



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
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MO 5/21
 14/2

4th June 1982

Dear John,

*A. J. C. 14/2
 h.a.*

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VISIT - US ASSISTANCE
IN THE FALKLANDS CONTEXT

In his telegram number 1977 of 1st June, Sir Nicholas Henderson has drawn attention to the important part played personally by both Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Haig in ensuring that our requests for military assistance in the Falklands context are met as fully and rapidly as possible. The Defence Secretary felt that it would be of value to you to have a note on the scale and value of this assistance before the Prime Minister's meetings with American leaders later this week.

The continued provision of this assistance is important for both military and political reasons. Militarily, the additional intelligence and communications facilities the US are making available to us, together with the equipment they are releasing, are without doubt important for our operational capability in the South Atlantic. The main features of the assistance which the US are providing to us are shown at Annex. It is particularly notable that a high proportion of this equipment is not normally procured by us from the US, which has inevitably led to some penalties for the United States' own forces.

The US have met in full virtually all our requests and have been very helpful in setting up arrangements for handling them quickly. These arrangements have worked well. To minimise our expenditure on consumables which may not ultimately be needed (munitions, spares etc) they have also agreed to hold stocks forward in US depots in Europe and on Ascension Island, with charges for the equipment being raised only as we draw items from store.

The US have made it clear that they do not wish to reveal publicly the extent of the help with which they are providing us. They are very worried about the effects on their relations with Latin America. We must accept this as a fact of life. But the clandestine nature of the assistance does pose difficult presentational problems for both the Americans and us, especially

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in rebutting misleading accounts of the assistance which the US are providing.

Quite apart from the wider political aspects, we do need the practical help the Americans are giving us. For this reason we should express warm thanks to the President for the solid way in which he has stuck by his commitment to us, and to show that we are fully aware of the strong personal support which both Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Haig have given over our requests.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Your ever
David Omand
(D B OMAND)

ANNEXMAIN FEATURES OF US MATERIEL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE
IN THE FALKLANDS CONTEXT

1. US assistance falls into three main categories: materiel assistance, logistic support and intelligence. The main features of each are outlined below. Those at paras 2.b. and d. are particularly sensitive.

2. Materiel Assistance

The following items either have been supplied or are being obtained from the US:

a. Anti-missile defences

2 VULCAN PHALANX close in defence systems for ships;

13 Chaff Dispensers, with 3,000 rounds.

b. Anti-aircraft defences

100 SIDEWINDER air-to-air missiles (further 200 missiles held in Europe for use if absolutely necessary);

8 STINGER surface-to-air weapons with 60 missiles.

c. Communications

16 MOTOROLA tactical satellite communication sets;

12 NESTOR secure speech sets.

d. Mines

50 LIMPET mines (provided subject to not being used in Argentina itself).

- e. Ground weapons and ammunition
4 Mortars, with 1,000 High Explosive and 200 illuminating rounds;
4,000 grenades;
24 BROWNING machine-gun mountings.
- f. Anti-radar missiles
10 SHRIKE anti-radar missiles.
- g. Personnel Protection
64 sets of NORTON body armour for helicopter crews.
- h. Night vision
22 sets of Passive Night Goggles for pilots (ordered pre-Falklands, but delivery accelerated).
- i. Engineering spares and equipment
HARRIER spares;
15 CHINOOK helicopter engines (ordered pre-Falklands, but delivery accelerated).

3. Logistic Support

- a. Ascension Island
Use of US-administered airfield and access to US fuel facilities, which have been replenished to meet our requirements. In addition, US C141 aircraft have flown accommodation and water purification units to Ascension Island for our use.
- b. Airfield matting
150,000 square yards of AM2 Airfield Matting and ancillary equipment.

c. Sea transport capacity

Conversion of the repair ship, SS STENA INSPECTOR, at a US shipyard.

d. Air-to-air refuelling

Provision of 2 KC 130 tankers in the UK to substitute for VICTOR tankers being used from Ascension Island.

4. Intelligence

Continuing close co-operation between our respective intelligence agencies, including the provision of a wide range of crucial additional intelligence material, and the exchange of intelligence assessments.