MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: Sunday, October 12, 1986
Time: 10:00 am - 1:35 pm
Place: Hofdi House, Reykjavik

Participants

US Side

The President
Secretary Schultz
Mr. Parris
Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

Soviet Side

The General Secretary
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Mr. Uspenskiy
Mr. Paleschenky (Interpreter)

Gorbachev opened the discussion with a quip: the Bible said that first had come the first day, then the second, etc. The two leaders were now on their second day; there was still a long way before the seventh. The President said that the two should be resting. Gorbachev agreed, as it was Sunday.

Gorbachev suggested that the session begin with a review of the progress achieved by the two groups which had met throughout the night before on arms control and non-arms control issues. After Gorbachev declined the opportunity to speak first, the President gave his assessment.

The President said that, with a few exceptions, he was disappointed with what had been achieved by the arms control group. With respect to START, the President understood that the sides were able to come to substantial agreement -- with give and take on both sides. Of course, there had been substantial work in this area, which had developed a sizeable amount of common ground. It was the President's understanding that the working group had been able to agree on a formulation for the outlines of a 50% reduction of strategic arsenals that should move the negotiations substantially ahead. Both sides should be proud of this achievement.

On INF, the President understood that the sides had discussed a number of issues, including SRINF, the duration of an interim agreement, and verification, and that they had come to the conclusion that these issues could be handled in negotiations. But the group had not been able to solve the issue of reductions of LRINF missiles in Asia. The last issue
had been discussed at great length. The question was now fairly simple, not technical at all. We had made clear since the time of our initial zero-zero proposal -- a proposal to eliminate all of the class of LRINF missiles, worldwide -- that we required a global agreement. This was thus not a new issue for us. It was an issue that we could no longer ignore if we were to make progress. The President said he could not and would not accept a situation in which sizeable reductions in Europe, even to zero, were not matched by proportional reductions in Asia. The Soviets knew the reasons for this -- the mobility of the SS-20 and the impact such a shift in the balance of SS-20's to Asia would have on our Asian allies. These were not new arguments. However, they were real concerns to the President. Our allies in both Europe and Asia fully supported this position. Our allies in both Europe and Asia fully supported this position, in fact they insisted upon it for their own security.

The President reminded Gorbachev that, in his most recent letter, Gorbachev had written that, with regard to Soviet systems in Asia, "a mutually acceptable formula can be found and I am ready to propose one, provided there is a certainty that a willingness can be found to resolve the issue of medium range missiles in Europe does exist." This issue, the President continued, must be dealt with on a global basis. The President had felt he and Gorbachev had agreed to pursue an interim, global agreement. They had agreed on an interim INF agreement, with equal ceilings on U.S. and Soviet LRINF warheads on each side of Europe, and an equal ceiling on U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles worldwide. We could accept the Soviet idea of 100 in Europe, if other elements could be worked out. The Soviets had proposed 100 warheads on each side in Europe. If agreement were reached on other aspects of an interim agreement, we would have no problem with that number.

The U.S. had long called for proportional reductions in Asia. If we reduced to 100 warheads in Europe, and reduced Asian systems in the same proportion, the Asian ceiling would come out to something like 63. 100 in Europe/100 in Asia was acceptable. In the right context, we could accept 100 in Europe and 100 in Asia. The President suggested he and Gorbachev settle now on 100/100 and instruct our negotiators to work out details.

Gorbachev interrupted briefly to clarify that the President's proposal was for 100 LRINF warheads each for the U.S. and Soviet Union in Europe and an additional 100 for the Soviet Union in Asia. The President explained that the U.S., under its proposal, would also have the right to deploy an
additional 100 warheads on a global basis. In response to a question, the President confirmed that those 100 would be based on U.S. territory.

On defense and space, the President felt he and Gorbachev recognized the basic differences in the two sides' approaches. For his part, the President recognized that Gorbachev at this point was not prepared to agree with him; but the President was not prepared to move from the course that he believed correct. Recognizing this, the President proposed that he and Gorbachev instruct their negotiators to focus on what the President felt to be three critical issues. Of the three, the U.S. believed that only the first two deserved immediate attention, but recognized Soviet concerns about the third and included it to respond to those concerns. The questions were:

-- First, how could activities with respect to the investigation of strategic defenses be synchronized with our shared goals of eliminating ballistic missiles?

-- Second, what should the conditions and timeframe be for increased reliance on strategic defenses?

-- Third, until these conditions are met, what common understanding might be reached on activities under the ABM Treaty on advanced strategic defenses?

At a minimum, the President asked, could the two sides not agree to instruct our negotiators to address these three questions in the hope of using them to move our positions closer together?

Moving to the question of nuclear testing, the President said that here, too, he had been disappointed with the outcome of the previous evening's efforts. He could only hope that that outcome had reflected a simple lack of imagination on the part of one or the other side's representatives.

