUSE THE ISSUE.

5. HOWEVER, WHEN THE COUNCIL ASSEMBLED FOR A FORMAL MEETING AT 2000Z, DE PINIES TOLD ME THAT HE HAD HIS INSTRUCTION AND WAS ABOUT TO TABLE HIS DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT). I TOLD HIM FIRMLY THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO VOTE AGAINST IT. I SAID THE SAME TO MRS KIRKPATRICK (USA) AND TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

I THEN GAVE PLAN X (IE THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MY TELNO 907 - NOT TO ALL) TO DE PINIES AND MRS KIRKPATRICK, EXPLAINING THAT I DID NOT INTEND TO TABLE IT: IT WAS ONLY MEANT TO ILLUSTRATE THE KIND OF CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION WHICH WE COULD SUPPORT. WE SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE COPIES OF PLAN X TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, WITH THE SAME EXPLANATION. THIS TACTIC HAD THE DESIRED EFFECT OF MUDDYING THE WATERS AND RAISING DOUBTS ABOUT THE ADEQUACY OF DE PINIES' DRAFT. DURING THE SUBSEQUENT FORMAL MEETING, AND AFTER ITS CLOSE, THERE WAS MUCH HUDDLING OF DELEGATIONS OVER OUR TEXT.

6. AT THE FORMAL MEETING, THE SECRETARY GENERAL READ OUT HIS REPORT. DE PINIES THEN SPOKE, INTRODUCING HIS DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH SPAIN AND PANAMA WOULD CO-SPONSOR. KAM (PANAMA) FOLLOWED SUIT, WITH LIBERAL REFERENCES TO OUR "ARROGANCE" "INTRANSIGENCE" AND "COLONIAL AGGRESSION". NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) MADE A

AND AFTER HIS CLOSE, THERE WAS MUCH Huddled UP DELEGATIONS OVER OUR TEXT.

6. AT THE FORMAL MEETING, THE SECRETARY GENERAL READ OUT HIS REPORT. DE PEREZ THEN SPOKE, INTRODUCING HIS DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH SPAIN AND PANAMA WOULD CO-SPONSOR. KAM (PANAMA) FOLLOWED SUIT, WITH LIBERAL REFERENCES TO OUR "ARROGANCE" "INTRANSIGENCE" AND "COLONIAL AGGRESSION". NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) MADE A CHARACTERISTICALLY CONFUSED STATEMENT IN WHICH HE SAID THAT SCR 502 SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED BUT ALSO SUPPORTED ANY CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE.

7. ROS (ARGENTINA) SPOKE AT LENGTH. THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD SHOWN THAT THE UK DID NOT INTEND AT ANY TIME TO HEED THE COUNCIL'S APPEALS. ITS ONLY OBJECTIVE WAS TO CONTINUE ITS AGGRESSION, WITH THE INTENTION OF INSTALLING IN THE ISLANDS A MILITARY SYSTEM AS PART OF ITS PLAN TO DOMINATE THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS WERE SIMPLY A MASK. ROS QUOTED VARIOUS STATEMENTS OF YOURS: UPI REPORTS ATTRIBUTING TO BRITISH OFFICIALS THE IDEA OF PERSUADING THE AMERICANS TO ESTABLISH A LARGE AIR AND NAVAL BASE IN THE FALKLANDS: A GUARDIAN ARTICLE ABOUT GIVING THE FALKLANDS THE SAME STATUS AS ASCENSION, AND SO ON. ARGENTINA ON THE OTHER HAND HAD REPLIED PROMPTLY AND POSITIVELY TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS UNDER SCR 505. ROS THEN READ OUT THE ARGENTINE TERMS OF 28 MAY (MY TELNO 884) AND GAVE HIS VERSION OF THE TERMS WE HAD TRANSMITTED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS EVIDENT. IN ITS VIEW, THE COUNCIL OUGHT TO ENDORSE THE RESTORATION OF A COLONIAL SITUATION, PLUS A MILITARY FORCE TO PRESERVE IT. THIS CONFORMED TO THE PATTERN OF THREAT AND AGGRESSION PURSUED BY THE BRITISH SINCE 1833. IT RECALLED GUANTANAMO, DIEGO GARCIA AND ASCENSION. THE COUNCIL SHOULD DEMAND ASSURANCES FROM THE UNITED STATES THAT ITS GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS OFFER TO ESTABLISH A MILITARY BASE IN THE FALKLANDS, ROS THEN READ OUT THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE RIO TREATY POWERS ON 23 MAY. ARGENTINA HOPED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD REFLECT ON IT.

