

HGM (79) 2nd Session

## COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING

LUSAKA, 1-7 AUGUST 1979

*RECORD of the Second Session held at Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka  
on Wednesday, 1 August, 1979 at 2.45 p.m.*

Present :

His Excellency Dr. K. D. Kaunda, President of Zambia  
(in the Chair)

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| The Right Hon. Malcolm Fraser, M P,<br>Prime Minister of Australia                                | The Right Hon. Lynden O. Pindling,<br>M P, Prime Minister of the Com-<br>monwealth of the Bahamas |
| HE Mr. Ziaur Rahman, President of<br>Bangladesh   | The Right Hon. J. M. G. M. Adams,<br>M P, Prime Minister of Barbados                              |
| HE Sir Seretse Khama, President of<br>Botswana  | The Right Hon. Mrs. Margaret<br>Thatcher, M P, Prime Minister of<br>Britain                       |
| The Right Hon. Joe Clark, Prime<br>Minister of Canada   | HE Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, President<br>of Cyprus   |
| The Hon. M. A. Douglas, Minister<br>for Finance, Trade and Industry,<br>Dominica                  | The Right Hon. Ratu Sir Kamisese<br>Mara, Prime Minister of Fiji                                  |
| HE Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara,<br>President of the Gambia   | HE Major Mensah Gbedemah, Armed<br>Forces Revolutionary Council, Ghana                            |
| The Hon. M. Bishop, Prime Minister of<br>Grenada  | The Hon. R. E. Jackson, Minister of<br>Foreign Affairs, Guyana                                    |
| The Hon. Shyam Nandan Mishra,<br>Foreign Minister, India  | The Hon. Michael Manley, Prime<br>Minister of Jamaica   |
| HE Mr. Daniel T. Arap Moi, M P,<br>President of Kenya   | HE Mr. I. T. Tabai, President of<br>Kiribati  |
| The Hon. C. D. Molapo, Minister for<br>Foreign Affairs, Lesotho                                   | The Hon. D. T. Matenje, M P, Minister<br>of Education, Malawi                                     |
| The Hon. Tengku Ahmad Rithaudeen<br>bin Tengku Ismail, Minister of<br>Foreign Affairs, Malaysia   | The Hon. Dr. Philip Muscat, M P,<br>Minister of Education, Malta                                  |
| The Hon. Sir Harold Walter, Minister<br>of External Affairs, Tourism and<br>Emigration, Mauritius | The Right Hon. R. D. Muldoon, Prime<br>Minister of New Zealand                                    |
| HE Major-General H. E. O. Adefope,<br>Commissioner for External Affairs,<br>Nigeria               | The Right Hon. Michael T. Somare,<br>CH, M P, Prime Minister of Papua<br>New Guinea               |
| The Hon. George Odum, Deputy<br>Prime Minister, St. Lucia   | HE Mr. F. A. Rene, President of<br>Seychelles   |

H E Dr. Siaka P. Stevens, President of Sierra Leone  
 The Right Hon. Peter Kenilorea, Prime Minister of Solomon Islands  
 The Right Hon. R. V. Dlamini, Minister without Portfolio, Swaziland  
 H R H Prince Tuipelehake, Prime Minister of Tonga  
 H E Mr. Godfrey Binaisa, President and Chairman of the National Executive Committee, Uganda

H E Mr. Shridath S. Ramphal, *Secretary-General*

Also present:

## AUSTRALIA

The Hon. Andrew Peacock  
 Mr. A. T. Griffith

## BANGLADESH

The Hon. Prof. Shamsul Huq  
 Mr. Farooq Sobhan

## BOTSWANA

The Hon. A. M. Mogwe  
 Mr. L. J. M. J. Legwaila

## CANADA

The Hon. Flora MacDonald  
 Mr. Allan Gotlieb

## DOMINICA

Mr. Julian N. Johnson

## THE GAMBIA

The Hon. Alhaji Muhamadu Lamin Saho  
 The Hon. L. K. Jabang

## GRENADA

Mr. G. Louison  
 Miss F. Rapier

The Hon. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore

The Hon. R. Premadasa, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka

H E Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania

H E Mr. Eustace Seignoret, High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Trinidad and Tobago

