

## United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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March 24, 1987

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CD167MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRANK C. CARLUCCI  
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: The President's Meeting with Neil Kinnock,  
March 27, 1987

In connection with the President's meeting with UK Labor Party Leader Neil Kinnock on March 27, we are forwarding the attached list of recommended participants in the meeting and biographic reports on Kinnock and the members of his party.


Melvyn Levitsky  
Executive SecretaryAttachments:

1. List of recommended participants
2. Biographic reports

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The President's Meeting with Neil Kinnock, March 27, 1987

Recommended Participants

U.S.

The President  
Secretary Shultz  
Howard Baker, Chief of Staff  
Frank Carlucci, National  
Security Advisor  
Assistant Secretary Ridgway  
NSC Notetaker

UK

Neil Kinnock, Labor Party Leader  
Denis Healey, Labor Foreign  
Affairs Spokesman  
Kevin Barron, Parliamentary  
Private Secretary  
Charles Clarke, Private Secretary  
Patricia Hewitt, Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON March 26, 1987

MEETING WITH NEIL KINNOCK

DATE: March 27, 1987  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 10:00 - 10:10 a.m.  
FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI

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I. PURPOSE: To emphasize our strong opposition to Labor's anti-nuclear policies and to underscore that they could change the "Special Relationship."

II. BACKGROUND: Your meeting with British Labor party leader, Neil Kinnock, comes at a time of intense political interest in the UK. There is increasing speculation that Mrs. Thatcher will call elections later this year. While she need not face elections before June 1988, Mrs. Thatcher recently said publicly that any date during the last year of her five-year term was "fair game." Her comment firmly opens the door for elections anytime after June 9. Mrs. Thatcher's precise thinking is Britain's best kept political secret, but most pundits predict either June or early Fall.

Kinnock has timed his visit to coincide with Mrs. Thatcher's trip to the Soviet Union. He, of course, wants his meeting with you to go well and to show that he, like Mrs. Thatcher, is an important player in international affairs. You often meet with major opposition leaders and Charlie Price strongly urged this meeting; so there is nothing extraordinary about your seeing Kinnock.

While Kinnock will want to accentuate the positive, our objectives are different: we want to make it clear that Labor's defense policies would adversely affect our common security interests and severely strain US-UK relations. This needs to be done firmly, but delicately, as it would strengthen Kinnock if we appeared to be intervening in UK domestic politics.

A majority Labor government would unilaterally dismantle Britain's nuclear forces and close US nuclear bases in Britain. Last week Labor modified its position, when Kinnock promised to keep US cruise missiles in Britain while US-Soviet INF negotiations continue. But this is only a tactical move. Moreover, it still weakens the Western bargaining position because it signals to the Soviets that, should they ever walk away from the table, Labor would still expel our nuclear missiles. The net result of a Labor government would be a "denuclearized" Britain and a drastic weakening of Western security.

Kinnock may suggest that Labor would enhance Britain's conventional contribution to NATO. Budgetary constraints make this very unlikely, even if British nuclear forces are eliminated. He also just declared that Labor would cancel

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UK participation in SDI research and he has been very critical of our policies in Southern Africa and Central America. He may, as well, try to argue that Labor's call for a nuclear-free Europe is consistent with the position you took at Reykjavik. You should challenge this campaign ploy.

The organization of Kinnock's trip to Washington has been haphazard. His people tried to avoid using the British Embassy, and only agreed at the last minute to Ambassador Acland's attendance at the meeting. And his schedule does not include the usual calls on George or Cap. He is expected to see a few people on the Hill, where we are confident he will receive a similar critical message.

At home, Labor and Kinnock are in some disarray following crushing defeats in two recent by-elections and former Prime Minister Callaghan has strongly criticized the party's defense program. Kinnock's leadership abilities are also under attack. While we must avoid giving him a sympathy vote, you need to make clear our serious concern over Labor's pledge to depart unilaterally from agreed NATO strategy. You should emphasize that we will not achieve arms reductions without Alliance solidarity. Kinnock will be accompanied by Denis Healey, Shadow Foreign Secretary and former Defense Minister, who, while basically friendly to the US, can be a forceful debater.

George's scope paper (at Tab B) lays out nicely the contrast between what we want and what Kinnock wants. Your suggested talking points are at Tab A.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary Shultz  
Secretary Weinberger  
Frank Carlucci  
Ken Duberstein  
Assistant Secretary Ridgway  
Peter Sommer, NSC  
  
Neil Kinnock, British Labor Party Leader  
Ambassador Acland  
Denis Healey, Shadow Foreign Secretary  
Charles Clarke, Private Secretary

IV. PRESS PLAN: Press pool coverage

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: Photo opportunity followed by brief discussion meeting.

