

TOP SECRET 2

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE  
CONTAINS CODEWORD

April 11, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: The Situation Room

SUBJECT: Additional Information Items

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British and German Attitudes on Schmidt-Thatcher Meeting: A Foreign office official told Charge Streater on Tuesday that Thatcher and Schmidt spent most of the first day of their late March meeting discussing their response to messages from the President which, in the official's view, contributed to the amicable atmosphere for talks on other topics, including the EC budget dispute. The British found the Germans much more relaxed, following Schmidt's visit to Washington, than they had been during the Chancellor's "private" visit in February. The Germans obviously believe the meetings in Washington were a success and convinced themselves "to settle down considerably." (C)

State Department review completed

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REVIEW ON APRIL 10, 2010

CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

NSA, DIA reviews completed

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President Zia's Meeting with the Price Congressional Delegation:  
During Zia's meeting with Codel Price, he noted that he had told you Pakistan cannot and will not ask for foreign troops to defend its soil; if it cannot defend its own territory, then "it should go down the drain." He expressed appreciation for what the U.S. is doing and if Pakistan has a choice it will opt for a relationship with the U.S. -- Pakistan could never be an ally of the USSR. However, the U.S. must alone decide to what extent it is in its interest to support Pakistan. Pakistan cannot make that judgment. Regarding Afghanistan he said if we want to stop the Russians, to preserve Pakistan, to protect the Gulf and sea lane, a line must now be drawn at the Khyber, "someone must do that." (C)

He indicated that for aid to reach the Afghan insurgents, Pakistan has to be the "conduit". It is difficult, however, for Islamabad to accept the risk of Soviet intervention when its own security concerns are so great -- "we are too weak on the ground ourselves." (C)

Congressional Equity

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Changes in Attitudes on Afghanistan by Soviet Citizens and Foreign Diplomats: In conversations over the past two weeks, foreign diplomats and students in Moscow have expressed growing pessimism concerning the effectiveness of the American-led condemnation of Soviet actions in Afghanistan. At the same time, our defense attache has noted that Soviet citizens seem much more eager to discuss and to defend their position in Afghanistan. In fact, most begin by criticizing U.S. policies in the Middle East, but no longer hesitate to give their views on Afghanistan when the conversation is turned in that direction. (C)

In the general tone of remarks by West European military attaches, there is a sense of weakening support of the U.S. position, although the vehicle for this message is usually the expression of disappointment in their own governments' softness. In more specific discussions some diplomats have detailed the belief and fear that Soviet logic is affecting state and regional policies of their own and other countries. (C)

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