The Hon. Vaovasamanaia Filipo, Minister for Finance, Western Samoa

## THE BAHAMAS

The Hon. Perry Christie  
 Mr. Harcourt Turnquest

## BARBADOS

The Hon. H. de B. Forde  
 Mr. A. W. Symmonds

## BRITAIN

The Right Hon. The Lord Carrington  
 Sir John Hunt

## CYPRUS

H E Mr. Nicos Rolandis  
 Mr. Andreas Christophides

## FIJI

Mr. J. Kotobalavu  
 Mr. R. T. Sanders

## GHANA

H E Mrs. Gloria A. Nikoi  
 H E Mr. E. M. Debrah

## GUYANA

The Hon. Mohamed Shahabuddeen  
 H E Mr. Cedric Joseph  
 H E Mr. Harry Dyett

## INDIA

Mr. J. S. Mehta  
 H E Mr. K. Natwar-Singh

## KENYA

The Hon. C. Njonjo  
 The Hon. Dr. M. Waiyaki

## LESOTHO

The Hon. C. D. Mofeli  
 H E Mr. M. M. Molapo

## MALAYSIA

Mr. P. A. Hamid  
 Mr. Ajit Singh

## NEW ZEALAND

Mr. F. H. Corner  
 Mr. A. M. Bisley

## PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Mr. Mekere Marauta  
 H E Mr. Frederick Reiher

## SEYCHELLES

Mr. D. J. Thomas  
 Mrs. E. Etienne

## SINGAPORE

Mr. C. T. Goh  
 M. S. Dhanabalan

## SRI LANKA

The Hon. Ranil Wickremasinghe  
 Mr. Bradman Weerakoon

## TANZANIA

The Hon. B. W. Mkapa  
 H E Amon J. Nsekela

## UGANDA

The Hon. Mr. Otema Allimadi  
 Mr. E. Tumusiime Mutebile

## ZAMBIA

The Hon. W. M. Chakulya  
 The Hon. M. C. Chona

## JAMAICA

The Hon. Carlyle Dunkley  
 Dr. R. B. Manderson-Jones

## KIRIBATI

Mr. A. Baiteke  
 Mr. A. O. Davies

## MALAWI

The Hon. D. B. Kaunda  
 The Hon. J. B. Mkandawire

## MALTA

Dr. A. S. Trigona  
 Mr. A. J. Falzon

## NIGERIA

H E Ambassador S. U. Yoloh  
 H E Ambassador J. D. O. Sokoya

## ST. LUCIA

H E Mr. Charles Cadet  
 Mr. Earl Huntley

## SIERRA LEONE

The Hon. Dr. A. O. Conteh  
 H E Dr. S. T. Matturi

## SOLOMON ISLANDS

Mr. F. Bugotu  
 Mr. F. Saemala

## SWAZILAND

The Hon. Prince Nqaba  
 Mr. E. V. Dlamini  
 The Hon. Dr. S. S. Nxumalo

## TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

H E Mr. R. Dumas

## WESTERN SAMOA

H E Mr. M. I. Toma  
 Mr. A. L. Hutchison

*Secretariat :*

Mr. E. C. Anyaoku  
 Mr. C. J. Small  
 Mr. M. Malhoutra  
 Mr. G. M. Brownbill  
 Mr. R. G. Brown  
 Mr. J. R. Syson  
 Mr. C. W. Sanger  
 Mr. S. J. Stellini  
 Dr. A. C. Bundu

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## I. MESSAGE TO HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

*Dr. Kaunda* called the Meeting to order and said that, traditionally the earliest opportunity was taken to send a message to Her Majesty The Queen as Head of the Commonwealth.

