


PS/Mr Blaker

CALL BY PAKISTAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON PRIME MINISTER: 17 JUNE

/ 1. I attach a first draft of the record of this morning's discussions with Lord Carrington which Mr Blaker may wish to see before the call at No 10.



G R Archer
South Asian Department

17 June 1980

1. copy to Michael Alexander, No. 10

who may wish to glance at
this before the 4:30 courtesy
call

2. G.W.

RML 17/ii

CONFIDENTIAL

CALL BY PAKISTAN FOREIGN MINISTER, 17 JUNE 1980

PresentAfghanistan

Lord Carrington welcomed Agha Shahi and asked about his recent discussions following the establishment of the Committee of Three by the Islamic Conference.

Agha Shahi said that the Pakistan approach had been to try to strike a positive note. He thought that the Cubans aided by the Indians and Romanians had been trying to ensure that any Non-Aligned action ran into the sands. The Soviet Union had hoped that there would be divisions within the Islamic Conference between the Syrians, PLO, Libyans and others. The strong line taken by Iran, whose revolutionary credentials were impeccable, had helped to overcome any problems and the outcome had been a strong line on Afghanistan. Mr Chatty, the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference, had approached the Soviet Ambassador in Paris because he knew him and it was understood that the Ambassador was well regarded by Mr Brezhnev. He had explained the proposal for a three man committee. Within 24 hours the Soviet Union had commented that the idea of the Committee was a good move, that the basis of its work would be the Afghan May 14 proposals, that it was not appropriate for the Committee to meet with insurgents and they should see representatives of the

/Babrak

Babrak Karmal government. In the light of these discussions the Soviet Union would consider seeing the Committee in Moscow. The basis for the Committee's work should be realities. There was no prospect of any settlement ignoring the government in Kabul and no attempt should be made to reach agreement behind their backs. Foreign interference must cease. The achievements of the October revolution must be irreversible. Mr Chatty had replied that he agreed discussions must take account of realities. These were (i) the Soviet military occupation was contrary to international law, (ii) Babrak Karmal was clearly not acceptable to the people of Afghanistan who were in active rebellion, (iii) no peace was possible in Afghanistan without cooperation of the insurgents, (iv) the Islamic Conference had enjoined the Committee not to recognise the Karmal government. Mr Chatty again asked whether the Soviet government would see the Committee. The reply was negative. In Tehran on 4-6 June the Committee of Three had agreed to meet with Afghan representatives in a neutral capital in Europe. Invitations had been sent to the government in Kabul and to resistance leaders. It did not appear that the Karmal government would accept the invitation. If they sent a low level representative Mr Chatty would see the representative separately.

Lord Carrington asked what would happen if no-one came from Kabul.

Agha Shahi said that the Committee's preference would be to deal with one representative of all the different factions. Alternatively they would be prepared to see two or three leaders. By doing so they would enhance the status of the insurgents and perhaps encourage unity.

CONFIDENTIAL

There were various signs that the idea of a united front was making some progress. Two Ayatollahs had come to Pakistan from Iran and were talking about participating in a united front. Mr Sayaf, the leader of the groups in the Liberation Front, had participated in the Islamic Conference as a member of the Iranian delegation. The difficulty was that the various groups obtained their funds from different sources. It would be helpful if there was one agenda through which to channel financial support. Lord Carrington asked whether there were any signs of an alternative to Babrak Karmal, who ~~had~~ ^{might not} / enjoyed wider support.

Agha Shahi said that he did not wish to identify anyone publically. They would then be labelled ~~an Afghanistan~~ ^{a Pakistan} candidate, which would not be helpful. There were however various possibilities. An ex-Prime Minister, Dr Yusuf, came to mind. He was currently in Bonn. Distinguished diplomats and other distinguished people still in Afghanistan came to mind.

Lord Carrington asked about future plans.

Agha Shahi said that the Committee would proceed with a meeting in a neutral capital, Geneva, even if only the insurgents met with them. If the Committee failed to find a way forward he saw the next step as a shift to the UN where Afghanistan would be inscribed on the agenda for the UNGA. He was not hopeful that the ~~Non-Aligned~~ ^{Movement} ~~Association~~ would achieve anything. Some of its members were trying to arrange for a meeting outside Havana. The Cuban credentials were now suspected. But he thought that the Cubans and others could successfully confuse issues at a meeting. Other subjects would be dealt with but no clear /line

CONFIDENTIAL

line on Afghanistan would emerge.

Lord Carrington asked about the Pakistani assessment of reports of recent fighting in Afghanistan. We were inclined to think these exaggerated.

Agha Shahi agreed but thought there must be a sub-stratum of truth. The insurgency was widespread, there was open tension continuing in Kabul, continued reports about insurgent activity had a steady affect on insurgent morale.

