
00

ZZ FCO

GR 600
SECRET
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 200210Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 793 OF 19 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MY TELS 789 TO 791 : FALKLANDS



- 1. SINCE MY TELS UNDER REFERENCE WERE DESPATCHED, THE SECRETARYGENERAL HAS DROPPED AN EXTREMELY EMBARRASSING BOMBSHELL. AS YOU
 KNOW, I HAVE BEEN HOLDING HIM BACK SINCE LAST FRIDAY FROM
 PRODUCING HIS OWN PAPER. MY MOST RECENT EFFORTS, WHICH I THOUGHT
 HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL, WERE MADE THIS MORNING (MY TEL NO 786, PARA 3).
 2. HOWEVER, HE HAS NOW LAUNCHED HIS PAPER (TEXT IN MIFT) AND
 HAS SENT COPIES TO ME AND ROS (ARGENTINA) WITH THE REQUEST THAT WE
 SHOULD TRANSMIT THEM TO OUR GOVERNMENTS OVERNIGHT AND LET HIM HAVE
 A REACTION AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TOMORROW MORNING (28 MAY).
 HE HAS ALSO HINTED AT THIS DEVELOPMENT IN HIS PRESS STATEMENT
 REPORTED IN MY TELNO 792.
- 3. WHEN WE REMONSTRATED WITH HIS STAFF THAT THIS MOVE WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE BRITISH POSITION AS I HAD DESCRIBED IT TO HIM AS RECENTLY AS LUNCH TIME TODAY, AND AS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD EXPLAINED IT TO HIM ON THE TELEPHONE, THEY SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED TO MAKE IT BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONCLUDING REMARKS IN HER CONVERSATION WITH HIM WHEN SHE HAD SAID SHE WOULD BE PREPARED TO LOOK AT ANY FRESH PROPOSALS. IT LOOKS THEREFORE AS THOUGH PEREZ DE CUELLAR, IN HIS DESPERATE DESIRE NOT TO SIGN OFF, HAS CHOSEN TO IGNORE THE CLARIFICATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS WHICH I GAVE HIM THIS EVENING (MY TEL NO 789, PARA 4). 4. THE PAPER IS VERY CLEVERLY DRAFTED AND IS UNDOUBTEDLY MORE FAVOURABLE TO US THAN TO ARGENTINA. BUT I FULLY REALISE THAT IT HAS COME TOO LATE, ALTHOUGH HIS PUBLIC HINT AT ITS EXISTENCE (WHICH MAY BE AMPLIFED BY LEAKS FROM THE SECRETARIAT) IS LIKELY TO GIVE YOU DIFFICULTIES IN THE COMMONS DEBATE. I ALSO REALISE THAT THE ARGENTINES ARE LIKELY TO ACCEPT IT AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. AS IT CONTAINS THE SEEDS FOR WEEKS OF FURTHER

5. FOR EXAMPLE, THE DETAILS OF WITHDRAWAL, VERIFICATION AND NON-REINTRODUCTION WOULD HAVE TO BE SPELT OUT AND NEGOTIATED. S ROOM FOR ENDLESS ARGUMENT ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT THE DEPENDENCIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS AND EXCLUDED FROM THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. THE ARGENTINES COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO AGREE OUT-OF-HAND TO THE FORMULATIONS ON TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH ARE GENERALLY FAVOURABLE TO US. THE SAME IS TRUE OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. AND THERE ARE OTHER POINTS. TO PUT IT IN A NUTSHELL, THE PAPER WOULD HAVE FORMED A GOOD BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS TEN DAYS AGO, BUT IT IS NOTHING BUT AN EMBARRASSMENT TO US NOW. 6. THE ONLY COURSE OF ACTION I CAN SUGGEST IS THE FOLLOWING. I COULD SAY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TOMORROW (20 MAY) THAT HIS PAPER DIFFERS IN CERTAIN IMPORTANT RESPECTS FROM OUR BOTTOM LINE AS PRESENTED TO HIM ON 17 MAY, ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNISE ITS POSITIVE ASPECTS. A FORTIOR! IT DIFFERS FUNDAMENTALLY FROM THE PRESENT ARGENTINE POSITION AS COMMUNICATED TO US TODAY (19 MAY). EVEN IF IT WERE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT NEGOTIATION OF IT WOULD TAKE MANY DAYS, IF NOT WEEKS, TO REACH EITHER SUCCESS OR FAILURE. HE KNEW HOW SERIOUS I WAS ABOUT OUR DEADLINE OF MIDDAY NEW YORK TIME TODAY (19 MAY). EVEN IF WE WERE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BUSIS OF HIS PAPER, WE WOULD FIRST WISH TO SEE DETAILED ARGENTINE COMMENTS ON IT, GOING BEYOND A SIMPLE AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT IT AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. MEANWHILE, I WOULD HAVE TO MAKE CLEAR TO HIM THAT THE EXISTENCE OF HIS PAPER WOULD NOT AFFECT ANY MILITARY PLANS WE MIGHT HAVE - I WOULD NEED TO SAY THIS NOT ONLY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN GOOD FAITH BUT IN CRDER TO AVOID ANY IMPLICATION THAT WE WERE ALLOWING OUR HANDS TO BE TIED BY THIS LAST MINUTE INITIATIVE. _

YOU MAY NOT WISH ME TO SAY THIS, BUT I COULD GO ON TO SAY THAT,

THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND MIGHT CHANGE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO

WHILE WE WERE WAITING FOR DETAILED ARGENTINE COMMENTS ON HIS PAPER,

PARSONS

SUPERCEDE THIS IDEA.

NNNN