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DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

CIVIL HOME DEFENCE POLICY

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Home Department

When the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee discussed civil preparedness for home defence on 15 May, I was invited to take the chair of a Ministerial Sub-Committee to examine urgently and report upon the requirements of civil defence and the most suitable arrangements for meeting them. I attach a report by officials which has now been considered and agreed by this Ministerial Sub-Committee. The report sets out:-

- a. The threat
  - b. Voluntary effort available in home defence planning
  - c. The problems of population dispersal and associated protection
  - d. The objectives of home defence planning
  - e. Some costed options to achieve these objectives.
2. In regard to the threat we concluded that Soviet forces have the capability to carry out significant attacks on the United Kingdom not only with nuclear weapons but also by conventional and chemical means. The detailed assessment at Annex A if anything understates the growing gravity of the Soviet threat.
3. In regard to voluntary effort we agreed that this was likely to be the most politically attractive and cost effective means of improving existing civil defence preparedness. The old Civil Defence Organisation was costly and bureaucratic and we concluded that it should not be considered further although it should be made clear to the public why we had taken this decision. But we should make every effort to harness use of individual volunteers in conjunction with the present voluntary organisations to increase preparedness at local level. There was a need to set up machinery to coordinate local civil defence planning, with this voluntary effort, where it existed, both locally and at a separate national level in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It would also be necessary to extend the training facilities at the Home Defence College at Easingwold. The Ministry of Defence is currently carrying out a review of the role of the Territorial Army and other

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reservists but it is too soon to say what manpower might be available to assist local authorities in home defence.

4. Population dispersal and shelter strategy are difficult subjects. But we concluded that there was no effective alternative to the policy of "stay put" and therefore there was a need to educate the population to give them confidence in the policy. It would help to allay the widespread public anxiety if a survey was carried out to identify buildings and sites that could be used as shelters by members of the public. It is also important to lay down approved specifications for domestic shelters, for which there is a growing market. But our planning must be based on a recognition that there would inevitably be an element of self evacuation and this fact would need to be taken into consideration in locating such things as food stockpiles.

5. The objectives of civil home defence planning are to respond to the threat and to allay public anxiety and Parliamentary concern. These objectives do not automatically lead to the same conclusions as the most effective response to the threat might be to enhance our offensive capability. But this would be insufficient to reassure the public or the Government's supporters in Parliament. I attach importance to the statement in paragraph 5 of Annex D that there are informal indications that political concern would largely be satisfied with additional expenditure on home defence of between £20 and £40 million annually. There may also be a need to indicate our willingness to take statutory powers to reassure public opinion in those areas where the local authorities make little or no preparations for civil home defence.

6. A series of costed options are set out in Annex E to meet these objectives. If these were accepted into the present order of home defence expenditure would roughly double from approximately £20 million a year to about £40 million. Acceptance of Priority I items only would take the expenditure to around £32 million. The division of options between Priority I and Priority II is in some areas an arbitrary one and arguably there should be no such sub-division.

7. The Ministerial Sub-Committee agreed with the proposed costed options as the best way of meeting the objectives of civil home defence planning. But we did not reach a conclusion on the difficult problem of how they should be funded. The options fall on a number of different departmental programmes, all of which are subject to pressure to reduce public expenditure. Obviously all proposed additional commitments are unwelcome and difficult to accommodate. Nevertheless such is the importance which I believe we ought to accord to this severely neglected area of defence policy that I recommend that the Committee should take a collective decision on the necessary measures which ought now to be taken, and that Departments should undertake to finance them within their existing programmes of public expenditure. To do otherwise must raise doubts about the credibility of the very expensive measures we are taking in relation to other aspects of defence policy, and it may also raise serious political problems for us. I believe that the necessary measures are those set out in detail in Annex E. If,



however, Departments are unable to give the necessary undertaking we shall have to refer our proposals to Cabinet so that they can be considered in the context of the forthcoming public expenditure survey.

8. Further work on civil home defence policy is required to complete a number of important studies on such matters as the use of industrial resources to support the nation in a crisis, the co-ordinated use of ports and railways, the extension of building regulations to require some degree of protection in new buildings, and the possible use of the Territorial Army for civil home defence. I propose to make a further report to the Committee on these matters in due course.


9. I seek the agreement of my colleagues:

- a. That the costed options set out in Annex E should be incorporated by departments into their forward planning.
- b. That I should make a Parliamentary statement before the recess to announce our decision.
- c. That I should make a further report when a number of current studies have been completed.

W.W.

Home Office  
Queen Anne's Gate

4 July 1980



REVIEW OF CIVIL HOME DEFENCE PREPAREDNESS

Report by Officials

Introduction

1. At the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee meeting on 22 May 1980 Ministers instructed officials to prepare a further series of papers proposing civil home defence planning objectives and costed options to achieve them in the light of current threat assessments, having particular regard to (a) the need to mobilise voluntary effort and (b) policies on population dispersal and shelter provision. Officials were also instructed to take account of the points made by the Trade Secretary in his letter of 22 May 1980 to the Home Secretary.

2. This note, together with its annexes, has been prepared by the Home Office in consultation with other interested Departments. The annexes are:-

- A. A statement by the Ministry of Defence of Soviet capability to attack the United Kingdom with conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons;
- B. A paper by the Home Office on voluntary effort in civil home defence planning;
- C. A paper by the Home Office examining the special problems of population dispersal (evacuation) and a strategy for shelter provision;
- D. A statement by the Home Office of the civil home defence planning objectives which Ministers may wish to adopt as peacetime goals;
- E. A paper by the Home Office setting out costed options to achieve (to some degree) the objectives stated in Annex D.

The Threat Assessment (Annex A)

3. Soviet forces have the capability to carry out significant attacks on the United Kingdom with conventional, chemical and nuclear weapons. Their intentions are less easy to judge thus making it difficult to match home defence preparations to the threat. The most likely targets are thought to be nuclear delivery means and

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their associated command and control centres; air defence facilities and reinforcement forces. Attacks on these targets using conventional or chemical weapons would be bound to affect the adjoining civil population. There appears to be insufficient risk, however, of either chemical or biological attack against the civil population at large to justify the enormously expensive measures which would be needed to counter those particular perils. Nor, given the strength of the NATO alliance and the renewed determination of member states to increase their defence spending, can the risk of either conventional or nuclear war in Europe be regarded as great. However, even with the present assessment of the chance of Soviet attack on Europe, the conclusion must remain that at least basic preparedness is necessary to enable the nation and as many as possible of its population to survive.

Voluntary Effort in Civil Home Defence Planning (Annex B)

4. The contrast often drawn between the pre-1968 existence of the Civil Defence Corps and the Auxiliary Fire Service and the present day absence of similar national organisations tends to obscure the very real contribution which is still made by nationally recognised voluntary organisations (WRVS, British Red Cross Society and St John's), the more locally based groups of civil defence volunteers and the very many individuals recruited and trained by the local authorities themselves to work within small communities in crisis and war. These are complementary to the contributions made by the Royal Observer Corps.
  
5. There are also some 250,000 Service reservists of which the TA accounts for about a quarter. The TA itself and most of the effective individual reservists are already earmarked for military tasks on the Continent, in the UK or at sea. The MOD have in hand a number of studies on future military requirements for reservists and it looks as if these will fully account for such effective uncommitted reservists as there are. It would seem prudent, therefore, for civil defence planning to proceed on the assumption that military effort will not be available in a period of tension or conventional warfare. Annex B accordingly considers how best to give fresh impetus to the harnessing of voluntary effort and how most effectively to achieve its integration in local authority plans. The resource implications are not substantial. The options set out in the Annex E include some necessary expansion of county emergency planning staffs in order to recruit, train and exercise volunteer home defence workers.

