

No 10 14

S E C R E T

GPS 240

DEDIP
BURNING BUSH
SECRET

FM FCO 041646Z APR 81
TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 177 OF 4 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR) BONN PARIS
UKDEL NATO AND PEKING.

MIPT: POLAND

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT

BEGINS:

OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET POSTURE REGARDING POLAND SUGGESTS
THAN AN INTERVENTION BY THE U.S.S.R. IS A SERIOUS POSSIBILITY.
CONSEQUENTLY, THE PRESIDENT HAS INFORMED PRESIDENT BREZHNEV OF
THE SEVERE CONSEQUENCES THAT WOULD RESULT SHOULD THE SOVIETS
INTERVENE.

I HAVE DECIDED TO LEAVE ON SCHEDULE FOR MY TRIP TO THE MIDDLE
EAST, BUT I WANTED YOU TO KNOW IF A CRISIS DEVELOPS IN POLAND, I
WILL IMMEDIATELY RETURN TO WASHINGTON. UPON RETURN TO THE UNITED
STATES, I WOULD CONSULT WITH THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
ON THE SITUATION IN POLAND. THEREAFTER I WOULD TRAVEL TO BRUSSELS
FOR THE EMERGENCY NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL WHERE WE
WOULD DECIDE ON THE LIST OF PROPOSED MEASURES TO DEAL WITH THE
POLISH SITUATION.

IT IS MY FIRM BELIEF THAT WE MUST, AT BRUSSELS, BE ABLE TO
ACHIEVE RAPID AND CONCRETE ALLIANCE DECISIONS. NONE OF US WILL BE
ABLE TO LINGER IN BRUSSELS, AND IT WILL BE DECISIVELY IMPORTANT TO
CONVEY SWIFTLY TO THE SOVIETS A CLEAR AND PAINFUL SIGNAL. WE MUST
NOT ALLOW THE EMERGENCY MINISTERIAL TO DEVELOP INTO A WESTERN
DEBATE. UNITY AND DECISIVENESS ARE DEMANDED BY THE NATURE OF THE
SOVIET CHALLENGE AND, MOST CERTAINLY, BY OUR PUBLICS AND
PARLIAMENTS.

/IN ADDITION

S E C R E T

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IN ADDITION TO THE GENERAL POINTS SET OUT ABOVE WHICH I HAVE SHARED WITH ALL OF THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE FOUR OF US HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY WITH REGARD TO POLAND. THE ALLIANCE PACKAGE OF MEASURES BUILDS ON THE CONSENSUS REACHED BY OUR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIRECTORS. THE NATO LIST, HOWEVER, HAS SOME OPEN QUESTIONS AND CAVEATS THAT COULD EASILY CAUSE THE MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION TO DEGENERATE AND LEAD TO A LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR. IT WILL TAKE LEADERSHIP BY ALL OF US TO INSURE THAT THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN. YOU WILL HAVE AN ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN ENCOURAGING OUR ALLIES WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO COME PREPARED TO MAKE SOME COURAGEOUS BUT NECESSARY DECISIONS.

THEREFORE, FOR ALL OF THESE REASONS, WE WILL NEED TO GET TOGETHER IN A QUADRIPARTITE CONTEXT BEFORE THE MINISTERIAL TO PLAN HOW WE CAN HEAD IT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

ENDS:

CARRINGTON

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S E C R E T

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FM FCO 041645Z APR
TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 176 OF 4TH APRIL 1981
INFO IMMEDIATE (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR) BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO,
PEKING.

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY ON ARRIVAL: POLAND

1. MIFT CONTAINS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM HAIG TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, DELIVERED TO THE RESIDENT CLERK AT NOON BST ON 4 APRIL.
2. PEKING SHOULD TAKE NO ACTION TO PASS THE MESSAGE ON UNLESS THE SITUATION IN POLAND MARKEDLY DETERIORATES.
3. RECOMMENDATION FOR A DRAFT REPLY WILL FOLLOW.

CARRINGTON

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