

Mr. Keogh  
Mr. Clarke ex. 912  
PA  
10/2/82

More of the same  
from Rouco. Some  
of it is patently absurd,  
but again much seems  
to reflect an official  
briefing.

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FOLLOWING FOR : C C BRIGHT ESQ, SAMD, FCO

COPY (BY BAG) : M W GROWCOTT ESQ, PORT STANLEY

FROM : M HICKSON, BRITISH EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

FALKLANDS : LA PRENSA ARTICLE

THE FOLLOWING IS AN EXTRACT FROM AN ARTICLE ENTITLED QUOTE THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS FRONT UNQUOTE BY IGLESIAS ROUCO IN LA PRENSA, BUENOS AIRES, ON 7 FEBRUARY: BEGINS

THE FOREIGN POLICY FRONT WILL BE WELL-OFF FOR NEWS THIS WEEK. OVER THE NEXT THREE OR FOUR DAYS, ARGENTINA WILL BE PRESENTING BRITAIN WITH A KIND OF PACKAGE OF CONDITIONS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE NOW INTOLERABLE PROBLEM OF THE MALVINAS. THE SITUATION IN BOLIVIA /...../ WILL ALSO BE SUBJECT TO INTENSE ANALYSIS /...../. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WILL COMMENCE A STUDY OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH VENEZUELA /...../.

THE DETERMINATION WITH WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS FACING UP TO THE MALVINAS NO DOUBT CONFORMS TO THE MOST POSITIVE CHAPTER OF ITS POLICY, TOGETHER WITH ITS WISH TO CLARIFY POSITIONS IN THE BEAGLE QUESTION. ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCES, AMONG THE CONDITIONS WHICH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WILL PRESENT TO LONDON ON WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY WILL FEATURE A SERIES OF DEADLINES TO RESOLVE THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM, AND A DEMAND FOR BRITISH RECOGNITION OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS AND THEIR INTENTION TO RETURN THEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN RESOLUTIONS. FROM WHAT WE KNOW, BUENOS AIRES IS NOT PREPARED TO GO ON TALKING INDEFINITELY, NOR TO PUT BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS AGAIN SOMETHING ON WHICH THE WORLD ORGANISATION HAS ALREADY PRONOUNCED. IF LONDON DOES NOT AGREE TO BIND ITSELF TO A WRITTEN TIMETABLE, BUENOS AIRES WILL APPARENTLY RESERVE THE RIGHT TO TAKE OTHER ACTION. WE FORECAST A FORTNIGHT AGO THAT SUCH ACTION MIGHT BY NO MEANS EXCLUDE THE RECOVERY OF THE ISLANDS BY MILITARY MEANS.

BESIDES THE ATTENDANT HISTORICAL RIGHTS AND THE INFINITE PATIENCE FAR SHOWN BY ARGENTINA, THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS THAT THE MALVINAS SITUATION IS SERIOUSLY INTERFERING WITH OUR SECURITY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, IS LIMITING OUR ECONOMIC AND GEOPOLITICAL PLANS, INCLUDING ONES RELATING TO ANTARCTICA, AND BEARS MOREOVER IN A MOST NEGATIVE FASHION ON OUR DISPUTE WITH CHILE OVER THE BEAGLE. LOOKING AT THE SUBJECT FROM AN INTERNATIONAL, OR WESTERN, VIEWPOINT, THE BRITISH PRESENCE THERE DEPRIVES ARGENTINA OF ITS PROPER PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENCE OF THE REGION AGAINST CONSTANT SOVIET PENETRATION, AND AS THE STATE DEPARTMENT ITSELF HAS BEEN OBSERVING FOR SOME TIME, THIS MAKES ANY STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR THE AREA VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE OR OF DOUBTFUL VALUE. SO IF IT IS BORNE IN MIND THAT IT IS NOT ONLY THIS COUNTRY WHICH FINDS ITSELF DAILY MORE PREJUDICED BY BRITAIN'S INEXPLICABLE OBSTINACY, IT SEEMS EASY TO PREDICT THAT AN INITIATIVE INVOLVING FORCE COULD COUNT NOT ONLY ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, PARTICULARLY OF THE THIRD WORLD, BUT ALSO ON THE SUPPORT, OR AT LEAST THE INTERESTED TOLERANCE, OF NATO, HOWEVER MUCH THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET MAY SHOW FORMAL SOLIDARITY WITH BRITAIN. FOR THE REST, THE FACT THAT ARGENTINA DOES NOT DEPEND ON THE APPROVAL OF ANY PARTNER OF THE UNITED STATES IN ORDER TO JOIN A DEFENSIVE PACT LIKE NATO - OR AN ECONOMIC ONE LIKE THE COMMON MARKET - COMPLETELY RULES OUT ARGENTINA'S NEED FOR A TREATY LIKE THE ONE SPAIN HAS JUST SIGNED WITH BRITAIN OVER GIBRALTAR - A TREATY WHICH WAS IMPOSED ON MADRID PRECISELY BY THE POSSIBILITY OF A BRITISH VETO ON ITS ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OR NATO.

ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCES, THESE FAVOURABLE PROSPECTS FOR BUENOS AIRES IN CONNECTION WITH THE MALVINAS CONSTITUTE ONE OF THE MAIN BASES OF ARGENTINA'S FORTHCOMING DIPLOMATIC ACTION, AND THEY ARE ALSO BEING CAREFULLY EVALUATED OVERSEAS. THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ADVANTAGES WHICH THE REGIME WOULD DERIVE FROM THE RECOVERY OF THE MALVINAS WOULD BE MERELY ADDITIONAL, ALTHOUGH NO LESS INTERESTING THEREBY TO THOSE IN POWER TODAY. AS IF THAT WERE NOT ENOUGH, SUCH ADVANTAGES COULD BE CARRIED OVER INTO THE ROME NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BEAGLE - FROM BUENOS AIRES' POINT OF VIEW, BECAUSE THEY WOULD STRENGTHEN ITS POSITION IN THE SOUTH, AND FROM CHILE'S AND THE VATICAN'S BECAUSE A GREATER READINESS TO LISTEN TO THEIR PROPOSALS MIGHT BE EXPECTED OF A GOVERNMENT WITH THE MALVINAS IN ITS HANDS....

ENDS

SIGNED : M HICKSON

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