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Population Dispersal (Evacuation) and Shelter Strategy (Annex C)

6. Annex C is a detailed examination of the validity of the "stay put" policy and a consideration of a more realistic shelter strategy within the financial constraints likely to exist in the foreseeable future. The conclusion is that, given the expected pattern of any nuclear attack and the country's population density, large scale evacuation plans are unlikely to succeed in the event of war. Further, that given the uncertainty of Soviet military objectives, the great majority of people are likely to be at least as well off in or near their own homes as in being evacuated or taking themselves off to areas which might be no safer from the effects of nuclear attack and where it would be almost impossible to provide for their support. The Annex concludes that Ministers may consider that the "stay put" policy remains the only viable policy and would be enhanced by further public awareness of the likely nature of a future war, self-help measures for shelter provision and the disadvantages of indiscriminate self-evacuation coupled with greater local authority effort to identify buildings etc suitable as shelter <sup>for those whose circumstances preclude shelter</sup> at home and steps to safeguard against conventional air attack those activities deemed essential. It does not view with favour government financial assistance to the general public for the installation of domestic shelters and leaves open to future consideration the question of how the burden of shelter in essential industries might be shared between central government and the public and private undertakings concerned. The relatively small additional expenditure required to improve the availability of government guidance on shelter provision is included in the costed options in Annex E.

7. Civil Home Defence Planning Objectives (Annex D)





Civil Home Defence Planning Objectives (Annex D)

7. From the standpoint of civil home defence preparedness the salient points of Annex A are:-

- a. the risk of incidental attack on adjoining civil areas during conventional air attack using high explosive or chemical weaponry; particularly those directed at command and control centres (which include central London), and those at the places listed in Appendix to the Annex; and
- b. the overshadowing risk of a strategic nuclear strike once hostilities are imminent or have begun at conventional level.

8. The Committee will recall that, at a meeting of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee on 20 March, it was agreed that the Home Secretary should arrange to make an undramatic parliamentary statement on the immediate low cost measures which the Government proposed to take to remedy some of the more obvious deficiencies in the existing arrangements. The cost of these measures would have been about £1 million in 1980/81 rising to approximately £5 million at the end of the current PES period. Subsequent contact between the Home Secretary and Government supporters suggested that such a statement would not be regarded as an adequate response either to the actual threat confronting the nation or to public and parliamentary concern. Further ministerial consideration of the Home Secretary's proposal to make a more positive statement about the Government's home defence intentions took place on 15 May, resulting in a decision to re-examine civil home defence preparedness in the light of detailed consideration by a ministerial sub-committee. This paper therefore assumes that within the financial constraints imposed by the country's economic situation Ministers will wish to consider somewhat more ambitious remedial measures than the basic steps initially agreed at the meeting on 20 March. Annex D is a statement of the broad civil home defence planning objectives which might be adopted at this stage.

Costed Options (Annex E)

9. The options proposed in Annex E are those considered most likely to be cost effective against both the threat of conventional air attack lasting for perhaps 2 to 3 weeks and the case of a nuclear attack of about 200 megatons on approximately 80 targets. The options are set out in two packages of high and not so high priority. The additional cost of these measures over the current PES period is:-

	£m					
	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86	
Priority 1	12.6	14.5	16.2	15.1	12.0	70.4
Priority 2	7.6	8.6	8.6	6.6	6.6	38.0
TOTAL of 1 and 2	20.2	23.1	24.8	21.7	18.6	108.4

£0.700 additional expenditure arises in 1980/81

10. Some of the other options, such as a high state of readiness of the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation, are already on the way to achievement and relatively modest additional expenditure is needed to bring current plans up to the level demanded by the recent assumption of a warning period reduced to 7-10 days. On the other hand, urgent action is needed to complete the infrastructure and communications for the wartime machinery of regional government, and much more needs to be done by local authorities to establish across the country a uniform pattern of effective plans for the continuation of vital local government services in war.

11. It is considered that the options set out in the Annex would, over a 5-10 year period, effect sensible improvements to the present level of civil home defence preparedness in line with the development of our general defence posture. There is reason to believe that the measures would also be regarded by Parliament as going much of the way towards meeting the need for greater central government involvement in and direction of the civil home defence planning of local and other public authorities and for greater public awareness of the likely form of a future war. There may of course continue to be criticism of the "stay put" policy and pressure for substantially increased public expenditure on shelter provision and in that sense the options proposed would not be universally regarded as a complete answer either to the threat or to public anxiety about the threat. However, Ministers may well regard the very large resource implications of an ambitious domestic shelter programme and of workplace shelter obligations on essential industry as unacceptable at this time. The threat is simply not of that order.

Financial Provision

12. When on 20 March, Ministers provisionally agreed to the announcement of immediate remedial measures costing £1 million in 1980-81 rising to about £5 million in 1984-85, their expectation was that, albeit with difficulty, the additional sums could be absorbed within their planned expenditure by making offsetting savings. However the view of the Departments who have the major responsibility for home





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defence plans is that it would not be feasible to absorb within their existing programmes the increased sums that are now proposed. Moreover, local authorities are likely to expect their share of the increased expenditure to be specifically identified for the purposes of grant. If therefore Ministers wish to expand their provision for home defence, it will be necessary for them to consider the proposals for additional expenditure in the context of the Public Expenditure Survey, in July. As the additions would represent part of the expenditure to be devoted to defence in a broad sense, it may be desirable to consider them alongside the defence budget, taking due account of the threat that the Alliance faces over the next few years.

Manpower Implications

- 13. The need for increased manpower resulting from the options proposed does, of course, run contrary to the government's policy of reducing both central and local government staffs. It is estimated that up to 150 additional posts might be needed in local authorities to improve the readiness of local war plans, to develop structures at community or parish level and to harness extra voluntary efforts to local planning. Central government departments and the National Health Service may need to assign about 80 extra staff to planning, direction and co-ordination, while there may be eventually some further requirement for extra staffs in public authorities and the nationalised industries in order to achieve a more satisfactory level in their field of civil home defence planning.

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Annex A

SOVIET CAPABILITY TO ATTACK THE UNITED KINGDOM

Note by the Ministry of Defence

1. Soviet capability over the period 1977-82 to attack targets in the United Kingdom is assessed in JIC(77)10. This assessment assumes that hostilities against the United Kingdom would be part of general aggression against NATO and concludes that the United Kingdom would be a high priority target area. This note summarises the position and deals in turn with warning time, duration of attack and, separately, with conventional, chemical and nuclear capability.

Warning Time

2. It is likely that general war would be preceded by a period of tension, but the amount of warning time before the outbreak of hostilities is impossible to predict. Likely firm warning based on military indications is estimated to be 7 days, but could be as little as 48 hours, if the Soviet Union chose to attack without completing its preparations.

Duration

3. The Soviet Union has the option of starting a war with nuclear weapons, but the JIC confirms (JIC(77)11) that war could open with a period of conventional hostilities. The duration of any conventional phase of war cannot be predicted, but could range from 2-3 days at one extreme to a period of weeks, depending on Soviet objectives and progress towards achieving them.

Conventional Air Attack

4. Capability. It is difficult to assess what proportion of Soviet air power would be devoted to attacks against the UK mainland or its

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immediate sea areas. We do not have any positive intelligence on Soviet war plans and the inherent flexibility of air power gives the Soviets a wide range of options. The principal capability of the Soviet Air Force to attack targets in the UK lies in the 500 bombers of the Long Range Air Force based in the Western USSR, but we cannot discount the use of limited numbers of Soviet Naval Air Force bombers and light bombers of the Tactical Air Armies. In 1977 the JIC assessed (JIC(77)10) that as a planning figure 180 aircraft might be available for operations against the UK base, which would be capable of dropping about 650 tons of bombs a day. This daily tonnage could double by 1982. The main weapons would be free-fall bombs, air-to-surface missiles and mines. Any attacking force would suffer losses and the extent of these is difficult to estimate, but the effects of attrition could be offset by a re-allocation of priorities and the use of reserves.

Targets

5. It is assessed in JIC(77)10 that likely categories of target for conventional attack in the United Kingdom are:-

- (a) Nuclear strike forces and nuclear delivery systems;
- (b) Other facilities, including command and control associated with UK and US nuclear forces;
- (c) Air Defence facilities;
- (d) Maritime forces and reinforcements being moved to and from the UK.

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6. The weight of attack on various targets would depend on the Soviet judgement of priorities at the time. These could include disrupting the reinforcement flow, involving attacks on reception and staging airfields. The important role of port facilities in the onward movement of transatlantic and British reinforcements to the Continent means that air attack (as well as mining) on the UK ports involved cannot be ruled out. A list of ports and civil airfields used for reinforcement is attached.

