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TO IMMEDIATE BELGRADE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 222 OF 26 SEPTEMBER

FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF PRIVATE SECRETARY WAS RECEIVED FROM UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1352 OF 24 SEPTEMBER

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

1. A TRIPARTITE BREAKFAST, HOSTED BY THE FRENCH, TOOK PLACE THIS MORNING, WITH THREE A SIDE PRESENT. THE CONVERSATION WAS VERY INFORMAL, WITH FRANCOIS PONCET IN PARTICULAR THINKING ALOUD RATHER THAN EXPRESSING CONSIDERED VIEWS.

IRAN/IRAQ

2. FRANCOIS PONCET WAS SOMEWHAT MYSTIFIED BY MUSKIE'S ATTITUDE DURING A BRIEF INFORMAL DISCUSSION AMONGST THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS THE PREVIOUS EVENING. IT WAS AGREED THAT MUSKIE PROBABLY WANTED TO QUOTE THE EUROPEANS IN SUPPORT OF A CONTROLLED REACTION TO EVENTS IN THIS AREA SHOULD HE ENCOUNTER AN EXCITED MOOD AT A WHITE HOUSE MEETING THIS MORNING. THERE WAS ALSO SOME DISCUSSION OF THE POSITION IN THE GULF AND THE THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. FRANCOIS PONCET HAD CLEARLY TAKEN SERIOUSLY AN ENQUIRY BY MUSKIE THE PREVIOUS EVENING ABOUT WHAT THE FRENCH COULD DO TO HELP MILITARILY: HE THOUGHT A FRENCH AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND FORTY PLANES WERE IN THE AREA, POSSIBLE OFF DJIBUTI. ANY ATTEMPT TO CLOSE THE STRAITS COULD PRESENT A REASONABLY MANAGEABLE CHALLENGE. HE SUPPOSED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE RELUCTANT TO BE INVOLVED BECAUSE OF THE HOSTAGES. HE HAD BEEN STRUCK ONCE AGAIN BY THE PERSISTENCE OF THE "VIETNAM SYNDROME" IN MUSKIE'S REMARKS. THE AMERICANS WERE EMBARKING ON A HIGH-RISK PROGRAMME IN THE AREA BY ESTABLISHING BASES AND INCURRING GREAT EXPENSE. THEY WERE AFRAID THAT THESE MIGHT LEAD TO ENTANGLEMENTS, AND OF BEING LEFT ALONE TO FACE THE CONSEQUENCES. FRANCOIS PONCET HAD ALSO BEEN STRUCK BY MUSKIE'S REACTION TO GROMYKO'S SPEECH: HE SEEMED TO BE APPREHANSIVE ABOUT ESCALATION IF THE RUSSIANS ACTUALLY BELIEVED WHAT THEY SAID. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT THAT MUSKIE HAD MEANT THAT GROMYKO'S SPEECH MIGHT HAVE MADE SOME IMPACT ON DETACHED OBSERVERS, WHO MIGHT THINK THAT HE HAD MADE OUT A CASE WHICH NEEDED ANSWERING.

3. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT THAT THE THREAT TO THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WAS LESS MILITARY (IT WAS LESS EASY TO CLOSE THE STRAITS THAN MIGHT BE SUPPOSED) THAN PSYCHOLOGICAL. LLOYDS HAD ALREADY DECLARED THE GULF A WAR AREA, AND THE RISK WAS THAT SHIP OWERS WOULD SIMPLY STAY CLEAR. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT ANY ACTION TO KEEP THE STRAITS OPEN WOULD NEED TO BE CAREFULLY PREPARED DIPLOMATICALLY WITH THE ARABS, WHO MIGHT SUPPORT IT IN PRIVATE, BUT NOT IN PUBLIC. AS A FIRST STEP WE NEEDED TO FIND OUT WHAT SHIPS WERE THERE: WHAT THE THREAT TO THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WAS AND HOW TO COUNTER IT: AND WHAT THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES WOULD BE.

QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS.

4. LORD CARRINGTON SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO RESPOND WHEN THE AMERICANS SHOWED INTEREST IN QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATION. NOW THAT WE HAD TO DEAL SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH AFGHANISTAN, THE MIDDLE EAST, IRAN/IRAQ AND POLAND, IT WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL TO KEEP IN CLOSER TOUCH THAN THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS COULD NORMALLY MANAGE. FOUR POWER CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON BASED ON THE EMBASSIES WOULD PROBABLY LEAK. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION (AND SOME SLIGHT HESITATION BY FRANCOIS PONCET) IT WAS AGREED TO PROPOSE TO THE AMERICANS THAT THIS MORE CONTINUOUS CONSULTATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN PARIS BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR THERE AND THE THREE POLITICAL DIRECTORS, WITH MILITARY ADVICE AS NECESSARY.

