

POLAND: ADVANCE COPIES 21

Poland

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 179 OF 12 MAR

INFO MOSCOW EAST BERLIN PRAGUE PARIS BONN WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO
THE HAGUE MODUK

SAVING TO SOFIA BUDAPEST BUCHAREST BELGRADE HELSINKI STOCKHOLM
UKMIS NEW YORK UKREP BRUSSELS

POLISH SITUATION.

1. WHEN I CALLED ON VICE-MINISTER DOBROSIELSKI AT THE MFA ON 12 MARCH, I ASKED HIM WHAT THE SIGNIFICANCE WAS OF THE PHRASE IN THE POLISH-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE OF 4 MARCH WHICH SPOKE OF THE SOVIET PARTY BELIEVING THAT THE POLISH COMMUNISTS WOULD " REVERSE THE CHAIN OF EVENTS AND AVERT THE DANGERS WHICH JEOPARDISE THE SOCIAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE POLISH NATION".

2. DOBROSIELSKI SAID THAT THE ENGLISH WORD "REVERSE" WAS RATHER STRONGER THAN THE POLISH WORD USED. HE ASSURED ME THAT IT CERTAINLY DID NOT IMPLY A REVERSAL OF THE RENEWAL AND A RETURN TO THE SITUATION EXISTING IN JULY 1980. EVEN IF THE POLISH LEADERSHIP WANTED THAT, WHICH THEY DID NOT, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT VIEW OF THOSE ELEMENTS IN THE EVENTS OF THE LAST 6 MONTHS WHICH WERE ANTI-SOCIALIST AND DESTABILISING. THEY WERE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGERS TO SOCIALISM

THEY WERE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGERS TO SOCIALISM OF CERTAIN TENDENCIES THAN WERE THE POLES. BUT IT WAS ONLY A MATTER OF DEGREE. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO PROTECT SOCIALISM; IT WAS JUST THAT THE RUSSIANS THOUGHT THE THREATS TO IT RATHER MORE SERIOUS THAN DID THE POLES.

3. , DOBROSIELSKI WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE WAS OF COURSE CONCERN AT WHAT WERE SEEN AS ACTIVITIES IN CERTAIN CIRCLES IN THE WEST WHICH AIMED DELIBERATELY TO SOW DISSENSION IN POLAND. THESE CIRCLES, AND HE WAS RATHER AFRAID THAT THEY MIGHT EXTEND EVEN TO ELEMENTS OF THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION, WANTED TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH IT WOULD PROVE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION NOT TO INTERVENE IN POLAND. THEY TOOK THE VIEW THAT THIS WOULD RELIEVE THE WEST OF THE AWKWARD NECESSITY OF HELPING A COMMUNIST COUNTRY, WOULD SIMPLIFY MATTER INTO BLACK AND WHITE AND FULFIL THEIR PRECONCEPTIONS OF THE SORT OF COUNTRY THE SOVIET UNION WAS. HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT, WHATEVER DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS THERE MIGHT BE BETWEEN THE POLISH AND SOVIET LEADERSHIP, THE QUESTION OF SOVIET INTERVENTION AS AN ACT OF POLICY DID NOT ARISE. NO RESPONSIBLE PERSON IN EITHER COUNTRY CONTEMPLATED IT.

4. I SAID THAT I SUPPOSED THAT HIS REFERENCE TO CERTAIN CIRCLES IN THE WEST WAS TO NEWSPAPER ARTICLES. SO FAR AS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WAS CONCERNED WE HAD NO INTEREST IN DESTABILISING POLAND. POLISH INTERNAL AFFAIRS WERE FOR THE POLES.

5. IN SPEAKING OF THE INTERNAL SITUATION, DOBROSIELSKI SAID THAT THE RECENT STRIKES AT LODZ SHOULD NEVER HAVE OCCURRED. AS WELL AS HOTHEADS IN SOLIDARITY, THERE WERE SOME VERY CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS IN THE PARTY. THOUGH RELATIVELY FEW IN NUMBER, THEY WERE QUITE POWERFUL. THE POLISH LEADERSHIP WAS COMMITTED TO THE RENEWAL AND THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THEIR WISHING TO REPRESS IT BY FORCE. BUT THERE WAS A PROBLEM IN THAT THEIR COMMITMENT TO POLITICAL, NOT FORCIBLE SOLUTIONS WAS OFTEN INTERPRETED AS WEAKNESS.

6. DOBROSIELSKI'S ADMISSION THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND POLISH SIDES I TAKE TO BE CODE FOR A PRETTY SERIOUS ROW.

7. THE VICE-MINISTER SAID THAT HE HOPED VERY SOON TO HAVE AN ANSWER ON DATES FOR CZYREK'S VISIT TO LONDON.