7. There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union would mount indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets, though some would suffer collateral damage through proximity to military targets. The areas of UK in which the density of military targets is least are:-

- (a) Somerset, Dorset, Devon and Cornwall
- (b) Wales and the adjacent border counties of England
- (c) North West England
- (d) Durham and Northumberland
- (e) Scotland
- (f) Ulster

though in all these areas there are military targets, some of high importance, particularly the nuclear bases in Scotland.

#### Chemical Attack

8. The Soviet Union has an extensive capability for offensive and defensive CW operations. Soviet doctrine classifies these weapons as "weapons of mass destruction" and their use requires a decision at the highest level (Politburo). It is thought that the Soviet Union

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Annex A

views the use of CW as an escalatory step second only in significance to the nuclear option. Little is known of Soviet CW planning, but it is possible that CW might be used in isolation and in advance of nuclear warfare.

9. There is no evidence of Soviet intentions to use CW against the population at large, but it might be used against targets in the United Kingdom such as ports and airfields. Persistent chemical agents delivered by bomb or missile would probably be used, and could remain toxic for a few days or as long as several weeks. There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union possesses biological weapons, although it has the capability to produce them.

#### Nuclear Attack

10. Capability. It is not possible to quote exact numbers, but for planning purposes JIC(77)10 estimated that for a strategic nuclear attack on the United Kingdom base the Russians might make available up to 150 land-based missiles and about 160 medium bombers. The number of missiles will fall to about 80 by 1982 but the number of warheads carried will increase. About 130 submarine-launched missiles might be available for attacks on NATO Europe; we cannot assess how many of these would be launched against United Kingdom base targets.

11. Targets. The main general target categories for nuclear attack would be Allied nuclear strike capability and associated facilities, centres of political administration and major cities, command and control and air defence centres, radars and airfields, seabed surveillance systems, and naval bases and ports associated with the movement of reinforcements.

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CIVIL PORTS AND AIR PORTS USED IN REINFORCEMENTS

AIRPORTS

Aldergrove  
Heathrow  
Gatwick  
Luton  
Manchester  
Glasgow  
Benbecula  
East Midland

PORTS

Belfast  
Larne  
Stranraer  
Ardrossan  
Rosyth  
Cairnryan  
Heysham  
Southampton  
Folkestone  
Dover  
Harwich  
Felixstowe  
Immingham  
Hull  
Plymouth  
Teesport

US/UK LOC

AIRPORT

Prestwick

PORTS

Liverpool  
Hythe (Solent)  
Barry

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## VOLUNTARY EFFORT IN HOME DEFENCE PLANNING

## Report by Officials

1. There is a long history of civilian self-help in the face of hostile attack. It has taken a variety of forms. The Civil Defence Act 1948 led initially to 20 years of widespread voluntary civil defence effort with a substantial superstructure of local authority and civil service administration. The latter was dispersed after the Civil Defence Corps and the Auxiliary Fire Service were disbanded in 1968.

Although there are 2 early day motions currently on the Order Paper advocating return to a voluntary organisation akin to the old Corps, it is unlikely that many of the signatories have in mind an exact replica of the previous entity. Certainly there must be doubt whether the reconstitution of the Civil Defence Corps or similar national body would necessarily be the best way to harness voluntary effort. It would be expensive, involve a large administrative organisation and probably fail to improve on locally organised effort.

Present Voluntary Organisations

2. The Royal Observer Corps (about 10,000 strong) represents the field force of the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation. It is run by the Ministry of Defence (Air Department) on behalf of the Home Office and its main task is to provide the operators for the 870 field monitoring posts, the 25 group controls and the 5 sector controls which together are responsible for the initiation of the attack warning system, and the subsequent warning and monitoring of radioactive fallout.

3. Navy, Army and Air Force



3. Navy, Army and Air Force reservists of all kinds at present number about 250,000 but when allowance is made for those who are too old or unfit for active duty and who cannot be traced or would be otherwise unavailable, the effective strength is probably about 200,000. With the major exception of the TA, most of these are individual reservists, ie. not organised and trained in units. The TA itself is now about 63,500 strong against an establishment of about 73,500. On mobilisation it would reinforce regular formations in the UK and in Europe in formed units.
  
4. Including the TA, about three-quarters of total effective reserves are already earmarked for military tasks in the UK and Europe and also at sea. These tasks include making up existing regular units and formations to wartime establishment, replacing battle casualties, and manning and operating various military facilities. A number of studies are at present in hand in the MOD into the future size, composition, liability and tasking of the reserves. These studies include the role of the TA in the 1980s and the possibility of expansion of Navy and Air Force reserves. It is too early to be able to say formally what contribution to civil defence tasks the reserves might in future be able to make. The work done so far, however, which has necessarily concentrated on military tasks, does clearly indicate that if future military requirements are to be satisfied then this will account for most if not all those reservists at present uncommitted. That being so, it would seem prudent for civil defence planning to continue on the basis that in a period of tension and of conventional war the Services will be fully engaged on the execution of military tasks. The position post-strike is, of course, rather different.
  
5. The most prominent civilian voluntary organisations in the home defence field are the Women's Royal Voluntary Service, the British Red Cross Society and the St John's Ambulance Association and Brigade. All of these have a national organisation; the WRVS are heavily dependent on central government funds.

6. Far behind them in strength if not in enthusiasm is the National Voluntary Civil Aid Service which is unevenly represented over the country and much more active in some areas than in others. Similar voluntary bodies active in home defence within counties include the well known Devon Emergency Volunteers and other groups (such as the 1500 trained Community Advisers in Wiltshire) sponsored by the local authorities themselves.

Scope for Voluntary Effort

7. As in World War II (when local air raid wardens and similar volunteers did splendid work) community or parish is the level at which there would be greatest potential gain from the participation of volunteers. As Wiltshire County Council have discovered, there is much that a community adviser (or street/estate leader) can contribute not only to the development of the emergency plans but also to their implementation both before and after a nuclear strike (see particularly paragraph 12b of Annex C). But other methods might well suit other areas better. The local WRVS or Devon Emergency Volunteers member, for example, may well provide the greater volunteer contribution through the co-ordination and general supervision and leadership of his parent body. Although inevitably the voluntary effort must be consistent with the war emergency plans formulated by the responsible local authority, there is much to be said for leaving all other aspects of the administration of the volunteers to voluntary management. The potential benefits of the voluntary effort are self-evident. But, in addition to the specific tasks to be undertaken by volunteers, there are the social and public relations advantages of greater openness in local emergency planning, participation of wide sections of the community and the limited (though not non-existent) cost to the taxpayer and ratepayer.
8. The major national voluntary organisations have hierarchies which include voluntary officers at county and district levels, and in many parts of the country there is already close co-operation between the officers and their local authority counterparts. To these should be added the voluntary officers of such local organisations as the Devon Emergency Volunteers. Since it is essential to integrate voluntary effort into local authority plans, volunteer (or liaison) officers should be appointed by local authorities. A volunteer co-ordinator or community advisers or other voluntary effort would relieve the fulltime local authority officers of much routine work.