Sir D Maitland explained our own attempts to ensure that events in Afghanistan received maximum publicity.

Agha Shahi said that Pakistan was quite satisfied with the extent of support from the West. It would not be helpful if Western activity impaired Pakistan's non-aligned credentials. He wanted Pakistan to be seen to be acting on her own initiative.

Lord Carrington asked about Iranian support for the Afghans.

Agha Shahi said that it remained to be seen whether the Iranians would go beyond talking but he had seen the Ayatollah Khomeini on 5 June. Khomeini had stressed that it would be a waste of time to talk to Babrak Karmal or his group, the need was to talk to the people of Afghanistan.

Lord Carrington commented on Agha Shahi's earlier reference to India. He thought the Indian view of Afghanistan was now more realistic than when Mrs Gandhi first came to power. And that the Indians would like to see the Russians out of Afghanistan.

Agha Shahi did not accept this. They had been discouraged by a report from their Ambassador in New Delhi that Mr Sathe on his return from discussions in Kabul, had told him that
/the

CONFIDENTIAL

the total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was not in India's interests. The Pakistanis did not believe that the Indians would take any action that might annoy the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had recently offered them a bait of a large arms deal on very soft credit terms. Mr Agha Shahi said that he now hoped to visit New Delhi in mid-July.

CONFIDENTIAL

Iran

Lord Carrington commented that the Americans had come in for substantial criticism at the Islamic Conference.

Agha Shahi said that both Mr Bani Sadr and Mr Qotbzadeh wanted to resolve the hostages problem but it would take time. The recent Tehran Conference on American intervention seemed to have given them some satisfaction. Mr Qotbzadeh had said that the liberation of Afghanistan from Soviet occupation was every bit as sacred as the liberation of Palestine and Jerusalem. He thought would be helpful if Britain could use its influence with the United States to persuade them that the Secretary General ^{of} ~~and~~ the Commission that had gone to Tehran should publish an account of their findings. The problem was that the hostage issue had been taken up by the Iranian people. The findings might satisfy the people. There was widespread distrust of the United States and an inclination to link the Americans with every other adversary. They were alleged to be backing royalists, ex-generals and to be in league with Iraq. Other governments felt that in present circumstances they could not speak out for the United States without irretrievably damaging their own standing in Islamic eyes. The criticism in Islamabad was inevitable and inescapable.

Middle East

Lord Carrington asked about the Pakistanis view about the Middle East.

Agha Shahi said that it was a pity that the Venice resolution had had to include the reference to not under-mining Camp David. This made it impossible for non-aligned and Islamic governments to welcome the European initiative.

Lord Carrington said that recognition must be given to the domestic pressures in the United States. Any statements made

CONFIDENTIAL

during the election campaign must be seen in the context of domestic pressures and would need to be thought through and reviewed afterwards. Both Mr Mondale and Mr Muskie would be influenced by their political antennae. It was these inhibitions of American policy that had made the European Community anxious to demonstrate that the Arabs had friends in the West. They had started with the idea of a resolution to supplement Resolution 272 but they had concluded that the United States under present circumstances would have to veto this and they did not see much point in producing something that would only force a veto.

Agha Shahi commented that on the Middle East he thought that Europe should consider after November differentiating their own position from that of the United States.

Mr Hurd said that the European line was not identical to that taken by the Americans.

Lord Carrington said that the Americans remained the key to getting Israel to accept any settlement. He thought there had been a real change of opinion in the United States on the Arab/Israel issue. There was evidence of this in the numbers of Senators and Congressmen visiting the Arab world.

Mr Hurd said that there was widespread criticism of the Israeli settlement policy in the United States as well as elsewhere.

Agha Shahi thought that the Islamic Conference countries would wish to take the Arab/Israel issue to the Security Council in pursuit of the resolutions of the Islamabad Conference although the outcome would probably be a US veto. He thought that there might be a special meeting of the General Assembly on Palestine.

/Supply of

CONFIDENTIAL

Supply of Military Equipment to Pakistan

Agha Shahi said that he wished to leave with Lord Carrington a modest list of equipment over which Pakistan would like assistance from the United Kingdom. He mentioned in particular Sea King helicopters with exocet equipment, night vision devices, laser range fighters, mortar locating radar and other naval equipment. He was looking for supply on the most favourable terms possible.

Lord Carrington noted that the Pakistanis were asking for supply as cheaply and as quickly as possible and said that we would do everything we could to help. He would forward the list to the Minister of Defence.

The Pakistan Ambassador commented on the BBC film on the Pakistan nuclear programme that had been shown the previous evening. He thought that it had been unhelpful and inaccurate.

Sir D Maitland suggested that the best course would be for the Pakistanis to make their own representations to the BBC mentioning the points with which they took particular issue.

The meeting ended at 12.50 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL



17 JUN 1950



17 JUN 1950