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INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, BAGHDAD.

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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALK WITH GROMYKO, 23 SEPTEMBER.

#### IRAQ/IRAN

1. LORD CARRINGTON SOUNDED OUT GROMYKO'S ATTITUDE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF MINISTERIAL PARTICIPATION IN SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS, AND TO A SECURITY COUNCIL CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE. GROMYKO WAS RELUCTANT ON BOTH COUNTS. THE SITUATION WAS UNCLEAR, AND THERE WAS A LACK OF INFORMATION. EVERYONE MIGHT BE WISER TOMORROW. HE WAS NOT SURE THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING WOULD BE WISE EVEN THEN. MOREOVER, FIGHTING MIGHT HAVE STOPPED BY THEN. SADDAM HUSSAIN HAD SAID THAT IRAQ HAD NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST IRAN; IT WAS STRANGE THAT THE FIGHTING SHOULD CONTINUE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. HE SUSPECTED THAT THE 1975 AGREEMENT ON SHATT AL ARAB HAD BEEN TOO HASTILY CONCLUDED, AND WAS NOT A RELIABLE AGREEMENT.

2. GROMYKO'S GENERAL ATTITUDE ON THIS SUBJECT WAS EVASIVE AND NON-COMMITTAL, THOUGH THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALSO THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE AN ELEMENT OF GENUINE UNCERTAINTY IN HIS MIND ABOUT WHAT WAS GOING ON ON THE GROUND, AND ABOUT HOW THE RUSSIANS SHOULD RESPOND.

#### AFGHANISTAN

3. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT HE DID NOT PROPOSE GOING OVER THE GROUND ON AFGHANISTAN ONCE AGAIN, HAVING HEARD GROMYKO'S SPEECH. BUT HE WAS AFRAID THAT THE WHOLE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EASTERN AREA WAS BECOMING DANGEROUS. GROMYKO RE-STATED THE SOVIET POSITION ON AFGHANISTAN IN CRISP TERMS. THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE TO PAST PROPOSALS. THERE COULD BE NO POLITICAL SOLUTION WITHOUT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AND IRAN. EVEN WITHOUT A SOLUTION AFGHANISTAN WOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE, AND ENCROACHMENTS FROM OUTSIDE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE REPULSED. SOVIET TROOPS WOULD REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS NO REAL FORCE FOR THEM TO MATCH THEIR STRENGTH AGAINST. THESE TROOPS WERE A STABILISING FACTOR, WHO WOULD LEAVE ONLY WHEN THERE WAS A COMPLETE END TO OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

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4. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT AGA SHAHI WAS DISAPPOINTED AT THE SOVIET REJECTION OF HIS SUGGESTION FOR A CONFERENCE, EVEN THOUGH SOME PEOPLE THOUGHT THAT A CONFERENCE MIGHT BE BENEFICIAL TO PEOPLE THEY WERE NOT ANXIOUS TO RECOGNISE. GROMYKO SAID THAT THERE WAS NOTHING FOR A CONFERENCE TO DO, LEAST OF ALL DISCUSS A POSSIBLE CHANGE OF REGIME. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS AN END TO INTERFERENCE. AFGHANISTAN WAS ALREADY NON-ALIGNED. IN THE PAST BRITAIN HAD PLAYED A ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD, BUT SHE WAS NOW FOLLOWING IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF THOSE WHO SENT ARMS TO AFGHANISTAN, INSTEAD OF APPEALING FOR REALISM. THE AFGHANS HAD NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS, BUT NOBODY WOULD TALK TO THEM ABOUT THE NEED TO LIVE IN PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP. IF THE PAKISTANIS HAD TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, THEY MUST BE WRONG IN THE HEAD.

5. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT WE DID NOT WISH TO SEE A GOVERNMENT HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN. NOR DID WE WISH FOR DISTURBANCES ON SOVIET BORDERS. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND BRITISH VIEW WAS NOT ALL THAT GREAT: WE WISHED FOR A NEUTRAL NON-ALIGNED GOVERNMENT WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE, WHICH INCLUDED HELP GIVEN TO THE RESISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN, FROM WHEREVER IT CAME, AND SOVIET FORCES. GROMYKO MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRESENCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF SOVIET TROOPS FRIGHTENED THE PAKISTANIS AND IRANIANS. LAST TIME THEY HAD MET LORD CARRINGTON HAD BEEN GLAD TO HEAR GROMYKO'S ASSURANCES THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO DESIGNS ON OIL IN THE GULF, AND WOULD LIKE TO HEAR CONFIRMATION OF THIS. GROMYKO SAID THAT HE WAS READY TO REPEAT THESE ASSURANCES A HUNDRED TIMES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS TILTING AT WINDMILLS: HE COULD NOT POSSIBLY BELIEVE THAT SOVIET FORCES WOULD REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN REACHED WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN. EITHER WE WERE UNDER A MISAPPREHENSION OR WE WERE MERELY FOLLOWING OUR AMERICAN ALLIES, WHICH WAS WORSE. OBSOLETE CONCEPTS ABOUT SOVIET POLICIES CLEARLY PREVAILED IN LONDON. HOW WAS IT POSSIBLE TO THINK THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT AFTER ALL GO FOR THE OIL AND THE PERSIAN GULF, DESPITE THEIR ASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY?

6. LORD CARRINGTON HOPED THAT THE RUSSIANS COULD UNDERSTAND THAT GENUINE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION SOMETIMES AROSE, AND REFERRED TO GROMYKO'S DISMISSIVE ATTITUDE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT WHEN THEY HAD MET IN NEW YORK LAST YEAR. THERE WERE A MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES IN AFGHANISTAN, AND THE BORDER WAS DIFFICULT TO POLICE. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS RECIPROCITY, AND THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TRUST. THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM WAS ONE OF TIMING. IT SHOULD NOT BE BEYOND THE WIT OF MAN TO OVERCOME THIS.

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7. FINALLY LORD CARRINGTON ASKED GROMYKO TO STOP JAMMING THE BBC. GROMYKO TRIED TO TURN THIS ASIDE WITH A LABOURED JOKE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE PERSISTED, POINTING OUT THAT JAMMING WAS IN RECONCILABLE WITH THE HELSINKI AGREEMENTS. GROMYKO ARGUED THAT THE FINAL ACT AT HELSINKI DID NOT PERMIT INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE HOPED THAT EVERYONE WOULD KEEP THEIR COOL IN MADRID. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT DEMAGOGY OR PROPAGANDA, AND WOULD REBUFF ANYONE WHO TOOK THIS ATTITUDE. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT A REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT IN MADRID WOULD BE ESSENTIAL. IT WAS NOT A GOOD BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN STATES TO IGNORE THINGS THAT HAD HAPPENED, AND TO PAPER OVER CRACKS.

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