9. Some additional public expenditure would be inevitable in that, even on the most pragmatic of approaches, there would necessarily be a need for some form of special support to the voluntary effort. At the very least, county emergency planning teams would require some enhancement to facilitate effective liaison with the volunteers and their parent bodies and to supervise the loan of certain specialised equipment, such as radiac instruments, for familiarisation and training. There should be no need for a professional cadre of trainers, dedicated training premises, free uniforms or the payment of bounties, but the reimbursement of travelling expenses should not be excluded since the cost of travel might well be an inhibition even in urban areas. Some central training would have to be provided and, given the proposed expansion in the capacity and throughput of the Home Defence College at Easingwold, provision might be made for attendance of rather more than the present number of members of the WRVS, BRCS and St Johns. Indeed, local authorities could be offered the opportunity of nominating suitable local volunteer leaders for attendance on appropriate courses at the College.
10. There is also scope for voluntary organisations contributing to planning above county level. First, the joint services planning committees, chaired by the appropriate military district GOC, meet twice yearly to consider home defence plans, usually with a military orientation within the home defence regions. Secondly, annual meetings of county chief executives (who are designated as wartime controllers) are convened to consider the co-ordination of local authority planning within the home defence regions. Third, there are similar regional meetings of county emergency planning officers which consider co-ordination of the more detailed aspects of local authority planning. In addition there is a well established infrastructure of volunteer scientific advisers sponsored by the Scientific Advisory Branch of the Home Office. There is likely to be some scope for offering a seat at the respective tables to appropriate officers of the voluntary organisations with a heirarchy extending high enough, but there may well be security considerations precluding such attendance at meetings of a primarily military nature. There are also the Regional Health Authorities of the National Health Service. Still at the regional level, selected volunteers might well be appointed to specific functions along the lines of the existing Home Office appointments of Regional Scientific Advisers and those made by the oil industry emergency committee. There could, for example, be regional or sub-regional industrial advisers, particularly if the CBI or some similar body were prepared to make and maintain the appointments.
11. Given the existence of several strong national voluntary organisations active within home defence and very properly keen to assume greater participation,



there is opportunity for consultation at national level. This could be co-ordinated by the Home Office and might involve something on the lines of occasional national conferences.

Since the British Red Cross and St John's have their major role in the medical field, the DHSS might be the best Department to ensure that the potential of these organisations is fully integrated with the war plans of the area health authorities, and for any necessary co-ordination with the related plans of the local authorities themselves.

Conclusion

- 12. There is much to be gained from seeking to harness voluntary effort for home defence planning, particularly at the community or parish level. The present surge of public and Parliamentary interest in the subject offers an opportunity unprecedented in recent years to attract volunteers and this should be put in hand by the county emergency planning teams, through the agencies of the established voluntary organisations wherever practicable. While some ad hoc consultation at national level would be required, little else by way of administrative machinery is to be contemplated. There need be no official recruitment campaign as such and the resource implications are not substantial. There would be a need, however, for the free loan of certain specialised equipment and the availability of an increased number of places on appropriate Home Defence College courses. There would certainly be a need for staff effort to achieve liaison at the local authority level, and this is a factor taken into account in Annex E in expenditure proper to local authorities.

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## POPULATION DISPERSAL (EVACUATION) AND SHELTER POLICIES

Report by Officials

1. This paper considers the related questions of population dispersal (evacuation) and shelter protection against the effects of conventional and nuclear air attack. Though the Soviet Union might use chemical weapons against specific targets of military importance in the United Kingdom (and, if they did, the civilian population in the area would be bound to be affected) there appears to be little risk of such attack against the civilian population at large. The paper first examines the continuing validity of the present "stay put" policy and then goes on to consider whether the credibility of this policy could be strengthened by different approaches to the questions of public information and shelter provision.

Population Dispersal (Evacuation)

2. If the only significant threat were of an all out nuclear exchange, then a dispersal scheme could be regarded as totally impracticable in view of the perhaps 20 million people who would have to be moved, the limited possibility of achieving this within any likely warning period, the insuperable logistical problems of movement and reception and, in the end, the shortage of sufficient habitable space reasonably secure against both the immediate and delayed (radiological) effects of the attack. But the possibility of a period of conventional war lasting some weeks demands further analysis since the target areas are likely to be more restricted and the effects of the attack confined to the immediate and closely adjacent areas of the target. In practice, of course, the implementation of any dispersal scheme against the contingency of conventional air attack has to keep in mind the very real danger of nuclear escalation.
3. The first question is which likely target areas might be selected for such evacuation. Existing intelligence of Soviet conventional capability, together with professional military judgement of the targets most likely to be perceived by Soviet planners as contributing to the achievement of their objectives, indicate that some parts of the country are less likely to be attacked than others (see Annex A). So it might be possible to decide within what perimeters there should be evacuation and to which areas the evacuees should go.

However, the plans could hardly be kept covert and it must be doubted whether the people in similar localities which were not to be dispersed would readily accept the political and military judgement of the dispersal planners. Indeed, to the extent that the Soviet may not already fully perceive

the military value of certain United Kingdom locations, our own dispersal plans might either confirm or influence their judgement.

4. The timing of dispersal would be a matter of complex judgement. In 1939/40 the crisis developed at an almost leisurely pace and there proved to be adequate time for the dispersal to be executed. In any future war the crisis period would be short and one of intensive activity, so that transport and other resources might be sought simultaneously by those responsible for the dispersal and those concerned with the conduct of a conventional war requiring the maximum use of installations in target areas for such purposes as the rapid reinforcement of NATO forces on the European mainland. Should evacuation be ordered too early, it might be that the crisis would subside, the dispersed population drift back (and the pressures to do so would be great) and credibility of the plan diminished should the international situation again worsen and the government be minded to try the same again. But if it were left too late, the attack might vitiate the execution of the plan and in any case nuclear war might quickly supervene.
5. Provided the schemes did not call for the relocation of many millions of people it should, given the peacetime planning resources, be possible to earmark the necessary billets (including private houses, schools and other public buildings), organise the redistribution of food and other essential supplies to match the dispersed population, arrange the necessary financial support of evacuees deprived of their normal source of income and even, though this might prove to be very difficult, provide in the reception areas adequate shelter against fallout radiation for the dispersed people. However, given the very much shorter period within which the plans would have to be implemented, the logistical problems in providing for even a limited number of evacuees might still prove intractable.
6. In short, the conclusion seems inescapable that the rapid implementation of even thoroughly pre-planned evacuation schemes would not only be difficult in itself but would inevitably impair the nation's ability to get onto a war footing and successfully contribute to fighting a conventional land battle in Europe. Even if the balance of advantage could objectively be assessed as being on the side of limited dispersal, it must remain problematical whether such uncertain benefit could at the present time justify the planning effort that would be required.



7. Given, then, that the arguments against dispersal schemes seem compelling, the question is what action should now be taken to satisfy critics of the "stay put" policy and possibly reassure the public at large that it is a sensible one. The two possible approaches to the problem are, first, public information and, second, examination of the current shelter policy.

#### Public Information

8. The advice in the recently published booklet "Protect and Survive", and in the related material to be promulgated through the media during a period of crisis, urges people to stay where they are, since there could be no guarantee that they would manage to find a safer place and they would survive better by sticking to the facilities and comforts of their own homes (which might well escape serious damage). We should, in reviewing the existing material, consider whether the "stay put" message should be hammered home with greater emphasis. We could make much more of the lack of any reasonable certainty about where and when an attack may occur, reiterate the enormous problems of making adequate provision for a dispersed and imbalanced population, point to the difficulties of timing an evacuation in a period when the possession of a nuclear deterrent must still be regarded as making war unlikely, and lay stress on the crucial importance of not inhibiting national deployment to defend the NATO line in Europe. An effective campaign on these lines could do much to avert the indiscriminate self-propelled exodus from major centres of population which critics of the "stay put" policy presage would occur whether the government had evacuation plans or not.
9. Urged to stay put by a government seen to be confident in its ability to avert the danger of war, most people would think twice before abandoning their homes and most of their possessions and "taking to the hills" (where it is claimed they would take themselves) where they could have no guarantee of shelter or other care. There will, however, be those with a firm destination (eg friends or relatives) and war emergency planning should take fuller account of self-evacuees of this type.

#### Shelter Policy

10. A shelter policy involves not only the physical provision of structures providing the necessary protection but also an overall strategy comprising peacetime

guidance and provision, plans for the logistical support of people in shelter, plans for the movement of people into shelter (and the timing of that movement), and arrangements for the control of people in and their release from shelter when the danger from air attack and its effects has receded.

