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Mr Male

MRS THATCHER'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN AND INDIA: SEPTEMBER 1976

1. You will be briefing Mrs Thatcher at 11.30 am on 31 August at the House of Commons.

2. You already have copies of the unclassified briefs on Pakistan and India which we have sent to Mrs Thatcher. Further material is attached to this submission, as follows:

- A i) Mrs Thatcher's programmes in Pakistan and India. These arrangements are of course in the hands of host governments, and many details are still tentative.
- B ii) A defensive background brief on immigration, prepared by Migration and Visa Department. We know that Mrs Thatcher will be taking a particular interest in this topic. Posts have been briefed to answer her factual questions fully and frankly, but not to speculate on the implications of their statistics.
- C, D iii) Additional briefing on (a) Pakistan and (b) India. This contains certain sensitive points which are not contained in Mrs Thatcher's written briefing, but which you may wish to make orally to her.

C H Seaward

C H Seaward
South Asian Department

23 August 1976

Thank you. She was interested in immigration, the constitution, poverty, the Emergency. I told her about Jaijai Gandhi. She reminded herself about Nurul Hasan. We must have spent 45 minutes on India and Pakistan.

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IMMIGRATION: DEFENSIVE BRIEF

1. It is clear that Mrs Thatcher is concerned about the number of potential immigrants. See, for example, Col. 1429 of Hansard of 3 August (Appendix A).
2. The department's brief for Mrs Thatcher mentions this year's quota of 5,000 special vouchers. To allow flexibility in the system the Government do not publish details of the allocation which is:

Kenya	2,500
Tanzania	1,000
Malawi	700
India	600
Others	200

(Mrs Thatcher should not be given these figures.)

The number of UKPH and their dependants in India is unknown; guesses range from 25,000 to 45,000 but we should avoid being drawn into the number-guessing game. The number of UKPH in Pakistan is negligible.

3. The numbers of dependants who are, or will be eligible, to come here are never mentioned publicly because no reliable estimates are available. The Home Office view is that the number is finite, although large. This is based on the theory that it is only the dependants of persons settled here on 1 January 1973 who are entitled to come here, plus fiancés and fiancées. As the next generation of immigrants becomes of marriageable age, the theory says, the system of arranged marriages will be favoured less and less. The FCO view is that based on the experience of posts which indicates that the 'pool' of dependants is a 'stream' which will never dry up. First the dependant children are admitted; when they grow up they send for a fiancé(e); the fiancé(e) sends for his dependant relatives (old parents and young brother perhaps) and so on again.

4. Lord Franks, with Mr Mark Carlisle MP, and Mr Sydney Irving MP will be considering whether a register of dependants is a possibility. The Home Office are against such a register because they consider that it would cause more problems than it would solve:

- a) It would be difficult to enforce registration unless a cut-off date with penalties for late registration were imposed.
- b) It might provoke a fear in the immigrant population that new restrictions were in prospect. This could lead to a rush of new applications and might encourage them to register the names of people who had little or no intention to come.
- c) There could be false registrations also of children for whom income tax allowances were being falsely claimed.

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- d) The possibility that the Register might produce a very large and frightening number could provoke the immigrants' organisations to advise their communities not to register.
- e) If the Register were confined to dependants as normally defined (children under 18 and parents over 65) it would not cover fiancé(e)s and spouses of both sexes who may now enter under the Immigration Rules. Nor would it cover parents still under 65 who would in time become eligible. It would thus produce at best a very incomplete and hence misleading picture.
- f) To be effective the Register might need to be kept permanently since additional immigrants are continuously acquiring settled status in the UK and may wish to bring in dependants.
- g) The cost of setting up and administering a Register would be substantial and possibly the money could be better spent on improving the existing machinery.
- h) The Governments of the countries from which immigrants come may well dislike the proposal, notably on the grounds that the large total number of eligible dependants will be revealed. It is also relevant that they are, to a certain degree, sensitive at home about the scale of outward emigration from their countries. The Bangladesh High Commissioner has already expressed to Mr Luard reservations about the proposal.

5. The FCO are prepared to give positive consideration to the idea because:

- a) In the present state of public opinion it seems to be highly desirable to arrive at some figure to show the size of our commitment towards dependants.
- b) The imposition of a deadline would reduce the risk of fraudulent applications and penalties could be imposed (eg relegation to the end of the queue) for those who made false or late claims.
- c) Even if a Register contained only eligible dependants of persons settled here at a specified date and excluded those who might become eligible later on, a reliable figure for the first category would be well worth having.
- d) A realistic figure of the extent of our commitment would be of considerable help to the FCO and our posts in planning workloads. If it could indicate a time limit within which the task might be wound up this might provide a much-needed boost to the morale of staff employed in immigration work.