The President noted that there was agreement in principle on the fact of immediate negotiations, on the agenda, on the order of subjects, and on the ultimate outcome. The President understood, however, that the sides could not get agreement because of an argument on how these negotiations should be characterized. He proposed that the two sides simply record that they agreed to immediate negotiations on testing issues. We were prepared to note that the ultimate objective, which we believed could be reached in association with the elimination of all nuclear weapons, was the cessation of all testing.
We both agreed that the first order of business should be the resolution of the remaining verification issues associated with existing treaties. With this agreement, it was possible to get started and characterize the negotiations in a way which met both sides' needs. But we had to agree on agenda and priority. Was it not possible for the two leaders to instruct their ministers to sort out the language quickly and record this agreement in suitable fashion.

In response to a question by Gorbachev as to what language the U.S. proposed with respect to testing, the President read from a paper prepared by the U.S. arms control working group the night before.

"The U.S. and Soviet Union will begin negotiations on nuclear testing. The agenda for these negotiations will first be to resolve remaining verification issues associated with existing treaties. With this resolved, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. will immediately proceed, in parallel with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, to address further step-by-step limitations on testing, leading ultimately to the elimination of nuclear testing."

Gorbachev indicated that the U.S. position was not clear to him.

Turning to the work of the second working group, which had addressed non-arms control matters, the President said that its participants had done a fine job. Their breakthrough on nuclear fusion was particularly commendable.

Gorbachev asked to give an initial reaction to the President's presentation, and to ask a few questions regarding the points the President had covered.

Referring to the President's expression of disappointment with the results of the arms control working group, despite the fact that it had labored for ten hours, Gorbachev said he had also been very disappointed. The Soviets felt the proposals they had brought to Reykjavik had been highly constructive in spirit -- and not just in philosophical terms. They had made real concessions to the U.S in a number of negotiations and had sought to establish conditions for reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. But they had found that, instead of seeking as they had to give an impulse to the discussions, the U.S. was trying to drag things backward.
As Gorbachev had said previously, the Geneva negotiations prior to the current meeting had reached an impasse. New approaches were needed, as were political will and an ability to think in broad terms, to escape this dead-end. The Soviets had crafted their proposals with this in mind. They had expected the same from the Americans.

It was possible to record some areas of agreement, e.g., with respect to strategic systems. Both sides had agreed to reduce by 50% all components in this category, both as to warheads and delivery vehicles.

INF was an issue over which the two sides had struggled for a long time. The problems were particularly difficult because they involved not just the two countries directly concerned, but their respective allies as well. The Soviets felt that their current position satisfied all U.S. concerns: Moscow had agreed to put aside consideration of UK/French systems; it had agreed that the problem of shorter range systems existed, and had agreed to freeze and to enter into negotiations on such systems. As for Asian systems, they bore no relation to the problem of reducing INF in Europe. Nonetheless, as the U.S. had insisted on linking European systems with those in Asia, the Soviets were willing to take Asian systems into account.

Gorbachev said he had developed the impression that the President and his administration's approach to arms control proceeded from the false impression that the Soviet Union was more interested in nuclear disarmament than the U.S. Perhaps the U.S. felt it could use such leverage to force the Soviet Union to capitulate in certain areas. This was a dangerous illusion. Such a scenario could never occur.

The President had mentioned the possibility of an interim INF agreement, Gorbachev continued. The Soviet Union could not accept such an interim solution. It was not interested in palliatives or make-shift solutions. But if the question of Asian systems could be resolved -- not just put into the negotiations, but dealt with in specific terms -- the U.S. could agree to zero systems in Europe and some sort of equal number in Asia. Was this a correct understanding of the American position?

The President described the U.S. view of the problem posed by Soviet SS-20's. As these weapons were mobile, they could be viewed as in two categories (i.e. for use in either Asia or Europe). If the Soviets were left with 100 systems in Asia after the U.S. had withdrawn its own LRINF deterrent from
Europe, the Soviets would gain an enormous advantage. This would pose great difficulties for U.S. relations with its friends in Europe, countries with which the Soviet Union was also seeking to improve relations. In response to Gorbachev's interruption that it was clear nothing would come of this discussion, the President invited the General Secretary to make some suggestions of his own.

Gorbachev complained that the President appeared to have forgotten that the Soviets had already agreed to leave out UK/French systems -- a major concern. How, Gorbachev asked, could the President speak of a zero solution in Europe when the Soviets would be obliged to eliminate their INF, while U.S. allies would retain their nuclear forces. Even though American allies were integrated into a common military structure, the Soviets were prepared not to count these systems in order to reach an INF agreement. With respect to the possibility that Soviet systems in Asia could be moved westward, the subject should not even be discussed at the President's and Gorbachev's level. Any agreement to include Asian systems would be verifiable; if there were a single fact of Asian systems being redeployed, it could be made to nullify the agreement. Thus, the concerns the President had raised were not serious. If he did not want an agreement, he should say so. Otherwise, neither leader should waste his time.

The President said we did not see UK and French nuclear weapons as part of NATO. The governments of those countries had made clear their deterrents were for their own defense. If the FRG, for example, were attacked, these systems would not be used. In any case, Soviet central systems were an adequate counter to such systems.

Gorbachev inquired why, given the concern the President had expressed about the FRG, the Soviets should be any less concerned about the defense of the GDR or other Warsaw Pact allies. As for UK systems, when Gorbachev had been in Britain, he had recalled to Mrs. Thatcher a published letter from her to SACEUR. The letter had expressed gratitude for U.S. assistance in modernizing the British nuclear deterrent, and had noted pointedly that these modernized forces would make the Soviets sit up and take notice. Gorbachev had explained to her that this was precisely what he had done, so she had no reason to be displeased.

More seriously, he continued, the two leaders were not at a press conference. They both knew the facts, so there was no reason to speak in banalities. The Soviets knew what the situation was with respect to the integration of UK forces; they even knew how targetting had been integrated. The
importance of the topic the two leaders were discussing made it necessary that they speak frankly.

The President pointed out that, in fact, the Soviet Union and United States were the only two real nuclear powers. Other countries having nuclear weapons had them basically in a defensive mode. The President envisioned that, if the U.S. and Soviet Union were to start the process of reducing their own nuclear forces to zero, and would stand shoulder-to-shoulder in telling other nations that they must eliminate their own nuclear weapons, it would be hard to think of a country that would not do so.

Gorbachev agreed. He felt, in fact, that the present chance might be the only one in this respect. Gorbachev had not been in a position a year ago, to say nothing of two or three years ago, to make the kind of proposals he was not making. He might not be able to make the same proposals in a year or so. Time passed; things changed. Reykjavik would be simply a memory.

The President remarked that the two were in the same situation in this respect. But if one were soon to be without authority, it was all the more important to use the time available to contribute something to the world -- to free the world from the nuclear threat.

Gorbachev said that the proposals he had brought to Reykjavik left his own conscience clear. He could look the President in the eye and say that, if it were impossible to reach agreements, it was all right. But the situation in Geneva had been marking time, and no agreements had been in sight. Now the U.S. did not appear to feel obliged to take Soviet concerns into account, while the Soviets had met American concerns. Could the two leaders not agree as follows: U.S. and Soviet INF would be eliminated from Europe; UK/French systems would be left aside; there would be a freeze and subsequent negotiations on short range systems; and the Soviets would be willing to find a solution to the problem of Asian systems.

In response to the President's invitation to describe in greater detail what the Soviets had in mind for Asian systems, Gorbachev elaborated on the proposals he had just made. U.S. and Soviet systems would be eliminated from Europe. UK/French systems would not be counted. There would be a freeze and subsequent negotiations on shorter range systems. In Asia, the Soviets would accept the U.S. formula that there be 100 warheads on Soviet systems, and the U.S. 100 warheads on its territory. The Soviets would accept this even though it would
require time to reduce several times, by an order of magnitude that Gorbachev could not even compute. As the U.S. insisted on posing ultimata and as the President was unwilling to make proposals of his own, the Soviet Union would accept this. After a prompt from Shevardnadze, Gorbachev added that this concession would be made despite the U.S. build-up in the Pacific basin. This should show how serious the Soviet Union was to reach agreements.

The President said he agreed to the proposal Gorbachev had described.

Gorbachev said that was good. He then asked when the U.S. would start making concessions of its own. The two leaders had gone through half the agenda and there had been no movement from the U.S side. The next issue would be the test of the U.S.'s readiness to meet the Soviets half way.

Prefacing his remarks on the ABM Treaty, Gorbachev recalled that the two sides had agreed in principle to reduce strategic forces by 50%. Agreement had also been reached on eliminating LRINF from Europe; on freezing and subsequently starting up negotiations on shorter range INF; and on 100 Soviet warheads in Asia, with the U.S. to have the right to the same number on its territory. These were unprecedented steps. They required responsible further steps in the implementation phase. This raised the question of verification, an issue which now became acute. The U.S. would find that the Soviets would be more vigorous than the U.S. in insisting on stringent verification requirements as the two countries entered the stage of effective disarmament. If it proved impossible to agree on such provisions, it would be impossible to reduce strategic and intermediate range weapons.

