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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Henry
Daniel Welch
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DECLASSIFIED

November 6, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *J.A. Baker*

SUBJECT: GULF TRIP

I thought I would give you a status report after the first three stops of my trip. The Emirs of Bahrain and Kuwait as well as King Fahd were all pleased with the message that I brought, anxious to move as quickly as possible, and answered all my questions positively.

Listed below are the questions and answers I posed to the Saudis. These questions are, where appropriate, identical to those posed to the two Emirs, whose answers were similarly positive.

Command and Control

- o The Saudis agreed with the following command and control statement, which was prepared by Defense representatives traveling with me: "Should military operations commence, a joint command as currently exists will continue; However, the commander of the US forces will have final approval authority for planning and coordinating all military operations."
- o The Saudis want to justify this statement by saying it applies only to operations outside the Kingdom, while current arrangements apply to defending the Kingdom. To meet Saudi concerns, I used their line with the press, but the agreed language is obviously broader and they understand that fact.

Multinational Force

- o The Saudis agreed that we will deploy at least another 140,000 troops. I also told them that we would be asking other countries for additional contributions, to keep the force as multinational as possible.

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir
() Classify as () Extend as () Downgrade to
Date 29 Declassify on _____ Reason _____

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Operations

- o If operations commence, the Saudis understand that we will conduct ground and air attacks against targets in both Iraq and Kuwait. The Saudis, like the Bahrainis and Kuwaitis, stressed that they are in this for the long haul.

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Financial Support

- o The Saudis reaffirmed their prior commitments regarding host nation support. The King also specifically agreed that out-of-country transport costs would be covered, which, combined with other payments, will take us to the \$2.5 billion they committed for calendar 1990.
- o At that same time, they clearly understand that we will need to talk about additional financial assistance for us in 1991 if operations commence.
- o I also raised the subject of economic assistance to Eastern Europe, but received no firm commitment from the Saudis. We will follow up by sending someone to work with Chas Freeman and the Saudis on the consequences for Eastern Europe and the importance of assistance for these countries.

Arab Forces

- o Norm Schwarzkopf is concerned about the inability of any Arab force in the Kingdom to conduct sustained military operations because of glaring logistical deficiencies. He has brought this fact to the attention of the Saudis, who agree that a problem exists, and the Saudis have committed to providing additional support for Egyptian, Syrian, and GCC ground forces.
- o In this same vein, I told them our military believes that their ground forces are not ready for military operations. They agreed with this assessment, and said they would work with us to redress the situation.

Political

- o The Saudis agreed with the proposition that we must stand in firm opposition to any suggestion of a partial solution.
- o They said they would help in any way we ask to get Perm Five agreement for a resolution authorizing the use of force against Saddam if he is not out of Kuwait by a time certain, which was stated very generally as around the first of the year.
- o The Saudis agreed that they would broadcast programs to Iraqi troops, and would jam incoming messages to our troops from Iraqi transmitters. However, they said they did not have the equipment they needed for these purposes.

Presidential Trip

- o As requested, I asked if King Fahd were willing to host a GCC meeting on Wednesday, November 21, during your visit to the Kingdom. He said he didn't think the meeting was a good idea, and I decided not to press him.

Afghanistan

- o I briefed the Saudis in general terms on where we stand with the Soviets in developing a joint statement on Afghanistan. The Saudis expressed some concern that moving during the crisis could cause difficulties, both in the Islamic world generally and with their religious conservatives especially, because our agreement would not specifically call for Najibullah's ouster from Kabul. We responded that neither we nor the Resistance could deliver Najib's departure at this point, but that securing a Soviet arms cutoff and a transition mechanism with real power would hasten his demise.

cc: Brent Scowcroft