

[RHODESIA: POLICY: ADVANCE COPIES]

S  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
SIR D MAITLAND  
MR DAY  
~~MR DAY~~  
MR ASPIN

PS/NO 10 ~~DOWNING~~ STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
MR R L WADE GERY )  
MR P M MAXEY ) CABINET  
MR GOULTY ) OFFICE  
MR W N WENBAN SMITH )  
DIO )

.....  
HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D  
HD/S AF D  
~~HD/UND~~  
HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/WAD  
PS/SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

RESIDENT CLERK

*me*  
**IMMEDIATE**

*Read in full.*

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SALISBURY 191910Z FEB 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 724 OF 19 FEBRUARY

INFO PERSONAL FOR HEADS OF MISSION WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

E E C POSTS LAGOS NAIROBI GABORONE LUSAKA CAPE TOWN

RHODESIA: NKOMO'S VIEWS

1. NKOMO CAME TO SEE ME, AS PART OF A ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE LEADING POLITICAL FIGURES, THIS AFTERNOON. WE HAD A GOOD TALK WITH MOST OF THE TIME SPENT REVIEWING THE SITUATION IN THE RUN UP TO THE ELECTIONS.
2. NKOMO SAID THAT HIS PARTY REMAINED UNABLE TO CAMPAIGN IN MUCH OF THE EASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY - VIRTUALLY THE WHOLE OF MANICALAND, THE RURAL AREAS OF MASHONALAND EAST AND A LARGE PART OF VICTORIA PROVINCE. HE DESCRIBED THE DIFFICULTIES HIS CAMPAIGN HAD ENCOUNTERED AND THE ABDUCTION AND MURDER OF SOME PARTY WORKERS AND OFFICIALS.
3. I ASKED NKOMO WHAT HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT THIS SITUATION. I EXPLAINED THE VERY GREAT DIFFICULTY OF TAKING CERTAIN KINDS OF ACTION TO CORRECT IT. NKOMO SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD INITIALLY BEEN AGAINST THE IDEA OF DECLARING THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES FAIR ELECTIONS COULD NOT BE HELD IN CERTAIN AREAS, HE COULD NOW SEE LITTLE ALTERNATIVE TO THIS. WE AGREED THAT THE WORST AFFECTED AREAS WERE THE RUSHINGA/RUDZI REGION IN THE NORTH-EAST; THE BUHERA/MARANKE



REGION IN MANICALAND; AND THE BELINGWE AREA OF MIDLANDS/VICTORIA PROVINCE. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT I HAD AS YET TAKEN NO DECISION AS TO ACTION THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN TO CORRECT THE EFFECTS OF INTIMIDATION. ANY SUCH ACTION WOULD HAVE TO BE VERY LIMITED IN SCOPE. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT OVER 90 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION SHOULD BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS ON THE DATES PROPOSED. ANOTHER METHOD MIGHT BE TO POSTPONE THE ELECTIONS IN THE WORST AFFECTED AREAS. EVEN ACTION OF THIS KIND WOULD ATTRACT SEVERE INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM. HOW MUCH SUPPORT COULD WE COUNT ON FROM HIM?

4. NKOMO SAID THAT AT LANCASTER HOUSE I HAD BEEN GIVEN FULL POWERS TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION. IT WAS BRITAIN'S RESPONSIBILITY TO DO SO. HE HAD DRAWN THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE COUNTRY TO MY ATTENTION. IT WAS NECESSARY TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT. IF WE DID HE WOULD NOT MAKE A PUBLIC DECLARATION OF SUPPORT; BUT HE WOULD CERTAINLY NOT CRITICISE THE ACTION WE TOOK. HIS POSITION WOULD BE WELL ENOUGH UNDERSTOOD ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA.

5. I SAID THAT WE WERE BY NO MEANS SURE THAT HIS POSITION WAS WELL ENOUGH UNDERSTOOD ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA. NKOMO SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA. AT OUR INSISTENCE HE AGREED TO SEND A MESSAGE (POSSIBLY THROUGH A PERSONAL EMISSARY) TO PRESIDENT SHAGARI. I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF HE COULD SAY PUBLICLY THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE ACTION TO CORRECT THE EFFECTS OF INTIMIDATION, AND TO SAY AGAIN - AS HE HAS ALREADY DONE - THAT THERE ARE VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY IN WHICH HE IS COMPLETELY UNABLE TO CAMPAIGN.

6. I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT, IF THE RESULT LOOKED LIKE BEING A TOLERABLE ONE, IT WOULD IDEALLY BE BEST TO DO NOTHING. APART FROM THE GENERAL INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS THERE WAS A DANGER THAT ANY ACTION WOULD PUSH Z A N L A OUT OF THE ASSEMBLY PLACES; AND POSSIBLY PUSH MOZAMBIQUE BACK INTO SUPPORT FOR MUGABE. NKOMO'S LINE WAS THAT IF HE WAS IN THE GOVERNMENT HE WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION. HE WOULD HIMSELF BE TRYING TO TELL PRESIDENT MACHEL WHAT WAS HAPPENING. IF WE TOOK NO ACTION, HOW COULD WE SAY THAT THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE FAIR? HE HAD MADE HIS POSITION CLEAR TO THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS. I SAID THAT I HAD LITTLE FAITH IN THEM, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE FACT THAT NKOMO CONTINUED TO BANG ON TO THEM ABOUT THE MISDEEDS OF THE AUXILIARIES WHICH, HE WELL KNEW, WERE ON A VERY MUCH SMALLER SCALE.