With respect to the ABM Treaty, Gorbachev expressed his conviction that nothing should be allowed to "shake" the ABM regime or confidence in an ABM Treaty of unlimited duration as deep reductions began to be implemented in strategic weapons. Gorbachev felt the President could agree to this proposition. As Gorbachev had said the day before, but would repeat, once one decided to reduce nuclear arms, one had to be certain that one side could not act behind the back of the other. So it was necessary to strengthen the ABM regime. The Soviet proposal for a ten year commitment not to withdraw from the Treaty would be a step forward toward strengthening the ABM regime.

In preparing their position, the Soviets had taken into account the President's attachment to the SDI program. Thus, under the ten-year pledge, SDI-related research in laboratories
would not be banned. This was not a strict limitation on SDI. The Soviets knew where the program stood. The U.S. had scored breakthroughs in one or two areas. Moscow knew which they were. But ten years would enable the two sides to solve the problems of reducing nuclear weapons, and so was necessary. The type of arrangement he was proposing, Gorbachev reiterated, would pose neither political, practical nor technical impediments to the President’s program.

The President replied that the U.S. had no intention of violating the ABM Treaty. It had never done so, even though, as the Soviets knew, it believed the Soviet Union had itself done more than was permitted by the Treaty.

With respect the SDI, the President recalled that he had made a pledge to the American people that SDI would contribute to disarmament and peace, and not be an offensive weapon. He could not retreat from that pledge. The U.S. had proposed a binding Treaty which would provide for the sharing of research which demonstrated a potential for defensive applications. This would facilitate the elimination of nuclear weapons. The President repeated that he could not retreat from his pledge. We would share the fruits of our research -- and out of our own self-interest. If everyone had access to the relevant technology, it would be a threat to no one. The President did not see why SDI could not be made a part of the ABM Treaty. He was dedicated to the establishment of mutual defenses against nuclear weapons. Reaffirming once more that he could not retreat, the President noted that Secretary Shultz wished to make a point.

The Secretary observed that both the President and General Secretary had spoken in terms of eliminating nuclear weapons. In what Gorbachev had said a moment before, the Secretary thought he had heard something a little different. He wanted to be sure he had heard correctly. Gorbachev had seemed to link his 10 year no-withdrawal pledge to the length of time necessary to eliminate nuclear weapons. Was that in fact the link that the General Secretary had in mind? Would the schedule be linked to what he would be doing on START and INF, so that, at the end of the ten years of which Gorbachev had spoken there would be no ballistic missiles, to set aside other nuclear weapons?

Gorbachev reaffirmed that this was the case. The proposal he had made last January had called for 50% reductions in strategic forces and elimination of INF in the first phase of a process aimed at eliminating all nuclear weapons. Subsequent stages would involve further reductions, including reductions by third countries. But major reductions by the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. would take place in this period, and so the ten year period Gorbachev had mentioned was of decisive importance. He was not retreating from, but reinforcing, the proposals he had made earlier. If one were serious about reducing nuclear weapons, therefore, there was a need to reinforce the ABM regime. Gorbachev could not agree to anything which would weaken the ABM Treaty. His goal was to strengthen the Treaty, not revise it as the U.S. had proposed. There was no logic to such an approach. Were the Soviet Union to accept it, the world would conclude it was doing so purely out of egotistical self-interest. Gorbachev would be unable to go before the Soviet people or the world with such a proposal. That was why the 10-year commitment he was seeking was necessary if there were to be major reductions in offensive forces.

Research was a different matter. The Soviets had taken into account the President's concerns. They knew he was bound by the pledge he had made to his own people and to the world. Research would continue, and this would show that SDI was alive. But such work should not go beyond the framework of laboratory research. There could be testing, even mock-up in laboratories. And such efforts would ensure against the appearance of a nuclear madman of the type the President had often mentioned.

The President countered that in fact it would not. What the Hell, he asked, was it that we were defending? The ABM Treaty said that we could not defend ourselves except by means of the 100 ground based systems which we have never deployed. If our only defense is that, if someone wants to blow us up, the other will retaliate. Such a regime did not give protection; it limited protection. Why the Hell should the world have to live for another ten years under the threat of nuclear weapons if we have decided to eliminate them? The President failed to see the magic of the ABM regime, whose only assurance of safety was the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. It would be better to eliminate missiles so that our populations could sleep in peace. At the same time, the two leaders could give the world a means of protection that would put the nuclear genie back in his bottle. The next generation would reap the benefits when the President and General Secretary were no longer around.

Gorbachev recalled for the President what he described as the long and complicated history of the ABM Treaty. It had not come as a bolt from the blue but after years of discussion by responsible leaders, who ultimately recognized the impossibility of creating an ABM system, and who concluded that, if the attempt were made, it would only fuel the arms
race and make it impossible to reduce nuclear arms. No one in the Soviet leadership, nor he personally, could agree to steps which would undercut the Treaty. So on this point it appeared the two leaders would have to report that they had opposite views.

