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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 January 1980

Dear Robin,

CALL BY MR. WARREN CHRISTOPHER

As you know, Mr. Warren Christopher called on the Prime Minister this morning. He was accompanied by the US Ambassador, Mr. Kingman Brewster. Mr. Hurd was also present.

Afghanistan

At the beginning of the meeting, Ambassador Brewster handed over the enclosed message from President Carter to the Prime Minister. Commenting on the letter, Mr. Christopher said that the United States Government needed the help of the British Government on both the punitive and the affirmative aspects of its policy on the Afghan crisis. In regard to the punitive measures, President Carter had taken a number of decisions which were, in domestic political terms, very risky. Mr. Christopher mentioned the grain embargo, the action on the export of high technology and the action on fisheries agreements. The United States hoped that its Allies would produce parallel action. He would be exploring steps that might be taken in London and thereafter in Rome, Brussels and in other capitals. On the affirmative side, Mr. Christopher said that he had just had a good meeting with a Pakistani delegation headed by Agha Shahi. The United States Government would be offering the Pakistan Government \$400 million of new aid. There would be \$200 million worth of economic aid and \$200 million worth of foreign military credits. Half of the aid would be included in the 1980 budget (a supplementary appropriation would be necessary) and half in the 1981 budget.

The Prime Minister said that her views on the Soviet action in Afghanistan were well known. She had been warning for a long time that the Soviet Government were capable of behaving in this way. The Western Allies would now have to work out what could be done. She asked about the United States Government's attitude towards a boycott of the Olympics. She thought that this would have the biggest impact on the people of the Soviet Union. Mr. Christopher commented that there was a ground swell of opinion in the United States in favour of moving the Olympics.

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This was, of course, an issue where governments had to be responsive to public opinion. The Prime Minister agreed and said that the difficulty was that many sportsmen wanted to participate in the Games. It would be much easier to get opinion moving if there was an alternative venue. In any case, an early decision was needed. The British Government had made its views clear on the British Lions tour of South Africa and it would be difficult for it not to take a position on the Olympic Games.

Iran

Mr. Christopher said that President Carter regarded it as important that the objectives of the UN Sanctions Resolution should not be frustrated by the Soviet veto. The United States Government's view was that the Russians had been committed by the 31 December Resolution to permitting the passage of the Sanctions Resolution. A way to impose the sanctions which had been envisaged must now be found. Mr. Christopher said that he was more than ever convinced that sanctions would have an effect in Tehran. The Prime Minister recalled her letter of 10 January to President Carter. There were some things that the British Government could do and some things that they could not do because primary legislation would be required. In reply to a question from Mr. Christopher, the Prime Minister said that it would be out of the question for the Government to seek new legislation at the moment. When Mr. Christopher asked whether it was not open to the Government to take some measures because of Iran's non-compliance with the 31 December Resolution, the Prime Minister said that she would have this looked into. The more that the Allies could do together, the better. When Mr. Christopher asked whether he could tell President Carter that the Prime Minister had said she would do all she could, the Prime Minister cautioned him against trying to read more into her words than was there. There was no point in her making promises until the matter had been looked at in detail. None the less, he could certainly tell the President that what could be done would be done. Mr. Christopher expressed his gratitude and commented on the psychological importance to President Carter of the Prime Minister's support.

I am sending copies of this letter, and its enclosure to John Wiggins (HM Treasury), Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), Bill Burroughs (Department of Energy) and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours truly

Michael Alexander

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.