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CIVIL HOME DEFENCE

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CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

CIVIL HOME DEFENCE

Note by the Secretaries

1. The attached memorandum by the Chairman of the Official Committee on Home Defence, and annexed preliminary report by officials, is circulated for information and as background to the Home Secretary's paper OD(80) 22.

2. The co-ordination of civil and military policy objectives in the home defence field (paragraph 4e of the attached memorandum and paragraph 2 of the Home Secretary's paper) could be achieved without new machinery if the remit of the Official Committee on Home Defence and its sub-committees were broadened to include military as well as civil aspects of home defence; ie the military defence of the United Kingdom as well as what has hitherto been conventionally understood by the term "home defence"

Signed ROBERT ARMSTRONG
R L WADE-GERY
R M HASTIE-SMITH

Cabinet Office

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CIVIL HOME DEFENCE

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Official Committee
on Home Defence

1. The Home Secretary last year initiated a review of the state of civil preparedness for home defence. This was entrusted to a sub-committee of the Official Committee on Home Defence. The report of that sub-committee, which is annexed has not yet been completed. But the Official Committee has agreed that it should be submitted in its present preliminary form as background for Ministerial discussion of the Home Secretary's policy paper OD(80) 22.

2. The major underlying issue concerns the assumptions to be made about the threat. At the time of the 1968 decision to restrict civil defence to a care and maintenance basis, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) worked to a "tripwire" strategy which assumed that a Soviet attack on Western Europe would lead to the early use of Western nuclear weapons, so that there was little prospect of conventional warfare lasting more than a very short time; something like 30 days warning time was expected before any war in Europe broke out; and the Russians were not thought capable of mounting a conventional air attack on the United Kingdom. In all these respects the situation has since changed. NATO now works to a flexible response strategy, under which the conventional warfare phase might last anything from a few days to several weeks; and since 1977 the Joint Intelligence Committee have assumed that warning time is likely to be only 7-10 days (and possibly as little as 2 days) and that there is a significant and growing Russian capability for conventional air attack on the United Kingdom.

3. This clearly affects the potential need for civil home defence. Officials in the Treasury and some other Departments, however, doubt whether any firm conclusions about new policies can be drawn until there has been further detailed analysis of the threat assumptions, of the civil home defence objectives suggested by those assumptions and of the extent to which current policies measure up to those objectives. They underline, in other words, the incomplete state of our present studies.

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4. Subject to this general reservation, the following preliminary conclusions seem to emerge from the work so far undertaken.
- a. The lack of plans for the protection of the public could be seen by the Russians as inhibiting any Western decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, and could thus affect the credibility of Britain's deterrent strategy. It would also affect morale in a warning period and support for a conventional war effort.
 - b. The state of planning by central government, local and other authorities and the emergency services is uneven, incomplete and far from enabling the nation to meet, within 7-10 days in a sudden crisis, the threat of either conventional or nuclear war.
 - c. Such planning as there is for industry, energy (except oil) and the health service relates predominantly to the nuclear threat. In other fields some progress is being made to meet the conventional threat, but nowhere are plans complete. There is no assurance that essential industry could be maintained during a period of conventional war. No civil plans exist to meet a possible attack with chemical weapons.
 - d. In the absence of any direction to the contrary from central government, local authorities are still basing their plans on the out of date 1968 assumptions described in paragraph 2 above.
 - e. There is at present no fully adequate system for achieving consistency in the state of readiness of the armed forces on the one hand and civil home defence on the other.
 - f. Civil home defence planning is inhibited by local authorities' lack of planners who have been normally vetted to receive classified information.
 - g. The strategic oil stockpile is at a satisfactory level, and some useful planning has been done on transport. But there is an interdependence between civil home defence planning in the fields of transport, energy and industry; and between such planning and the military posture of Britain and the Alliance.

h. An adequate framework for voluntary organisations, local voluntary bodies and individual volunteers could be provided by local authorities, without the creation of a national organisation such as a civil defence corps.

j. Further work would be necessary before officials could offer considered advice on policy regarding shelters, the evacuation of the public from danger areas and the protection/dispersal of central government in the face of conventional threat.

k. The public are not well informed either about the various threats or about possible protective measures.

5. Paragraph 62 of the report sets out some provisional financial estimates. Officials are agreed that there would be advantage in authorising the small expenditures there given under options A and B, provided that offsetting savings can be found. The estimates do not include anything for a shelter programme (which might cost something under £100 million in the context of conventional attack and up to £15,000 million in the nuclear context); for the protection of central government from conventional attack; for measures against chemical warfare; or for any further preparations in the industrial or energy fields.

R L WADE-GERY

Cabinet Office

17 March 1980

HOME DEFENCE REVIEW 1980THE CURRENT STATE OF CIVIL PREPAREDNESSREPORT BY THE HOME DEFENCE PLANNING SUB-COMMITTEEBACKGROUND

1. Ministers last took collective decisions on civil preparedness for home defence in 1972 and before that in 1968. These covered the life-saving aspects of civil defence and the wider planning needed to maintain continuity of government and essential supplies, industries and services.

1968

2. It was considered that there would be sufficient warning of any Soviet political intention to attack the United Kingdom within the NATO Alliance to allow time for civil preparedness to be brought to readiness before the end of an assessed period of 3 or 4 weeks warning of Soviet military preparations. It was also assessed that general nuclear warfare would rapidly ensue; the Warsaw Pact's capabilities of conventional air attack upon, and effective sabotage within, the United Kingdom were considered negligible.

3. Preparedness and, in particular the life-saving aspects of civil defence was placed under care and maintenance. Expenditure was cut from £22.5 million to £7.2 million. The Civil Defence Corps was disbanded as was the peacetime civil defence structure in the regions, the loss of which could not then be made good by local authorities. Only the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO) was retained at a state of readiness. Some premises for control and communications were retained but many assets were disposed of. A minimum of training and paper planning was continued to preserve expertise to reactivate civil defence and other planning to achieve readiness once a Soviet political intention to attack was perceived. Effective planning to maintain industrial production and the energy industries ceased with the exception of that for oil.

1972

4. There was little change from the 1968 assessments and assumptions. Priorities were adjusted within the current total expenditure, then about £10 million, principally to provide comprehensive planning guidance based on the 1968 assumptions and additional staff for local authorities. Staff college training for central and local officials was begun at the Home Defence College. Improvements were initiated to premises for Sub-Regional Controls (now Headquarters) and to communications between them and local authorities. Priorities have since been kept under review.

5. The ministerial committee on home defence was dissolved and the level of the official committee lowered; this reduced awareness at the political and the most senior official levels. Until 1979 officials judged that any general approach for additional funds to improve preparedness might prove counter-productive. Some Departments were however able to obtain authority for particular projects whilst others suffered cuts. Overall expenditure in real terms has remained fairly constant since 1968; that currently estimated under PES programme 9 for 1980/81 is £19.6 million. The existing PES forecast to 1983/84 is summarised at Appendix 1 with additional expenditure proposed as a result of this review at Appendix 2.

CURRENT ASSESSMENTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

6. The current assessment of warning time, made in 1975 is that there might not be an adequate period of political warning of any intention by the Soviet Union to initiate hostilities and that warning of military preparations to attack would be only 7-10 days and, possibly as little as 48 hours.

7. The latest assessment of the Soviet Union's capability to launch conventional air attack on the United Kingdom, made in 1977 (JIC(77) 10) is that 650 tons of bombs could then be lifted and that this capability could be doubled by 1982. Whilst no estimate of attrition is available, this capability may be compared with an average of about 250 tons dropped on London and provincial centres in major raids in 1940/41. The weight of nuclear attack is assessed at 200 megatons delivered over 80 targets,

including major centres of population. It is assessed that conventional attacks will be concentrated on military targets rather than on centres of population, but such targets would include civil installations used for military purposes, eg certain ports, airports and inland transport centres, many of which lie in populous areas. There is a risk of chemical attack on such targets, within the weights assessed.