The next item, Gorbachev felt, should be negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. When the Soviets had pulled together their current position, they had worked from U.S. proposals to try to see how the two sides' approaches coincided. What was their line of thinking? The two leaders should direct their representatives to start negotiations on ending nuclear testing.

The talks would proceed for a certain period of time. During that period, each side could do what it liked, i.e., tests would be permitted. To take into account U.S. concerns, the Soviets were prepared to agree that the agenda for such a first phase could include: test yields, the number of tests, the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties (TTBT/PNET), and verification.

These were all U.S. issues which the Soviets had incorporated into their approach. In contrast, Gorbachev sensed from what the President had said that the U.S. was only considering its own interests. Specifically, U.S. proposals did not adequately deal with the problem of a comprehensive test ban. Gorbachev could not agree to a proposal which reflected only American interests.

The conversation, he continued, had reached a point where it was time for the American side to make a move in the Soviet direction on the ABM Treaty and CTB. There was a need for the flexibility which would demonstrate whether the U.S. was in fact interested in finding mutually acceptable solutions to problems. Gorbachev had heard it said that the President did not like to make concessions. But he also recalled an American expression which seemed apt: "it takes two to tango." With respect to the major questions of arms control and nuclear disarmament, the two leaders were the only partners in sight. Was the President prepared to dance?

The President in response sought to put the U.S. position on testing in an historical perspective. For three years, during the late fifties, there had been a moratorium on nuclear tests. Then the Soviet Union had broken the moratorium with a series of tests unprecedented in their number and scope. U.S. experts had subsequently determined that the Soviet Union had been preparing for that test series throughout the period of the moratorium. President Kennedy
had resumed testing, but because we had made no preparations to test during the moratorium period, we were placed at a severe disadvantage. President Kennedy had vowed we would never again be caught unprepared in this area. But in fact we were still behind. The Soviets had largely completed the modernization of their weapons stockpile before announcing their moratorium.

In any case, a comprehensive test ban would have to follow reductions in nuclear weapons. And there must also be adequate verification. Until now, the Soviets had been unwilling to address this issue seriously. Now that they had done so, the U.S. stood prepared to join them. But, in view of the historical precedents he had mentioned, the President felt Gorbachev would understand why, to quote another Americanism, we were "once burned, twice shy." Nonetheless, the U.S. had made concessions to Soviet concerns. The President again read the language on testing developed the night before by the U.S. working group, highlighting the statement's final sentence on a comprehensive test ban as an ultimate goal of negotiations.

Gorbachev indicated that the U.S. language was not acceptable to the Soviet side. In their own package, the Soviets had proposed that representatives be instructed to start negotiations on "banning nuclear testing." In an initial phase, these talks could deal with other issues. But the final goal must be to achieve a CTB on both military and civilian tests. Shevardnadze interjected that the ultimate goal should be stated first. In response to the President's remark that the U.S. language covered the concern Gorbachev had expressed, Gorbachev complained that the U.S. formulation suggested that it did not want to state directly the subject and goal of the negotiations. Instead, it appeared the U.S. wanted the talks to drag on forever. Under the U.S. formula, talks could go well beyond the ten years during which it would be necessary to find a solution to the problem of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union would not help provide the U.S. a free hand to test as much and as long as it wanted. Shevardnadze remarked that acceptance of the U.S. formulation would call into question the ultimate goal of reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons.

The President said that perhaps there was some difficulty in the translation, but it appeared to him that the U.S. language met Soviet concerns. (Gorbachev quipped that Zarechnak could tell the President that were were indeed talking about totally different things.) The President asked Gorbachev if the U.S. formulation would be more acceptable if the final sentence were moved to the front of the paragraph.
Gorbachev replied that it would not. Perhaps, he suggested, Shultz and Shevardnadze should be tasked with working out a formula. The problem, he said, was that the U.S. was saying that there could be talks -- talks identified as having the "ultimate objective" of a CTB -- but focused primarily on other things. Work on a CTB would start only at a later stage. But we should make it clear that we had already "started" work in that area. What was needed were clear-cut formulae without side-tracks. What the Soviets were proposing, Gorbachev recapitulated, was talks on a CTB, during which testing could continue, and in the first stage of which ancillary issues such as verification could be dealt with. In a second stage of the same talks, there would be movement toward a complete ban on nuclear tests. As a lawyer, Gorbachev felt confident that such an arrangement would allow no room for side-tracking.

The President remarked that Gorbachev had touched on something very basic with respect to our problem with one another. Gorbachev's remarks reflected a belief that the U.S. was in some way trying to attain an advantage out of hostility toward the Soviet Union. While it would do no good to tell Gorbachev he was wrong, since it would only be the President's word (which the President knew to be true), the President could say that we harbored no hostile intentions toward the Soviets. We recognized the differences in our two systems. But the President felt that we could live as friendly competitors. Each side mistrusted the other. But, the President affirmed, the evidence was all on our side.