8. CORREA DA COSTA (BRAZIL) THEN MADE A NOTABLY PRO-ARGENTINA SPEECH. BRAZIL HAD MADE SEVERAL EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. IT WAS REGRETTABLE THAT THE UK HAD UNILATERALLY INTERRUPTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS. THE UK HAD NO RIGHT TO TRY UNILATERALLY TO ENFORCE SCR 502. THE COUNCIL SHOULD DEMAND AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, WITH UN PARTICIPATION. IT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR COMPETITION BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS TO BE EXTENDED TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

NO RIGHT TO TRY UNILATERALLY TO ENFORCE SCR 502. THE COUNCIL SHOULD DEMAND AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, WITH UN PARTICIPATION. IT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR COMPETITION BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS TO BE EXTENDED TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

9. I SPOKE NEXT (TEXT IN MY THIRD IFT - FCO, COI AND WASHINGTON ONLY).

10. TROYANOVSKY'S (USSR) STATEMENT WAS VERY SIMILAR TO THE ONE HE MADE ON 22 MAY (MY TELNO 821). HIS ONLY NEW POINT WAS TO EXPLOIT OUR INSISTENCE THAT AMERICAN FORCES WOULD HAVE TO PARTICIPATE IN LONG TERM SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND ACCUSE US OF NEFARIOUS STRATEGIC DESIGNS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

11. DE PINES THEN INTERVENED A SECOND TIME TO COMPLAIN, WITH SOME PASSION, THAT I HAD MISREPRESENTED HIS DRAFT. THE REFERENCE IN THE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH TO THE NEED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PARTS OF SCRS 502 AND 505 MEANT THAT THERE WOULD BE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, AS WELL AS THE OTHER STEPS REQUIRED BY SCR 502. WHAT HE WAS ASKING FOR WAS SIMPLY A CEASEFIRE, WHICH WAS A DIFFERENT CONCEPT FROM THAT OF A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

12. LIN QING (CHINA) SPOKE BRIEFLY IN SUPPORT OF DE PINES' DRAFT. I SPOKE IN RIGHT OF REPLY TO TROYANOVSKY AND ROS SPOKE IN RIGHT OF REPLY TO ME. THERE ENSUED A PROCEDURAL ARGUMENT, IN WHICH SPAIN AND PANAMA PRESSED FOR A VOTE TONIGHT. BUT JAPAN INSISTED ON THE NEED FOR INSTRUCTIONS AND IT WAS FINALLY AGREED TO MEET AGAIN AT 1500Z TOMORROW (3 JUNE) TO VOTE.

13. MY RECOMMENDATIONS ARE IN MY FOURTH IFT.

PARSONS

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
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F2 JUN 1982

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DESKBY 030400Z WASHINGTON  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 030115Z JUN 82  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 914 OF 2 JUNE  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON



MIPT : FALKLANDS

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-  
GENERAL SUBMITTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 2 JUNE

INTERIM REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS)

1. THE PRESENT INTERIM REPORT IS SUBMITTED IN PURSUANCE  
RESOLUTION 505 (1982) WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED AT ITS  
2368TH MEETING ON 26 MAY 1982.  
RESOLUTION 505 REQUESTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO UNDERTAKE A  
RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES, BEARING IN MIND SECURITY COUNCIL  
RESOLUTION 502 (1982) AND THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN HIS STATEMENT  
OF 21 MAY 1982: TO ENTER INTO CONTACT IMMEDIATELY WITH THE PARTIES  
WITH A VIEW TO NEGOTIATING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A  
CEASE-FIRE; AND TO SUBMIT AN INTERIM REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS  
POSSIBLE AND, IN ANY CASE, NOT LATER THAN SEVEN DAYS AFTER THE  
ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION.