It was agreed that the following message be sent to Her Majesty by the Chairman on behalf of the Meeting:

“At the start of their Meeting, Commonwealth Heads of Government and their representatives have asked me to convey warm and sincere greetings to Your Majesty as Head of the Commonwealth. It is with especial pleasure that we welcome your presence in Lusaka on this occasion.

We hope our discussions and consultations will make a significant contribution to the enhancement of mutual understanding and harmony and to the development of further co-operation between our countries and peoples.

Conscious that our association embodies a network of regional and other relationships and is enriched by its diversity, we believe the Commonwealth can play a valuable role in helping the international community to advance global accord and enlarge human freedom and we pledge ourselves to strive to this end.”

## II. ORDER OF AGENDA AND FORMAT

*Dr. Kaunda* drew the attention of the Meeting to the draft Agenda and asked whether any amendments were proposed.

*Sir Dawda Jawara*, The Gambia, proposing a new topic, the establishment of a Commonwealth Human Rights Commission, under Item 4, said that the matter had been raised for discussion in London in 1977 and again in Winnipeg in 1978 at the Commonwealth Law Ministers Conference. He therefore hoped that it would be inserted in the Agenda for substantive discussion.

*Sir Harold Walter*, Mauritius, supporting the proposal, suggested that the establishment of a Human Rights Charter should also entail a charter of human responsibilities arising from those rights. Mauritius had submitted a Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities to the recent OAU summit. The Charter had been referred to a team of legal experts for consideration. The same pattern could be followed by the present Meeting.

*Sir Dawda Jawara* indicated that he would be willing to discuss his ideas with Mauritius to determine what else should be included.

The Meeting agreed that the subject be included as sub-item (g) in Agenda Item 4: Commonwealth Co-operation and further agreed to remit it to the Committee of the Whole for initial consideration.

*Dr. Muscat*, Malta, recalled that, at the meeting of Senior Officials, the Maltese delegation had proposed that the situation in the Mediterranean be included as a sub-item under Item 3 (a): International Developments—the World Political Scene. He had, however, been surprised to read in the report of the meeting circulated by the Secretariat—HGM (79) 3—that the meeting had felt that the subject of the Mediterranean could be dealt with under Item 3(a) itself.

Whilst the Mediterranean could in general be dealt with under Item 3(a), the principal reason for suggesting a separate sub-item was the significance of the problem, not only to the European and North African states, but also to peace and security throughout the world. He therefore renewed the proposal for a separate sub-item.

*Dr. Kaunda* said he understood that, when the Secretary-General had put the proposal to the meeting of Senior Officials, there had been no support for it. That was why it had not been proposed as a sub-item of the Agenda. He drew the attention of the Meeting to the letter circulated by the Secretary-General on 13 June 1979. With regard to Item 3(a): International Developments and the World Political Scene, the Secretary-General had written:

"It is envisaged that under this sub-item Heads of Government, as in the past, will wish to discuss from the particular point of view of their countries some of the many political changes in the world at large which have occurred in the two years since their last meeting in London, such as the evolution of detente, shifts in the world's power structure and the changing nature of power itself, the problems of the Middle East and the prospect for the future, changes in Iran and current aspects of disarmament. In addition, Heads of Government will wish to consider developments affecting Cyprus, Belize and other areas of more direct Commonwealth concern not covered by separate sub-items."

He hoped that this explanation would assist the Meeting to put the matter into perspective.

*The Secretary-General* agreed that the Chairman's remarks more than adequately reflected the situation. Although there could possibly have been some misunderstandings, the summary record of the previous day's meeting reflected the Secretariat's understanding of the discussion. However, the Minister had made a proposal and it was for Heads of Government to indicate whether they supported it.

*Mr. Kyrianiou*, Cyprus, indicated his support for the proposal.

The Meeting agreed to include the situation in the Mediterranean as a sub-item under Item 3(a) of the Agenda.