Prepared by:  
Peter R. Sommer

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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#2167

March 24, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: Visit of British Opposition Leader Neil Kinnock, March 27, 1987

WHERE DOES OUR RELATIONSHIP STAND?

- o U.S. relations with the Labor Party have been strained since the left wing gained control of the party in 1981.
- o Awareness in the U.S. of the new leadership's support for unilateral nuclear disarmament and American criticism of those policies heightened over past year as the possibility of Labor's coming to power increased.
- o Labor's position in the polls and Kinnock's leadership rating have deteriorated significantly since last fall.
- o This fall from public favor has been due in significant measure to the British public's reaction to Labor's proposals on defense--unilateral removal of all U.S. nuclear systems, scrapping British ballistic missiles, and cancellation of the British Trident program.
- o Kinnock's inaugural visit to Washington in 1984 as the new Labor leader went well but a more recent trip last December for several public appearances and meetings with Members of Congress was notably less successful because he found virtually no support for his defense policies.
- o Influential Congressmen and Senators, including liberal Democrats, have uniformly criticized Labor's defense program to Kinnock and other Labor leaders here and in London.
- o In positioning himself for his call on you, Kinnock modified his position on the removal of cruise missiles from Britain and would now permit them to remain as long as INF negotiations with the Soviets were underway.

WHAT DO WE WANT?

- o To show an even-handed approach to the leader of a major British party and deflect charges of favoritism and interference in the approaching British elections.

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- o To inform Kinnock that, even with the changes on the timing of the removal of cruise missiles, the U.S. and the Alliance have grave problems with Labor's defense program.
- o To ensure that Labor and the British public understand that while we will deal constructively with any government elected by the British people, Labor's defense policies would involve serious consequences for the UK and the Alliance.

WHAT DOES KINNOCK WANT?

- o To meet with the President as Leader of the British Opposition and potential Prime Minister to demonstrate that he is a serious figure in international affairs.
- o To present his offer on cruise missiles and thereby to be seen as a good ally and a participant in the arms control process.
- o To show that he can get along with the UK's most important ally despite differences on defense policy.
- o To show that he and the President share a common abhorrence of nuclear weapons and that Labor's policies are not that far from ours.
- o To find or create signs that Washington could live with a Labor Government and a unilateralist defense policy despite current rhetoric.

WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED FROM THIS VISIT?

- o Reiterate our basic concerns with Labor's proposals on defense.
- o Convince Kinnock that Labor's defense policies could strain US-UK relations and severely damage the Alliance.
- o Demonstrate publicly our respect for the democratic process in the UK while underlining our disagreement with a specific policy.
- o Make clear the difference between our approach to arms reductions and a less nuclear world and that of Labor and other supporters of unilateral disarmament.

Attachment: Suggested Talking Points

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Talking Points for the President's Meeting with Neil Kinnock

Bilateral

- The U.S. and Great Britain have enjoyed an especially close and mutually beneficial relationship since the outbreak of World War II.
- This has endured through changes of governments on both sides of the Atlantic of differing political philosophies.
- Key elements in our relationship have been our shared perceptions on strategic and security issues and the role played by the UK in NATO and in other parts of the world.
- We would not wish this to change, but the positions Labor has adopted on defense issues would make it very difficult for any American administration to carry on as before with a Labor Government.
- As George Shultz and Secretary Weinberger have made clear, we are deeply concerned about the defense policies of your party which directly affect us and the rest of the Alliance.
- Because we would be directly affected, we have felt obliged to speak out to make sure you and others understand our position.
- At the same time, we do not wish to and will not attempt to interfere in your country's internal affairs and the coming British elections.

Labor's Defense Policies

- We do not consider your party's prescription of unilateral nuclear disarmament an effective way to defend our countries and the rest of NATO or to achieve meaningful reductions in nuclear weapons.
- Even with the modifications you have made about leaving cruise missiles temporarily in the UK during INF negotiations, we believe Labor's nuclear withdrawal proposals would be disastrous for deterrence and for the Atlantic Alliance.
- We are working to achieve real reductions in nuclear weapons in the negotiations in Geneva.
- Given Gorbachev's recent removal of a Soviet roadblock to an INF agreement, we are more optimistic about the possibilities for success.

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- We will have a better idea of the prospects for success after Secretary Shultz' visit to Moscow next month.
- If we are able to reach agreement with the Russians, it will be due to the Alliance's determination, solidarity, and willingness to station missiles in several countries.
- The cruise and Pershing II missiles are deployed because of NATO's decision to counter the nuclear-armed Soviet SS-20's aimed at Western Europe.
- From our experience, the Russians will negotiate under those circumstances, they will not give up significant military capabilities if they know that by waiting they can achieve the same results at no cost to themselves.
- While nuclear deterrence imposes great burdens on the world and on its leaders, it has kept the peace in Europe for more than 40 years.
- Nuclear weapons, unfortunately but realistically, will have to be part of the West's arsenal and the agreed strategy of flexible response for the foreseeable future
- We need to manage the problems nuclear weapons pose rather than wishing them away.
- While we all need to do more to strengthen our conventional defenses, that alone will not assure our safety.
- A "defensive" conventional defense for NATO, such as proposed by Labor and others, is also hardly the recipe for dealing with the massive Soviet conventional threat to Europe.