2. IN THE AFTERNOON OF 26 MAY, I MET SEPARATELY WITH THE PARTIES  
AND REQUESTED THAT EACH PROVIDE WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS A  
STATEMENT OF THE TERMS IT CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE FOR A CEASE-FIRE.  
IT WAS MY HOPE, AS I EXPLAINED TO THE PARTIES, THAT, ON THE BASIS  
OF THEIR REPLIES, TERMS COULD BE DEVELOPED WHICH WOULD BE  
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE. I INDICATED THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISPATCH  
OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS

STATEMENT OF THE TERMS IT CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE FOR A CEASE-FIRE. IT WAS MY HOPE, AS I EXPLAINED TO THE PARTIES, THAT, ON THE BASIS OF THEIR REPLIES, TERMS COULD BE DEVELOPED WHICH WOULD BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE. I INDICATED THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISPATCH OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF A CEASE-FIRE, AS MENTIONED IN RESOLUTION 535, COULD BE MADE ON SHORT NOTICE, WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. ON 27 MAY, I RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS PROVIDING AN INDICATION OF THE TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR A CEASE-FIRE. ON THE SAME DAY, I RECEIVED A FIRST RESPONSE FROM THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS SUPPLEMENTED ON 28 MAY BY A COMMUNICATION ON THE TERMS FOR A CEASE-FIRE ACCEPTABLE TO ARGENTINA.

4. I HAVE HAD EXTENSIVE EXCHANGES WITH THE PARTIES, INCLUDING CONVERSATIONS BY TELEPHONE WITH THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND WORSHIP OF ARGENTINA. DURING THESE EXCHANGES, WHICH CONTINUED UNTIL THIS MORNING, I EXPLORED VARIOUS APPROACHES IN SEEKING THE DEGREE OF AGREEMENT NECESSARY FOR A CEASE-FIRE.

5. IT IS MY CONSIDERED JUDGEMENT THAT THE POSITION OF THE TWO PARTIES DO NOT OFFER THE POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPING AT THIS TIME FOR A CEASE-FIRE WHICH WOULD BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE GIVEN TO ME BY RESOLUTION 535 (1982), I SHALL NEVERTHELESS MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES IN THE EVENT THAT AN OPPORTUNITY CAN BE FOUND IN WHICH THE EXERCISE OF MY GOOD OFFICES CAN CONTRIBUTE TO BRINGING THIS TRAGIC CRISIS TO AN END.

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22 JUN 1982

NYFO 005/03



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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 030109Z JUNE 82  
 TO FLASH FCO  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 915 OF 2 JUNE  
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON HAVANA DUBLIN MADRID KAMPALA KINSHASA  
 ACCRA PANAMA CITY GEORGETOWN WARSAW AMMAN TOKYO UKDEL NATO PARIS  
 MOSCOW AND PEKING.

MIPT: FALKLANDS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION TABLED BY SPAIN AND PANAMA ON 2 JUNE.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,  
 REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) AND 505 (1982) AND THE NEED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PARTS THEREOF,  
 1. REQUESTS THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE TO CEASE FIRE IMMEDIATELY IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS);  
 2. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO USE SUCH MEANS AS HE MAY DEEM NECESSARY TO VERIFY THE CEASE-FIRE;  
 3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION WITHIN 72 HOURS.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 030110Z JUNE 82  
TO FLASH FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 916 OF 2 JUNE  
AND TO COI  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

MY 3 IPT'S: FALKLANDS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

BEGINS

I PAY TRIBUTE ONCE AGAIN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE EFFORTS HE HAS MADE DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 502 AND 505. THE FACT THAT IT HAS NOT PROVED POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE IS NOT IN ANY WAY THE FAULT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HE HAS AGAIN DISPLAYED THE HIGHEST QUALITIES DEMANDED OF HIS OFFICE.

I HAVE SAID BEFORE, BUT IT CANNOT BE REPEATED TOO OFTEN, THAT THE CURRENT BREACH OF THE PEACE WAS CAUSED BY ARGENTINA. IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH CLOSED THE DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL ON 1 APRIL. IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH REMAINED SILENT IN THE FACE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S APPEAL NOT TO USE FORCE LATER THAT SAME DAY AT THE TWO THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH MEETING OF THIS COUNCIL. IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH THE NEXT MORNING INVADED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. IT WAS AND IS ARGENTINA WHICH HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RESOLUTION 502 WHICH DEMANDED THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE TROOPS. FAR FROM WITHDRAWING THEM, ARGENTINA REINFORCED THEM. IT IS THE UNITED KINGDOM WHICH WAS THE VICTIM OF THE ARGENTINE ACT OF AGGRESSION. IT IS THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS WHO HAVE BEEN VICTIMS OF THE ARGENTINE



