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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 010145Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 347 OF 31 MARCH 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV (FOR S OF S'S PARTY), BUENOS AIRES,
WASHINGTON, PORT STANLEY (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR), MODUK, CINC
FLEET AND F OF F1 (EMBARKED).

MY TELNO 343: FALKLAND ISLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. ON FURTHER REFLECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASISE THE FOLLOWING POINTS.
2. IT WOULD BE UNWISE OF US TO CALL THE COUNCIL EXCEPT TO PRE-EMPT AN IMMEDIATE THREAT OF AN ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THEMSELVES. IT WOULD LOOK LUDICROUS IF WE CALLED THE COUNCIL OVER THE SOUTH GEORGIA INCIDENT. WE WOULD GAIN LITTLE SYMPATHY FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA COULD NOT SETTLE A DISPUTE ABOUT THE ILLEGAL PRESENCE OF TEN SCRAP MERCHANTS ON A VIRTUALLY UNINHABITED ISLAND WITHOUT RESORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
3. SECONDLY, I EMPHASISE THAT, IF WE DECIDE TO CALL THE COUNCIL TO DETER AN ARGENTINE MILITARY THREAT TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, WE MUST, REPEAT MUST, BE ABLE TO PRODUCE ABSOLUTELY CONVINCING EVIDENCE IN PUBLIC OF A GENUINE AND IMMEDIATE THREAT OF INVASION. OTHERWISE WE WILL LOOK AS FOOLISH AS THE AMERICANS WHEN THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONVINCE EVEN THEIR OWN PUBLIC OF EG MASSIVE TRANSFERS OF SOVIET WEAPONRY VIA NICARAGUA TO EL SALVADOR.
4. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL LEAVE HERE EITHER ON THE EVENING OF 1 APRIL OR THE FOLLOWING DAY. I AM RELUCTANT TO SPEAK TO HIM UNLESS I HAVE A FIRM REQUEST TO MAKE. HE WOULD BE BOUND TO CONSULT MY ARGENTINE COLLEAGUE IN CONFIDENCE BEFORE TAKING ANY ACTION. THIS MIGHT SIMPLY SERVE TO PRECIPITATE ARGENTINE MILITARY ACTION IF THEY THOUGHT THAT WE WERE ON THE POINT OF MAKING A DETERRENT MOVE IN THE UN.

PARSONS

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