



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 June 1980

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Prime Minister

This all seems to have gone smoothly. It may well be that the political discussion (+ the political section & the communiqué) ^{will} ~~may~~ be the most valuable part of the Summit.

Dear Michael,

POLITICAL DISCUSSION AT VENICE

Phd 19/6

1. As foreshadowed in my letter of 6 June, I attended, as the Prime Minister's personal representative, a 7-power meeting called by the Italians in Rome on 16 June to prepare for the proposed political discussions at the Venice Summit. A list of participants is at Annex A. (The American, German, French and British teams were almost the same as for the secret 4-power meeting on the same subject in Paris on 3-4 June.)

2. Timetable This will of course be for the Heads of Government to decide, at their opening breakfast on 22 June. But we agreed in Rome to recommend that, following a morning on economic affairs, political discussion should begin with a working lunch on 22 June attended only by Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers; that this should be followed by an afternoon meeting on political questions, at which the same two-person teams would be joined by one note-taker; and that the day should end with a dinner attended only by the Heads of Government, who might wish on that occasion to pull together both the economic and the political threads of the day's proceedings. That would leave 23 June as a wholly economic day, except that agreement would need to be reached then on the whole communiqué, including its concluding section on political affairs (unless the latter had been disposed of at the end of Sunday's discussion).

3. Documents

- (a) We agreed without amendment on the 'annotated agenda' (Annex B) which had been secretly pre-agreed at the Paris meeting and was before us as a nominally American draft. As you will see, it is now called 'Points of reference for the discussion'.
- (b) We also agreed on a draft passage for the communiqué (Annex C), to follow the main economic section. As planned at Paris, we started with a nominally French draft and agreed a number of small additions already negotiated à quatre. The other 3 delegations (Italians, Japanese and Canadians) did not seem to detect the process of quadripartite 'fixing' and themselves suggested only the most minor of the drafting changes.

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18 JUN 1961



4. The Prime Minister is not of course committed to either of these documents. But I think they would in fact be quite satisfactory from our point of view.

5. Substance Only two fresh points of interest emerged in our discussions:-

(i) The Japanese are nervous about discussing China. Ostensibly, they are content that the subject should be on the agenda (last paragraph of document at Annex B), given that there is no proposal to mention it in the communiqué. In practice, I suspect they may want to keep even private discussion to a minimum. Their representative was discreet about the reasons for his caution. But one can see that one of the great Asian powers might be concerned not to seem^a/least openly to be discussing the other with a gang of foreign devils!

(ii) The Canadians suggested that their Prime Minister was likely to want to raise the subject of 'crisis management' in general, ie lessons for the future from the less-than-brilliant western handling of the Afghan crisis. They read out a list of objectives (Annex D) which M. Trudeau might have in mind for the upshot of the political discussions at Venice. They got little support but did not seem very ready to be discouraged.

6. It was generally agreed that Afghanistan was the special circumstance which called for political discussion in what has hitherto been a purely economic forum; and that the political agenda should therefore be Afghanistan-related. If the Germans still have ambitions to widen things out at Venice they gave little indication of it at Rome; and only made passing reference to Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow.

7. No one mentioned Arab-Israel or the Middle East.

8. Little attention was paid to the three "spare" pieces of communiqué text which had been agreed earlier by the economic preparatory group, which had however suggested that they might be better included in the political section. These concerned terrorism/hostage-taking; hijacking; and refugees. They are annexed to Robert Armstrong's minute to you of 9 June (A 02297). It seemed to be tacitly accepted that the first^{ty} should be excluded from the communiqué but given to the press after the meeting by the Italian chairman, acting explicitly on behalf of all 7 governments. As regards refugees, the Germans pointed out that the proposed text (Annex E) seemed unsatisfactory in two ways. It did nothing to discourage tyrannical governments from solving their internal minority problems at the rest of the world's expense by ruthless expulsion; and it implied too early a commitment by the Seven to pick up the immigrational and financial bill. No decision was taken. But it clearly is an

/unsatisfactory



unsatisfactory result and I suspect that it will now be quietly dropped. In its present form, I can see no British interest in having it included.