WAS AND IS ARGENTINA WHICH HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RESOLUTION 502 WHICH DEMANDED THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE TROOPS. FAR FROM WITHDRAWING THEM, ARGENTINA REINFORCED THEM. IT IS THE UNITED KINGDOM WHICH WAS THE VICTIM OF THE ARGENTINE ACT OF AGGRESSION. IT IS THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS WHO HAVE BEEN VICTIMS OF THE ARGENTINE USE OF FORCE TO OCCUPY THE ISLANDS. I DO NOT PROPOSE NOW, MR PRESIDENT, TO DWELL ON THE TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCES THE ISLANDERS HAVE SUFFERED OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS. REPORTS SO FAR ARE NECESSARILY INCOMPLETE BUT FROM THOSE AREAS WHERE ISLANDERS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TALK FREELY OF THEIR EXPERIENCES UNDER ARGENTINE OCCUPATION, SOME VERY SOMBRE AND DISTURBING FACTS ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE.

I HAVE HAD OCCASION AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS OF THIS COUNCIL TO SET OUT THE UNITED KINGDOM'S POSITION IN DETAIL. I WILL NOT WEARY THE COUNCIL BY REPEATING ALL MY ARGUMENTS, WHICH, I BELIEVE, EFFECTIVELY REFUTED SOME OF THE MORE EXTRAVAGANT DISTORTIONS ADVANCED TODAY BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA. I MUST REPEAT ONCE AGAIN THAT IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH FIRST USED FORCE AND BEGAN THE PRESENT CRISIS. EVERYTHING WE HAVE DONE SINCE HAS BEEN IN EXERCISE OF OUR INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE. WE HAVE NEVER ARGUED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS ASSUMING THE TASK OF EXECUTING THE MANDATE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE TRUE POSITION IS THAT IN THE FACE OF ARGENTINA'S FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF RESOLUTION 502, WE HAVE EXERCISED OUR RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE FOR WHICH NO MANDATE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS REQUIRED BY THE TERMS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. OUR OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN CLEAR. AGGRESSION MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO PAY. PEOPLES MUST NOT BE SUBJUGATED AGAINST THEIR WILL. PEOPLES MUST ENJOY THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. POLITICAL PROBLEMS MUST NOT BE SETTLED BY ARMED FORCE. THESE ARE PRINCIPLES WHICH MY GOVERNMENT HAS NOT BEEN PREPARED TO COMPROMISE. THEY HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH "COLONIALISM" "IMPERIALISM" AND OUTWORN SHIBBOLETHS OF THAT KIND. WHAT CONCEIVABLE REASON COULD MY COUNTRY HAVE FOR WISHING TO ESTABLISH BRITISH OR OTHER MILITARY POWER IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. IF WE HAD HAD SUCH EXTRAORDINARY PRETENSIONS, I SUGGEST TO THE COUNCIL THAT WE WOULD HAVE KEPT A LARGER GARRISON THAN 40 ROYAL MARINES ON THE FALKLANDS BEFORE THE ARGENTINE INVASION. WE HAVE DONE EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER, SHORT OF COMPROMISING THESE PRINCIPLES, TO BRING ABOUT THE PEACEFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CENTRAL ELEMENT SCR 502 - NAMELY UNCONDITIONAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS. THIS HAS NOT PROVED POSSIBLE AND WE HAVE BEEN LEFT WITH NO CHOICE BUT TO DEFEND THESE PRINCIPLES BY OTHER MEANS. WE HAVE NEVER BROKEN OFF OR INTERRUPTED NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE NEGOTIATED FULLY AND IN GOOD FAITH THROUGHOUT THIS LONG PERIOD.

I TURN NOW TO THE RECENT NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE HELD PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF RESOLUTION 505.

AS MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL BEAR IN MIND THIS NEGOTIATION BEING HELD

HAVE BEEN LEFT WITH NO CHOICE BUT TO DEFEND THESE PRINCIPLES BY OTHER MEANS. WE HAVE NEVER BROKEN OFF OR INTERRUPTED NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE NEGOTIATED FULLY AND IN GOOD FAITH THROUGHOUT THIS LONG PERIOD.