PAKISTAN

5. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE SLIPPAGE IN THE PALISTANI ATTITUDE WAS A CAUSE FOR REAL CONCERN. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT GISCARD WOULD SEE PRESIDENT ZIA IN PARIS TOMORROW. LORD CARRINGTON

PAKISTAN

5. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE SLIPPAGE IN THE PALISTANI ATTITUDE WAS A CAUSE FOR REAL CONCERN. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT GISCARD WOULD SEE PRESIDENT ZIA IN PARIS TOMORROW. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT AGHA SHAHI WAS VERY BITTER ABOUT THE EUROPEANS' "BUSINESS AS USUAL" ATTITUDE TO THE RUSSIANS. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE PAKISTANIS WERE FACING SOVIET AND INDIAN PRESSURE. THE FACT WAS THAT, IN A CRUNCH, NO-ONE WOULD HELP THEM, AND THEY KNEW IT. THE GERMANS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY COULD ONLY HELP FINANCIALLY AND NOT MILITARILY, AND THE AMERICANS HAD OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES TOO. IT WAS NOTED THAT HOPES THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD FINANCE LARGE-SCALE MILITARY SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN HAD NOT MATERIALISED. ARAB COUNTRIES WERE GIVING PRIORITY TO THE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION. LORD CARRINGTON SUGGESTED THAT THE NINE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO GET SOME RETURN FROM THE ARABS FOR THEIR POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST IN TERMS OF AFGHANISTAN: IF THEY COULD ESTABLISH THIS LINK, SO COULD WE.

6. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT IF THE PAKISTANIS RECOGNISED BABRAK KAMAL, OTHER MOSLEM COUNTRIES WOULD FOLLOW. THE PAKISTANIS WERE ALSO THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE FOR THE RESISTANCE. WE SHOULD THINK ABOUT ALTERNATIVE ROUTES. LORD CARRINGTON SAID IT WAS CLEAR FROM HIS TALK WITH GROVMKO THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN A SETTLEMENT. WE THEREFORE HAD TO DECIDE ON A LONG TERM POLICY. FRANCOIS PONCET AGREED: WE NEEDED "A MATURE AND CYNICAL ATTITUDE OVER A LONG PERIOD". WE SHOULD DECIDE JUST WHAT WE WERE PREPARED TO DO BOTH ON HELPING THE RESISTANCE AND ON PAKISTAN.

POLAND

7. GENSCHER THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT MOVE INTO POLAND IN ABOUT SIX MONTHS, AFTER MADRID WAS OUT OF THE WAY. THE ONLY WAY THE WEST COULD HELP TO STABILISE THE SITUATION, EVEN AT A LOW ECONOMIC LEVEL WHICH EXISTED BEFORE THE STRIKES BEGAN, WAS BY STRONG ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT SO FAR AS WESTERN ECONOMIC AID WAS CONCERNED THE QUESTION WAS NOT WHETHER BUT HOW MUCH. WHEN HE HAD SEEN THE FORMER POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER IN PARIS RECENTLY, WOJTASEK HAD IMPLIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD STICK TO THE LETTER OF THE GDANSK AGREEMENT, BUT WOULD FEEL FREE TO BREAK IT UNLESS THE UNIONS DID LIKEWISE. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE GDR FOREIGN MINISTER, FISCHER, HAD CLAIMED THAT THE POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY WOULD SOON REGAIN LOST GROUND AND POLAND WOULD "GET BACK INSTEP". PUJA, THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, HAD TAKEN A SIMILAR LINE. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT THAT THIS REFLECTED CONCERN AMONGST THE MORE HARD-LINE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND PERSONALITIES, AND ALSO A CERTAIN DEFENSIVENESS.

U.N. SPECIAL SESSION ON DEVELOPMENT

8. GENSCHER THOUGHT THE US, UK AND GERMAN TACTICS HAD BEEN MISTAKEN, AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HOPED TO SECURE A CHANGE IN THE GERMAN POSITION AFTER THE ELECTIONS. WE SHOULD NOT HAVE FOUGHT THE BATTLE ON THE MANDATE, BUT DURING SUBSTANTIAL NEGOTIATIONS HE HOPED THAT THE BRITISH WOULD CHANGE THEIR POLICY TOO. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED HOW LITTLE REACTION THERE HAD BEEN TO THE US-UK-GERMAN ACTION.

MIDDLE EAST

9. FRANCOIS PONCET SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO SPELL OUT SOME FACTS OF LIFE TO MUSKIE AT THE MINISTERIAL QUADRIPARTITE MEETING THAT EVENING, BUT ACCEPTED GENSCHER'S ADVICE NOT TO FIX MUSKIE ON A HOOK.

10. FOR COMMUNICATIONS DEPT. PLEASE CONSULT PRIVATE OFFICE ON DISTRIBUTION.

CARRINGTON

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