11. A number of factors militate against any realistic policy of public shelter construction in the United Kingdom. Should a nuclear attack occur, the number of targets in the United Kingdom is so large, having regard to the size of the island and the density of the population, that the enormous costs involved would be quite disproportionate. Even to exclude the construction of shelters near likely ground zeros (in effect most of our most heavily populated cities), concentrating on peripheral urban areas, with less elaborate provision (against fallout only) in rural districts, would still indicate expenditure of the order of £15 billion. But even if new shelter construction must be excluded for reasons of economic constraint and doubtful cost effectiveness, there might still be something to be said for commissioning a detailed survey of all substantially constructed buildings, particularly those with basement facilities, to determine what protection they would afford against blast, heat and radiation, and what resources in peacetime would be required to make them habitable for up to 2 or 3 weeks for large numbers of people. The objective of such a study - which could include tunnels and underground systems - would be, first, to establish in quantitative terms how many people could be sheltered; second, to assess whether any adaptation could feasibly be undertaken in peacetime to facilitate their occupation during a period of crisis; third, to judge the practicability of equipping them during a period of crisis and successfully managing them during occupation.

12. Given the underlying policy of household self-help, this memorandum goes on to examine the nature and timing of technical advice to the public, the question of whether any financial assistance should be made available; what directions and assistance should be available to local authorities; and what needs to be done about shelter for the continuance of essential activities.

a. Technical Advice to the Public

For people far enough away from the ground zero of a nuclear weapon explosion, the advice in the booklet "Protect and Survive" would be

both feasible and effective despite the ridicule heaped upon it by those who either are antagonistic to any civil defence at all or who believe that the government should spend at unrealistically high levels. However, the advice has its limitations particularly for those living in certain kinds of dwelling and for those whose personal fitness or strength precludes their constructing the necessary protection. A Home Office working group, led by scientists, has been tasked to produce later this year design outlines for a range of family/domestic shelters affording a significantly higher degree of protection than the guidance in "Protect and Survive". The range will include designs suitable both for those who have well built houses with gardens, <sup>and</sup> those living in flats and bungalows and other kinds of dwelling posing special problems. Costs will range from about £200 for an indoor "Morrison" or table type shelter to about £6,000/£7,000 for a much more elaborate concrete shelter; but it would be up to individuals to agree prices with any firms which decided to manufacture and supply such shelters. While the government is probably committed to making this guidance available in peacetime there will need to be some caution in order to avoid heightening public anxiety or raising expectations about government financial assistance. There is already much commercial activity in this field.

b. Financial Assistance

As to financial assistance, various suggestions have been made ranging from outright grants to tax or rate relief. No such course can be recommended. Economic considerations apart, it would appear eccentric to subsidise measures which have yet to be considered justified. Furthermore, seeming to favour the more affluent might well be contrasted with what would be recalled as the more equitable steps of generally free distribution by the government of "Anderson" (and, later, "Morrison") shelters before the blitzkrieg of World War II.



c. Local Authority Surveys

Community shelter, supplementing the general policy of household self-help, would seem to offer considerable scope for the use of voluntary home defence effort both in peacetime planning and in crisis implementation. This is precisely the kind of activity area in which local community advisers could be of enormous benefit in assisting fulltime local authority planners during normal times and, during a warning period, mobilising the efforts of those to be sheltered in provisioning and equipping the communal shelter they are to occupy. However, the role of volunteers in this connection does not avoid the resource implications for both central and local government. The reason why little local authority progress has been made in many areas in identifying shelter for, inter alia, people in transit is lack of strength in the small county emergency planning teams and also the lack of time (or commitment) for technical involvement by the professional fulltime staffs with functional responsibility. Should the government decide to issue clear requests or instructions to local authorities to embark upon shelter surveys, then county emergency planning teams will need considerable strengthening, and certain professional staffs (primarily in housing and technical services departments) will need to play a greater role in this area of home defence activity. The surveys, mostly of public premises, would remain informal; power of entry would not be called for.

d. Shelter for Maintenance of Essential Activities

During a period of conventional air attack on military installations and civil targets of military importance it would be important to ensure that essential activities would continue despite such attacks. First, to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on industry, it is vital to assess as precisely as possible which industries and installations are likely to be targets but must be kept going even in the face of air attack. Once these are identified, some existing structures might, with minor adaptation, offer adequate protection against conventional air attack. In other cases major adaptation or even new construction might be needed to achieve acceptable protection. Should government authorise an examination of such measures, it would be necessary for the departments concerned to survey the requirement, prepare estimates of cost, and make proposals as to the distribution of the cost between central government, the public and private authorities concerned. This selective approach would demand considerable effort on the part of

central government and other public authorities but it is the only way to ensure that any expenditure is limited to necessary protection. The alternative of placing statutory responsibility on all employers to provide shelter at the work place would impose substantial and largely futile burdens on industry and commerce. Notwithstanding the existence of plans to deploy regional, sub-regional and other staffs during a period of crisis, one of the government's objectives at the time will be to maintain the normal systems of government for as long as possible. Parliament, several central government departments, and some regional offices are in areas of high risk of attack and more needs to be done to ensure that essential activities can continue under the threat of conventional air attack. There is little current provision for due functioning in protected accommodation and the Property Services Agency could be charged with ensuring that suitable safe accommodation is earmarked so that, during a period of crisis and conventional attack, the essential functions of government could be maintained.

#### Conclusion

13. The Government should take the opportunity afforded by the current home defence review to make a clear statement of a shelter strategy designed to reinforce the "stay put" posture which the public will be advised to adopt during a period of crisis and attack. The strategy should include the peacetime education of the public about the implications of both conventional and nuclear air attack, together with advice on the measures they would be urged to take during a crisis period and peacetime guidance on domestic shelters for those who, during normal times, wish to consider making advance provision. The policy of household self-help, for which no financial assistance should be given, should be supplemented by requesting and assisting local authorities to survey existing buildings with a view to earmarking suitable structures as shelters for those caught away from their homes or whose homes or personal circumstances are likely to preclude their achieving adequate protection for themselves. In this connection local authorities should be encouraged to make maximum use of voluntary effort both in the peacetime planning of limited communal shelter and in the implementation of shelter provisioning and occupation during a crisis period.
14. The departments responsible for vital installations of industry, transport and communications for wartime purposes should survey the requirements for shelter at work places deemed essential, prepare estimates of costs and consider the distribution of those costs between central government and the authorities concerned.

- 15. In conjunction with the Property Services Agency central government should consider its requirements for protected accommodation to enable essential activities to continue during a period of crisis and in the face of conventional attack. Comprehensive arrangements would be extremely costly.
- 16. The implementation of a strategy on these lines, if approved by Ministers, should become the responsibility of a working party steered by the Home Office and reporting to the planning sub-committee of the Official Committee on Home Defence.

Warfare in the Future

...the inherent instability of various areas of the world, notably central and south America, and a number of other areas of potential conflict in the military sense in support of the military and economic objectives, the risk of a war in Europe leading to a major attack on the United Kingdom must be considered carefully. The main responsibility to launch such conventional and nuclear attack against the United Kingdom is retained but it must be questioned whether their political or military motives could lead to their own goals, despite the slightest danger of a nuclear attack on London being... If, therefore, the danger of war is low - if the so-called 'cold war' does not break out, including the United Kingdom, has already paid the price by way of destruction - then it might be considered that the grounds to be paid in order of how before the... would similarly be... However, the possibility of an alternative strategy is reinforced by... under the... that... the... the... of... and at least some of its people.

...particularly, because the British armed forces rely in periods of tension or conventional war on various kinds of civil support (e.g. communications and transport) and... in the relevant... this would help to ensure that certain military... (notably... and... of British and American reinforcements, and... of military operations, the loss of which the UK is a... are effectively... In addition, civil preparations could clearly have an impact on... in periods of tension or war and, as a... in maintaining... for government measures... of... military... of... to these...

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## CIVIL HOME DEFENCE PLANNING OBJECTIVES

Report by Officials

1. This paper sets out broad home defence planning objectives proposed for adoption at this stage. It has been prepared in the light of the current Ministry of Defence assessment of Soviet capability to attack the United Kingdom (Annex A) and takes particular account of the likelihood that there might be no more than 7 to 10 days warning before the onset of air attack on the United Kingdom.

