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WITH COMPLIMENTS

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to stimulate thought prior to discussion
on Tuesday night

FOREIGN POLICY: AIMS AND CONSIDERATIONS

1. Defence policy should depend on a clear articulation of foreign policy.
2. A foreign policy can:
 - i. be exclusively concerned with the protection of a state's own territory (or territories);
 - ii. be concerned primarily with the protection of a state's territory, but seek temporary or permanent alliances abroad to secure this better;
 - iii. be concerned with the propagation or advancement of:
 - (a) ideals;
 - (b) economic interests;
 - (c) territorial ambitions;of the state concerned.
3. External policy as a rule has been carried out irrationally, in the sense that the theory has usually followed the actions caused by it: e.g. Britain did acquire her empire mostly in a fit of absence of mind. Afterwards Rhodes and others created imperialism. The same is true I think of the withdrawal from empire. (What really happened in 1945-60 is still a little mysterious. I think that those who really believed in empire and were powerful, believed in the Indian empire; when that collapsed they did not devise a theory much less a policy for Africa. N.B. All the European empires gave way in Africa without collaboration with each other. I can only assume that Duncan Sandys was right when he said that Britain had lost the desire to rule and was right about the rest of Europe too).
4. British foreign policy since 1500 has very rarely been able to be defined as 2(ii). Between 1558 and 1815 our main aim was to prevent the French having an entree in the North Sea. To secure that we went to great lengths to support the independence of the Low Countries by subsidies to German allies etc. The possession

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of Hanover (1714-1837) was a help in securing this. The European wars and diplomacy enabled us to win an empire overseas ("America will be won in Europe" etc).

5. The main aim of policy to-day is to protect the homeland. As the Falklands campaign reminded us, the word "homeland" must include all our residual imperial responsibilities, e.g. Gibraltar, Saint Helena, Tristan da Cunha, Hong Kong, and the numerous islands in the Caribbean. One aim of policy could be to re-examine all these responsibilities and deliberately seek to abandon them: perhaps the Foreign Office has been pursuing this aim. If so the 'solution' of such a problem does not anyway immediately establish freedom from responsibility (see Belize). In this respect I should personally like to see a policy adopted which has two prongs:
 - (i) the grouping together of all those islands which may have in the future a real and continuing use for the security of the (British Isles) homeland - taking into account that we remain a global if not a super power (Francis Pym at Chatham House); and
 - (ii) some policy designed to find a West European or a NATO responsibility for all the others. Don't forget that nearly every other Western European country (except Germany and Italy) has a few such "residual" problems and so has the USA. A joint free world solution for all might be pursued.
6. The main threat to the homeland is the Soviet Union. In some respects the Soviet Union is a straightforward military threat in the style of Philip II, Louis XIV, Napoleon, the Kaiser or Hitler. Russia could for example dominate the Low Countries, could become the largest single power in Europe and could either conquer us or reduce us to tributary status, without Communism coming into it. People even in the XVIII century thought it might happen - see Frederick the Great's famous letter to his brother. But probably Russia could not hold together without an ideology and would not constitute a threat to others without a communist one (e.g. we would hardly be threatened by a Pan Slav

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ideology, though I suppose the US just might be). The military threat of the USSR is so great (combined with their propaganda, espionage, sabotage, subversion apparatus) that it is easy to forget the essential part played by ideology which gives their leaders a compass if not a chart and an excuse for a goal of world domination (even if global Finlandisation may be a short term aim - it was nearly achieved between 1973 and 1979/80).

7. Other threats to the homeland in future cannot be excluded: e.g. Islamic fundamentalism supported by global terrorism (a Gadaffi-Khomeini alliance based on blackmail, nuclear weapons and terrorists would seem a distinct possibility).
8. At present we do not seem to have many plans arising under (iii) of 2 except (b) to propagate our economic interests of a modest kind i.e. not to control our sources of energy if imported but to secure e.g. embassy help for businessmen. I do not think that we have had territorial ambitions since 1914 and even then the Middle East fell into our power rather by chance.
9. A case in my opinion can be made for thinking that we should pursue (iii) (a) - the propagation of our ideals - more vigorously. Of course there must be many occasions when we will need authoritarian regimes to assist the defence of the homeland (e.g. Frederick the Great 1756; the Tsar 1914; Stalin 1941; perhaps Pinochet 1982). But the interests of preserving peace, of securing stable international money, of guaranteeing trade etc would all be better served if we could say now more forcefully, and schemed to achieve it more subtly, as was hoped in 1910 (or 1820 by Canning) that the ideal of representative democracy seemed the sovereign formula for the coming age (Elie Halévy). Perhaps there could be some kind of world democratic club for the 36 to 40 representative democracies, however embarrassing the exclusions would seem (e.g. Israel not Saudi Arabia would be in). But as the Prime Minister, in her Canning-like way, has said on several occasions, the best way to secure international peace is to promote this kind of democratic tradition as widely as possible.

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10. It is worth noticing that our present defence guaranteed by NATO is a unique undertaking. Never before in our history have we had a permanent peacetime alliance. It was an immense achievement to secure US for this "entangling alliance" against all its own traditions. We assume that we wish it to last as long as the Soviet threat lasts.
11. Within the fabric of NATO I have always thought it desirable to see whether some kind of strengthening of the European pillar of this alliance could not be done by a new EDC. The conventional wisdom is that it would risk "decoupling" with the US but I don't believe the US would be against it provided it strengthened us all and helped their budget (Henry Kissinger agrees, incidentally).
12. Europe. I believe that we should be much more ruthless over our attitude to the EEC and say explicitly that we look on that organisation as a great international market (and what could be more creative than that?) not as a prefiguration of a European super state. We therefore should go slow on "European foreign policy" except where it is concerned with regulation etc of the market.

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