8. There is also a threat of organised professional sabotage by infiltrated Warsaw Pact diversionary brigades against military and certain civil targets mainly associated with the deterrent. The assessment of the threat is to be reviewed; it may be necessary to improve the protection of assumed civil targets but no cost estimate can yet be given.

9. In 1977 revised planning assumptions for home defence took account of the changed assessments of warning time and of the likelihood that, whilst the threat of general nuclear war remained, hostilities initially could be conventional and last more than a few weeks. The latter takes account of the change in NATO philosophy from that of a "trip wire" defence to that of a graduated response to the qualitative and quantitative improvements in Soviet capabilities.

10. In short, the changes since 1968 in assessments and assumptions require more advanced and complex plans; whilst some to meet the nuclear threat remain valid (although incomplete) their execution in a crisis would need to be accelerated. Fresh plans are needed to meet the threats of conventional war, for which some factors conflict with existing plans to meet the nuclear threat eg dispersal of life-saving forces to survive nuclear attack would reduce their ability to deal with conventional attacks.

RESPONSE TO NATO

11. Just as military planning is co-ordinated within the Alliance, so there is increasing activity in co-ordinating civil preparedness, particularly to support the military, to maintain external supply of critical items and essential production and to co-ordinate the use of transport; however the life-saving aspect of civil defence is largely left to individual nations. A wide range of planning is addressed within successive 4-year cycles, some of

which is useful for our national purposes but all of which makes demands on Departments' limited resources within which the same staff are in most cases called upon to handle civil contingencies, our response to NATO civil preparedness and our national plans. National deficiencies affect our standing in the Alliance.

12. In May 1979 NATO Ministers emphasised that civil preparedness is an essential part of detente, deterrence and defence and that weaknesses in the civil sector can have damaging effects on the Alliance military posture. Previously the United Kingdom's low per capita expenditure on civil preparedness had been adversely commented upon. In 1977 NATO Ministers had given guidance that priority in civil preparedness be given to planning to meet a crisis and conventional hostilities and that to meet the nuclear aftermath should be secondary.

CIVIL/MILITARY CO-ORDINATION

13. The protection of the public from enemy action is an inherent responsibility of government. [This is provided by the Armed Forces whose total defence budget is currently some £8000 million per year; and by civil preparedness expenditure on which £20 million is spent per year. Effective civil preparedness and protection is essential to maintaining public confidence in crisis and war. There is a lack of central co-ordination of civil and military policy objectives and, in particular of the balance of expenditure as between civil and military preparedness for home defence. Traditionally, civil expenditure on defence is considered within a range of protective services including law and order. In peacetime it is inevitable that more urgent demands are perceived for funds voted for this general purpose. There may be advantage, in relation to Parliament and to public opinion, in presenting in the Public Expenditure Survey civil preparedness expenditure immediately after military expenditure; to do so need not imply any degree of Ministry of Defence control over the civil expenditure, nor any departure from the present arrangement of a common PES programme aggregating charges to individual Departments' votes.

14. The disparity between our civil and military preparedness has been criticised in NATO and by the media, to the point of questioning the credibility of deterrence. In an era of nuclear supremacy a low level of civil preparedness and protection could be argued to indicate confidence in the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Now that the Soviet Union has a least parity with the Alliance, including a second-strike capability, the lack of civil protection could be seen as a potentially powerful inhibition on any political decision within the Alliance to initiate the use of nuclear weapons.

15. Nonetheless, co-operation in day-to-day planning is better than in many NATO countries. Close links exist between appropriate Defence Secretariat divisions and civil Departments and the latter have direct contact with the staff of the United Kingdom Commanders' in Chief Committee (Home) on planning for home defence, the reinforcement of Europe and the support of United States' forces in this country.

PRESENT STATE OF PREPAREDNESS

16. In the past decade, given the constraints considerable progress has been achieved by most Departments and local and other authorities in paper planning and, in some cases in providing physical assets. The situation is better than that which could have been expected to follow the perpetuation of care and maintenance. However, the cumulative effect of political disinterest, shortage of funds and the absence of any national plan coherently to achieve inter-related objectives is that preparedness is patchy at central and at local levels and, almost without exception, incomplete. The general state of planning is far short of that needed to place the nation on a war footing in 7-10 days. In a sudden crisis this would cause severe political embarrassment, possibly detract from the credibility of deterrence and, in conventional war, jeopardise our ability to sustain the economy and so maintain support for our own and Allied military forces. For brevity, this report is focussed on deficiencies and remedial action.

17. The first essential is that Ministers should be invited to confirm that they require a coherent national programme to cover civil and military preparedness for home defence, to indicate the timescale in which they wish civil preparedness improved to match the current assessments, and to determine whence the funds are to be found.

CRISIS MANAGEMENTWar Books

18. Transition to war measures in the Government War Book (GWB) are revised and rehearsed annually. Some civil measures relate to the nuclear threat and require revision to relate to the conventional, others could not be implemented in 7-10 days and some are not backed up by firmly established plans. War book measures can only mirror substantive policy decisions and the application of resources. Most major Departments maintain supplementary books, increasingly in a format compatible with the GWB. To be effective many civil measures require implementation by authorities outside central government. However, security constraints have led to, for example, local authorities being advised of GWB measures only in general terms and there is no standard presentation of local and other authorities' war plans which in some cases are incomplete. Active consideration is being given to improving local plans and determining how best to transmit instructions to implement them; there is a need for an essential minimum of planners outside central government to be vetted to receive classified information.

War Emergency Legislation

19. The existing draft legislation, drawn up in 1965, is out of date and could not be put into effect within 7-10 days. A working party was charged last year to recommend this spring the basis of revised legislation to meet current assessments and needs. A separate report will be put to Ministers.

PROTECTING AND INFORMING THE PUBLICWarning and Monitoring

20. The United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation, including the Royal Observer Corps, provides a national service to warn the public of nuclear and conventional attack and of the pattern and level of fallout. It can be brought to readiness in 7 days, including a cell at the United Kingdom Regional Air Operations Centre (UKRAOC), 5 sector controls, 250 carrier control points and 18,000 fallout warning points; the attack warning elements can be manned within 48 hours. The current annual running costs are £4.3 million. In addition, a capital expenditure of £11.5 million over 5 years commencing in 1980/81 has been included in PES to renew communications between the carrier controls and the fallout warning points.

21. Whilst the attack warning system, ie UKRAOC to the carrier control points, can be manned in 48 hours present plans for its communications, based on the 1968 assumptions on warning time, are that the Post Office would connect emergency circuits in the warning period. This may prove impracticable in a 48 hour warning during which the Post Office would have to provide many other such circuits. It is essential that the attack warning elements be permanently linked to each other and to the main RAF radar stations by dedicated private wires provided in peacetime. Given a graduated lead-in the annual additional rental costs are estimated as rising from £0.175 million in 1980/81 to £0.525 million in 1982/83 and thereafter. Additional expenditure is needed to replace other obsolete rented telecommunications equipment, to increase Royal Observer Corps allowances so as to maintain recruiting and training interest, and for additional research. The combined cost of these items is estimated as rising from £0.34 million in 1980/81 to £0.715 million in 1984/85.

Shelter and Evacuation

22. The present policy is that evacuation in the face of the nuclear threat is not to be attempted and that the public be advised to "stay put" at home, availing themselves of self-help protection for so long as attack and fallout warnings remain in force; this policy would, in a general nuclear attack, expose 40 per cent of the population to high risk of death from nuclear blast and fire. No protection or advice is afforded the general public against the chemical threat, although the Ministry of Defence has decided to provide protective equipment to armed forces engaged on home defence and to certain key employees. The need to improve the protection of the population is clear. However, the factors affecting shelter and evacuation policy are complex and, as between the nuclear and the conventional threats, conflicting. A full shelter programme could well cost £15,000 million or more whilst the most essential conventional protection might be obtained for some tens of millions of pounds.

23. In an all-out nuclear attack some 20 nuclear weapons might be detonated on major cities to destroy them as centres of population and administration. About 60 more weapons might be directed at military targets involving severe damage by blast and fire to other densely populated areas. The power of

nuclear weapons is such that no practicable shelter would enable people to survive close to the points of explosion; some 5 - 10 per cent of the area of the country, mostly heavily populated, would suffer severe blast damage. Outside the target areas the principal danger would be from radioactive fallout, from which no part of the country could be considered safe. Substantial dwellings and buildings provide a reasonable degree of protection against fallout, and this could be improved in a warning period. A degree of specific protection against blast would be more difficult and expensive. To supplement the current policy that people should "stay put" at home, even in high-risk areas, local authorities are advised to earmark public buildings as shelter for a proportion of their population who might be caught in the open at the time of attack. Very few authorities have the staff resources to make surveys and keep them up to date. Nothing is done to provide protection at places of work, or against the chemical threat.

24. At first sight, a reasonable policy could consist of evacuating people in a warning period from the likely nuclear target areas into the less densely populated parts of the country and encouraging the provision of shelter against fallout, and to some extent blast, by self-help or with official (essentially financial) support, either in a crisis or on a long-term basis in peacetime. However, such a policy would entail moving some 20 million people when it was judged that the risk of nuclear attack was high. It is far from clear that this could be undertaken successfully within the likely warning time. To be effective, the evacuation would have to be total, ie not limited to say the women and children. Subsidiary problems would include the billeting and financial support of the evacuated third of the population, the reorganisation and distribution of food and other supplies and the safeguarding of vacated property. But these problems might well be exacerbated in any unorganised exodus from the cities in the absence of any official plan for evacuation, shelter and redistribution of supplies.

25. If further study showed such a policy to be practicable in terms of time and cost, the complete abandonment of major cities and other populous areas before or during conventional hostilities could halt many industries and services essential to the war effort. Strict adherence by the public to the present advice to "stay put" at home would have the same effect. In either case the success of a robust conventional defence would be jeopardised

and with it the possibility of avoiding either defeat or general nuclear war. The timing of any mass evacuation in face of an assessed high risk of nuclear attack and, indeed that of the issue of advice to "stay put" at home would call for fine political judgement in the event.

26. In face of the conventional threat a policy for limited, local evacuation coupled with shelter at or near their work for those engaged in essential industries and services might be appropriate. To retain public confidence during conventional hostilities such a policy might need to be coupled with published, detailed plans for controlled, swift, mass evacuation in face of an imminent threat of nuclear attack. But this would carry with it the problems already outlined. A prerequisite to detailed civil study of these problems (which also bear on policy needed for the protection or dispersal of central government, see paragraphs 33 and 34 below) is that as precise an analysis as possible be provided of the likely pattern and weight of conventional and chemical attack. The civil and military approaches to chemical protective measures need to be co-ordinated. A working party could provide a more detailed report which might show that elements of nuclear and conventional protection could be compatible and feasible.

Public Information

27. There is widespread ignorance among the public, the media and officials of the threats and about protective measures. For many years the perception has been of immediate general nuclear war. Until recently this has led to apathy in face of the appalling consequences and of the perceived inadequacy of steps taken to alleviate them. Publicity material is maintained ready for use throughout the media on self-help protection from fallout; conventional and chemical weapon effects have not yet been addressed. A working party will report this spring on public information policy in a warning period and in war, including relations with the media and the question of censorship; its recommendations may need to be put to Ministers.

28. A more open approach by government now would counter criticism of undue secrecy and a more informed public might change its attitude. It has been announced to Parliament that the pamphlet "Protect and Survive" will be updated and placed on sale at the time the outcome of this review is announced. A

further pamphlet on home defence arrangements could also shortly be made available (cost £0.1 million for 1980/81). However, to retain their impact, the equivalent videotapes should not be released to the media until the event. An explanation of civil preparedness activity could accompany the bare statement of civil expenditure given in the Public Expenditure Survey. Government acknowledgement of the conventional threat would increase the demand for protection but its dimensions would be more readily grasped and the public might see increased voluntary effort as a credible low-cost means towards meeting it. Acknowledgement of the chemical threat could, however, lead to fears similar to those attending the nuclear.

War Time Broadcasting Service (WTBS)

29. This involves the introduction of single channel (radio only) broadcasting when nuclear attack is imminent, and the continuation of broadcasting in its aftermath. The service should be capable of surviving attack and providing broadcasts to the whole of the United Kingdom, separate transmissions within the regions and a limited external service. Since 1967 the first provision has been almost met but little local information could be given after attack. Expenditure forecast for 1980/81 is £0.45 million rising to £0.46 million in 1983/84.

30. An examination is being made to determine which broadcasting stations should be hardened to cater for the regional and external requirements; the preliminary estimated cost of £4.5 million for works which could be completed over 5 years and of £0.14 million additional annual charges. The timing of the introduction of the WTBS in advance of nuclear attack is also being examined. Whilst normal radio and television broadcasting would be required to continue for as long as possible in a warning period and in conventional war, the dispersal of staff to man the WTBS in the regions would reduce the peacetime services; this study is unlikely to have cost implications as switching arrangements for the WTBS already exist.

CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT

Central Government

31. The continuity of central government in the face of nuclear attack is outside the scope of this report. Each Department is responsible for its own protection against unauthorised entry and sabotage in a warning period and in

war, as in peacetime. As part of key point policy, plans are being developed and co-ordinated with the police and the armed forces; additional expenditure may be needed to meet the diversionary brigade threat to key points, no overall estimate can yet be given. No policy exists for the protection or dispersal of central government in face of the threat of conventional air attack. In most cases where Departments have provided emergency suites and communications rooms their locations have been determined, in the light of the 1968 assumptions, in relation to the needs of Ministers in a warning period and the availability of accommodation, rather than to the need for protection.

32. A policy is required for conventional protection and/or dispersal which may need to cover arrangements for Parliament. The cost implications could be considerable. Expenditure on, and implementation of, such a policy could not be kept covert and so any policy developed should be consonant with that for shelter and evacuation of the population.

Government in the Regions and Zones

33. It is planned that 17 Sub-Regional HQs (SRHQs) in England and Wales, and 4 Zone HQs in Scotland be manned in the warning period to co-ordinate essential services between counties and, in Scotland, regions in the immediate aftermath of nuclear attack and to form the basis of regional government as conditions permitted. Ministers would be appointed as commissioners, and staff drawn from all government Departments. Expenditure forecast for 1980/81 is £1.78 million rising to £3.2 million in 1983/84.

34. The building programme is incomplete. Construction of 3 new and adaptation of 5 existing premises is required in England and Wales at an estimated additional cost of £1.45 million over the next 3 years; in Scotland 2 of the 4 Zone HQs need to be replaced, and urgent repairs are required at a third, at a total additional estimated cost of £2.05 million. Communications between these HQs and the local authorities (the Emergency Communications Network (ECN)) need to be modernised. A comprehensive survey of needs in England and Wales and £1.5 million for Scotland will be required over 10 years; the programme could be accelerated. In Scotland immediate expenditure on communications equipment is estimated at £0.20 million over 3 years from 1981/82 onwards. Preparations in Northern Ireland are complete. The total estimated additional cost of completing premises and modernising communications is thus approximately £8.2 million, at present planned over the next 12 years.

35. The selection of staff, based on the 1968 assumptions on warning time goes no further than identification of the source from which individuals would be found; only the principal officers are selected, briefed and trained now. The current assumptions on warning time demand that staff are selected - preferably as volunteers - briefed and trained in peacetime and that an essential minimum of operational staff are ready to man the HQs within 48 hours. This essential higher state of readiness has cost implications for all Departments providing staff. The Civil Service Department, in conjunction with others, is studying how higher preparedness can be achieved and at what cost; a further report will be made in June. Meanwhile it is estimated that once staff are so selected provision of a programme of training and exercises covering England, Wales and Scotland would cost £0.05 million in 1980/81 rising to £0.11 million in 1985/84 and thereafter.

36. A study is also being made of the possible role of SRHQs in conventional war, but there would appear to be no specific cost implications in their being so used. The study also includes a review of arrangements for regional government in the aftermath of nuclear war.

LOCAL AUTHORITY AND EMERGENCY SERVICES PLANNING

The State of Planning

37. Whereas military defence is a direct responsibility of central government, many aspects of civil preparedness and, in particular the life-saving aspects of civil defence are the statutory responsibilities of local and other authorities outside central government. It is only through their full-hearted co-operation that any coherent level of civil preparedness can be achieved. Their present plans are governed by the 1968 assumptions, the revised priorities of 1972 and the subsequent comprehensive guidance issued in relation to the threat of nuclear war. Present plans, whilst not all invalidated by the 1977 assumptions vary in quality and completeness; the shorter warning period demands a higher state of preparedness. Furthermore, neither the local authorities nor the emergency services have plans to meet the conventional or chemical threats; indeed, the plans for the emergency services are based on the need for immediate dispersal from major centres of population to survive for life-saving tasks in the nuclear aftermath. Security constraints on the 1977 assumptions have prevented local authorities and the emergency services being instructed to plan to meet them.

58. However, a study at the Home Defence College last November was attended by central and local officials and by emergency service representatives to look at a hypothetical case based on the current assumptions. The scenario was closely aligned with current assessments of warning time and of the types of targets that might suffer conventional air attack, and with the overall Soviet conventional weapon capability. The study did not take account of the sabotage or chemical threats. It was hypothetical in the weight of attack portrayed on individual targets and so in the damage envisaged in the various counties and regions, a median level being adopted. It should not be discounted that heavier attacks might be made in populous areas on military targets, including civil installations used for reinforcement and resupply by our own and United States forces. For such assessed targets greater local, or reserve, resources of manpower and equipment may be needed than for other areas.

39. The local authorities do not favour the re-establishment of a national voluntary organisation like the Civil Defence Corps which was too rigid and very expensive to administer, equip and train. It is best to leave the structure of the local emergency organisation and services to be developed flexibly and economically within the framework of the local and other authorities having the statutory responsibility. They are best placed to guide the voluntary organisations and other local volunteer bodies, such as those now existing in Devon and in Wiltshire, to make effective contributions to local preparedness. The most economic way of improving reserve capabilities of the emergency services is to relate their strength in each area to the perceived risks, ie to follow the normal basis of establishing. Detailed vulnerability and damage assessments need to be made by local authorities and the emergency services. The prerequisites are that local planners be vetted to receive classified information and that more precise assessments of the likely weight and pattern of conventional attack should be provided to them. The Ministry of Defence have provided such initial assessment to civil Departments. Authorisation is required to release the information to local authority and emergency service planners.

40. It would be helpful that Ministers confirm that local authorities should guide and assist local voluntary organisations to improve local preparedness, rather than that any national organisation, such as a civil defence corps, should be created.

Financial arrangements

41. Approved Home Defence expenditure by local authorities in Great Britain is about £4.4 million annually; 75 per cent specific grant has been paid to encourage local authorities to meet their statutory obligations. Nevertheless, performance has varied, being generally better in the non-metropolitan areas. An agreement in principle to discontinue the specific grant and absorb support for Home Defence expenditure into the Rate Support Grant was deferred for 1980-81 pending the outcome of this review. It does not necessarily follow that the continuation of specific grant will in itself lead to more effective planning. Used in support of either (a) government exhortation and advice or (b) tighter definition of statutory duties, its retention and possible increase to say 80 per cent might help to increase the overall total of Home Defence expenditure but it would not be enough to get more effort out of the backward authorities. Furthermore, under the present arrangements for Rate Support Grant, any increase in the amounts of specific grant reduces the support available for other services and for resource equalisation between authorities. The total of local authority expenditure has been agreed for 1980/81 and any increase in home defence expenditure would reduce the amount available for other services.

42. Support of Home Defence expenditure through Rate Support Grant would be more acceptable to the local authority associations, and consistent with Ministers' general approach to local authority finance. Ministers have been able to alter the level of provision in many other services without departing from the block grant principle. However, in the present financial situation this might not lead to significantly increased expenditure without firmer statutory requirements for civil defence planning. An alternative would be to make Home Defence expenditure an agency service, 100 per cent funded by central government and carried out to centrally prescribed standards. This would yield better results and

would overcome the difficulty raised by Ministers' commitment to the local authorities not to protect individual services within the overall local authority expenditure plans. However, 100 per cent reimbursement would demand close scrutiny in its administration and require substantially more central staff. Moreover the Home Departments would be prone to the assumption of default powers. Ministers will need to consider whether to continue, and possibly increase the rate of, specific grant or, alternatively make home defence expenditure an agency service reimbursed by central government. The first course would require further consultation with the local authority associations with whom it has been agreed to support home defence expenditure through normal rate support grant from 1981/81 onwards.

43. It is recommended that the limited adaptation for war of premises of the 333 non-Metropolitan Districts in England and Wales should be encouraged. Capital expenditure of this type is funded by local authorities out of revenue either directly or by the payment of loan charges and is relevant expenditure for the purposes of the Rate Support Grant. However, if it is decided to retain specific grant, or to make home defence an agency service, there would be advantages in bringing this expenditure into line with other home defence expenditure. This also applies to Regions and Districts in Scotland (where the supply of telephone links should also be included as home defence approved expenditure). In England and Wales there might be a lead time of 2 years for schemes to be submitted; thereafter the annual cost is estimated at £1 million for 5 years. In Scotland the annual cost for premises would be £0.3 million for 5 years, and for communications the total cost would be £0.2 million over 5 years commencing 1980/81.

Emergency Services

44. The emergency services now need to plan not only to disperse elements to ensure survival for tasks in a nuclear aftermath but also to maintain normal cover so far as possible for the population whether any evacuation takes place or not, and to meet the additional hazards of conventional, sabotage and chemical attack.

45. On the basis of the weight and pattern portrayed at the Home Defence College study it appears that for the police existing manpower on extended duty would be adequate, with special constables and traffic wardens deployed on selective tasks. Training needs to be adapted at an estimated annual cost of £0.01million. Some local expansion of the ambulance service in areas at risk might be needed on an improvised basis using requisitioned vehicles and volunteer drivers and attendants. Major enhancement of the existing reserve capability of the fire brigades appears to be needed, involving both increased voluntary recruitment and training and the replacement of the existing fleet of reserve appliances, originally maintained for civil defence but in recent years retained to meet civil contingencies. The preliminary estimate of cost for England and Wales is £28 million for 4 years and £25 million thereafter and for Scotland similarly £4.0 million and £3.5 million. The annual cost of providing a new heavy rescue capability needed to meet conventional air attack is estimated as £12 million for England and Wales and £1.5 million for Scotland. These estimates may be refined when more detailed risk and damage assessments can be completed.

Planning and Training Effort

46. A higher state of readiness will entail more intensive planning and training of key staffs with emphasis on wartime headquarters and associated communications and the expansion of planning to establish links with the public, involving guidance to the voluntary organisations, to other volunteer bodies such as those in Devon and in Wiltshire and the training of other volunteers prepared to take on a responsible role in an emergency. This effort will require the reinforcement of local emergency planning teams in England and Wales at an additional annual cost of £1 million; and in Scotland of £0.20 million in 1980/81 rising to £0.70 million in 1983/84 and thereafter. However, unless specific grant for civil defence is retained for at least another year, local authorities may be reluctant

to increase civil defence expenditure now, since the level of rate support grant for 1980/81 has been agreed.

47. Increased activity by local authorities will call for a commensurate increase in central training at the Home Defence College. The building of some 20 additional study bedrooms and other facilities would contribute to increasing the capacity by up to 50 per cent. The estimated cost of building is £0.1 million, with additional staff costing thereafter £0.05 million annually. Increased activity on shelter policy, support and co-ordination of local authority planning and that for the emergency services will require additional staff resources in the Home Office, Scottish Home and Health Department and other Departments. The annual cost of an increased presence in the regions is estimated at £0.06 million for the Home Office and £0.02 million for the Scottish Home and Health Department. The cost of other additional functions will depend upon the time-scale within which greater preparedness is to be achieved.

Summary of Additional Cost

48. The cost of increased local authority and police planning and training activity, together with increased central training and staff effort to support it is estimated as rising from £1.2 million in 1980/81 to £1.85 million in 1982/83 and thereafter. The preliminary estimate of the cost of enhancing the fire services capabilities, including the provision of a heavy rescue service is £45.5 million annually for 4 years and £42 million annually thereafter.

MAINTENANCE OF ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIES

General

49. National planning since 1968 has concentrated on arrangements to assist recovery in the aftermath of nuclear war, details are outside the scope of this paper. Since 1977, mainly in response to guidance by NATO Ministers, planning has begun towards identifying essential needs in crisis and conventional war. Progress has varied between Departments depending on their allocation of staff to the tasks. Lack of progress in one field can inhibit that in another; any lack of definition of essential needs inhibits transport, energy and manpower planning.

50. In May 1979 NATO Ministers, concerned with the support of populations as well as of armed forces, directed that essential needs of trade in crisis and war be examined in parallel with planning to allocate substantial civil transport resources to support rapid reinforcement of NATO Europe, primarily by the United States as part of deterrence and of defence. Lack of civil contingency plans for essential industries might in the event inhibit the taking by the North Atlantic Council of a decision to start rapid, massive transatlantic reinforcement. The United Kingdom is committed to providing its most productive merchant ships and cargo aircraft to support the United States effort, in addition to our own reinforcement of NATO Europe.

Agriculture, Fisheries and Food

51. Present Plans The Emergency Division of the Ministry embraces planning for peacetime contingencies, civil preparedness for war including management of the food stockpile and responding to NATO planning in which the head of the division is currently the chairman of the NATO Food and Agriculture Committee. Planning resources were strengthened in 1979, taking into account the 1977 assumptions, particularly that on conventional war, and also the experience of the road haulage dispute. No powers exist to control food or agriculture except under the Emergency Powers Act 1920 and draft war emergency legislation. Powers, organisation and procedures for controlling food, including rationing are being re-examined. A Bill and a rationing scheme have been drawn up to meet a civil contingency but the scheme needs adaptation for defence purposes; some documents needed to implement it have been printed.

52. Stockpile A strategic food stockpile augments commercial stocks to prolong endurance and facilitate control of basic food stuffs in crisis, war and in the aftermath. The main items (fats, flour and sugar) are heavily import dependent and provide most of the energy in the diet. Ministers recently endorsed the stock levels and provided £13 million with which 45,000 tonnes of sugar and 10,000 tonnes of salt have been bought. Current Public Expenditure Survey forecasts rise from £6.8 million in 1980/81 to £9.2 million in 1984/85 to allow regular maintenance, turnover of stocks and a small increase in that of yeast. A leading member of the food industry will report in about 6 months time on his independent review of the management of the stockpile, including a look forward over the next 20 years.

53. Further Plans and Expenditure It is proposed to bring the leaders of the food industries and food trades representatives designated for wartime duties fully into future, more open planning and to give them training for war. Plans will be developed more closely with the local authorities who will probably act as the Ministry's agents in food control. A study will be held at the Home Defence College in November 1980 to consider all food and agriculture planning in the light of the 1977 assumptions. The Ministry's circular to local authorities will be revised to include conventional war aspects and more specific food control measures. More information will need to be given to the public and, in particular to farmers. About £2 million will be needed to complete printing, including food control documents. A new method of maintaining the emergency feeding equipment is being developed and will require an additional provision of £0.1 million from 1981/82 for about 5 years. The sugar stockpile is still 35,000 tonnes below the authorised level; at the current price of £300 per tonne about £12 million will be needed to replenish it. Depending on the timescale in which Ministers require local authority planning to be brought to readiness, up to 4 additional HQ planning staff may be needed costing £0.04 million annually with commensurate effort at regional offices. The total additional costs are for £14 million capital expenditure and £0.14 million annual costs up to 1984/85. A few additional staff will also be needed by the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland.

Industry and Trade

54. Co-ordination Under the arrangements for dealing with civil preparedness and NATO planning within the Departments of Industry and Trade, civil aviation, shipping, and to some extent telecommunications, are handled separately from the other industries for which the Departments are responsible. Also, unlike many other Departments, with the exception of civil aviation and shipping, the staff who handle these subjects are not concerned with the response to peacetime emergencies. Civil aviation and shipping are reviewed in the following section on transport.

Industry (other than telecommunications, civil aviation and shipping)

55. Current plans Until 1977 there was no requirement to plan for conventional war or to maintain essential industry in such circumstances. In consequence very few staff resources have been devoted to this work, and indeed no single member of the Departments of Industry and Trade has been concerned solely with the civil preparedness of industry and NATO defence

planning. As a result, and like many other countries, the United Kingdom has found it difficult to meet the planning ambitions of NATO, especially since the United States sees the NATO Industrial Planning Committee as a prime instrument through which to encourage increased production for military purposes and to promote the study of the wider essential needs of industry and the materials that might be in critically short supply in crisis or war.

56. Future Plans and Expenditure The Department of Industry is now leading a Working Party to study, in the light of the 1977 assumptions, the demands which industry is likely to be required to meet; the priorities which should be established; and the constraint such as the production capacity available, the supply of materials bearing in mind that there are no strategic stockpiles, the availability of labour, and the provision of energy, which industry would face in meeting the demand. This is essentially a long-term exercise involving many other Departments. An interim report will be prepared later this year for submission to Ministers. At that stage it is unlikely to be possible to determine the order of cost to sustain and protect essential industrial production in crisis and conventional war. However, the cost could be substantial, particularly if it was decided to stockpile materials. At present the main task is to determine the demand which industry might face and this will require a considerable staff effort within the Department of Industry. As the work proceeds and depending upon the timescale which is set and the conclusions which are reached, there could be a need for more staff within the Department but this requirement cannot be determined at present.

Telecommunications

57. Current Plans The Post Office has a statutory obligation to maintain due functioning in war for which it receives a grant of 52.75 per cent for approved capital expenditure. Departments requiring dedicated line and other telecommunications equipment obtain it in the main by rental charged to their own votes. Increasing technological advances and increased economic efficiency militate against wartime needs, eg international subscriber trunk dialling greatly increases the problems of controlling international telecommunications in crisis or war. Civil needs for telecommunications in a warning period and in war are kept under constant review.

58. Future Plans and Expenditure The Department of Industry is studying with the Post Office the financial and manpower resources needed to enable the latter to continue adequately to fulfil its role in support of civil aspects of home defence planning and to take measures needed to secure its proper functioning in a warning period and in war. Current forecast expenditure on grant payable by the Department of Industry is £0.45 million in 1980/81 and £0.50 million thereafter. Additional annual expenditure of £0.25 million may be needed to implement the outcome of the study.

Energy - Coal, Gas and Electricity

59. Present Plans There is considerable variation between the state of plans of these nationalised industries and that for oil. When the 1968 decision to institute care and maintenance was taken planning by the nationalised industries was being reorientated to meet substitution of sub-regional for regional controls. The position was aggravated by structural changes taking place in the coal and gas industries requiring a review of the location, communications and stand-by equipment needed for emergency HQs. The 1968 decision negated proposals to instal new communications links, to provide all energy industries with emergency HQs in the regions, and to provide stand-by equipment and shelter. Consequently, the industries have

been reluctant to accept the credibility of planning for war and so to apply staff effort to it, although they have plans to maintain supplies in peacetime emergencies. The deficiencies in planning for war could not be made good in the warning period. The Department has inadequate staff allocated to generate a change of attitude and maintain an overview of renewed planning.

60. Future Plans and Expenditure The Department of Energy are planning a presentation to key figures in the nationalised energy industries to indicate the threat, in particular of conventional war and the action appropriate to meet it. The National Coal Board and the Electricity Council have stated the view that before they make plans they should know whether government funds would be made available to implement them. By virtue of Statutory Instruments nos. 269 and 274 of 1954, made under the Civil Defence Act 1948, the Secretary of State may make due functioning grants at 52.75 per cent to electricity and gas undertakings for approved expenditure; there is no similar provision for the coal industry, it apparently not being a public utility in terms of the Act.

61. No estimate can now be given of the cost of bringing the nationalised energy industries to preparedness to match the 1977 assumptions; however, the provision of 3 additional central staff at an annual cost of £0.03 million would enable planning to be reactivated. An indication that government is prepared to consider proposals attracting due functioning grant might help to restore the confidence of the gas and electricity industries in the credibility of planning for war. The position of the National Coal Board, and possibly other similar organisations in other fields, needs to be reviewed in relation to the Civil Defence Act 1948 and to their present constitutions and statutory obligations.

Energy - Oil

62. Current Plans International planning for oil in the International Energy Programme, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and in NATO has assisted in greater progress being made in national preparedness. In consultation with the Oil Industry Emergency Committee (OIEC) a major revision is underway of policy on oil distribution, supplies and stocks.

However, the work is constrained by the lack of definition of essential needs, in particular of industry; until at least an initial assessment can be made (see paragraph 56 above) the revision can only proceed by making assumptions which may prove false. Military needs, in particular to support the increasing numbers of United States forces planned to be based here in war are being defined, and plans made to meet them. Estimates of most emergency services' needs have been made but may require adjustment in the light of their further planning to meet the 1977 assumptions; subject to this the revision of oil policy may be complete by the end of 1980 when implications may need to be put to Ministers.

63. Future Plans and Expenditure Powers exist under the Energy Act 1976, which could be used in peace, crisis or war, to control the natures and levels, but not the locations of commercial stocks of crude oil and petroleum products; generally speaking stocks for 90 days are so maintained. Since World War II a government pipeline system with associated storage has been maintained to meet civil and military needs in war, until recently as a charge against civil defence in the Public Expenditure Survey. The future status, control and financing of this system is under consideration and recommendations may later need to be made to Ministers. A strategic stockpile of 598,000 tons of gas oil and 118,000 tons of products is maintained, principally in salt cavities as an insurance against delay in resupply in the nuclear aftermath. There is no identifiable annual cost but contingency provision of £0.017 million is made to turnover the stock, if necessary. It seems prudent to invite Ministers to endorse that the stockpile be retained. At present no major cost implications are seen as likely to arise from the revision of oil policy, provided the pipeline system can continue to be operated on a self-financing basis.

Summary of Essential Industrial Planning

64. The present states of planning for food, for industry and for energy vary widely and, in total are far from providing any assurance that essential support of the economy could be maintained for long in conventional war. Additional capital expenditure of £14 million is needed to bring food planning to readiness and to complete replenishment of the sugar stockpile. Additional annual expenditure of £0.25 million on due functioning grant for the Post Office

may be needed. No estimate can be given of the capital cost of bringing essential manufacturing industry and nationalised energy industries to readiness, but they may prove to be substantial. As planning proceeds it may be advisable to review those nationalised undertakings which might merit due functioning grant, and to determine how those not so qualifying might reasonably be assisted to meet any wartime obligations placed upon them. Meanwhile, additional annual expenditure of £0.07 million on increased staffs would assist planning for food and enable that for energy to be reactivated.

TRANSPORT

65. Co-ordination The Department of Transport plans for inland transport, including ports and anchorages whilst the Department of Trade plans for civil aviation and ocean shipping. Both Departments work closely with the Ministry of Defence to support movement of our own and United States armed forces and in responding to NATO civil planning.

66. Under the aegis of the Department of Transport progress has been made with plans to set up a Surface Transport and Shipping Co-ordinating Centre (STSCC) in London and to operate in a warning period and in conventional war to enable Departments to co-ordinate shipping, port and inland transport activities to meet national and allied plans. Protected accommodation is available but needs refurbishing and the provision of essential communications. These need to be ready in peacetime so that the Centre can operate as soon as needed in a warning period. In developing the communications plan it may be found that some tasks could be automated to match naval and railway control operations which are computer-based; such provision would minimise the staff needed in the STSCC. Plans are not yet completely developed to enable a firm figure to be given for refurbishing the protected accommodation which will be needed, but if all the available accommodation were to be made habitable, the cost would approach £1 million. Additionally, approximately £0.5 million annually will be needed for rented communications; the costs will fall to be shared between the Departments of Transport and of Trade and the Ministry of Defence.

67. Railways British Railways' organisation can easily be co-ordinated with the STSCC. Their computer facilities would provide information to, and take directions from the Centre. However, the trends from rail to road haulage and increasingly towards the use of specialised railway wagons to meet specific peacetime needs have significantly reduced the railways' capacity to handle general goods. The potential of the railway system to meet increased demands in war, including transporting ammunition is thus in question. Departments have agreed to notify their needs for rail movement in a warning period and in war and, once examined by the Department of Transport, the implications may need to be put to Ministers. The increasing electrification of railway operations makes them ever more vulnerable to sabotage and other enemy action.

68. Road Transport Whilst our armed forces' needs are known and plans to meet them exist civil Departments have not been able to provide Department of Transport with details of their requirements for road vehicles in a warning period and in conventional war. If left to ad hoc arrangements these needs might not be met in the likely warning time. The increasing demands being placed by United States forces will require extensive planning. Procedure for procuring vehicles for military purposes are being reviewed. The 1977 assumptions create no specific need for additional expenditure.

69. Ports The Ports and Shipping Organisation in the provinces, planned essentially for the nuclear aftermath could be brought into operation wholly or in part in a warning period or conventional war; the industries have been consulted and staff nominated who are vetted and trained. The disposal of obsolete mobile cranes, approved last year proceeds. The depot organisation which housed them and other equipment still retained is being examined. Planning is concentrated on ensuring ports are ready and able to handle our own and United States reinforcements and resupply. A study is to be made of 20 year-old moorings in anchorages to ensure suitable arrangements exist to handle modern ships; there may be cost implications. Equipment held for handling grain is at the end of its useful life and will require replacement at a capital cost of £4 million.

70. Containers Work is in hand on behalf of NATO and the United Kingdom industry. Adequate plans for handling container traffic in a warning period and war are increasingly important for both military and civil purposes, following commercial trends to greater containerisation. It would be impossible to discharge a large volume of containers once the container terminals in major ports had been put out of action or evacuated. War damage could seriously reduce our handling capacity; any remedial action would be expensive. Research continues to find a solution which, once found, might cost about £5 million. Our dependence upon, and the vulnerability of, container handling facilities may justify special protective measures against sabotage and conventional air attack.

Civil Aviation

71. Contingency planning is geared primarily to support for military reinforcement and is continually updated to take account of changing assumptions and military needs. The bulk of the United Kingdom civil fleet is committed to our national reinforcement of Europe, and after that cargo-capable aircraft would be committed to United States transatlantic reinforcement. No specific plans exist to maintain long-haul, short-haul or internal service in crisis or war; a joint committee of the Department of Trade and the Ministry of Defence would determine priorities for any available passages. The impact on essential air cargo traffic of taking aircraft for reinforcement has yet to be assessed. However, the limited manpower resources for civil aviation planning are fully committed.

Ocean Shipping

Current Planning

72. The Department of Trade provides a co-chairman and a secretariat for the NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS). Consultation with the industry is maintained through the General Council of British Shipping (GCBS). The Department participates in planning for the STSCC. National planning is directed to the reinforcement of Europe successively from the United Kingdom and from the United States. A commitment has been made that, subject to the finalisation of military requirements and clarification of the needs of essential trade in crisis and war, ships needed will be provided when called for. Crisis management and the transition to war are covered as are host national responsibilities for the NATO Defence Shipping

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Authority (DSA) Eastern Branch and the NATO Interallied Insurance Organisation (IIIO). Plans are made for government control of United Kingdom merchant shipping in war and for the United Kingdom War Risk Insurance Office which will run parallel to the NATO IIIO. The NATO ocean shipping planning is directed at a review of plans for the support of United States reinforcement of Europe, for transitional arrangements to co-ordinate Alliance shipping in a crisis leading to the DSA organisation for war to pool all ships over 1600 GRT within the Alliance, and for the Interallied Insurance Organisation for the war risk of allied ships.

73. Future Plans and Expenditure The final development of national planning for shipping will depend upon the co-operation of the industry and, in particular of those nominated for senior posts in the National Shipping Authority. This will require the continued use of existing manpower. The development of NATO planning for ocean shipping is now reaching its peak, and assuming the plans review is accepted by the Alliance, its detailed application should follow later this year. No additional cost implications are foreseen.

Summary

74. Transport planning is generally well forward. Further study is required of the railways' goods capacity to meet general needs, in particular of the armed forces in a warning period and conventional war. Departments' requirements for additional rail capacity and additional road vehicles need to be determined. The provision of alternate container handling facilities requires further research. Plans to maintain essential civil air traffic, particularly at the time of reinforcement need to be made, as part of a wider study from the users' point of view of the impact of taking ships and aircraft from trade for Alliance reinforcement purposes; proper civil contingency plans could be conducive to the North Atlantic Council taking an early decision that Europe be reinforced, in particular from the United States. A prerequisite to such a study is knowledge of essential needs, in particular of industry. Finally, determination of energy needs, in particular of oil, depend on knowledge of needs for both industry and transport.

ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND EMPLOYMENT SERVICES

Environment

75. The only area of responsibility with apparent policy and cost implications arising from the 1977 assumptions is that for control of construction

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work. At the recent Home Defence College study it became apparent that increased local authority activity on civil preparedness and other essential work in a warning period and in conventional war would be accompanied by similar activity within counties by central government, other public bodies and the private sector. This points to a need for effective control of construction work at such a time. The Department of the Environment is reviewing related plans and will report shortly; the provision estimate of cost of planning staff is £0.05 million.

Health and Social Security

76. Current Plans It became apparent during the Home Defence College study that the 1977 assumptions had considerable policy implications for present Health Service plans which, based in the main on the 1968 assumptions, are primarily directed to evacuation of hospital supplies and equipment and of medical and nursing staff to deal with the aftermath of nuclear attack. Whilst an element of dispersal still needs to be planned for, the outbreak of conventional war would require the maintenance of cover for the population in urban areas, (unless evacuation policy is changed) and the ability to handle civil casualties arising from conventional attacks. Continuation of such cover would become an increasing factor in maintaining public morale and support, the longer conventional hostilities lasted. Planning is in hand to receive into NHS hospitals large numbers of wounded British personnel from NATO Europe and from within the United Kingdom. Present plans are that no support will be provided for United States armed forces in this country. This has led the United States to plan to bring in mobile field hospitals, but in their build-up period it may be necessary to receive United States forces' casualties in United Kingdom hospitals whilst their mobile field hospitals are being established. Planning is now needed to handle civil casualties in conventional war.

77. Future Plans and Expenditure The 1977 assumptions, and incomplete preparedness generally, demand increased central activity by the Health Departments especially to form and issue amended and expanded planning advice to National Health Service authorities and to reassess the condition, location

and distribution of the medical stockpile and associated equipment such as radiac instruments. Energy requirements need to be reviewed, as do aspects of the machinery of government such as Departments' and National Health Service representation at wartime controls, their war books and that key point protection might need to cover medical stocks. Legislation and public information need to be re-examined. Miscellaneous external matters concerning NATO, allied forces and dependents, port health and ships crews also need to be looked at again. Increased planning activity by National Health Service authorities, which at present falls entirely on the Regional Health Directors (designate) without assistance, will also be entailed. Since both the Department and the Service are organised largely on a basis of professional and administrative divisions, with no discrete civil preparedness functions apart from a small administration elements in the Departments, it is as yet impossible to provide a precise estimate of increased staff costs but £0.5 million annually (£0.4 million for the Service and £0.1 million for the Departments) is provisionally estimated. The medical stockpile needs to be made more effective at an estimated cost of £5.0 million of which £1.0 million should be made available in the first year of the programme. These figures cover Great Britain.

Employment

78. Present Plans Arrangements for the control and allocation of labour in crisis and war, drawn up in the light of the experience of World War II on which the existing draft emergency legislation is based, are being reviewed in the light of the 1977 assumptions, current industrial relations and the need early in a warning period to support our own armed forces and to meet the increasing demands for civil labour, mostly skilled, being specified by the United States forces under the United States/United Kingdom Line of Communication Arrangement. The Department of Employment is preparing a paper, the implications of which may need to be put to Ministers. The problems are likely to be political and legislative, rather than financial.

79. The Departments' present plans envisage that, in conjunction with the Department of Health and Social Security, it will introduce a war emergency scheme of benefits in the event of a complete breakdown of communications as a result of massive evacuation or nuclear attack. This would cover all the

unemployed who would otherwise be available for work; this potentially enormous financial commitment should be reviewed by any working party on shelter and evacuation policy (paragraph 26).

Summary

80. Plans for the control of construction work, for the National Health Service, for control of employment and for social benefits to be paid in the abnormal conditions of war need to be reviewed in the light of the 1977 assumptions, in particular that of a period of conventional hostilities. The only preliminary cost estimates available are of £5.0 million capital expenditure to enhance the medical stockpile and recurring expenditure of £0.5 million to increase the planning effort within the Department of Health and Social Security and the National Health Service.

PROGRAMME AND COST OPTIONS

81. The additional costs, so far as estimates are available, of achieving an adequate degree of civil preparedness averaged over the next five years are:-

	<u>1980/81</u>	<u>1981/82</u>	<u>1982/83</u>	<u>1983/4</u>	<u>1984/5</u>	<u>Thereafter, roughly</u>
£m	11.0	60.3	60.7	60.1	61.7	51.7

These figures from 1981/82 onwards includes £32 million for the fire service (£28.5 million after 1984/85) and £13.5 million to create and maintain a reserve heavy rescue capability in every fire brigade. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food costs of £14 million (£12 million fully to replenish the sugar stockpile and £2 million to complete printing of control documents) is averaged, £2.8 million over the five years, but could be incurred over say two. But these estimated additional costs exclude those of shelter for the population (apart from shelter surveys of existing buildings), of protection or dispersal of central government in face of the conventional threat, of chemical protection, and of arrangements needed to sustain essential industrial production and energy supplies in war. An additional cost of £10.15 million would be needed after 1984/85 to complete the re-equipment of the Emergency Communications Network in England and Wales and in Scotland. Essential shelter against conventional attack might be obtained for several tens of millions of pounds, but a full programme against nuclear attack could cost as much as £15,000 million depending on the share to be borne by public funds.

82. The following breakdown of provisional estimates may provide a guide to determine options for more limited objectives, £m:-

	<u>1980/81</u>	<u>1981/82</u>	<u>1982/83</u>	<u>1983/84</u>	<u>1984/85</u>
A. increase central and local planning and training, train volunteers, provide information on protection, local premises and communications (Appendix 2, serials 6, 13, 14-17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 27, 31, 38, 39 and 40).	2.5	2.7	2.6	4.2	4.2
B. enhance communications and research for Warning and Monitoring Organisation, increase allowances for Royal Observer Corps (Appendix 2, serials 1-4).	0.5	0.7	1.0	1.1	1.2
C. refurbish transport co-ordination premises and provide communications (Appendix 2, serials 32 and 33).	0.5	1.0	0.5	0.5	0.5
1. complete wartime broadcasting service and sub-regional and zone EQs and improve their communications (Appendix 2, serials 7, 10, and 11).	1.4	3.2	4.1	3.8	5.3
E. enhance food control arrangements (Appendix 2, serial 25).	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
	or -	1.0	1.0	-	-
F. enhance medical stockpile (Appendix 2, serial 11).	1.0	2.0	2.0	-	-
G. complete sugar stockpile (Appendix 2, serial 26).	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4
H. increase Post Office and functioning grant (Appendix 2, serial 29).	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
I. increase and train Fire Brigades' reserve of manpower and create, train and equip reserve heavy rescue service (Appendix 2, serials 19 and 20).	-	45.5	45.5	45.55	45.5
J. increase railway capacity for war, replace wartime moorings, cranes and grainhandling equipment (Appendix 2, serials 34-37).	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0

Home Defence PES ForecastTreasury Computer Print-out as at 8.2.80All figures at 1979 Survey Prices

	<u>£m</u> <u>1980/81</u>	<u>£m</u> <u>1981/82</u>	<u>£m</u> <u>1982/83</u>	<u>£m</u> <u>1983/84</u>
MAFF	5.1	6.9	6.9	6.9
DOE	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
DESS	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
HO	9.7	12.3	12.3	12.3
SHHD	1.1	1.5	1.5	1.5
PSA	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
DEPT TRANSPORT	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
DEPT INDUSTRY	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.2
TOTALS	19.6	24.4	24.3	24.2

Summary of Proposed Additional Civil Preparedness Expenditure (£m)

Serial	Para-Graph	Item	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	Thereafter	Comments
		<u>Warning and Monitoring (covering the UK)</u>							
1	21	Provision of private wires for attack warning	0.175	0.350	0.525	0.525	0.525	0.525) Rental charges
2	21	Replace other obsolescent equipment	-	0.025	0.150	0.275	0.375	0.375	
3	21	Increase ROC allowances	0.320	0.320	0.320	0.320	0.320	0.320	
4	21	Increase research	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	
		<u>totalling</u>	<u>0.515</u>	<u>0.715</u>	<u>0.015</u>	<u>1.140</u>	<u>1.240</u>	<u>1.240</u>	
5	22-26	<u>Protection of the public against nuclear chemical and conventional threats</u>	No precise estimate available. Full protection costs could reach £15,000m. Essential conventional shelter might be obtained for survival £10'sm.						Further detailed study is needed
34	6	27 & 28 <u>Information</u> - Initial cost of revising and placing on sale "Protect and Survive"	0.100	-	-	-	-	-	
		<u>War-Time Broadcasting Service</u>							
7	30	Harden selected transmitters for regional and external broadcasting after nuclear attack	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04	0.14	
		<u>Continuity of Government</u>							
8	31	Protection of key points against the threat of sabotage	No estimate yet available						The extent of the threat is being researched
9	32	Protection/dispersal of central government in face of the conventional threat	No estimate yet available						Policy is yet to be determined
10	34	Completion of Sub-Region and Zone HQ premises	0.200	0.700	0.800	0.400	1.400	-	

Serial	Para-Graph	Item	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	Thereafter	Comments
11	34	Re-equipment of Sub-Region and Zone Communications	-	0.08	1.52	1.50	1.45	1.45 to 1991/92	Programme should be accelerated
12	35	Increased readiness of Sub-Region, Zone etc staff	No estimate yet available						CSD is examining
13	35	Train Sub-Regional and Zone HQ staffs	0.030	0.055	0.085	0.110	0.110	0.110	
		<u>totalling</u>	<u>0.230</u>	<u>2.255</u>	<u>2.985</u>	<u>2.710</u>	<u>4.210</u>	<u>1.410</u>	
		<u>Local Authorities and Emergency Services Specific grant:-</u>							
15	43	Extend to non-metropolitan districts in England and Wales	-	-	1.00	1.000	1.000	1.000) Additional to) provis-) ional forecast) of:-
16	43	Extend to regions and districts in Scotland	0.300	0.300	0.300	0.300	0.300) £4.0m for England) and Wales and
17	42	Extend to communications costs in Scotland	0.020	0.030	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.050) £0.4m for Scotland) annually) 1980/81
		<u>Totalling for specific grant</u>	<u>0.570</u>	<u>0.570</u>	<u>0.580</u>	<u>1.600</u>	<u>1.600</u>	<u>1.600</u>)

Serial	Para-Graph	Item	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	Thereafter	Comments
		<u>Emergency Services</u>							
18	45	Police training for conventional war	<u>0.010</u>	<u>0.010</u>	<u>0.010</u>	<u>0.010</u>	<u>0.010</u>	<u>0.010</u>	
19	45	Fire brigade reserve personnel, training and equipment	-	32.000	32.000	32.000	32.000	28.500) May be revised when more detailed vulnerability and damage assessments completed; does not include cost of decontamination against chemical threat
20	45	Create, train and equip heavy rescue service within fire brigades	-	13.500	13.500	13.500	13.500	13.500	
		<u>totalling for fire brigades</u>	-	45.500	45.500	45.500	45.500	42.000	
		<u>Planning and Training Effort</u>							
21	46	Increased staff in local planning teams	1.200	1.200	1.200	1.700	1.700	1.700	
22	47	Additional premises and staff at Home Defence College	-	0.150	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.050	
23	47	Additional, inspectorial staff in Home Departments	-	0.080	0.080	0.080	0.080	0.080	Further control staff will be needed as local activity increases
		<u>totalling, local and Home Departments planning and training effort</u>	<u>1.200</u>	<u>1.430</u>	<u>1.330</u>	<u>1.830</u>	<u>1.830</u>	<u>1.830</u>	

Serial	Para-graph	Item	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	Thereafter	Comments
		<u>Agriculture, Fisheries and Food</u>							
24	53	Improved maintenance of feeding equipment	-	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	
25	53	Additional printing of control documents	0.400	0.400	0.400	0.400	0.400	-	£2m averaged over 5 years but could be completed by end 1981/82
26	53	Complete replenishment of sugar stockpile	2.400	2.400	2.400	2.400	2.400	-	£12m averaged over 5 years but could be completed by end 1981/82
27	53	Additional staff	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.040	
37		<u>totalling</u>	<u>2.840</u>	<u>2.940</u>	<u>2.940</u>	<u>2.940</u>	<u>2.940</u>	<u>0.140</u>	
		<u>Industry</u>							
28	56	Arrangements to sustain essential industry in war			No estimate available				Working party has been charged to study
29	58	Increase in Post Office due functioning grant	<u>0.250</u>	<u>0.250</u>	<u>0.250</u>	<u>0.250</u>	<u>0.250</u>	<u>0.250</u>	
		<u>Energy</u>							
30	61	Arrangements to sustain nationalised energy industries in war			No estimate available				
31	61	Additional staff to initiate and maintain planning	<u>0.030</u>	<u>0.030</u>	<u>0.030</u>	<u>0.030</u>	<u>0.030</u>	<u>0.030</u>	

Serial	Para-graph	Item	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	Thereafter	Comments
		<u>Transport</u>							
32	66	Refurbish premises for STSCC	0.500	0.500	-	-	-	-	
33	66	Provide communications for STSCC	-	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	
34	67	Improve railways capacity for wartime purposes)							Provisional overall estimate of £10m averaged over 5 years
)							
35	69	Replace grain handling equipment and cranes)	2.000	2.000	2.000	2.000	2.000	-	
)							
36 37	69 70	? Replace wartime moorings Provide reserve container handling equipment)							
		<u>totalling</u>	<u>2.500</u>	<u>3.000</u>	<u>3.000</u>	<u>3.000</u>	<u>3.000</u>	<u>0.500</u>	
		<u>Environment</u>							
38	75	Arrangements to control building and other works	<u>0.050</u>	<u>0.050</u>	<u>0.050</u>	<u>0.050</u>	<u>0.050</u>	<u>0.050</u>	
		<u>Health and Social Security</u>							
39	77	Increased Health Department's planning effort	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	0.100	?	
40	77	Increased NHS planning effort	0.400	0.400	0.400	0.400	0.400	?	
	77	Enhance medical stockpile	1.000	2.000	2.000	-	-	-	
		<u>totalling</u>	<u>1.500</u>	<u>2.500</u>	<u>2.500</u>	<u>0.500</u>	<u>0.500</u>	-	
		<u>TOTAL OF ESTIMATES SO FAR AVAILABLE</u>	<u>11.025</u>	<u>60.290</u>	<u>60.730</u>	<u>60.100</u>	<u>61.700</u>	<u>51.700</u>	