

57

17/2/82

Mr. Luce ✓

PS/Mr Luce

Mr Fearn ✓

Over taken by events

10.50

on 1 March

R3.18/2

FALKLAND ISLANDS AND UNITED STATES

1. Mr Enders, the Assistant Secretary in the State Department responsible for Inter-American Affairs, is leaving Washington for a visit to several South American countries on 28 February. While he is in Argentina, he is certain to be given the Argentine view of the Falklands dispute.
2. Mr Luce has agreed that it would be advisable for Mr Enders to be briefed on the dispute before he leaves Washington. Mr Luce hopes that it may be possible for him to call on Mr Enders either late on 27 February or early on 28 February, following the Anglo-Argentine talks in New York on 26 and 27 February. We are pursuing this with Washington.
3. However, the timing is very tight and it may not prove possible to arrange a meeting. In this event, Mr Luce has agreed that we should ask our Embassy to outline our position to Mr Enders. This is not ideal, as the briefing will have to precede the New York talks, but it is the best alternative. To allow for quick action to be taken I submit two telegrams to Washington drafted on the assumption that a Ministerial meeting will not be possible. If these are approved, I should be grateful if PS/Mr Luce could consult the Department before they are despatched.

Aw 949/325/1		
RECEIVED - SOUTH AMERICA DEPT		
22 FEB 1982		
DESK OFFICER		FILED BY
INDEX	FA	Action Taken
16 February 1982		

P. R. Fearn

P R Fearn
South America Dept

These telegrams should issue only if Mr Luce's current efforts to make a date with Mr Enders fail.

cc PS
PS/PUS
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MCAD

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17/2

Mr Chase 22/2
Mr Zippert 22/2

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The lds can now be ~~destroyed~~. I have

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

Precedence Deskno

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO FEBRUARY 82
RE ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	INFO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES
	10	INFO PORT STANLEY (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR)
	11	INFO UKMIS NEW YORK
	12	FALKLAND ISLANDS
	13	1. There have been reports recently from Argentine sources
	14	claiming US agreement to support the Argentine position on the
	15	Falklands dispute in exchange for Argentine support for US
	16	foreign policy objectives, notably on Central America. We do
	17	not place too much credence on these reports, which seem likely
	18	to be mainly Argentine wishful thinking. But in view of the
	19	tougher line being adopted by the Argentine Government on the
	20	dispute, the disturbing increase in the level of belligerency in
	21	the Argentine press on the issue and the fact that Enders will
///	22	almost certainly be briefed on the Argentine position when he is
///	23	in Buenos Aires in March, we see advantage in getting our view
	24	across to him at an early stage.
	25	2. As you know (telecons Fearn/Renwick), Mr Luce would have

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Catchword

telegram

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File number

Dept

SAMD

Distribution

STANDARD

Drafted by (Block capitals)

SAMD

P R FEARN

NAD

MCAD

Telephone number

SED

233 3760

ESSD

MAED

Authorised for despatch

NEWS DEPT

Additional distribution:

FALKLAND ISLANDS

Comcen reference

Time of despatch

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 liked to brief Enders personally after the Anglo-Argentine talks in New York on 26 and 27 February. But we accept that there will not be time for this before Enders's departure.
 3. We should accordingly be grateful if you could speak to Enders before he leaves on the lines set out in MIFT. Please pass on Mr Luce's regrets that time does not permit a meeting on 27 or 28 February. You should explain that a briefing before the New York talks is not what we would have preferred, but it presents the only means of outlining the position as we see it before Enders leaves for South America.
 4. The purpose of your approach to Enders is not, at this stage at least, to seek American support for our position on the Falklands, although we shall certainly be lobbying for support if the dispute again becomes a live issue at the UN. Our objective ~~at this stage~~ is to explain to the Americans the political and practical difficulties that we face in the dispute and to indicate ~~to the Americans~~ the advantages of deterring any adventurist Argentine action which could lead to a difficult confrontation between the UK and Argentina over the Falklands.
 5. We have restricted the contents of MIFT to the essentials. If you require background, our guidance telegram No 37 of 3 April 1980 remains broadly valid.