Central America

- You have said some very harsh things about our support for the democratic forces in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America.
- We recognize that there will be differences, even among close friends, about tactics.
- We find it difficult to understand, however, when leaders in democratic countries effectively support totalitarianism and communism in our part of the world where important interests are at stake for us.

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TALKING POINTS

- Welcome to White House. Our countries have long enjoyed a close and mutually beneficial relationship. It has lasted through changes of government of widely differing political philosophies on both sides of the Atlantic .
  
- Key elements in our relationship have been shared perceptions of security interests and collective defense through NATO.
  
- But in all candor, Labor's positions on defense issues would make it very difficult for any American administration to carry on as before with a Labor government. Your defense policies would have a profound and unpredictable effect on NATO, our bilateral relationship, and on East-West relations.
  
- Since we would be directly affected, we have an obligation to speak out on your proposed policies. Please be assured that we will not attempt to intervene in Britain's internal affairs and the coming elections.
  
- It is NATO's policy of firmness, solidarity, and willingness to deploy INF missiles -- not unilateral abandonment of nuclear weapons -- that has caused the Soviets to negotiate seriously.

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- Your party's prescription of unilateral nuclear disarmament undercuts both our negotiating positions and NATO's strategy of flexible response.
  
  - We have noted your recent modification leaving cruise missiles in the UK during INF negotiations. But your fundamental policies -- giving up Britain's nuclear deterrent and removing NATO-dedicated US forces from the UK -- do not appear to have changed. These policies are unacceptable for reasons I just cited.
  
  - Whether to maintain British nuclear forces is entirely a British decision. Yet we strongly believe these forces enhance NATO's deterrence posture, which is the heart of our objective: preventing war. They also add to Britain's leadership role, which is important to us.
  
  - While we all need to do more to strengthen our conventional defenses, that alone will not assure our safety. History shows that conventional balances can be very uncertain.
  
  - Prospects for an agreement with the Soviets seem to have improved. We will have a better idea following Secretary Shultz's visit to Moscow next month. But one thing has not changed: without Alliance solidarity there will not be progress.

- (If raised): There is no correlation between your party's call for a nuclear-free Europe and the Reykjavik proposals. Your version is unilateral disarmament; ours is staged reductions by both sides as Mrs. Thatcher and I spelled out at Camp David. The long-term aim of reducing and ultimately eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons will not be served by unilateralism.
- Central America: You have said harsh things about our support for the democratic forces in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America. We find it difficult to understand why some leaders in democratic countries effectively support totalitarianism in the Western Hemisphere where important US interests at stake.



-- Welcome. Our countries long enjoyed a close/mutually beneficial relationship. Has lasted through changes of government of widely differing political philosophies. Key elements in relationship have been shared perceptions of security interests and collective defense through NATO.

-- Labor's positions on defense would make it difficult for any American administration to carry on as before. Your policies would have a profound/unpredictable effect on NATO, East-West relations and bilateral relations.

-- Since directly affected, have an obligation to speak out. Please be assured that we will not attempt to intervene in Britain's internal affairs.

-- It is NATO's policy of firmness, solidarity, and willingness to deploy INF missiles -- not unilateral disarmament -- that has caused Soviets to negotiate seriously. Your party's prescription of unilateral nuclear disarmament undercuts both our negotiating positions and NATO's strategy.

-- Have noted your recent modification leaving cruise missiles in the UK during INF negotiations. But your fundamental policies, which are unacceptable, do not appear to have changed. George and Cap may wish to say few words.

-- Whether to maintain nuclear forces is entirely a British decision. Strongly believe these forces enhance NATO's deterrence posture, and deter war. They also add to Britain's leadership role, which is important to us.

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-- All need to do more to strengthen conventional defenses, but that alone will not assure our safety. History shows that conventional balances can be very uncertain.

-- Prospects for agreement with Soviets have improved. Will have a better idea following Secretary Shultz's visit to Moscow next month. One thing has not changed: without Alliance solidarity there will not be progress.

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-- (If raised): No correlation between your call for a nuclear-free Europe and Reykjavik proposals. Your version is unilateral disarmament; ours is staged reductions as Mrs. Thatcher and I spell out at Camp David. My long-term aim of reducing/eventually eliminating nuclear weapons not served by unilateralism.

-- Central America: You have said harsh things about our support for democratic forces in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America. Find it difficult to understand why some leaders in democratic countries support totalitarianism where vital US interests at stake.