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FROM PRETORIA 040750Z JUL 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 182 OF 4 JUL

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK LUSAKA GABORONE MAPUTO LUANDA

DAR ES SALAAM SALISBURY WASHINGTON LAGOS

SAVING PARIS OTTAWA BONN

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 964 : NAMIBIA

1. AS I SEE IT, OUR PROBLEM, AND THAT OF OUR PARTNERS IN THE FIVE, REMAINS WHAT IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN, NAMELY HOW TO PREVENT THE IRRESISTABLE FORCE, IE THE INCREASINGLY IMPATIENT FRONTLINE STATES AND SWAPO AND THE UNITED NATIONS, COLLIDING DANGEROUSLY (FOR US) WITH THE IMMOVABLE OBJECT, IE SOUTH AFRICA. FOR THE REASONS I HAVE EXPLAINED BEFORE, I REALLY BELIEVE - AND THE PUS WILL BE ABLE TO JUDGE THIS FOR HIMSELF WHEN HE SEES BRAND FOURIE NEXT WEEK - THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE IMMOVABLE IN THE SENSE THAT EKSTEEN NOTWITHSTANDING, THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF COMMITTING THEMSELVES WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT AND PARTICIPATION OF THE INTERNAL PARTIES TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN AGREEMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE HOWEVER MANY CONCESSIONS ARE MADE TO THEM ON THE DETAILS OF THE DEMILITARISED ZONE, IE ON PARAGRAPH 4 OF PIK BOTHA'S LETTER OF 12 MAY. FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT CANNOT CRACK THE WHIP TOO HARD OVER MUDGE AND THE DTA. MUDGE NEEDS TIME TO TRY, EVEN IF VAINLY, TO ESTABLISH HIS NEW ADMINISTRATION. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD SURELY NOT HAVE CARRIED OUT THEIR RECENT RAIDS INTO ANGOLA AND GIVEN THEM SO MUCH PUBLICITY HAD THEY REALLY WANTED TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT SOON. IF, THEREFORE, WE CONCENTRATE ALL OUR ENERGIES ON BATTERING DOWN THE WALL BRICK BY BRICK IN A FRONTAL ASSAULT WE SHALL SOON FIND THAT WE RUN SLAP INTO THE SANCTIONS OBSTACLE INSTEAD.

2. THE WISER COURSE IN MY VIEW IS TO TRY TO FIND A WAY THROUGH THE BRICK WALL, EVEN IF IT TAKES US ALL RATHER LONGER TO REACH THE OTHER SIDE. THAT IS WHY I CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE THAT WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE, ALBEIT DISCREETLY, THE IDEA OF DIRECT SOUTH AFRICAN/SWAPO CONTACTS AND, IF NEED BE, AN ALL-PARTIES CONFERENCE. THANKS TO THE RECENT LUSAKA CONFERENCE, TO THE ANGOLANS AND TO MUGABE THE OPENING IS THERE AND WE SHOULD TRY TO GET THE MAIN PROTAGONISTS THROUGH IT. I CAN SEE WHAT THE PROBLEMS AND COMPLICATIONS WOULD BE OVER PARTICIPTION, REPRESENTATION, SCOPE ETC BUT THESE NEED NOT BE ABSOLUTE OBSTACLES IF WE ALL SET OUR MINDS TO IT.

OF COURSE IT MAY NOT WORK AND THE CLIMATE FOR TALKS IS HARDLY PROMISING AT PRESENT. BUT IF A WAY CAN BE FOUND TO TRY THIS NEW APPROACH IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO BREAK THE IMPASSE IN THE COURSE OF DIRECT DISCUSSION. AT THE VERY LEAST WE SHALL GAIN MORE TIME.

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3. THE ALTERNATIVE OF MAINTAINING OUR PRESENT COURSE SEEMS TO ME TO LEAD INEVITABLY TO AN EARLY CONFRONTATION OF A SERIOUS KIND IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

4. WHAT I AM ADVOCATING ALSO HAS THE POTENTIAL ADVANTAGE, IF WE TREAD DEFTLY, OF PUTTING THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINDING AN AGREEMENT ON THE PARTIES CONCERNED AND OF EXTRICATING OURSELVES AND THE FIVE FROM OUR UNENVIABLE INTERMEDIARY POSITION, IF ONLY FOR A TIME. WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO AVOID PLAYING SOME ROLE IN BRINGING THE PARTIES TOGETHER, BUT AT LEAST WE SHOULD NOT BE THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS, AS WE WOULD BE IF WE FOLLOWED EKSTEEN'S ADVICE AND PUT OURSELVES IN THE LIMELIGHT OF A MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS TOGETHER WITH WALDHEIM. I CANNOT JUDGE FROM HERE WHAT THE ELECTION CONSIDERATIONS, IF ANY, OF SOME OF OUR PARTNERS MAY BE IN THE WHOLE AFFAIR, BUT SURELY THERE IS NO ADVANTAGE FOR US IN THIS KIND OF EXPOSURE. THERE IS NOT MUCH JOY EITHER, I REALISE, IN BEING SEEN TO BE THE ODD MAN OUT AMONGST THE FIVE. TO REVERT, THEREFORE, TO THE EARLIER METAPHOR, COULD WE PEGHAPS CONSIDER APPEALING TO OUR PARTNERS, IF NECESSARY AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, TO TRY THIS NEW APPROACH TOGETHER INSTEAD OF STUMBLING ALONG WEARILY AND SOMEWHAT OUT OF STEP UNTIL SHORTLY WE FIND THAT THE WAY WE ARE GOING IS TOTALLY BLOCKED OFF?

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

LEAHY

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