Response to the Threat

- Despite the apparent instability of certain areas of the world, notably south west Asia, and notwithstanding a measure of Soviet willingness to use military power in support of its military and economic objectives, the risk of a war in Europe leading to air or missile attack on the United Kingdom must be considered unlikely. The Soviet capability to launch both conventional and nuclear attack against the United Kingdom is undoubted but it must be questioned whether their political or economic ambitions could, even in their own eyes, justify the slightest danger of a nuclear attack on Russian cities. If, therefore, the danger of war is low - if for no other reason than that the West, including the United Kingdom, has already paid a high premium by way of deterrence - then it might be concluded that the premium to be paid by way of home defence insurance should similarly be low. However, the credibility of our deterrent strategy is reinforced by demonstrating to the Soviets that we have faced the prospect of nuclear war by taking meaningful steps to safeguard the survival of the nation and at least some of its people.
3. More particularly, because the British armed forces rely in periods of tension or conventional war on certain kinds of civil support (eg. communications and transport) civil preparedness in the relevant fields would help to ensure that certain military tasks (notably reception and/or despatch of British and American reinforcements, and the conduct of military operations, for both of which the UK is a base) are effectively discharged. In addition, civil preparedness could clearly have an impact on maintaining public morale in periods of tension or war and, as a consequence, in maintaining public support for government measures (including, of course, military measures) taken in these periods.

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Response to Public Anxiety

4. Whatever the government's assessment of the real nature of the threat it is clear that some part of the general public is deeply worried about the volatile international situation, and this anxiety is fully reflected through the media. Critics of the perceived inadequacy of the present home defence arrangements are seizing the opportunity to press the government into greater commitment to home defence and it seems unlikely that they will be easily deflected. It is hard to say how the international climate will develop in the near future but it would be prudent to reckon on public concern continuing for some appreciable time unless the government is seen to be taking some remedial action.

Response to Parliamentary Concern

5. Parliamentary interest in home defence matters over the last 6 months has been unprecedented in recent years. It is largely confined to the government party and there can be little doubt that its supporters expect the government to announce substantial decisions in the forthcoming statement. The recently established working group of conservative backbenchers aims to produce a report based on a questionnaire circulated among Conservative backbench MPs and there are informal indications that the party would largely be satisfied with additional expenditure on home defence of between £20 and £40 million annually.

Conclusion

6. Pulling these strands together points towards a civil home defence planning objective aimed at securing the maximum number of survivors from the initial onslaught - whether conventional or nuclear - so that human endeavour within a framework of residual democratic government can set itself the task of regenerating society within the United Kingdom. This overall aim will call for the smoothest possible transition to war, the maintenance of essential national and government services and a prepared strategy for recovery and eventual regeneration.



COSTED OPTIONS TO ACHIEVE CIVIL HOME DEFENCE PLANNING OBJECTIVES

Report by Officials

Introduction

1. The purpose of this Annex is to provide Ministers with costed options for achieving the civil home defence planning objectives stated in Annex D. The options take account of the nature of the threat as assessed by the Ministry of Defence (Annex A), the scope for voluntary effort in civil home defence planning (Annex B) and the special problems of dispersal (evacuation) and shelter policies (Annex C). Adoption of the options set out in this paper would fall well short of a perfect solution, the likely cost of which would be far greater than justified by the present assessment of the threat as set out in Annex A.


Protection of the Population by Dispersal (Evacuation) and/or Shelter

2. Annex C deals with the factors influencing policies on evacuation and shelter and makes recommendations as to further action. The option is to strengthen the "stay put" policy by developing, within peacetime financial constraints, greater public awareness of the likely nature of any future war and a more realistic shelter strategy than is presently available. Since the "stay put" policy is likely in peacetime to be subject to criticism, and at least to some extent disregarded by the public in war, the government should aim to state clearly the basis of the policy and to emphasise how families stand the best chance of survival in or near to their homes. Although cost constraints may be felt to preclude an ambitious shelter programme (even if any feasible programme were assumed to be effective in the event), there are certain worthwhile peacetime measures discussed more fully in Annex C.

Level of Expenditure

3. At its meeting of 20 March the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee agreed in principle to limited remedial measures costing around £1 million in 1980/81 and rising to about £5 million by the end of the survey period. The options set out in this Annex and tabulated in the appendix constitute proposals amounting to a strategy which subsumes and goes beyond the basic measures provisionally agreed. If accepted in toto, the present order of home defence expenditure would roughly double from approximately £20 million to about £40 million annually. Acceptance of Priority 1 items only would take the expenditure to around £32 million. The proposals are explained in the following paragraphs.

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## A. SURVIVAL MEASURES

The United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation

4. This organisation, including the 10,000 members of the Royal Observer Corps, exists to warn the public of both nuclear and conventional attack and of the pattern and level of radioactive fallout following a nuclear strike. It can be brought to full readiness in 7 days and the attack warning elements can be manned within 48 hours. Additional expenditure is vital if the organisation is to be kept at a state of readiness consonant with the expected shorter warning period. To heighten the state of readiness it is necessary to link the attack warning elements of the system by dedicated private wires to each other and to the main Royal Air Force radar stations. The annual additional rental costs are estimated as rising [from £0.200 million in 1980/81] to £0.600 million in 1982/83 and thereafter [expenditure of the 1980/81 figure does of course depend upon early decisions being made by Ministers]7. It is also necessary to replace obsolete rented telecommunications equipment and to increase Royal Observer Corps allowances, so as to maintain recruiting and training interest. The combined cost of these items is estimated as rising [from £0.350 million in 1980/81] to £0.905 million in 1984/85. Provision for comparisons and basic research is desirable and would cost another £0.055 million from 1981/82.

Public Information in Peace and War

5. The judgement of what information should freely be made available to the general public in peacetime is a difficult one to make. Both central and local government have already responded to the present climate of enquiry. The official booklet "Protect and Survive", which was prepared with a view to free distribution to every household during the previously expected warning period of 3 to 4 weeks, is now on sale at a price of 50 pence net. Over recent months many local authorities, using the material in "Protect and Survive", have prepared information leaflets which are available on request and in public libraries. It would not be justified to embark on positive campaigns to encourage people to take preparatory steps in peacetime (having regard to the sustained effort required for such Home Office campaigns as those against the dangers of household fires and burglaries), but it would be right to persevere with the present more open attitude towards home defence matters and adopt certain low cost means, such as the availability of cheap informative leaflets, of responding to public concern. More specific public guidance on shelter protection will result from the work of the current Home Office working group on domestic fallout shelters (see Annex C).

6. Radio, television and the press are the channels for communicating public advice during a period of crisis and the necessary material is available and prepositioned. It is necessary to review the material regularly in the light of changing assumptions and developments in technical knowledge. The cost involved is unlikely to be substantial and the expected extra staff effort required is allowed for in the proposals for minor enhancement of central government planning staffs (paragraph 21 below).

#### Wartime Broadcasting Service (WTBS)

7. The WTBS is an essential component of civil home defence preparedness in that it will provide the only effective means of mass communication pre-attack and be the sole means of making generally known the radiological situation post-attack. Present plans provide for the introduction of single channel (radio only) broadcasting when nuclear attack is imminent. The planned service should be capable of surviving attack and broadcasting to the whole of the United Kingdom as well as being capable of separate transmissions within the regions and a limited external service. The first provision has been almost met, but little local information could be given after attack. An examination of which broadcasting stations should be hardened to cater for the regional and external requirements is in hand; the preliminary estimated cost is £6.5 million for works spread over 5 years with £0.14 million additional annual charges. These figures are subject to refinement as the examination progresses.

#### B. PRIMARY POST-ATTACK MEASURES

##### The Machinery of Government in War

8. Although, during a period of conventional air attack, both central and local government will continue to operate within the present democratic framework, it is important to complete our plans for rapid delegation to residual systems of district, county and regional government in the event of a nuclear attack. Present plans provide for 17 protected sub-regional headquarters in England and Wales, 4 protected zone headquarters in Scotland and a protected regional headquarters in Northern Ireland. The intention is that they should be manned during the warning period to co-ordinate essential services between local authority areas in the immediate nuclear aftermath and to form the basis of regional government when conditions permit. The building programme is incomplete. The Emergency Communications Network (ECN) between these headquarters and local authorities needs attention; the system is only partly complete and much of the equipment, particularly radio, is obsolescent and unlikely to do its job post nuclear attack. It is essential to have available a physical infrastructure of

protected and provisioned buildings and communications ready for immediate activation during a period of crisis.

