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From the Private Secretary

2 July 1979

Prime Minister's Bilateral Meeting with Premier Clark of Canada in the New Otani Hotel, Tokyo, on 29 June 1979 at 1900

By prior agreement, the Prime Minister had a short bilateral meeting with Premier Clark of Canada on the final day of the Economic Summit meeting in Tokyo, 29 June. Premier Clark, accompanied only by his Private Secretary, called on the Prime Minister in her hotel suite at 1900. Much of the conversation was devoted to domestic political matters. The following is a summary of the main points which arose on international issues.

Rhodesia and the CHGM

The Prime Minister summarised for Mr. Clark the security considerations of which she would have to take account in deciding whether to advise The Queen not to travel to Lusaka for her State Visit and for the CHGM. The Prime Minister indicated that, in certain circumstances, she might wish to consult Mr. Clark, among others, and seek his views. Present indications were, however, that President Kaunda was doing his best to implement his undertaking to secure the removal of ground-to-air missiles from the Lusaka area.

The Prime Minister went on to inform Mr. Clark of Lord Harlech's recent tour of the Front Line and other Southern African states. In the British Government's view, the Rhodesian elections had created a new situation; but it was clear that the Front Line Presidents would not accept the totality of the Rhodesian constitution. Lord Harlech would be travelling to Salisbury on 2 July for talks with Bishop Muzorewa and the Bishop himself would subsequently be travelling first to Washington and then to London. The British Government wished to use the advance which had taken place in Rhodesia as a basis for further movement. The Front Line Presidents seemed to believe that a final constitution for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia should be vetted or sponsored by the UK. The Government would try to get as far as they could in advance of the CHGM and would then have some proposals to make at that meeting.

/Mr. Clark

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Mr. Clark did not dissent from the Prime Minister's assessment and emphasised that he would like to be kept fully informed of further developments, through whatever channels the Prime Minister wished to designate. He, for his part, would ensure that the Canadian Government was not committed to any firm decision on Rhodesia in advance of the Lusaka meeting. The Prime Minister said that she would ensure that Mr. Clark was kept fully informed, through our High Commissioner in Ottawa. Mr. Clark told the Prime Minister that, although the Canadian High Commissioner in London had urged him to travel to Lusaka via London, he had decided to make his first visit as Premier to Francophone Africa and would therefore be visiting Senegal en route to Lusaka.

Canadian Indians

Mr. Clark said that he wished the Prime Minister to be aware of a possible problem concerning the Canadian Indians. Governor General of Canada was a member of the New Democratic Party and had in the past been active on the issue of Canadian Indian status. The Indians did in fact have a claim to a special constitutional position and they also had special status in relation to the Crown: they tended to regard The Queen as their own monarch rather than as Queen of Canada. As a result, the Indians sometimes tried to deal directly with The Queen; he had been asked to approve a recommendation that the Indians should be granted an Audience but, like Premier Trudeau, had declined to endorse it. The Indians might, however, come to London anyway and lobby MPs and others. Mr. Clark said that his own advice had been and remained that no formal recognition should be given to Indian status. The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Clark for this warning and indicated that she would be guided by him on the substance of the question.

Quebec

Mr. Clark said that the Levesque Government was now beginning to run out of steam, and its popularity was less absolute than it had been. The Progressive Liberal Party, under Mr. Ryan, was now a responsible alternative and an effective force, as Mr. Trudeau had been, for Federalism. Mr. Levesque had delayed the impending referendum, probably because he thought he would lose. The new Canadian Government, on the other hand, had the advantage of novelty and could look towards the referendum with optimism. If Mr. Ryan could win the referendum, he might well go on subsequently to win the election. In general, the situation in Quebec was considerably less alarming than it had been a short while ago.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

J.S. Wall, Esq., Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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