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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD

September 20, 1979

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: WILLIAM E. ODOM<sup>WEO</sup>  
SUBJECT: Weekly Report

Afghanistan

The DCI's alert on a possible Soviet military intervention seems to have missed the critical point although there was some chance of a limited intervention. Taraki was Moscow's man. The Amin coup apparently caught the Soviets off balance.

25X1

The Politics of Soviet Cultural Affairs

You may have noticed that the Soviets closed the exhibit, Russian Art 1800-1850, at Renwick across the street on Saturday. It was to run until November 11. This unprecedented Soviet step is apparently a retaliation for defector mezzo-soprano Renata Babak's recital of 19th Century Russian songs scheduled for this Sunday. The Smithsonian is sponsoring the recital and, of course, the Renwick is a Smithsonian gallery. Add the two Bolshoi defections this week, and the score for the Soviet Ministry of Culture is low. (U)

NSA review  
completed

State Dept. review  
completed

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NLC Review  
Completed.

Classified by Dir, NSA  
Review on September 20, 2009

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Soviet Reactions on the Brigade in Cuba Issue

As Les Denend pointed out to me today, we need to think about the dynamics of Soviet behavior in this episode as well as our own domestic dynamics. Two possible points for counter pressure by the Soviets come to mind. First, we should not forget the hints about the allied patrols to East Berlin. Second, opportunities for destabilizing the things on the Saudi Arabian peninsula from the base in South Yeman are considerable. We have tasked the DCI to focus on this problem. A third more general Soviet tactic is conceivable. The Politburo might write this Administration off as too inept to deal with and merely wait out the election next year. To achieve this hiatus they would have to discount SALT and make a number of concessionary gestures to the West Europeans sufficient to keep alive European confidence that detente is irreversible. It is not inconceivable that West European leaders, except possibly for **Thatcher**, could be brought to share the Soviet view about waiting the U.S. out for the next 18 months. We have thought a great deal about nuclear coupling and decoupling. The present crisis over Cuba could confront us with political decoupling. (S)

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