9. Construction of 3 new and the adaptation of 5 existing premises in England and Wales should be brought forward at an estimated additional cost of £4.5 million over 3 years; in Scotland the replacement of 2 of the 4 zone headquarters and urgent repairs at a third will cost an additional £2.05 million. The earlier completion of the programme would greatly encourage local authorities in their own approach to the task of designating suitable premises as county and district headquarters in war. Provision for commo rations is desirable at £0.045 million from 1981/82. Communications between the sub-regional and zonal headquarters and the local authorities (the emergency communications network) is greatly in need of modernisation. This would cost just under £6 million spread over the next 4 years. The Department of Industry is studying with the Post Office the financial and manpower resources needed to enable the latter to continue adequately to fulfil its role in support of civil aspects of home defence planning and to take measures needed to secure its due functioning in a warning period and in war. Additional annual expenditure of £0.25 million is in mind.

#### Central Government Staff with War Appointments

10. The current assumptions on a shorter warning period demand that a far higher proportion of the staff of sub-regional headquarters and of the regional groups which, in a period of crisis, would be dispersed to suitable locations should be selected, briefed and trained in peacetime so that an essential minimum of operational staff are ready to man headquarters within 48 hours. At present only a very small minority of the staff needed to fill essential wartime appointments have been designated. Some training and exercising has been given to the Principal and Deputy Principal Officers and communications teams of the sub-regional headquarters. The Civil Service Department is exploring with departments the need to nominate, brief, train and exercise a much higher proportion of the staff who will be needed. Arrangements to provide the necessary training and exercises for the staff will involve an additional cost of perhaps £0.065 million in 1981/82 rising to £0.120 million in 1983/84.

#### Food Stockpiles, Distribution and Control

11. There are strategic food reserves to augment commercial stocks in order to prolong endurance and facilitate the control of basic food stuffs during crisis, conventional war and for 3 months after a nuclear attack. Senior management of



the food industries and food trades should be more closely involved in peacetime planning and training for their war responsibilities. There should also be close co-operation between the Ministry's central and regional staffs and the local authority officers designated as having wartime responsibility for food control and distribution. The farming industry needs further information on the implications of conventional and nuclear war and this is in hand. There should exist in peacetime a prepared system of rationing and food control. Stocks of emergency feeding equipment require proper maintenance.

12. The sugar strategic reserve is still 35,000 tons below the authorised level; about £12 million spread over 5 years would be needed for replenishment. About £2 million, again over 5 years, would be needed to print food control documents. A new method of maintaining the emergency feeding equipment is being developed and will require additional annual provision of £0.1 million from 1981/82 for about 5 years.

#### Medical Stockpile

13. The Health Services plan to provide medical and nursing care for the casualties of war (including European battlefield casualties) and the sick and to maintain a basis for future reconstruction. The existing medical stockpile is an almost random collection of items not directly related to discerned needs. Rationalisation and dispersal is a high priority. Locally held reserves, eg of pain-killing drugs, need replenishment. The estimated cost of necessary improvements is £5 million spread over 3 years. Some of this may warrant first priority in expenditure on further consideration.

#### Local Authorities

14. All government departments, local authorities and other essential public services should have well documented and regularly exercised plans for a rapid switch to war footing. Considerable work has already been done in this area but a great deal of further staff effort is required, particularly on the part of local authorities, before there can be reasonable assurance that there would be a smooth transition to wartime arrangements. Central government departmental war books and local authority transition to war arrangements should be compatible and maintained at a high state of readiness.
15. In England and Wales the GLC and County Councils have a statutory duty, under the Civil Defence (Planning) Regulations 1974 to make plans for the continuation of essential local services in war, including the necessary training of staff. Comparable provisions apply in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Despite the

promulgation since 1972 of detailed central government advice on all aspects of the home defence planning responsibilities of local authorities, not all have achieved the objective of completing comprehensive plans capable of implementation with even the long-standing assumption of a warning period of 3 to 4 weeks, let alone the expected shorter period of 7 days. As a corollary to this, local authorities need to earmark and equip protected accommodation to serve as their wartime headquarters preferably with standby premises. Lack of money has precluded the necessary impetus, particularly at the district level. The completion of main and standby wartime headquarters and their connection to the emergency communications network is urgently required if there is to be public confidence in civil home defence preparedness.

16. Some Shire counties have made considerable progress in developing plans for survival at the community level. This is an area of planning affording considerable scope for voluntary effort (see Annex B). All local authorities, in both rural and urban areas (including the major conurbations), should identify communities and develop organisations which would form the basis of survival and initial recovery from a nuclear attack. Community leaders and advisers should be identified, recruited, briefed, trained and exercised in the role which the local authority would expect them to perform during crisis, conventional war and post nuclear attack.
17. Approved home defence expenditure by local authorities in Great Britain is running at around £5 million annually; 75% of this is met by specific grant from central funds. An agreement in principle to discontinue the specific grant and absorb support for home defence expenditure into the rate support grant was deferred for 1980/81 pending the outcome of this review. Separate submissions are to be made to Ministers on the question of continuing specific civil defence grant and, for the purpose of this Annex, it is assumed that Ministers and the LAAs will not feel able to dispense with the arrangement during the period 1981/82-1985/86. On this basis it is proposed that approved local authority expenditure should be nearly doubled to not less than £11 million\*annually in Great Britain, involving additional provision of £6.3 million by 1983/84. With Priority 2 items, the additional provision would be £8.3 million. Ministers are committed to entering into discussions with the Local Authority Associations to consider how best to utilise the additional resources to be made available.

\* includes £1 million first priority expenditure for promotion of voluntary effort.

One would expect to see the additional sums being broadly divided in the ratio 4:2 (or 6:2) between the strengthening of emergency planning teams and development of voluntary effort on the one hand and the accelerated adaptations of local authority premises for wartime control purposes on the other. Strengthened emergency planning teams would also facilitate comprehensive local surveys of buildings and other locations to be used for shelter purposes in war (see Annex C).

#### Training and Exercising

18. The Home Defence College at Easingwold is the only central training establishment. It concentrates on the training of local authority staffs and elected members in the background to their wartime responsibilities. The provision of adequate central and local facilities for appropriate training and exercising to be given to the key staffs of central and local government and other public authorities who would be designated for wartime roles is essential. The Home Defence College at Easingwold is not at present able to satisfy the demand for training in all its various areas of activity. It is necessary to expand the capacity of the College by 40%, increasing the number of places from 50 to 70, as well as increasing the throughput of students by administrative means. The initial capital cost of the necessary expansion will be around £0.150 million. It is envisaged that the Principal of the Home Defence College might also act as the professional home defence adviser to local and other public authorities, using the staff of his establishment for the dual purposes of central training and providing technical advice on the formulation of civil defence plans. This accords with the College charter and an estimated additional staff cost of £0.100 million annually would provide for both the increased training burden on the College and, probably, for the function of providing advice to individual local authorities.

#### Emergency Services

19. The police, fire, ambulance, hospital and general medical services should have in peacetime comprehensive plans for the fulfilment of their role in both conventional and nuclear war. All these services should train key officers in their war responsibilities and exercise their plans for adopting the appropriate wartime deployments and postures. Annex B deals with the general question of harnessing voluntary effort to home defence plans. The police already have the special constables and a working party is currently examining how recruitment might be improved. Some local expansion of the ambulance services, particularly in areas of high risk of attack, should be planned. The Area Health Authorities



are expected to ensure in peacetime that both the British Red Cross and the Order of St John are closely involved in planning. Against the contingency of a possibly protracted period of conventional air attack on certain targets in the United Kingdom the Fire Service should plan a heavy rescue capability making use of volunteers. Reinstatement of the staff officer posts dispensed with in the 1960s will enable the Chief Fire Officers designated as Regional Fire Advisers to improve co-ordination of brigade war plans and make more feasible the rapid absorption of extra manpower in a war crisis. The primary cost is about £0.155 million with an additional £0.715 million if support staff prove necessary.