CARRINGTON
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OUT TELEGRAM

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IMMEDIATE

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ZCZC 1 ZCZC
 GRS 2 GRS
 CLASS 3 CONFIDENTIAL
 CAVEATS 4
 DESKBY 5
 MFCO 6 FM FCO FEBRUARY 82
 RE.ADD 7 TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
 ELNO 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
 9 INFO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES
 10 INFO PORT STANLEY (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR)
 11 INFO UKMIS NEW YORK
 12 MIPT: FALKLAND ISLANDS
 13 1. The Falkland Islands dispute poses a very difficult
 14 problem for the British Government. We have no doubts about
 15 British sovereignty over the Islands and their Dependencies.
 16 The Islanders are few in number but they are staunchly British.
 17 They have been administered by Britain since 1833 though they
 18 now have a broad degree of self-government. The Islanders do
 19 not want independence. They also firmly reject (as was again
 20 made clear during the Islands elections in 1981) any transfer of
 21 sovereignty to Argentina. They want to remain a dependent
 22 territory under British administration with their present way of
 23 life undisturbed. In our view the Islanders should have the
 24 right to determine their future.
 25 2. The British Government are therefore committed to acting

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Drafted by (Block capitals) P R FEARN		
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 2 only in accordance with the Islanders' wishes on the sovereignty
 3 dispute. The Islanders are our main concern: and there is no
 4 basis to suggestions that we wish to retain sovereignty over the
 5 Islands for economic and strategic reasons. No solution to the
 6 dispute which did not have Islander approval would be approved
 7 by the British Parliament.
 8 3. At the same time, we recognise that the dispute provides an
 9 unwelcome source of tension in the area, prejudices our
 10 relations with Argentina and prevents the development of the
 11 Islands' natural resources. ~~Also,~~ While the dispute continues,
 12 it will not be possible for Islanders to look forward to a
 13 stable and prosperous future. We are therefore resolved to find
 14 a solution to the dispute acceptable to all concerned. That is
 15 why we have held talks with the Argentines over a number of
 16 years. But there has been little progress, and it is difficult
 17 to see how progress can be made while the Argentines' principal
 18 aim remains a full transfer of sovereignty to them.
 19 4. Present indications are that the Argentines under General
 20 Galtieri's more muscular leadership intend to take a tougher
 21 line on the dispute. We hope that the Anglo-Argentine talks in
 22 New York on 26 and 27 February will ensure a prospect of
 23 continued and constructive negotiations. ~~on the dispute.~~ But the
 24 room for manoeuvre is severely circumscribed. If the negotiating
 25 dialogue breaks down, the Argentines may well turn to other more
 26 direct means of exerting pressure. In the first instance this
 27 could take the form of the withdrawal of services, such as air
 28 communications and fuel supplies, on which the Islanders depend.
 29 These will be difficult to replace but not impossible. We would
 30 also expect the Argentines to take the issue again to the UN;
 31 we would hope that the UN would give due weight to the
 32 Islanders' right to self-determination and reject the
 33 Argentines' claim that the issue is simply one of decolonisation.
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2 5. We are however particularly disturbed at a number of
 3 recent reports in the Argentine press, which appear to reflect a
 4 degree of official briefing, which suggest that if negotiations
 5 do not lead to early agreement on a transfer of sovereignty,
 6 Argentina should resort to military action to achieve its aim.
 7 We do not believe that this is the considered view of the
 8 Argentine Government. But it may be closer to the thinking of
 9 some senior members of the armed forces, particularly the navy,
 10 and the Government could in certain circumstances find it
 11 difficult to resist public pressure.

12 6. We expect that the Argentines will raise the question of
 13 the Falklands dispute with Mr Enders. If so, it would be
 14 helpful if he could suggest to them the inadvisability of
 15 raising tensions on this issue. The dispute is a difficult
 16 problem but any lasting solution can only be reached through
 17 peaceful negotiation between the parties concerned. In
 18 particular, whatever international support Argentina may
 19 consider it has for its sovereignty claim, any resort to military
 20 action would be very dangerous. Some press articles have
 21 suggested that the UK would not respond in the event of military
 22 attack: the Argentines should understand that the UK would have
 23 no option but to act in defence of British interests.

24 7. Mr Luce would be happy to discuss the problem further with
 25 Mr Enders at the next opportunity.

27 CARRINGTON

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