*Mr. Premadasa*, Sri Lanka, referred to his country's interest in a document that he had submitted and which had been circulated by the Secretariat. It dealt with what had become a critical issue to many countries—that of housing, urban development and the environment. He felt, therefore, that it would be appropriate if there could be some time for discussion on those issues, and suggested that they be dealt with under Agenda Item 4: Commonwealth Co-operation: perhaps under sub-item (c) Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation. His Government was also very interested in the Commonwealth Youth Programme and noted with pleasure that the subject was to be discussed in the Committee of the Whole.

The Meeting agreed that Paper HGM (79) 18—Housing, Urbanisation and Environment—would be discussed under Agenda Item 4: Commonwealth Co-operation.

*Mr. Muldoon*, New Zealand, commented on the timetable for discussions that had been submitted by Senior Officials. It concerned Southern Africa, the position of which in the timetable, and the time to be devoted to its discussion, had been changed from those previously proposed. Although it was the most important immediate topic that would be discussed he considered that it must not

be permitted to overshadow the broad range of topics which were also before the Meeting. For example, the new timetable might give inadequate time for discussion of the item dealing with the Island Developing and Other Specially Disadvantaged Members—which was very important for the independent states of the South Pacific, and on which the Secretariat had produced an excellent paper. He therefore suggested that there be a brief introductory session on Southern Africa on Friday, 3 August, with a view to the matter being canvassed informally over the weekend before discussions were resumed at the beginning of the second week.

*Dr. Kaunda* suggested that the timetable already took full account of the factors being urged by Mr. Muldoon. Southern Africa was listed for discussion on Friday morning and the Island Developing and Other Specially Disadvantaged Members in the afternoon. That would enable delegates to have informal discussions over the weekend about Southern Africa as well as the world economic situation.

*Dr. Kaunda* then referred to the arrangements proposed for refreshment breaks during Sessions. They would be 30 minutes long in the mornings and 15 minutes in the afternoon. The objective of the longer morning break was to give Heads of Government an opportunity to pursue their discussions in smaller informal groups and so assist the forward movement of the Meeting.

The Meeting next agreed to remit the following items to the Committee of the Whole for initial consideration and report before the weekend if possible:

- Commonwealth Youth Programme
- Commonwealth Foundation
- Memorandum on the Advisory Committee on Relationships between the Official and Unofficial Commonwealth
- Memorandum on Women and Development
- Resolutions of Ministers of Health and Commonwealth Youth Leaders
- Proposed Establishment of a Commonwealth Human Rights Commission
- Proposed Establishment of a Commonwealth Film and Television Institute.

The Meeting further agreed that petitions addressed to the Meeting as a whole should be referred by the Secretary-General to the Chairman and to the Head of Government concerned, in consultation with whom a decision would be reached on the action to be taken; and that petitions addressed to individual Heads of Government should be forwarded to them.

*Dr. Kaunda* referred finally to the proposals relating to the style and format of Heads of Government Meetings, as set out in the Secretary-General's letter of 19 June, 1979. He felt that the matter needed little discussion, save to adopt the proposals as a guide for the future. Heads of Government would all be familiar with the style and format of their Meetings which were designed to encourage a frank exchange of views. For the same reasons an atmosphere of informality and the attendance of a limited number of officials were important.

The Meeting agreed to adopt the Secretary-General's suggestions.

### III WORLD POLITICAL SCENE and SOUTH EAST ASIA

*Dr. Kaunda* explained that the former Prime Minister of India had originally agreed to introduce Agenda sub-item 3(a). Because of the political changes in India *Mr. Lee Kuan Yew* had agreed, at very short notice, to introduce the sub-item, combining it with sub-item 3(b)—South East Asia—on which he had earlier agreed to speak.