### C. OTHER MEASURES

#### Maintenance of Essential Industries and Services

20. The United Kingdom has an obligation to respond to guidance by NATO Ministers on identifying and planning for essential industrial and transport needs in both crisis and conventional war. Industrial and transport provision for the post attack situation is the responsibility of national government. A peacetime aim is to plan for the effective satisfaction of the requirements which the armed services (including the United States forces) will place on industry and transport during conventional war. A further aim is the identification of industrial, agricultural, transport, energy and other resources vital to the survival and recovery of the nation after a nuclear attack together with the preparation of plans for the priorities to be established in those circumstances. Means of fulfilling these aims are currently under examination.

#### Central Government Planning Staffs

21. The co-ordination of increased home defence planning activity on the part of central government, public and local authorities, along with greater effort to harmonise the home defence planning of both civil and military authorities, will require additional staffs in several central departments with major home defence responsibilities. The total cost of these staffs is likely to be £0.420 million per annum, and £0.400 million for the National Health Service, starting in 1981/82. The precise numbers of additional staff required will need to be settled when the full implications of increased activity are recognised and when the scope for redeploying existing staff has been exhausted. It may be that about 80 additional central government and NHS staff will be needed.

#### War Emergency Transport Services

22. A study is being made of 20 year old moorings and anchorages with a view to modernising those vital as an alternative to existing ports which are considered

to be prime targets (see Annex A). Their historic cost is £6.5 million, offset by current rent income. Modernisation might cost £1 million. The equipment the Department holds to tranship grain from bulk carriers to coasters or lighters at moorings and anchorages is at the end of its useful life. The estimated replacement cost is £4 million phased over 5 years. The Department in conjunction with our NATO allies is remitted to conduct research into methods of unloading large container ships at moorings and anchorages. A solution once found could cost about £3 million. Rail movement in a warning period and conventional way may require replacement of general purpose stock and there are likely to be cost implications. It would seem prudent to provide for an additional annual sum of £2 million overall in each of the 5 years 1981/82 to 1985/86 with half in priority 1. These measures collectively would enable both military and civilian essential movements to continue despite dislocation in a period of conventional warfare and help secure national recovery and regeneration in the event of nuclear attack.

Conclusion

23. The Appendix to this Annex summaries the proposed additional expenditure in £m according to whether they are regarded as first (P1) or second (P2) priority. They involve £20.240 million (£12.625 million for P1 only) in 1981/82; £23.155 million (£14.540 million for P1 only) in 1982/83; £24.785 million (£16.170 million for P1 only) in 1983/84; £21.755 million (£15.140 million for P1 only) in 1984/85; and £18.755 million (£12.040 million for P1 only) in 1985/86. £0.700 million could arise in 1980/81 if decisions are made in time for the money to be found within existing programmes and for the work to be completed.

## RECOMMENDED PATTERN OF ADDITIONAL HOME DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (Cm)

Item	1980/81		1981/82		1982/83		1983/84		1984/85		1985/86		Remarks
	P1	P2	P1	P2	P1	P2	P1	P2	P1	P2	P1	P2	
<u>United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation</u>													
Private Wires	0.200	0.400	-	0.600	-	0.600	-	0.600	-	0.600	-	-	)
Replacement of obsolete equipment etc	-	0.070	-	0.210	-	0.350	-	0.470	-	0.470	-	-	) Home Office
RCC allowances	0.350	0.435	-	0.435	-	0.435	-	0.435	-	0.435	-	-	) and SHHD
Increased research	-	-	0.020	-	0.020	-	0.020	-	0.020	-	0.020	-	)
Compo Rations	-	-	0.035	-	0.035	-	0.035	-	0.035	-	0.035	-	) (CSD)
	0.550	0.905	0.055	1.245	0.055	1.385	0.055	1.505	0.055	1.505	0.055	-	
<u>Wartime Broadcasting Service</u>													
	-	1.040	-	1.540	-	1.540	-	1.540	-	1.540	-	-	Home Office and BBC
<u>Sub-Regional and Zonal Headquarters</u>													
Completion of Premises	-	1.300	-	1.150	-	2.600	-	1.500	-	-	-	-	Home Office and SHHD
Compo rations	-	-	0.045	-	0.045	-	0.045	-	0.045	-	0.045	-	) (CSD)
	-	1.300	0.045	1.150	0.045	2.600	0.045	1.500	0.045	-	0.045	-	
<u>Communications</u>													
Emergency Communications Network	-	0.800	-	1.750	-	1.650	-	1.600	-	-	-	-	Home Office and SHHD
Post Office due functioning grant	-	0.250	-	0.250	-	0.250	-	0.250	-	0.250	-	-	) (DI)
	-	1.050	-	2.000	-	1.900	-	1.850	-	0.250	-	-	
<u>Local Authorities</u>													
Wartime Headquarters (premises and comms)	-	2.040	-	2.330	-	2.350	-	2.350	-	2.350	-	-	)
Planning teams *	0.100	3.800	2.000	3.900	2.000	4.000	2.000	4.000	2.000	4.000	2.000	-	) Home Office and SHHD
	0.100	5.840	2.000	6.230	2.000	6.350	2.000	6.350	2.000	6.350	2.000	-	

\* includes £1m a year first priority expenditure for promotion of voluntary effort

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Item	1980/81		1981/82		1982/83		1983/84		1984/85		1985/86		Remarks		
	P1	P2	P1	P2	P1	P2	P1	P2	P1	P2	P1	P2			
<u>Training</u>															
Home Defence College - premises	-	-	0.150	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	) Home Office ) - all departments	
" " " - staff	-	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	-		
Central government staff with war appointments	-	-	0.055	-	0.100	-	0.120	-	0.120	-	0.120	-	-		
	-	-	0.315	-	0.200	-	0.220	-	0.220	-	0.220	-	-		
<u>Emergency Feeding Arrangements</u>															
Replenishment of strategic reserve (sugar)	-	-	2.400	-	2.400	-	2.400	-	2.400	-	2.400	-	2.400	)	
Printing of control documents	-	-	0.400	-	0.400	-	0.400	-	0.400	-	0.400	-	0.400	) (MAFF/SHHD)	
Maintenance of equipment	-	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	)	
Water authorities preparedness	-	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	) (DOE/SDD)	
	-	-	0.200	2.800	0.200	2.800	0.200	2.800	0.200	2.800	0.200	2.800	-		
Emergency Medical supplies	-	-	1.000	-	2.000	-	2.000	-	-	-	-	-	-	) (DHSS/SHHD)	
<u>Emergency Transport</u>															
Improvements:															
railway capacity )	-	-	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	) Department of	
grain handling )	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	) Transport	
moorings )	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	)	
container handling )	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	)	
<u>Emergency Fire Service</u>															
Regional staff officers	-	-	0.155	0.715	0.155	0.715	0.155	0.715	0.155	0.715	0.155	0.715	0.155	0.715	Home Office

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Item	1980/81		1981/82		1982/83		1983/84		1984/85		1985/86		Remarks
	P1	P2	P1	P2	P1	P2	P1	P2	P1	P2	P1	P2	
<u>Central Government Staff</u>													
Home Office	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-
Scottish Office	0.050	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-	0.100	-
MAFF	-	0.040	-	0.040	-	0.040	-	0.040	-	0.040	-	0.040	-
BHSS (and NHS)	-	0.500	-	0.500	-	0.500	-	0.500	-	0.500	-	0.500	-
DOE	-	0.050	-	0.050	-	0.050	-	0.050	-	0.050	-	0.050	-
Energy	-	<u>0.030</u>	-	<u>0.030</u>	-	<u>0.030</u>	-	<u>0.030</u>	-	<u>0.030</u>	-	<u>0.030</u>	-
	0.050	0.820	-	0.820	-	0.820	-	0.820	-	0.820	-	0.820	-
OVERALL TOTALS	<u>0.700</u>	<u>12.625</u>	<u>7.615</u>	<u>14.540</u>	<u>8.615</u>	<u>16.170</u>	<u>8.615</u>	<u>15.140</u>	<u>6.615</u>	<u>12.040</u>	<u>6.615</u>		

P1 - First Priority  
P2 - Second Priority

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7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1