9. As before, I have informed Lord Carrington of the position reached and am also copying this letter and its enclosures to Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

Michael

Michael Palliser



PREPARATORY MEETING FOR VENICE SUMMIT
VILLA MADAMA, ROME 16 JUNE 1980

Present

CANADA

Mr Klaus Goldschlag

Deputy Under-Secretary,
Department of External Affairs

Mr J H Taylor

Assistant Under-Secretary.
Department of External Affairs

FRANCE

M. Gabriel Robin

Political Director, MFA

M. Patrick Leclercq

Diplomatic Counsellor, Presidential
Staff

M. Garrigues

Embassy, Rome

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

State Secretary van Well

MFA

Ambassador von Staden

Chancellor's Office

Herr Reinhard Schenk

Head of West European Dept, MFA

ITALY

Signor Walter Gardini

Political Director, MFA

Signor Ramiro Ruggiero

Under Secretary, MFA

Signor Sergio Berlinguer

Diplomatic Counsellor,
Prime Minister's Office

JAPAN

Deputy-Minister Kikuchi

MFA

Mr Donowaki

Deputy Director (Europe)

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir Michael Palliser

Permanent Under Secretary, FCO

Mr Robert Wade-Gery

Cabinet Office

Mr Roger Garside

Planning Staff

UNITED STATES

Mr Warren Christopher

Deputy Secretary of State

Mr George Vest

Assistant Secretary of State (Europe)

Mr Robert Blackwill

National Security Council Staff

- U.S.A. -

(Points of reference
for the discussion)

1. OBJECTIVE: TO RETURN TO A SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT, NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN AT PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, AND TO DETER FURTHER SOVIET AGGRESSIONS.
THIS IMPLIES:

- WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES.,
- A GOVERNMENT BROADLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE.,
- ARRANGEMENTS DESIGNED TO INSURE THAT AFGHANISTAN NEITHER THREATENS NOR IS THREATENED BY ITS NEIGHBORS.

2. ACTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN FIVE MAIN AREAS:

- A) PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION
 - IN THE REGION:
 - BY SUPPORTING AFGHAN RESISTANCE
 - BY DETERRING SOVIET MILITARY ESCALATION IN AFGHANISTAN OR ACROSS ITS BORDERS.
 - DIRECTLY ON THE SOVIET UNION.
- B) PROVISION OF AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL SOLUTION. WE SHOULD CONSIDER INITIATIVES TO BE DISCUSSED WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES.
- C) PREVENTION OF NEW SOVIET INITIATIVES IN THE REGION IN THE FORM OF EITHER SUBVERSION OR OF THE USE OF FORCE, BY STRENGTHENING COUNTRIES THERE AND BY PROVIDING REASSURANCE TO THEM.
- D) ENCOURAGEMENT FOR PARALLEL ACTIONS BY OTHERS, E.G., THE INITIATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND DIRECT SUPPORT GIVEN TO THE RESISTANCE.
- E) DISCOURAGEMENT OF RECOGNITION OF THE BABRÁK KARMAL REGIME THROUGH CONTACTS WITH THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES.

3. IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL AND THE CSCE PROCESS.

4. IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA AND RELATIONS WITH THAT COUNTRY. —

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DRAFT POLITICAL PASSAGES FOR INCLUSION IN THE COMMUNIQUE

1. In defining this global strategy and showing our united determination to make it a reality, we consciously accept the responsibility that falls to the three great industrialised areas of the world - North America, Western Europe and Japan - to help create the conditions for harmonious and sustained economic growth. But we can not do this alone: others too have a part to play.
2. Moreover, present circumstances oblige us to emphasise that our efforts will only bear fruit if we can at the same time preserve a world in which the rule of law is universally obeyed, national independence is respected and world peace is kept. We call on all countries to join us in working for such a world and we welcome the readiness of non-aligned countries and regional groups to accept the responsibilities which this involves.
3. We therefore reaffirm hereby that the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan is unacceptable and that we are determined not to accept it. It is incompatible with the desire of the Afghan people for independence and with the security of the states of the region. It is also incompatible with the principles of the United Nations Charter and with efforts to maintain genuine détente. It undermines the very foundations of peace, both in the region and in the world at large.
4. We fully endorse in this respect the views already expressed by the overwhelming majority of the international community, as set out by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution No ES-6/2 of 14 January 1980 and by the Islamic Conference at both its recent sessions.
5. Afghanistan should be enabled to regain the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character it once enjoyed. We therefore call for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and for the Afghan people to be left free again to determine their own future. Only thus will it be possible to re-establish a situation compatible with peace and the rule of law and thereby with the interests of all nations.



6. We are resolved to do everything in our power to achieve this. We are also ready to support any initiatives to this end, such as that of the Islamic Conference. And we shall support every effort designed to contribute to the political independence and to the security of the states of the region.



CANADIAN PROPOSED ''OBJECTIVES'' OF THE POLITICAL DISCUSSION

- (i) to dispel the perception of division and disarray among the principal Western countries; ✓
- (ii) to put an end to public recrimination between them; ✓
- (iii) to try to reach a reasonable consensus on how we go forward from here; ✓
- (iv) to examine how well we are served by existing processes and mechanisms of consultation; ✓
- (v) to look beyond the present crisis to some general principles of crisis management. ✓

CONFIDENTIAL
STATEMENT ON REFUGEES

ANNEX E

We are acutely conscious of the human suffering caused by the flow of refugees. We pledge ourselves to join with others in supporting refugees and in assisting their resettlement.

We call on those countries that are responsible for the problem to eliminate the causes of this human tragedy.

CONFIDENTIAL

STATEMENT ON HIJACKING

[At the request of the Heads of State and Government who participated in the Summit, I, in my capacity of chairman of the meeting, am pleased to make the following statement which concerns the declaration on air-hijacking issued in Bonn in July 1978.]

The Heads of State and Government expressed their satisfaction at the broad support of the international community for the principles set out in the Bonn Declaration of July 1978 as well as in the international Conventions dealing with unlawful interference with civil aviation. The increasing adherence to these Conventions and the responsible attitude taken by States with respect to air-hijacking reflect the fact that these principles are being accepted by the international community as a whole.

While enforcement measures under the Declaration have not yet been necessary, the Heads of State and Government emphasise that hijacking remains a threat to international civil aviation and that there can be no relaxation of efforts to combat this threat. To this end they look forward to continuing co-operation with all other governments.

CONFIDENTIAL

STATEMENT ON THE TAKING OF DIPLOMATIC HOSTAGES

Gravely concerned by recent incidents of terrorism involving the taking of hostages and attacks on diplomatic and consular premises and personnel, the Heads of State and Government reaffirm their determination to deter and combat such acts. They note the completion of work on the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages and call on all States to consider becoming parties to it as well as to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons of 1973.

The Heads of State and Government vigorously condemn the taking of hostages and the seizure of diplomatic and consular premises and personnel in contravention of the basic norms of international law and practice. They declare that their Governments will also co-operate for the purpose of bringing the perpetrators of such acts to justice. The Heads of State and Government urge all Governments to adopt policies which will contribute to the attainment of this goal and to take appropriate measures to deny terrorists any benefits from such criminal acts. They also resolve to provide to one another's diplomatic and consular missions support and assistance in situations involving the seizure of diplomatic and consular establishments or personnel.

The Heads of State and Government recall that every State has the duty under international law to refrain from organising, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organised activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, and deplore in the strongest terms any breach of this duty.

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