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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3845 OF 21 NOVEMBER 1979

YOUR TELNO 1698: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: BRIEFING FOR SUBSTANTIVE TALKS

1. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO SAY HOW CARTER WILL WANT TO PLAY HIS HAND AT HIS TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER HERE NEXT MONTH. THE IRANIAN ISSUES INCREASE THE IMponderables. BUT YOU MAY LIKE TO HAVE A TENTATIVE ASSESSMENT AT THIS STAGE. I WILL ADD TO IT LATER.
2. CARTER WILL BE SEEING THE PRIME MINISTER ON HIS HOME GROUND, AND WILL SEE THE VISIT PRIMARILY AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW HIMSELF TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AS A PRESIDENT WHO IS NOT A LAME DUCK BUT IN COMMAND OF AFFAIRS AND WORKING CLOSELY WITH AND ENJOYING THE CONFIDENCE OF ONE OF AMERICA'S PRINCIPAL ALLIES. THIS IMAGE COULD HELP CARTER IN HIS FIRST TASK WHICH IS TO DEFEAT KENNEDY FOR THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION.
3. SO THE PRESIDENT HAS A STRONG MOTIVE FOR MAKING THE VISIT APPEAR A SUCCESS AND FOR AVOIDING SOUR NOTES. FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE IRANIAN CRISIS SATISFACTORILY MEANWHILE WILL ONLY SERVE TO UNDERSCORE THESE OBJECTIVES FOR CARTER.
4. THE RIGHT DECISIONS BY THE ALLIANCE IN THE PREVIOUS WEEK ON TNF WILL SET THE STAGE WELL. SALT II IS UNLIKELY TO BE THROUGH THE SENATE BY THE TIME THE PRIME MINISTER GETS HERE AND CARTER WILL PROBABLY ASK THE PRIME MINISTER TO TAKE A HELPFUL LINE ON SALT II WHEN SHE MEETS MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON 17 DECEMBER. CARTER MIGHT GO ON TO REFER TO HIS APPROACH TO SALT II, BUT PROBABLY NOT IN ANY DETAIL.
5. ENERGY POLICY SEEMS CERTAIN TO FIGURE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE TALKS, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE IEA MINISTERIAL MEETING. THIS WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO MAKE PLAIN WHAT WE EXPECT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE ENERGY FIELD. THE PRESIDENT WILL ALSO NO DOUBT WISH TO SPEAK TO THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND OUTLOOK IN THE UK AND IN THIS COUNTRY. HE WILL ALSO SURELY SPEAK ABOUT WORLD-WIDE ECONOMIC ISSUES.
6. OUR PRESENT INFORMATION IS THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE ADVISED TO RAISE THE CARIBBEAN WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, AND SEEK A MORE ACTIVE BRITISH ROLE IN THE AREA.

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7. CARTER WILL ASSUME THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL WANT FROM HIM:
(A) GENERAL AGREEMENT ON U S HELP WITH POST-POLARIS (BUT NO AGREEMENT ON DETAILED POINTS):

(B) CONTINUING SUPPORT OVER RHODESIA:

(C) A CHANGE IN U S POLICY ON THE SUPPLY OF ARMS FOR THE RUC.

CARTER WILL HAVE NO DIFFICULTY ON (A). DEPENDING ON HOW THE SITUATION EVOLVES MEANWHILE, HE WILL HAVE NO DIFFICULTY ON (B), AND INDEED CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC OPINION HERE IS LIKELY TO BE POINTING IN THE DIRECTION WE WILL WANT. ON (C) CARTER WILL WANT TO AVOID OPEN DIFFERENCES, AND POSTPONE THE HARD CHOICE.

8. ON PRESENT EVIDENCE CARTER WILL NOT WANT TO DISCUSS CTB OR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION OR CHINA. (CHINA COULD WELL COME UP WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER SEES HAROLD BROWN, SINCE BROWN WILL BE GOING SHORTLY AFTERWARDS TO CHINA).

9. I IMAGINE THAT THE ABOVE ALSO COVERS THE ISSUES WHICH WE WOULD WANT TO SEE DISCUSSED, EXCEPT POSSIBLY FOR DEFENCE SALES TO THE U S, PARTICULARLY THE AV8B AND PERHAPS THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY WHICH IS ARISING ON A NUMBER OF BILATERAL ISSUES (PARTICULARLY NORTH ATLANTIC SHIPPING, ANTI-TRUST SUITS, AND AIR SERVICES).

10. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN DUE COURSE TO KNOW IF THERE ARE PARTICULAR POINTS WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH HAROLD BROWN.

11. THE ABOVE, DRAFTED BEFORE RECEIPT OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, COMPRISES OUR COMMENTS FROM HERE UPON IT AT THIS STAGE. BUT THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SCENE MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO BE CATEGORICAL ABOUT MID-DECEMBER ATTITUDES.

HENDERSON

FILES	RID
NAD	DEF, D
PCD	ACDD
OLD	PS
NEWS. D	PS/MR RIDLEY
MED	PS/PUS
MAED	SIR A DUFF
ESSD	LORD N.G. LENNOX
RHOD. D	