To illustrate his point, the President began a quote from Marx, prompting Gorbachev to observe jocularly that the President had dropped Lenin for Marx. The President countered that Marx had said first much of what Lenin said later. In any case, both had expressed the view that socialism had to be global in scope to succeed. The only mortality was that which advanced socialism. And it was a fact that every Soviet leader but Gorbachev -- at least so far -- had endorsed in speeches to Soviet Communist Party Congresses the objective of establishing a world communist state.

Moreover, even when the two countries had been allies during World War II, Soviet suspicions had been such that Moscow had resisted U.S. shuttle bombing missions to and from Soviet territory. After the war, the U.S. had proposed on nineteen separate occasions -- at a time when it had a monopoly on nuclear weapons -- the elimination of such weapons. The Soviet Union had not only rebuffed such offers, but had placed nuclear missiles in Cuba in the sixties.
President could go on, but he wanted simply to make the point that such behavior revealed a belief on the Soviets' part in a world-wide mission which gave us legitimate grounds to suspect Soviet motives. The Soviets had no grounds for believing that the U.S. wanted war. When Gorbachev came to the United States, he would see that the last thing the American people wanted was to exchange their life-styles for war. The President suspected the same was true for the average Soviet citizen.

Gorbachev observed that, with respect to Marx and Lenin, history was full of examples of those who had sought to overcome their philosophy by force. All had failed. Gorbachev would advise the President not to waste time and energy to such an end.

But to return to the present, and, Gorbachev noted, because the President had initiated "invitation" comments in this vein, Gorbachev felt obliged to say that the Soviet Union recognized the right of the U.S. people to their own values, beliefs, society. There were things Soviets liked about the U.S. and things they did not. But they recognized the Americans were a great people who had a right to conduct their affairs as they saw fit. It was up to the American people to choose their government and their President. Thus Gorbachev had been surprised when he had heard of a recent statement by the President to the effect that the President remained true to the principles of his 1981 Westminster speech. That speech had referred to the Soviet Union as an evil empire; it had called for a crusade against socialism in order to relegate it to the ash heap of history. What would the outcome be if the U.S. sought to act according to these principles? Would we fight one another? Gorbachev failed to understand how such a statement could be considered an appropriate "forward" to the Reykjavik meeting. In any case, he reminded the President, the President had initiated the discussion.

The President reminded Gorbachev in turn that there was a Communist party in the United States. Its members could and did organize and run for public office. They were free to try to persuade the people of the validity of their philosophy. That was not true in the Soviet Union. The Soviets enforced rather than persuaded. Similarly, when communist parties took power in third world countries, they quickly eliminated other parties by force. In the U.S., anyone could organize his own party. There was only one party in the Soviet Union, and a majority of the Soviet population were excluded from membership. So there was a fundamental difference in the two societies' approaches: the U.S. believed that people should have the right to determine their own form of government.
Gorbachev indicated that he would be happy to have a wide-ranging conversation with the President on the moral, philosophical and ethical issues raised by the President's remarks. For the moment, he would simply note that the situation in the Soviet Union was not as the President had described it, and that the President's remarks showed that they differed fundamentally in their basic conceptions of the world. But the two leaders seemed to agree that each side had the right to organize its society according to its own philosophical or religious beliefs. This was an issue which the two might come back to at another time. Gorbachev had no desire to quarrel. He was convinced, in fact, that, while he and the President might have different characters and conceptions, a man-to-man relationship between them was possible. The President said he looked forward to welcoming Gorbachev at some point as a new member of the Republican Party. Gorbachev commented that there had been a profusion of parties in Russia both before and after the Revolution. These things were the result of historical processes. He commented that Secretary Shultz appeared to have a contribution to make.

The Secretary observed that it appeared there was the beginning of a joint statement on strategic weapons. (Gorbachev nodded.) On the basis of the two leaders' discussion, it should also be possible to formulate a similar statement on INF. (Gorbachev again nodded.) On Space/ABM/SDI, there had been no agreement, but the two sides had identified and characterized their areas of disagreement. These appeared not to deal with the question of whether or not to adhere to the ABM Treaty, since the U.S. was adhering, but rather over the period involved.

Gorbachev commented that, in the context of what had been agreed to on strategic and intermediate range offensive arms, a statement on adherence to the ABM Treaty would be necessary. That was obvious.

Shevardnadze asked if the approach outlined in the President's letter to the question of the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty remained valid. The Secretary reminded Shevardnadze that the President had called for a two-stage approach. That was still on the table. Gorbachev asked if that meant the U.S. did not accept a ten year period.