*Mr. Lee Kuan Yew*, Singapore, said he had accepted the honour with reluctance because it was not easy to stand in place of *Mr. Desai*. He had neither his age nor his detached view of the problems which beset the world. The remarks which he was about to make would reflect his perceived reality of the world as it was in 1979, not the world which Commonwealth leaders might have expected when they had agreed, two years earlier, to meet in Zambia.

In many ways the present Meeting reflected the problem of managing an organisation which had grown from five to 40 members, and in which the structural changes required to give everybody a sense of participation had not been adequately made. That was one of the problems of the contemporary world. The UN which had been established by five Great Powers after the war and which then had less than 50 members, now had to cater for the divergent, conflicting and competing interests of over 150 members. It was unable to cope; nor were other organisations such as the IMF and GATT. If it was possible for all concerned to feel that they had got something out of the present Meeting which was both relevant and of value to them, then the Commonwealth would continue to have meaning.

Everyone lived with the pluralities of the world system and all were keepers of their brother's conscience. He and his colleagues from South East Asia were as concerned with Southern Africa as the rest of the Commonwealth. They had learned that it was necessary to be concerned if they wanted the rest of the Commonwealth to be concerned with South East Asia. It was one inter-dependent, inter-reacting world.

The first reality which had to be acknowledged was that there was a strategic stalemate because neither the US nor the Soviet Union had overwhelming force. Under that new Roman arch, not of bricks but of nuclear missiles, it was therefore possible to find some leeway for manoeuvre.

He said that he had once asked an American why his countrymen could not strike a deal with the Soviets as the Europeans had done in the 19th Century and thus carved up the world. The American, who was an idealist and an adviser to successive Democratic presidents, said that a deal had been offered by Stalin to Truman but Truman had tossed it out. He personally did not attribute the Americans with such a charitable instinct. He thought that it would not have been tenable because in the 1950s Britain remained a considerable power, and by the 1960s the French possessed nuclear weapons as did the Chinese. The problem of adjusting to the world lay in the sureness with which governments could anticipate shifts in the power balance.

He would describe his own experience of South East Asia in the context of a changing power balance, allowing other Heads of Government to apply what was not in fact just one facet of a total world situation. Human beings co-operated and contended whether in tribes or as modern nation states. When the Communists posed an overwhelming threat in the 1940s and 1950s, particularly after China and the Soviet Union appeared such a monolithic bloc, the West reacted, and coalesced. From 1949 to 1954, the French, with the support of the Americans, held the Vietnamese Communists from the failure of Fontainebleau in 1949 until Dien Bien Phu and Geneva in 1954. The French then opted out and the Americans

assumed the burden for the next 21 years, with assistance from the Australians and the New Zealanders and others interested in that part of the world. The Communists won in April 1975 but the result of that victory was not what everybody assumed it would be: a relentless expansion of Communist strength and influence. In 1959, in fact, China had begun its first quarrels with the Soviet Union and it was now known that by 1969 grave conflicts nearly led to war between the Soviet Union and China. That created the opening that enabled Kissinger to arrange for President Nixon to visit Peking in February 1972. The Vietnamese decided that their Chinese comrades could not be trusted. So the current situation, although unexpected, was in many ways totally predictable.

The Americans had opted out of the mainland of South East Asia and the Chinese faced a Vietnam which had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with the Soviet Union in November 1978. In December the Vietnamese had openly invaded Kampuchea, a fellow Communist state. The future for South East Asia would have looked sombre if the Chinese had not risked putting the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation to the test. On 18 February, after much prior publicity as to the limited nature of the operation, they moved into Vietnam. They pulled out in March, after nearly four weeks. For those in South East Asia it was a breathtaking time. In the 1940s, the 1950s and the 1960s, for three decades after the war, it was "pax Britannica" and "pax Americana" which had maintained a semblance of peace and stability in the area. Now, a new balance of sorts had emerged, one which was a sorry admission of the limits of American power and illustrative of the growing strength of the Soviet Union. In this particular instance China had seen her national interests challenged by another major Communist power. She intervened. The South East Asian countries did not rejoice but they were beneficiaries, at least for the time being. That was the dilemma they faced: a dilemma which would constantly arise in many other parts of the world.

