CODY NO.

# Shadow Cabinet Paper A FOLICY FOR PRICES.

(Incorporating the Report and Recommendations of the Competition Folicy Group)

#### Introduction: The Role of Prices Tolicy

The political reality is that prices are the single most moortant matter of concern to the electorate and one of the major influences affecting the way they vote at any election.

At present there is widespread public cynicism and dissillasionment with the cosmetic, 'gimmicky' Frices Policies which the present Government have introduced, because they have so obviously failed.

However, it could be electorally disastrous to offer the immadiate outright aboliton of the symbols of price controls, and yet offer nothing in exchange to indicate our anxiety about rising prices.

It is crucial, therefore, that we should have a policy for prices that is distinctive and one which does not attempt to adapt or build in failed Socialist policies. It must be clearly shown to be an alvance and not a retreat.

Such a policy must meet political needs, at the same time recognising that the defeat and containment of inflation must depend, above all, on the pursuit of prudent economic policies and vigorous competition.

Conservative Policy must also have regard to the fact that prices may appear to be, or may be cost dominated (e.g. by raw materials, pay, the value of currency, etc.) in spite of the corrective influence of the market place, and that while the offects of such costs on prices can be lessened by successful economic policies, there will always be political repercussions requiring attention by governments. Public enger over individual price rises tends to evaporate, to a certain extent, if they can be fully explained and vindicated.

A New Policy

The following principles should underwrite a new policy for prices:

(a) Re-invigoration of competition to improve the operation of

- market forces.

  (b) The removal of distortions such as subsidies and restrictive tractices. B a profile !
- (c) The removal of controls, which have little or no effect on price
- rises, but do immense damage to industrial expansion and jobs.

  (d) Justification of prices and profits (where this is feasible) by exposure and education. (It is particularly important to counteract myths such as 'it is the fault of the EEC', or 'the farmers' or 'profiteering').

The general objective of the new policy should be to establish a sense of fairness in prices and profits and a better understanding of the way the free enterprise system works.

## PROPOSALS

### Frices

competition.

1. The Department of Frices and Consumer Protection should be reduced in size and renamed the Department of Competition and Consum Affeirs - its terms of reference would be limited accordingly.

2. Five years of price controls have had little effect on prices, have seriously deterred investment and heaped unnecessary bureaucratic burdens on business and industry. The <u>Price Commission</u>, margin con-

- trol and pre-notification should all be removed but with some stealth (possibly in two stages during a period of declining inflation There is no point in prevoking political attack if this can be avoided. The saving would be approximately 27-8 million in the financial year 1978-9 and a reduction in staff of 600.
- 3. The Office of Fair Trading should be greatly strengthened with enhanced powers to investigate on two separate but related fronts, namely Frices and Competition.
- namely Frices and Competition.

  4. The functions of the Office of Fair Trading in the COMPETITION sphere should include:-
- (a) Investigation of specific cases where price abuse arises out of imperfect competition, monitoring of market trends in advance of monopoly and marger references, detection of conditions which give rise to these abuses and the preservation of conditions of fair

be necessary.

(c) Continuous monitoring of pricing practices where a monopoly clready exists both in the Frivate Sector and in the Nationalised

(b) References to the Monopolies Commission where this is found to

- clready exists both in the Frivate Sector and in the Nationalised Industries.
- 5. New powers will need to be vested in the Office of Fair Trading to act against such practices where they are not already covered by existing monopoly and mergers legislation or to recommend that
- action be taken by the Secretary of State.

  6. The functions of the Office of Fair Treding in the PRICES schere should include:-
- (a) The monitoring and investigation of prices either independently or where a special reference is made by the Secretary of State in areas of particular consumer concern and where the political pressures are irresistible. There will need to be provision against purely vexatious references.

  (b) The publication of reports resulting from such investigations which would explain or justify prices by indicating those (supply
- or demand) factors which cause prices to rise or fall (costs, profits etc.). The main object of this would be to recognise consumer concorn and to educate and reconcile the public to inevitable price increases.

  7. However, if there were evidence of abuse and if no justification could be found, it would be up to the Secretary of State to negotiate with the company concorned and if possible obtain a voluntary agreement. Evidence of abuse would occur very rarely indeed and the likelihood
- of companies, subject to adverse publicity, entering into voluntary agreements of is very high.

  3. The object of the first (section4) of the two new functions of the Office of Fair Trading is to meet a genuine need for improvement in competition policy and practices it could have a not insignificant effect on prices.
- The object of the second (section 6) is to meet the very important short and long term political requirements.

  Neither would have an unfair or adverse effect on Dusinesses and industry. Furthermore, bureaucratic interference would be greatly reduced.

and industry. Furthermore, bureaucratic interference would be greatly reduced.

In the very rare case of a price abuse giving rise to negotiation of a voluntary agreement or in the case of a sanction being imposed on the grounds of imperfect competition, we should not be afraid of provoking complaints from the industry concerned as there would

be compensatory political dividends with consumers and Trade Unions

## Legislative Consequences

- 1. The eventual repeal of the Price Commission Act.
- 2. The introduction of a small Feir Trading (Amandament) Bill to provide for the new functions. The following changes to the Fair Trading Act 1973 would be considered:-
- (c) The Consumer Protection Advisory Committee pert of the CFT, but attached to the EFCP would be given a more extensive remit to report on those price increases which are an outstanding source of public concern. (Amend Sections 14 and 17 of Fair Trading Act 1973).
- (b) Commensurate with its greater responsibilities, the OFT should be reconstituted so that all the decisions are taken by a small board (3-5 persons) presided over by the Director General.
- (c) The OFT elready has a large Competition Unit. No legislative changes would be necessary here.
  - The Monopolies Commission should be strengthened (if sufficient candidates with the requisite expertise can be found) to speed up monopoly and marger investigations where it is practical to do so.
- 4. Existing Monopolies and Morgars legislation should be amonded to provide for the automatic triggering of merger references in certain circumstances.
- 5. The Office of Nationalised Industries Ombudsman would have to be set up. At the same time it would be possible to make the requisite amandments to the various nationalised industries Acts governing the regional consumer councils (e.g. Electricity Act 1947, Transport Act 1962 etc.).
- 6. It may well be advisable to appoint a new Director General of Fair Trading and a new Chairman of the NCC.
- 7. Public Expenditure. Savings on the Price Commission would amount to 67-2 million in a full year. The total cost of the nationalised industries consumer councils in 1977/70 is 61,714,000, which would be substantially reduced by these proposals.

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