

WHITE PAPER LIST, EMBARGOES ETC

We had no evidence that the White Paper List was not as informative as it could be at the time it was produced. On CFR embargoes we wanted 24 hours where possible. The Lobby were invited to provide evidence if/when we seemed to fall short of this ideal.

PRIME MINISTER'S ENGAGEMENTS

0945: Courtesy call, new Indonesian Ambassador, Saleh Basarah. President Soeharto's State visit next week.

12 noon: NATO Secretary, General Dr Josef Luns. First formal call on PM. Also seeing SoS/Defence. Lunching with Foreign Secretary. Subjects for discussion: NATO affairs and Western defence. We do not expect to brief on the meeting.

1645 (in H/C): Dr Ferech Adami, leader of Maltese Nationalist (Opposition) Party. At own request. Also seeing Foreign Secretary. Adami met PM at European Democratic Union Conference in London, July.

1700 (No 10): Portuguese Democratic Alliance: Dr Francisco de Sa Carneiro (President Social Democratic Party); Professor Diogo Freitas do Amaral (President Centre Social Democrat Party, CDS); Eng. Goncalo Ribeiro Teles (President Popular Monarchist Party, PPM). Courtesy call.

2000 (No 10): Farewell dinner for Archbishop of Canterbury. Ecumenical occasion. Full guest list available.

PARLIAMENT

1530: Lord Privy Seal: Statement on Rhodesia (Foreign Secretary in Lords at 1500). Revised business statement by Chancellor, Duchy of Lancaster.

Supply debate on steel industry (SoS/Ind is expected to announce Assisted Area status for Corby).

M/Transport substantive oral PQ on setting-up working party on traffic laws.

RHODESIA

We refused to be drawn about the PM's meeting with the Leader of the Opposition which was on Privy Council terms. We think that the Opposition had requested the meeting. We rehearsed the likely events later today and the timetable for the Bill (and, after the Lobby, corrected the impression we had given that all stages in both Houses would be dealt with this week). Our latest understanding is that it should go through the H/C this week and would go into the H/L next week, probably Monday. We refused to be drawn on whether the Opposition had indicated their position on the Bill. HMG was confident it could get the Bill through, though this obviously depended on Opposition co-operation and there could be delays.

RHODESIA (Cont)

We again rehearsed our understanding of the Bill (it is an enabling Bill to appoint a Governor, bring back Zimbabwe Rhodesia to legality and enable the organisation of elections and the administration of the country. It is a forward-looking Bill) and explained that it does not deal directly with sanctions. We once more went over some of the sanctions ground and eventually parried further questions by indicating that more would be revealed this afternoon.

RAIL CLOSURES

We understand there have been no discussions between M/Transport and BR on closures.

DARRYN CLARKE

CFRs tomorrow. The local paper were told to go and sort out their problems with DHSS.

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PRIME MINISTER'S ENGAGEMENTS ETC:

We repeated the essential logistical points of the 11.00 am briefing after ...

RHODESIA BILL:

Nick Fenn, FCO, gave a briefing on the Rhodesia Bill.

He said that the Bill was an enabling Bill to give powers to implement the results of the Constitutional Conference. It would cover making a Constitution, holding elections, bringing into force parts of the Constitution covering an election and the appointment of a Governor. He said it was not an independence Bill (that would follow); it was not a Bill about sanctions and it was not an attempt to pre-empt the Conference and the Patriotic Front. It was needed quickly because delaying any implementation would cost lives and would put the settlement at risk. It was needed quickly also to maintain the momentum of the Conference where, he emphasised, the negotiations were three-sided and no one had a veto.

On the Conference itself he said that the PF had already accepted the Constitution, the Governor and elections; and the Salisbury Delegation had, inter alia, accepted that the present Government would not exercise its Ministerial role during the transitional period.


On sanctions he said that Section 2 was important as a "political symbol" and given the progress made at the Conference, HMG think it would be wrong to renew S2. Other sanction powers would be lifted when the country returned to legality. There was, however, a clause in the Bill - 3(1)(b)(i) - which was a general enabling power under which sanctions of the S2 type could be continued. Ministers wanted to reserve their position, taking a decision based on the actual situation that would exist next week.

In answer to questions, points he made were:

- The PM has ruled out the use of troops. But the Governor would have the right (as all Governors seemingly have) to deploy troops. It was not HMG's intention to be dragged into sending in troops if the Conference collapsed. HMG had taken an "act of courage". It was an "assertion of UK responsibility"; and it had been worth trying - look at what had already been achieved.
- Maintaining the momentum was crucial. There was a danger of the agreement being unravelled if HMG couldn't act as quickly as possible when agreement was reached. The Governor, he agreed, should be ready to leave within hours.
- The PF, he acknowledged, could use the existence of the Bill as a reason for delay. They were also waiting for Kenneth Kaunda. But the existence of the Bill was also an incentive to them.
- The general enabling power in the Bill was, he acknowledged, "a sweetener to Salisbury".

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- He agreed that the 15 November deadline was "inconvenient".
- Oil: HMG could rely only on the assurances of the oil companies and it expected them to observe the rules.
- He hoped there would be no trouble from the UN. Cautioned against "the unwisdom of boat-rocking".
- Timetable: HMG wanted two months from ceasefire. PF want 2 months to arrange [?] ceasefire + 3 months to demarcate consistencies, bring back refugees etc (which HMG argued would take a year). HMG were prepared to go for party list system, a perfectly valid democratic process. PF said they controlled 90% of the country... so why ask for a long time? HMG flexible - would negotiate at the margin...


8-11
