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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 231934Z SEPT 81
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 909 DATED 23 SEPTEMBER 81
INFO PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES, WASHINGTON, PORT
FOR GOVERNOR FALKLAND ISLANDS)

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INDEX	PA	Action Taken

FOLLOWING FFROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER
23 SEPTEMBER

1. LORD CARRINGTON RAISED THE QUESTION OF MISS HOBSON AT THE END OF THE MEETING. DR CAMILION SAID THAT HE WOULD SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE BUT EMPHASISED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS A DIFFICULT ONE AND HELD OUT NO REAL HOPE OF A POSITIVE SOLUTION. THE REST OF THE MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.
2. CAMILION, WHO WAS SUPPORTED BY ORTIZ DE ROZAS, ARGUED ON PREDICTABLE GROUNDS BUT WITHOUT POLEMICS FOR A START TO FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR AT A LEVEL TO BE AGREED. LORD CARRINGTON REPLIED THAT WE TOO WANTED NEGOTIATIONS TO GET UNDER WAY BUT THAT WE HAD TO CARRY THE ISLANDERS WITH US. IT WAS A BASIC FACT OF POLITICAL LIFE THAT NO BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD NEGOTIATE OVER THEIR HEADS OR SEEK TO COERCE THEM. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO DO OUR BEST TO PERSUADE THEM OF THE BENEFITS OF AN ACCOMMODATION, ESPECIALLY AS FAR AS INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WERE CONCERNED, BUT WE HAD REALISTICALLY TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT ISLAND OPINION HAD IF ANYTHING GONE BACKWARDS OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS. THE NEXT THING WAS TO GET THE ISLAND ELECTIONS OUT OF THE WAY. THE BEST WAY OF MAKING PROGRESS THEREAFTER MIGHT BE FOR THE ARGENTINES TO SAY THAT THEY HAD SOME PROPOSALS TO MAKE AND THAT THEY WOULD INTRODUCE THEM WHEN TALKS RESUMED (TO ANNOUNCE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSALS BEFOREHAND MIGHT PROVOKE AN ISLANDER REJECTION).
3. ORTIZ DE ROZAS RECALLED THAT THE ARGENTINE NOTE PROPOSING NEGOTIATIONS REMAINED ON THE TABLE AND REQUIRED AN ANSWER. LORD CARRINGTON REPEATED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE ARGENTINES TO MAKE A PROPOSAL ON THE LINES HE HAD SUGGESTED AFTER THE ISLAND ELECTIONS.
4. IN THE COURSE OF FURTHER DISCUSSION CAMILION SAID:
 1. THE ARGENTINES WOULD MAINTAIN THE SERVICES THEY PROVIDED TO THE ISLANDERS BUT THEY SEEMED TO GAIN VERY LITTLE THEREFROM: THE ISLANDERS SIMPLY POCKETED WHAT WAS ON OFFER. MEANWHILE THE ARGENTINES WERE NOT ABLE TO TAKE MEASURES SUCH AS OPENING A BANK OR A TELEVISION STATION WHICH WOULD HELP THEM PERSUADE THE ISLANDERS OF THEIR CASE.

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II. ARGENTINA WAS COMMITTED TO RESPECT THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS, WOULD STICK TO THIS POSITION AND WAS PREPARED TO OFFER ALL GUARANTEES THAT COULD BE IMAGINED. BUT IF THE STARTING POINT WAS TO BE THE WISHES RATHER THAN THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS THERE WOULD BE NO WAY FORWARD BECAUSE THE ISLANDERS WISH TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO WOULD ALWAYS PREVAIL.

III. THE KEY QUESTION WAS THAT OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THIS HAD TO BE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE ARGENTINE. NO-ONE LIKED CHANGE, BUT THE ISLANDERS COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO VETO THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

5. LORD CARRINGTON PICKED UP CAMILION'S REFERENCE TO ISLAND INTERESTS AND WISHES AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE WERE COMMITTED TO RESPECT THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS. IT WAS ONLY ON THIS BASIS THAT IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY POSSIBLE FOR US TO MAKE PROGRESS. HE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD GET THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED BUT THERE WAS NO POINT IN PRETENDING THAT DIFFICULTIES DID NOT EXIST. WE WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ORTIZ DE ROZAS ON HOW BEST TO PROCEED.

PARSONS

FCO WHITEHALL
SAMD

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED