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ZZ TEL AVIV

GRS 445

SECRET

FM FCO 311240Z MAR 82

TO FLASH TEL AVIV (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 100 OF 31 MARCH '82.

Aw 040/325/12		
RECEIVED PRIVATE SECRETARY NO. 18		
31 MAR 1982		
DESK OFFICER		REGISTRY
INDEX	PA	Action Taken

FALKLANDS CRISIS

1. FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED REPLY TO BUENOS AIRES TELNO 126. (12)  
BEGINS

WE ARE GRATEFUL TO YOU AND TO THE AMERICANS FOR THIS REPORT OF US/ARGENTINE EXCHANGES ON OUR BEHALF. WHILE WE SHALL CONTINUE TO BE GRATEFUL FOR AMERICAN EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AWAY FROM HASTY OR VIOLENT REACTIONS, WE DO NOT SEE THAT WE CAN USEFULLY ASK THEM TO UNDERTAKE NEGOTIATING A SOLUTION OF THE SOUTH GEORGIA PROBLEM ON OUR BEHALF. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION WE FEAR THAT WE WOULD END UP WITH THE AMERICANS ALSO EXERTING PRESSURE ON US TO REACH A SOLUTION WHICH WAS POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

YOUR TUR WAS DESPATCHED BEFORE THE PROMINENT UK MEDIA STORIES ABOUT NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINES AND OTHER SHIPS BEING DESPATCHED TO THE FALKLANDS. WE MUST ASSUME THAT THESE SPECULATIVE REPORTS (PARTICULARLY TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR OWN LATEST SECRET REPORTS INDICATING ARGENTINE JUMPINESS) WILL GIVE AN IMPRESSION IN BUENOS AIRES THAT WE ARE SEEKING A NAVAL RATHER THAN A DIPLOMATIC WAY OUT OF OUR DIFFICULTIES. THIS COULD BE A VERY DANGEROUS IMPRESSION TO LEAVE - EVEN FOR A FEW DAYS.

WE THEREFORE THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT WE LAUNCH OUR DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY, EVEN IF THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE TO THIS AND THE DESPATCH OF OUR 'EMISSARY' IS LIKELY TO BE LESS SPEEDY (INDEED THERE WOULD BE SOME ADVANTAGE IN NOT HASTENING UNDULY). WE THEREFORE WISH YOU TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE IN MY TELNO 116.

HOWEVER WE ARE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE SKILL AND FIRMNESS WITH

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WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN HANDLING THESE EXCHANGES SO FAR AND WE HAVE OF COURSE NO WISH TO RISK UNDERMINING YOUR POSITION AS AN INTERLOCUTOR. IF YOU FEEL IT WOULD BE HELPFUL YOU MAY THEREFORE INSERT INTO THE MESSAGE A SENTENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT 'THE EMISSARY WOULD BE COMING TO SUPPORT OUR AMBASSADOR BY PUTTING AT HIS DISPOSAL SOMEONE WITH AN UP TO DATE KNOWLEDGE OF MY OWN THINKING ON EVERY ASPECT OF THIS PROBLEM'. WE WOULD RATHER NOT DROP THE REFERENCES TO 'CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS' BECAUSE WE THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT THE ARGENTINES SHOULD NOT THINK WE HAVE RUN OUT OF ANY IDEAS EXCEPT MILITARY ONES.

AS REGARDS YOUR FURTHER SUGGESTION (YOUR TELNO 128) THAT THE EMISSARY SHOULD BE SOMEONE LIKE LORD CARVER OR LORD HILL-NORTON, WE THINK THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD MORE EFFECTIVELY BE CARRIED OUT AT WORKING LEVEL AND THAT IN ANY CASE SOME OF THE PRESENTATIONAL OBJECTIONS WHICH WOULD APPLY TO SENDING A MINISTER TO BA WOULD ALSO APPLY TO SENDING A PROMINENT PUBLIC FIGURE.

ENDS

2. WE SHALL OF COURSE AWAIT SECRETARY OF STATE'S COMMENTS BEFORE DESPATCHING THIS FURTHER TELEGRAM WHICH REFLECTS MR LUCE'S VIEWS.

CARRINGTON

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