A multi-polar world theoretically meant a diffusion of power centres, but in reality it made for greater anxiety because nobody was totally in control. After three decades of fighting and great triumph and victory, the outcome had not been a glorious peace and the build-up of the Communist millennium, but more conflict, more war, more devastation, more bitterness, more inhumanity than at any stage of the American campaign against the Vietcong or against North Vietnam. The outcome had so far been an exodus of between 350,000 and 400,000 boat people, of 200,000 Kampucheans across the border into Thailand and the prospect of between one and two million more Kampucheans who would have to cross the border to avoid dying of starvation because the rainy season had come and no planting had taken place. Who, he asked, had caused all that suffering. Vietnam had the skills of war but she did not have the sinews of war: the factories that turned out artillery pieces, ammunition and aircraft. It was Russian aircraft that had ferried Vietnamese troops from Ho Chi Minh City to Siem Reap. It was the Russians who had taken over the air transportation for Laos once provided by the Americans. Thus, he concluded, there was no millennium. The reason for that was that the momentum built into the system led to more and more conflict until a balance was reached. That balance had not yet been achieved with any measure of stability in Asia. Nor had it yet been achieved in Africa, particularly Southern Africa, nor in the Middle East.

The relevant lesson that he could draw was that unless the small nation states could find greater stability and security by "rafting" with each other, they would become the arenas of that continuing contest for supremacy. It was a cruel, relentless, pitiless conflict, and although fine sentiments had been expressed at Geneva about the unnecessary degradation of human beings, the stakes involved were high.

A power vacuum had been created when the Americans withdrew and a pre-emption had been attempted through a regional power. That pre-emption

had in turn been contested. The dilemma was acute. If there had been no intervention and the Vietnamese had gained supremacy, that in fact meant Soviet supremacy. If the intervention was too successful it meant that in 10 or 15 years, there would exist a dominance, perhaps not amounting to hegemony, by a Communist power that exerted its influence over all the guerrilla movements in the countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. For those countries a stalemate was the best prospect, a stalemate which left them more time to consolidate their security, to increase their co-operation and to widen their options in choosing their partners in economic development and progress. He added that that might sound like a far-fetched dream, but three weeks earlier the first signs of such a possibility had appeared when the Voice of the Thai Communist Party had gone off the air. For the past seven years broadcasts from South China inciting revolution had been directed to Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia. Now they had stopped the broadcasts to Thailand.

He did not know whether such options with regard to the balance of power existed for Africa as he was not familiar with the details of the conflicts and the contradictions there. But he felt that it was in governments' interests to exploit those contradictions intelligently and within the ambit of the Great Power conflict. From his experience of watching the Communist system at work he was greatly impressed by its capacity to organise human societies, to produce the weapons of war and develop the muscles of a warlike society. It was also now apparent that for all the grandiose five-year plans regularly proclaimed by the Communist countries, they were unable to match the free market economies of America, Western Europe and Japan. The Chinese had, in fact, the previous year taken one of the boldest steps ever made by a Communist power by openly acknowledging that its only hope of achieving full modernisation depended upon access to Western technology, capital and know-how. But a price for that would have to be paid and he did not have to teach the Americans, the Japanese, or the West Europeans what price to extract.

If progress through strife was the only way, then the ally in those circumstances had to be the Soviet Union. He said that not because he wished it to be so but because he knew it to be so. He had seen conflict in South East Asia, and seen how Soviet weaponry, plus human resolve, had brought down American prestige. But he also knew that four years after that conflict ended the Soviet Union and her allies in COMECON had failed to get Vietnam going again. The enigma of the current situation was that the Communists were growing stronger and stronger in military terms but more and more cumbersome and inefficient in satisfying the needs of their own people and those of their allies. They had to import food, and sophisticated technology, whether drilling bits from the Americans to explore for oil or a Fiat assembly line from the Italians. But the sheer output of their weapons systems had made the Soviet Union the predominant power currently in Western Europe, and slowly but relentlessly it was achieving parity in naval power in the Pacific. Three weeks before the Japanese, who had adopted a very low profile since 1945, had concluded that, with the arrival of the Soviet aircraft carrier *Minsk* in the Pacific, which had come all the way from the Black Sea, and with access to friendly ports like Cam Ranh Bay, the Soviet fleet would be equal to, if not stronger than, the present American fleet.

That trend held grave implications for all Commonwealth countries. Mr. Lee Kuan Yew did not pretend to be able to see the future. Nobody could. It was not pre-ordained but, rather, what governments chose to make of it. He felt that if the Communists could be held militarily and there was no war or opportunities for conflict in which they could exploit their military superiority, then the free market economy would beat them. But if, in areas outside the major zones of confrontation in Western Europe and the Sea of Japan, which were absolutely critical to the Americans, there was no more erosion of Western power, and if there were no more Ethiopias and Afghanistans, then the free market economies

would continue to flourish. He therefore advised his African friends not to assume that conflict inevitably led to victory or the achievement of desired objectives. But, if there was no other alternative, then conflict was the only way. It was a difficult choice and one that Africans would have to decide themselves in the full knowledge that there was a certain dynamic, a momentum, in conflict itself. One could not turn violence on and off like a tap. It had been widely believed in 1975 and indeed, right up to 1978, that the skills and the discipline of a people at war for 30 years, if turned to constructive pursuits, could build Vietnam into one of the great industrial nations of Asia within 20 years. It was not to be. The country was locked in constant combat. A dynamic for conflict had been built into their system.

He offered one tentative conclusion from his experience in South East Asia. For the first time in human history battles were not being fought in isolation. They were part of one inter-reacting world. Whether it was the Americans committing atrocities on the Vietnamese or Vietnamese inhumanities to their own people and Kampuchians, it was no longer a world in which events could be isolated. The Vietnamese had not wanted to go to Geneva. They had had to go. They had pretended that world opinion did not matter; but it did matter, and the number of refugees had slowed down immediately prior to the Conference. He believed that the exodus would not resume before the Non-Aligned meeting in Havana in September 1979.

He advised his African friends not to acquiesce in that process of conquest and the installation of a puppet regime. If they did they could not be the friends of the South East Asian member countries who knew better than anybody else because their own future was at stake. When the Foreign Ministers of the five countries of ASEAN had met in Bali at the end of June they had asked that all Vietnamese troops be withdrawn from Kampuchea and that the Kampuchean people be allowed to decide their own future. If in fact Heng Sam Rin did represent the Kampuchean people and was their saviour from the atrocities of Pol Pot, then so be it.

Underneath the nuclear arch countries were dicing with each other's future. All humanity was caught up in one of the most tumultuous periods of change in human history. There were no precedents to go by, no examples from the past. The science and technology that the West had pioneered had created a totally different world. If countries could persevere and build, where necessary destroying in order to build, then perhaps the historic conference in Lusaka would not have been in vain. Every conference was an historic event. The conference in London in 1962 when Britain wished to join the Common Market, had been a particularly historic occasion for those who had participated in it. It had not worked out the way Mr. MacMillan, the British Prime Minister, had thought it would. Britain did not get into the Common Market in 1963 and by the time she did in 1973 she was so weakened that when the oil crisis struck in October 1973, membership became a liability.

He had been in Lagos in January 1966, and he saw a few faces round the table who had also been present there. He had not believed that sanctions would bite in a matter of weeks rather than months, but they had had to endure that period. He considered that what Heads of Government did the following weekend did matter, otherwise he would not have come. The meeting could make the difference between more conflict or less conflict although he did not believe that it was going to make the difference between conflict and peace as the dynamics of conflict were already too entrenched in the system. If what was done in April 1979 in Rhodesia had been done in 1973 when the Tories were in office, Lord Pearce would have returned with a different assessment. A chance had been lost then but now it was necessary to live in 1979.