7. I THEN DISCUSSED HOW NKOMO SAW THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT. HE CLEARLY HOPES THAT HE WILL BE PRIME MINISTER. HE WOULD WISH TO FORM A COALITION WITH TWO OF THE OTHER THREE AFRICAN PARTIES WHOM HE EXPECTS TO GET ANY SEATS (MUZOREWA, MUGABE AND SITHOLE) AND WITH THE WHITES. HE SEEMS PSYCHOLOGICALLY ADJUSTED AT THE PRESENT TO THE FACT THAT HE MAY BE INVOLVED IN TRYING TO FORM AN ANTI-MUGABE COALITION (THOUGH POSSIBLY WITH SOME Z A N U (P F) ELEMENTS IN IT). THIS IS OBVIOUSLY, COULD CHANGE WITH EXTERNAL PRESSURE OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTS. BUT AT



COULD CHANGE WITH EXTERNAL PRESSURE OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTS. BUT AT THE MOMENT HE IS VERY BITTER ABOUT THE TREATMENT HEATED OUT TO HIM BY MUGABE. HE MUST ALSO FEAR THAT HE MAY GET FEWER SEATS THAN MUGABE DUE - HE GENUINELY BELIEVES - IN GREAT PART TO INTIMIDATION.

8. IN A SEPARATE MEETING WITH GENERAL ACLAND AND RENWICK, NKOMO TRIED TO FIND AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD ENABLE HIM TO BRING SOME Z I P R A TROOPSE INTO TRAINING AT ESSEXVALE NEAR BULAWAYO. HE WOULD WANT THE OFFER TO BE MADE JOINTLY TO Z I P R A AND Z A N L A: BUT IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD START WITH Z I P R A. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER HE WILL NOW BE PREPARED TO GIVE CLEAR ORDERS TO DABENGWA TO PUT THIS INTO EFFECT.

9. MUZOREWA SENT ME A MESSAGE THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT, ALTHOUGH HIS CAMPAIGN WAS MOVING FORWARD IN CERTAIN AREAS, HE WISHED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WERE OTHER AREAS IN WHICH HE SIMPLY COULD NOT CAMPAIGN AT ALL (THE AREAS IN QUESTION ARE THOSE DISCUSSED WITH NKOMO). IT WAS FOR ME TO DECIDE THE EXTENT OF ANY ACTION WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN AND ITS CHARACTER. BUT IF NO ACTION WERE TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE EFFECTS OF INTIMIDATION, HE WOULD NOT REGARD THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS AS FAIR.

10 WE ARE NOW IN THE DIFFICULT POSITION OF HAVING MUZOREWA AND ALL THE OTHER PARTIES PRESSING US OPENLY TO TAKE ACTION TO CORRECT THE EFFECTS OF INTIMIDATION BY MUGABE: AND NKOMO EXPRESSING HIMSELF EQUALLY STRONGLY, BUT PRIVATELY, IN THE SAME SENSE. I SHALL BE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT THE OPTIONS NOW OPEN TO US. THE DIFFICULTIES OF ANY POSITIVE ACTION TO ADJUST THE SITUATION ARE OBVIOUS IN TERMS OF THE LIKELY REACTIONS ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA AND ON THE PART OF MANY OF THE OBSERVERS, AND THE RISK OF REACTION BY MUGABE. WE MUST HOWEVER ALSO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NO LESS SERIOUS DANGER THAT IF NO ACTION IS TAKEN THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE ACCEPTED BY NKOMO, MUZOREWA OR THE WHITES.

11. I REGARD NKOMO'S POSITION AS THE KEY. HE SAID HIMSELF THAT WE SURELY REALISED THAT IF HE ENDED UP IN THE GOVERNMENT, IT WOULD GAIN INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION. THERE WAS NO DESIRE WHATEVER ON THE PART OF ZAMBIA OR BOTSWANA TO GO BACK TO THE WAR. IF WE CAN KEEP NKOMO WITH US I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS INDEED THE KEY TO OUR ABILITY TO FORM A WIDER COALITION HERE, LEADING TO THE DE-ESCALATION OF THE WAR: AND TO OUR ABILITY TO GAIN A MEASURE OF INTERNATIONAL ACQUIESCENCE (AND WE HAVE NEVER REALLY BEEN ABLE TO HOPE FOR MORE THAN THAT) IN THE OUTCOME.

12. IN SHORT - THERE ARE OBVIOUS RISKS IN TAKING ANY ACTION VIS-A-VIS MUGABE: BUT THERE IS A REAL DANGER ALSO OF LOSING THE SUPPORT OF THE OTHER SIGNIFICANT FIGURES PLUS THE RHODESIAN MILITARY COMMANDERS IF NOTHING IS DONE.

IT IS A FAIR OLD DILEMMA AND I SHALL BE LENDING ALL MY ATTENTION TO THIS PROBLEM OVER THE NEXT FOUR DAYS WITH A VIEW TO SENDING YOU MY RECOMMENDATIONS AT THE WEEK-END.



IT IS A FAIR OLD DILEMMA AND I SHALL BE LEADING ALL MY ATTENTION  
TO THIS PROBLEM OVER THE NEXT FOUR DAYS WITH A VIEW TO SENDING  
YOU MY RECOMMENDATIONS AT THE WEEK-END.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SPEAKING TO YOU ON THE TELEPHONE WHEN YOU'RE  
BACK FROM ROME.

FCO PASS ALL

SOAMES

NNNN