The Secretary suggested three points to describe where the two sides were. They could be cast in terms of the leaders' having instructed their negotiators to explore the following areas to bridge existing differences. The Secretary then
read the three questions the President had read in his opening presentation.

When the Secretary reached the second point, on a "cooperative transition to advanced strategic defenses", Gorbachev interrupted to point out that the Soviets did not recognize the concept. It was the U.S. which intended to deploy SDI. The Soviets would not make such an arrangement possible. Their concept was different. The Secretary continued to read the three points, noting that the final point was designed to respond to Soviet concerns.

The President, the Secretary continued, had made clear he would not give up SDI. Gorbachev had said he recognized that to be the President's position, and that the Soviets had made an effort to accommodate it. Gorbachev nodded, adding with a laugh that some even felt he was trying to encourage development of SDI so as to increase the U.S. defense burden. Thus, as it turned out, he was on the President's side, and the President had not even known it.

The President noted that, as the oldest person in the room, he was the only one who could remember how, after World War I, poison gas had been outlawed. But people kept their gas masks. And it was a good thing, because poison gas came back. The same could happen with nuclear weapons: if, after their elimination, someone were to bring them back, we would need something to deal with that.

Gorbachev commented that the preceding conversation had convinced him of the veracity of reports that the President did not like to make concessions. The President clearly did not want to give any concessions on the question of the ABM Treaty -- its duration and strength, or on the cessation of nuclear testing.

The President replied that he felt we had agreed on testing.

Shevardnadze asked if it would be possible to consider the period during which there would be no withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. It might be possible to reach agreement on this point. Gorbachev reiterated that a much more rigid adherence to the ABM Treaty, for a specific period of time -- say, ten years -- would be necessary to create the confidence necessary to proceed with deep cuts in offensive systems. Returning to the Secretary's earlier point, he underscored that the ten year period would coincide with the most significant reductions on the offensive side. Shevardnadze pointed out that there was a question of principle: if the two sides
could not agree on a period for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, it would be impossible to agree on reductions. Gorbachev added that the Soviets had proposed a package, and that individual elements of their proposals must be regarded as a package.

The President expressed the view that there should be no such linkage. The U.S., for its part, believed the Soviet Union already to be in violation of the ABM Treaty. The U.S. had not even built systems provided for in the Treaty.

Gorbachev interrupted to note that, on the first two questions (START and INF) it would be possible to say there were common points. On the second (ABM and testing), there had been a meaningful exchange of views, but no common points.

With that, the meeting could end. It had not been in vain. But it had not produced the results that had been expected in the Soviet Union, and that Gorbachev personally had expected. Probably the same could be said for the United States. One had to realistic. In political life one had to follow reality. The reality today was that it was possible to reach agreements on some major, interrelated questions. But because there was a lack of clarity, the connection had been disrupted. So the two sides remained where they had been before Reykjavik.

Gorbachev said the President would now report to Congress. Gorbachev would make his report to the Politburo and the Supreme Soviet. The process would not stop. Relations would continue. For his part, Gorbachev was sorry he and the President had failed to provide a new impulse for arms control and disarmament. This was unfortunate, and Gorbachev regretted it.

The President said he did, too. He had thought we had agreements on 50% reductions, on INF, on considering what to do about the ABM Treaty, and on reducing nuclear testing. Was this not so? Were the two leaders truly to depart with nothing?

Gorbachev said that that was the case. He suggested the two devote a few minutes to humanitarian and regional questions, which, he pointed out, had been discussed by the second (non-arms control) working group. The President agreed, and the two briefly reviewed papers prepared by the working group the night before.

The President asked to make a few comments on human rights. He had no intention of saying publicly that he had demanded anything from Gorbachev in terms of such issues as family reunification and religious persecution. But he did
want to urge Gorbachev to move forward in this area, since it was a major factor domestically in limiting how far the President could go in cooperation with the Soviet Union. As he had told Gorbachev before, one in every eight people in the United States had family connections of some sort to the Soviet Union, so a significant part of the American population was concerned by such phenomena as the shut-down in emigration from the Soviet Union. We would continue to provide lists of people we had reason to believe wanted to depart. And if the Soviets loosened up, we would not exploit it. We would simply express our appreciation.

Gorbachev expressed regret that there was not more time to address humanitarian questions. There were some specific concerns he had wanted to put before the President. And he wanted to make clear that Soviet public opinion was also concerned about the state of human rights in the United States.

One question he did want to broach had to do with expanding the flow of information between the two countries. This was of potentially great importance. On the U.S. side, the Voice of America over the years had developed an enormous capability of broadcasting to the Soviet Union. It broadcast round the clock, in many languages, from many transmitters outside the Soviet Union. The Soviets did not have the same opportunity for their broadcasts to be heard in the United States, and so, to put things on an equal basis, they jammed VOA broadcasts.