I TURN NOW TO THE RECENT NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE HELD PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF RESOLUTION 505. AS MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL RECALL, THIS RESOLUTION REAFFIRMED RESOLUTION 502 BY WHICH THE COUNCIL - AS LONG AGO NOW AS 3 APRIL - DEMANDED THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THE UNITED KINGDOM'S POSITION WAS THAT IT WOULD WELCOME A CEASEFIRE WHICH WAS INSEPARABLY LINKED TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES AND TO THE COMPLETION OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD. THIS POSITION WAS BASED SQUARELY ON RESOLUTION 502.

THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA HAS SET OUT IN FULL THE RESPONSES OF HIS GOVERNMENT DURING THE PAST WEEK. I DO NOT INTEND TO FOLLOW HIM DOWN THAT PARTICULAR ROAD OF CONTROVERSY. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS MAINTAINED A UNIQUE CONFIDENTIALITY ABOUT THE NATURE OF HIS NEGOTIATIONS SINCE THE OUTSET AND EVEN IN THE FACE OF THE STATEMENT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA, I DO NOT INTEND TO BREACH THAT CONFIDENCE. I WOULD ONLY SAY THIS: THAT THE EXPLANATION BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA MAKES CLEAR IN MY JUDGEMENT THAT IF ARGENTINE PRE-CONDITIONS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED, THEY WOULD HAVE LED US BACK INTO THE MORASS OF PROCRASTINATION AND EVASION WHICH MY GOVERNMENT HAS EXPERIENCED ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS OF EXTREMELY INTENSIVE NEGOTIATION. THE PLAIN FACT IS, MR PRESIDENT, THAT UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA CHANGES ITS POSITION IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CONDITIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE DO NOT EXIST. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THE CALL BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVES OF SPAIN AND PANAMA FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO MY DELEGATION. A CEASEFIRE WHICH IS NOT INSEPARABLY LINKED TO AN IMMEDIATE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH RESOLUTION 502 BECAUSE THAT RESOLUTION DEMANDS THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THE CALL FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE WOULD LEAVE ARGENTINE FORCES IN POSITION.

AS I INDICATED EARLIER, THE UNITED KINGDOM IS PERFECTLY PREPARED FOR A CEASEFIRE SO LONG AS IT IS INEXTRICABLY LINKED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEMAND IN RESOLUTION 502 FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. WE HAVE NO WISH TO INFLICT OR SUFFER FURTHER CASUALTIES. WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS HONOURABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEPARTURE OF ARGENTINE FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 502. BUT THE COUNCIL'S DEMAND FOR WITHDRAWAL MUST BE HEEDED. BECAUSE THE CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE CONTAINED IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION READ OUT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF SPAIN DOES NOT LINK THE CEASEFIRE WITH WITHDRAWAL. MY DELEGATION WILL BE OBLIGED TO

ARE READY TO DISCUSS HONOURABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEPARTURE OF ARGENTINE FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 502. BUT THE COUNCIL'S DEMAND FOR WITHDRAWAL MUST BE HEEDED. BECAUSE THE CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE CONTAINED IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION READ OUT BY THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF SPAIN DOES NOT LINK THE CEASEFIRE WITH WITHDRAWAL, MY DELEGATION WILL BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE IT.

A RESOLUTION BETTER FITTED TO THE NEEDS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION WOULD, I SUGGEST, CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

1. A REAFFIRMATION OF RESOLUTIONS 502 AND 505, IN ALL THEIR PARTS.
2. AN EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR HIS CONTINUING EFFORTS TOWARDS PEACEMAKING.
3. A REITERATION OF THE DEMAND IN RESOLUTION 502 FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.
4. A CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE, WHICH WOULD COME INTO EFFECT AS SOON AS WATERTIGHT ARRANGEMENTS EXISTED FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD, IN DIGNITY AND ON AN HONOURABLE BASIS. THESE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, HAVE TO BE AGREED BETWEEN THE MILITARY COMMANDERS OF THE TWO SIDES IN THE ISLANDS.

THESE ARE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION. I COMMEND THEM TO THE COUNCIL. MY DELEGATION COULD SUPPORT SUCH A RESOLUTION.