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- e) Clarification of the problem would help to allay the concern which has been expressed by representatives of the countries of the sub-continent and thus contribute to the maintenance of our good relations with them.
6. When Mrs Thatcher meets Pakistan Ministers she may raise the question of immigration with them and they will probably say that they have offered to help HMG to prevent illegal immigration. The Pakistan Ambassador has recently told the Home Secretary that his government had no wish to encourage illegal immigration and his government's cooperation was at HMG's disposal. This offer was repeated when Mr Luard was visited in July by Mr Niazi, the Pakistan Minister for Religious Affairs, Minority Affairs and Overseas Pakistanis. All our posts have established good working relationships with the local authorities concerned but it would not be satisfactory for us to look to the local governments to verify suspect documentation. This would almost inevitably cause long delays and could also lead to a new form of corruption.
7. Mrs Thatcher may have read Mr Hawley's report on his visit to the sub-continent as this was leaked to Mr Enoch Powell MP who gave a copy to the House of Commons library. A copy is attached at Appendix B.
8. The Home Office is considering changes in the Immigration Rules to prevent marriages contracted merely to circumvent control. The Home Secretary mentioned this in the Opposition Supply Day debate in the House of Commons on 5 July (see Hansard extract attached at Appendix C).
9. Mr Luard has written to Dr Summerskill (see Appendix D) about the priority appointments given to certain categories of applicant at our posts overseas. Mr Luard has proposed that we (a) do away with all priority or (b) put male fiancés in a slower queue. No final decision has yet been taken.
10. The members of the UK-based staff of the Immigration Sections at our posts in the sub-continent are either career Diplomatic Service officers or Immigration Service officers seconded to the Diplomatic Service; there is a mix of each category in each post. The ideal establishment was increased in Dacca (from 5 to 12), Islamabad (14 - 18) and Karachi (1 to 2) in 1974. Because of financial and manpower restraints no further extra staff can be provided. Ministers have told MPs of this frequently.

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PAKISTAN: ADDITIONAL POINTS TO MAKE

a) Mr Bhutto

1. Mr Bhutto is now virtually unchallenged within his party or government. He has a genuine regard for the desires of the electorate and pays lip service to democratic institutions, but his style of government is authoritarian. The continuation of the State of Emergency makes effective opposition impossible. The press is not entirely controlled but has little freedom of manoeuvre.

2. Mr Bhutto represents himself as left wing but the more radical sections of the 1970 PPP Manifesto have been quietly set aside. Power is in the hands of those bureaucrats whom he trusts, and he makes most decisions himself.

3. The army is the only foreseeable alternative government, but they have shown no desire to repeat the experience of 1958-71. Mr Bhutto is on the whole likely to do better for Pakistan than his military predecessors and his handling of relations with India has been a success for Pakistan.

b) Foreign Policy

4. Although the theoretical basis of Pakistan's foreign policy is bilateralism (which may be interpreted as getting on well with everyone) Pakistan realises the importance of US and Western support, and therefore remains a member of CENTO. But Pakistan frequently complains that CENTO provides no guarantee for her against the threat she sees from India and Afghanistan.

c) India

5. Despite the recent improvements in relations Pakistan remains deeply suspicious of India. She is unlikely to admit what we believe to be the case, that India has no intention of attacking her. Pakistan was much concerned by the Indian nuclear explosion of 1974. The needs of a Pakistan nuclear weapons development programme may be a further reason, in addition to the ambitious plans for nuclear

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power generation, for the importance Pakistan attaches to the acquisition of reprocessing facilities. The US Government are anxious to prevent this. We are concerned generally that countries who, like Pakistan, have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty should not acquire the means to embark on a nuclear weapons programme, although we are disposed to be more confident of French assurances of safeguards for the reprocessing plant France has agreed to sell to Pakistan than the Americans are.

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INDIA: ADDITIONAL POINTS TO MAKE

THE STATE OF EMERGENCY

1. We know that the Indian Government continue to be very concerned at the widespread criticism of Mrs Gandhi's emergency measures from the news media and public opinion in Western countries. Western governments have all taken the public line that the Indian Emergency is an internal affair of the Indian Government, in which they have no standing to intervene. But these professions do not satisfy the Indian Government who crave an explicit endorsement of the Emergency, in particular from Britain. Western Ministers who have visited India have been under pressure to express public "understanding" of the Emergency. None has succumbed.
2. At the time of the declaration of a State of Emergency, plans were being made for a visit to India by the Prince of Wales in the autumn of 1975. This visit was postponed, and the announcement issued by Buckingham Palace stated explicitly that this had been done on the advice of the British Government. This news was censored in the Indian press. We know that the postponement still rankles with Mrs Gandhi and the Indian Government.
3. The irritation of the Indian Government at criticism in Western news media has in particular been directed towards the British press and the BBC. This reflects in part a chronic over-sensitivity about British opinion, and in part the fact that the British press circulates in India and is read by the large Indian community in this country, and that the overseas broadcasts of the BBC have a large Indian audience. Mrs Gandhi herself tends to dwell on a catalogue of the alleged misdeeds of the British news media: her memories are inaccurate and are presumably based on tendentious reporting from India House.

DEFENCE SALES

4. We attach importance to indications that India may wish to diversify her sources of supply of defence equipment. We attribute this interest to Sanjay Gandhi, of whom the new Defence Minister, Bansi Lal, is a close associate. Substantial military sales to India

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would of course have a strategic significance as well as welcome commercial implications. A favourable decision on such a deal, which of course lies in the hands of the Indian Government, would be a welcome political gesture and would go some way towards redressing our increasing deficit in trade with India.

MRS GANDHI AND SANJAY

5. Mr Male may wish to give Mrs Thatcher a fuller briefing on Mrs Gandhi and Sanjay than can appear in our written personality notes. We know that Mr Adam Butler (Mrs Thatcher's PPS and a member of her party in India) has spoken to India House, raising the possibility of an encounter with Sanjay.

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