What Gorbachev proposed was this: the Soviets would stop jamming VOA if the U.S. would help the Soviet Union enhance its ability to broadcast to the United States. Perhaps the U.S. could help the Soviets rent a radio station for this purpose, or intervene with some of its neighbors to facilitate the establishment of Soviet transmitters close to the U.S. In this way, both sides would be able to relay their points of view to the others' population.

The President pointed out that, in the U.S., we recognized the right of the individual to hear all points of view. The press conference Gorbachev would give after their meeting would be carried by the U.S. media. The same would not happen in the Soviet Union. In response to Gorbachev's request for an answer to his specific proposal, the President agreed to look into the matter on his return to Washington, and said he would be supportive.

Picking up on the President's remarks on the media, Gorbachev pointed out that half of the foreign films shown in the Soviet Union were American. Virtually no Soviet films
were shown in the U.S. There was no equality in this arrangement.

The President replied that this was a function of the market, rather than any attempt to ban Soviet films. (Gorbachev commented that the President was trying to avoid a direct answer.) The U.S. government could not dictate what films private entrepreneurs showed. The President noted that he did not know now films were distributed in the Soviet Union, even though he used to make films. Gorbachev said that here was a paradox: in an allegedly democratic country there are obstacles to Soviet films; in an allegedly non-democratic country half the foreign films were American. This did not tally with the view of Soviet society the President had described earlier.

The President saw the explanation to the paradox in the differences between private and government ownership. In the Soviet Union, there was no free enterprise. In the U.S., films were distributed by private industry. If the Soviet Union wanted to, it could do what other countries had done and form its own distributing company. If it could convince local theatres to show its films, fine. But the government could not order them to.

Raising another question, Gorbachev asked why recent tele-bridges between cities in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had not been shown at all in the U.S., but had been seen by 150,000,000 viewers in the Soviet Union. So much for the impact of private enterprise. The President reiterated that the government could not compel theatre owners to show films. But he pointed to the recent visit of the Kirov ballet to demonstrate that American audiences responded positively to quality Soviet performers, and that Soviet culture did, in fact, have access to the U.S. public.

Raising a final question in the "humanitarian" sphere, Gorbachev complained that, for the past 30 years, the U.S. had denied visas to Soviet trade union representatives seeking to visit the United States. During the same period, many U.S. labor leaders had visited the Soviet Union. Again, where was the equality of access? The President agreed to look into the matter as well as the question of what could be done with respect to Soviet films.

The President said he had two additional points to raise.

First, he could not go back and tell the American farmers that he had met with the General Secretary without raising the Soviet failure to meet their obligations under the bilateral
Long Term Grain Agreement to buy the minimum amount of American wheat. Gorbachev replied that the President should tell them all the money the Russians had hoped to spend on grain was in America and Saudi Arabia as a result of lower oil prices. The President pointed out that America's oil industry had suffered as much as the Soviet Union's as a result of OPEC's pricing policies. We had had no hand in creating the hardships.

Second, the President wished to read a copy of a letter to Gorbachev from National Symphony Orchestra Director Rostropovich, seeking Gorbachev's approval for certain of Rostropovich's relatives to attend jubilee concerts in the West in connection with the maestro's 70th birthday. After the President read the letter, Gorbachev indicated that he had received it and responded personally, and that the necessary instructions had been given to enable Rostropovich's relatives to attend the celebrations. The President thanked Gorbachev.

Gorbachev noted that "the moment" appeared to have come.

Shevardnadze asked if he and the Secretary were to remain "unemployed," or if the leaders had any instructions for them.

The Secretary said he had tried to formulate some language on INF and space, recognizing that there had been agreement on the one hand, and a lack of agreement on the other. After being invited by Gorbachev to proceed, the Secretary read the following passage:

"The President and General Secretary discussed issues involving the ABM Treaty, advanced strategic defense, the relationship to .......... of offensive ballistic missiles intensively and at length. They will instruct their Geneva negotiators to use the record of these conversations to benefit their work."

Gorbachev said the statement was unacceptable, and asked that the passage on INF be read. The Secretary read the following passage:


Gorbachev said that that was clear. He suggested that, if the President had no objections, the two Foreign Ministers might see what they could come up with while the two leaders took a brief break. Gorbachev didn't mind waiting an hour or two.
Shevardnadze remarked that it should be possible to come up with agreed language on nuclear testing. That would leave the question of the duration of a non-withdrawal pledge with respect to the ABM Treaty.

Gorbachev said that that had been covered in the discussion. A withdrawal pledge was necessary to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty so as to justify the risk of reduction strategic and intermediate range offensive weapons.

Gorbachev proposed that, if the President agreed, the two of them meet again at 3:00 pm. The President agreed, and escorted Gorbachev from the room, ending the session.