

Mufaxed to
Blackpost @ 1210pm
12/10

MR. BUTLER

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PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH

I attach a slightly revised version of the section on Arms Control. The amendments are self-explanatory, except for those marked in the margin by A, B, C, and D.

The reasons for these are as follows:

- A. This amendment separates the original 1979 decision from Reagan's zero option. Purely factual.
- B. This is important. If we simply say "cruise and Pershing will be deployed" Kohl's opponents in the Bundestag debate will say that the West has taken its decision and the debate is not genuine.
- C. We have deleted the Prime Minister's reference to the number of warheads. The MOD have always been against indicating publicly the figure for our warheads. If we do it now, we shall be pressed to do it later with Trident and may not want to.
- D. The point of "on missiles" is that Reagan's proposal does not cover e.g. warheads on bombers.

A. J. C.

12 October 1983



... destroy weapons are verified.

We're negotiating about two sorts of nuclear weapons, the intermediate and also the biggest of all, the long range strategic missiles. Both sides have both kinds. Let me talk about the intermediate first.

Some six years ago the Soviet Union began to replace hers by the accurate SS20s with three times as many warheads. As we had nothing comparable, in 1979 NATO decided to modernise our intermediate forces with cruise and Pershing II missiles in order to restore the balance of deterrence. At the same time we tried to persuade the Soviet Union to reduce the SS20s. Later we offered to eliminate these missiles on both sides. If we succeeded, no cruise or Pershing II missile deployments would be necessary. This is President Reagan's zero option.

A

There has still been no positive response from the Soviet Union. If the Russians remain obdurate, the first cruise and Pershing II missiles will be deployed at the end of this year.

B

At the negotiating table in Geneva we are nevertheless continuing to seek an agreement to keep the numbers as low as possible on both sides. No weapons would be better than some but few weapons would be better than more. NATO is determined to keep these talks going even after deployment has begun.

/Meanwhile



Different
order.

Meanwhile the whole situation has been deliberately clouded and confused by the Soviet propaganda attempt to suggest that our Polaris, which is strategic, should be included in the Intermediate talks. But Polaris is our last resort deterrent. We had it long before the SS20s and then, and now, we need it, in case we should ever be threatened by that great arsenal of Soviet strategic weapons. Our strategic force amounts to only 2½% of these, however you measure it.

There are separate talks in Geneva concerning the strategic weapons. The Soviet Union and the United States have about 9,000 warheads each. As far back as 1981, President Reagan D suggested that as a first step the warheads on missiles should be cut on both sides by one third.

Again there has been no positive response from the Soviet Union.

But if ever this enormous strategic armoury were hugely reduced, then of course we should wish to consider how we in Britain could contribute to the arms control process.

As you see, Mr Chairman, the West has made proposal after proposal. And the day the leaders of the Soviet Union genuinely decide, through arms control agreements, to make this a safer world, they will be pushing at an open door.