

GR 250

SECRET

SECRET

ECLIPSE

DESKBY 140900Z

FM WASHINGTON 132344Z JANUARY 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 118 OF 13 JANUARY

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, BONN, CAPETOWN.

*MS*

YOUR TELNO 11 TO PARIS: NAMIBIA.

1. WE AGREE THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ARE LIKELY TO BE HOSTILE TO THE IDEA OF SANCTIONS: INDEED SOME REPUBLICANS WOULD PROBABLY WELCOME AN EARLY CONFRONTATION IN THE U.N. BUT OTHERS (INCLUDING CROCKER) WOULD PREFER TO AVOID A SANCTIONS RESOLUTION FOR FEAR THAT A U.S. VETO WOULD DRAG THE NEW ADMINISTRATION INTO CONFRONTATIONAL AFRICAN AND U.N. POLICIES BEFORE THE CHOICES HAD BEEN PROPERLY THOUGHT OUT. THERE IS THEREFORE A CHANCE THAT THE INCOMING ADMINISTRATION WILL URGE THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO GIVE JUST ENOUGH GROUND TO KEEP THE U.N. PROCESS ALIVE WHILE THEY CONSIDER THEIR FUTURE OPTIONS. DESPITE THE RISK THAT BY 20 JANUARY AN EARLY SHOWDOWN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAY BE INESCAPABLE, THE REPUBLICANS ARE FIRM IN THEIR REFUSAL TO ENGAGE THEMSELVES IN THE ISSUE BEFORE THEY ASSUME OFFICE. (PARA 4 OF GENEVA TELNO 17).

2. IF A SANCTIONS RESOLUTION IS PUT FORWARD SHORTLY AFTER 20 JANUARY, THE GENERAL THRUST OF REPUBLICAN POLICY SUGGESTS THAT THEY WOULD NOT ALLOW IT TO PASS. BUT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BE CERTAIN EXACTLY WHAT THEY WOULD DO WHEN THE PRINCIPAL DECISION-MAKERS (EXCEPT FOR CROCKER, IF AS EXPECTED HE GETS THE JOB OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY) HAVE NOT FOCUSED ON THE DETAILS OF THE PROBLEM. IF THEY DID DECIDE TO VETO THE NEW U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD CLEARLY BE MORE COMFORTABLE EXERCISING A VETO IN COMPANY WITH THE UK AND (BETTER STILL) WITH FRANCE AS WELL. THEY WOULD CERTAINLY EXPECT BRITISH SUPPORT.

HENDERSON

*NAMIBIA STANDARD.  
S. AF. 3.  
OAS.  
UNO.  
NAD.  
ECD.  
ERD.  
CABINET OFFICE*

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

SECRET