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MSG FROM: NSWRP --CPUA
To: NSAGK --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL

NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON
Subject: Thatcher Letter
Wilma, would you please print out for AGK? Thanks.

*** Forwarding note from NSPRS --CPUA 12/03/86 08:44 ***
To: NSRBM --CPUA ALTON G. KEEL NSWRP

NOTE FROM: Peter Sommer
SUBJECT: Thatcher Letter

Bob Pearson is sending you a copy of the brief letter Mrs Thatcher sent the President last evening. I recommend that you show it to the President at today's 0930 meeting. The letter in essence is a plea to have the upcoming NATO DPC and NAC communique--one will be issued at the end of this week, the other at the end of next week--conform to the agreed Camp David points. The letter was prompted by initial Defense stiff arming against earlier British suggestions to this effect. Defense prefers the more general formula, which apparently does not emphasize the first five year priorities, in the NATO NPG October communique. The NPG communique was post-Reykjavik but pre-Camp David.

I have also recommended that a copy of the letter be provided immediately to State and Defense since the action is really in their hands. Final communique language is agreed to by "Ministers" in Brussels. We may also want to consider forwarding State and Defense any specific Presidential reaction to MRS T's letter. Bob Linhard may want to comment on how to handle the British request. As he told me yesterday, there is a way to "square the circle".

cc: NSREL --CPUA NSDAM --CPUA
NSJFM --CPUA NSLFB --CPUA
cc: NSWGH --CPUA NSPRS --CPUA
NSRBM --CPUA

Amb. Antony Ireland

NSC 8608571

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CURRENT U.S. TEXT FOR USE IN THIS
PORTION OF THE DPC COMMUNIQUE ON
THE TABLE AT NATO IN BRUSSELS

- 13. WE SUPPORT THE UNITED STATES' INTENTION TO BUILD UPON THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED AT REYKJAVIK IN SEEKING BALANCED, EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON ALL OF THESE ISSUES. WE AGREED THAT INSTEAD OF SIMPLY CODIFYING THE EXISTING LEVELS OF ARSENALS, AGREEMENTS REACHED IN GENEVA SHOULD SEEK TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR FORCES IN WAYS THAT WILL ENHANCE STABILITY AND MINIMIZE THE RISK OF WAR.

- 14. WE FULLY ENDORSED THE UNITED STATES' POSITIONS AT GENEVA ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE, STRATEGIC, AND DEFENCE AND SPACE SYSTEMS. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE AGREED THAT STRONG SUPPORT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE PRIORITY OF ACHIEVING AN INF AGREEMENT WITH APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS ON RIGHTS AND CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE INF MISSILES; A 50 CUT OVER FIVE YEARS IN UNITED STATES AND SOVIET STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES - EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION TO BE AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN BOTH CASES. NOTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION AGREED LAST YEAR TO CONCLUDE A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT, MINISTERS CALLED ON THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP NOT TO HOLD AN INF AGREEMENT HOSTAGE TO ANY OTHER AGREEMENT. A FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD DESTROY THE CREDIBILITY OF THE HIGHEST SOVIET ASSURANCES. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE UNITED STATES' EXPLORATION OF SPACE AND DEFENCE SYSTEMS, AS IS PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY.))

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IMMEDIATE USNATO FOR ASD RICHARD PERLE (SECDEF'S PARTY)
(PLEASE DELIVER BY 0700, 4 December)

FROM: COL BOB LINHARD

SUBJECT: DPC Communique Language

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. Per our telcon, the text of the recent correspondence between Mrs. Thatcher and the President and the subsequent UK language had been forwarded by SEPTEL to be delivered to you by 7am.

3. Here is the composite text that we discussed on the phone.

a. [Based on US para 13] Following Reykjavik, we support the United States' in seeking balanced, equitable and effectively verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. We agreed that instead of simply codifying the existing levels of arsenals, agreements reached in Geneva should seek to achieve substantial reductions in offensive nuclear forces in ways that will enhance stability and minimize the risk of war.

b. [New para 14 based on Thatcher language] We, therefore, welcome the progress at Reykjavik towards agreement on 50% strategic reductions and on long-range intermediate nuclear weapons -- effective verification to be an essential element in both cases. We fully endorse the U.S. determination to negotiate detailed agreements on this basis and urge the Soviet Union to join in this effort at the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva. Progress on INF must not be held hostage to any other agreement, nor must it neglect the existing imbalances in SRINF of all relevant ranges for which constraints and equal rights must be provided. The Soviet advantage in SRINF ballistic missiles will need to be addressed. In the same context, we strongly support the United States' exploration of space and defense systems, as permitted by the ABM Treaty. We will continue to consult closely on all of these issues.

4. The UK Embassy (John Kerr) indicated that the UK could be prepared to accept the composite language above if it were agreeable to the US. I told the UK embassy that we would take this text under consideration but that we would next like to see the outcome of the progress that could be made at the Weinberger-Younger meeting.

5. Will await your call and debrief in the morning. Best Regards. YY

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Bob -

We spoke to Peter Sommer last evening about this letter. In addition to copies to Bob Linhard and himself, Peter suggests a copy of this be sent to State and Defense. I have sent copies to Sommer and Matlock.

Karen