IN CONCLUSION, MR PRESIDENT, AT RISK OF REPEATING MYSELF, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASISE ONE THING: THE OBJECTIVE OF MY GOVERNMENT IS TO SET FREE THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS FROM ARGENTINE OCCUPATION WHICH BY THEIR OWN DEMOCRATIC DECISION THEY NEVER, NEVER, WANTED. ALL WE WISH TO DO IS TO ENABLE THOSE PEOPLE TO RESUME THEIR PEACEFUL, HARMLESS AND INOFFENSIVE LIVES AND TO MAKE UP THEIR OWN MINDS, IN FREEDOM AND WITHOUT CONSTRAINT, REGARDING THEIR LONG TERM FUTURE. WHEN WE TALK ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FUTURE, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO SHIELD THE ISLANDERS AGAINST ANY THREAT OF RENEWED AGRESSION - THAT IS ALL.

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PARSONS

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NYFO 007/03

(17) Flash

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 030111Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 917 OF 2 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON DUBLIN MADRID KAMPALA KINSHASA ACCRA  
PANAMA CITY GEORGETOWN WARSAW AMMAN TOKYO UKDEL NATO HAVANA  
PARIS MOSCOW AND PEKING.

MY FOUR IPTS: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. SPAIN AND PANAMA WILL PRESS HARD TOMORROW MORNING (3 JUNE) FOR AN IMMEDIATE VOTE ON THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION. THEY CAN COUNT ON SIX AFFIRMATIVE VOTES (CHINA, USSR, POLAND, SPAIN, IRELAND, PANAMA). I THINK WE CAN COUNT ON FIVE NEGATIVE VOTES OR ABSTENTIONS (FRANCE, UK, US, GUYANA, JAPAN).
2. SPAIN/PANAMA THEREFORE HAVE TO GET THREE OUT OF THE FOLLOWING FOUR IN ORDER TO GET THE NECESSARY NINE VOTES TO TURN OUR NEGATIVE VOTE INTO A VETO: JORDAN, TOGO, UGANDA, ZAIRE.
3. IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT PLAN X MAY CREATE A NEGOTIATING SITUATION AND BUY US MORE TIME. WE KNOW THAT IRELAND, GUYANA, UGANDA, FRANCE AND JORDAN ARE IN A HUDDLE TO SEE IF THEY CAN GET A NEGOTIATION STARTED ON THE BASIS OF PLAN X. BUT WE NEED TO PLAN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WE SHALL BE FACING A VOTE ON THE SPANISH DRAFT TOMORROW MORNING.
3. I RECOMMEND THAT THE MOST URGENT LOBBYING SHOULD NOW BE CARRIED OUT IN DUBLIN, KAMPALA, AMMAN, AND KINSHASA. I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT MR CONNOR SHOULD TRY TO GET HOLD OF OTUNNU (UGANDA) AND KAMANDA (ZAIRE), IF POSSIBLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH SINCLAIR (GUYANA), TO TRY TO PERSUADE THOSE CONCERNED NOT TO VOTE FOR THE SPANISH DRAFT. I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT TOKYO SHOULD TAKE ACTION TO ENSURE THAT THE JAPANESE ABSTAIN, AS I BELIEVE THEIR DELEGATION HERE ARE RECOMMENDING. WE HAVE ASKED THE FRENCH TO LOBBY IN LOME (THE TOGOLESE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IS ILL AND IN ANY CASE

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5. AS REGARDS THE FRENCH AND AMERICANS, I AM PRETTY SURE THAT DE NANTEUIL IS RECOMMENDING AN ABSTENTION. HE WILL NEED VERY FIRM INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS TO STAY WITH US. MRS KIRKPATRICK, WHO SPENT THE LATTER PART OF THE AFTERNOON CLOSETED WITH GENERAL MIRET OF PRESIDENT GALTIERI'S STAFF, IS IN A STATE OF AGONY. SHE TOO WILL NEED FIRM INSTRUCTIONS TO DO THE RIGHT THING.

6. FINALLY, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF A HIGH-LEVEL APPROACH COULD BE MADE IN GEORGETOWN TO TRY TO EXTRACT A NEGATIVE VOTE FROM GUYANA.

7. EMERGENCY UNIT: PLEASE REPEAT MY TEL NO 987 (WHICH CONTAINS THE TEXT OF PLAN X) TO ALL POSTS WHICH ARE INSTRUCTED TO LOBBY.

PARSONS

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