He had shared some thoughts with his colleagues not out of nostalgia but out of a desire to be helpful. He had undertaken that responsibility with great reluctance because it was difficult for him not to speak his mind, and that was a luxury that he increasingly found he could ill-afford. If he had done nothing more than remind the meeting of the consequences of the postures and the positions it would be taking then the Chairman's decision to ask him to open the discussion might not altogether have been misplaced courtesy. He added that it was not he who was going to die; nor were his properties or cattle imperilled. He had, however, seen destruction and war and by its deliberations the meeting would either diminish or increase the likelihood of more destruction, more pain and more suffering.

*Dr. Nyerere*, Tanzania, asked if Mr. Lee Kuan Yew would tell the Meeting a little more about China: his experience in developing relations with his neighbours, and those who were not quite his neighbours, might be instructive to others. He enquired, specifically, as to the likely influence of China on international developments over the next 10 to 20 years.

*Mr. Lee Kuan Yew* said that it depended on the extent to which, over the next two to three years, Deng Xiao Ping succeeded in giving to his people in the cities some of the benefits of his opening up of China to the West, and whether they could feel any appreciable increase in the comforts of life, which they were exposed to through live television coverage of their leaders' visits to Japan and the US. It was no longer possible for the Chinese to put the clock back because they had chosen to show their people what life could really be like. They could not go back to self-reliance, to doing things themselves, to working out their own technology. Deng's problem now was to produce results after 12 years of cultural revolution during which all top management and technocrats were sent out to the farms and the countryside. The first revision was made when the number one economist Chen Yun, who was first banished in 1959, was rehabilitated in early 1979. The Chinese started shedding their heavy iron and steel and aluminium industries and concentrating on farming and light industries. If the Chinese succeeded, then it was possible to project a 10-year viewpoint. Chairman Hua was only 57 and in good health, and was increasingly following the approach of Deng. He had made his first journey outside China last year to Rumania, Yugoslavia and Iran. It was quite obvious that he was in favour of modernisation because of the shock of seeing how backward China was even in comparison to modified forms of Communism as in, for instance, Yugoslavia. It was expected that he would receive a deeper shock on witnessing life in northern Europe during his forthcoming visit to Bonn, Paris and London in October 1979. If Communism had to be modified in order to get China moving then that would be done.

With regard to China's foreign policy, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew said he suspected that the current change was a tactical one, and that China's long term desire for great power status could not be stifled. China had been the centre of the universe before and to accept a subsidiary status was something psychologically impossible. All of the concessions being made to the Thai Government, which he hoped would subsequently be made to Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, would therefore be shortlived. When the Chinese had developed their sinews after 12, 15 or 20 years they would reassert themselves.

*Dr. Nyerere* said that he assumed from that that Mr. Lee Kuan Yew did not expect trouble from the Chinese for 20 years.

*Mr. Lee Kuan Yew* replied that he did not expect trouble for at least 10 years. China was such a vast place that its development was going to take a great deal of work and he did not think that they had fully calculated the cost. They had, for instance, about a dozen universities, none of which had any

high-level technology, engineering or applied science courses. To reach the standard of the US of about 30 per cent of the population reaching tertiary institutions, the Chinese would need about 11,000 universities. It was difficult to see how that could be achieved. Students had to be sent abroad to acquire knowledge. Even a bright, well prepared undergraduate of 20 would not be fully effective for at least 15 years. He thought therefore that 10 trouble-free years was a fair bet but he did not want to predict what would happen when the Chinese developed their sinews. He doubted that they did not believe that they were a big power.

*Sir Harold Walter*, Mauritius, said that he would like to ask Mr. Lee Kuan Yew if, in his opinion, China demonstrated any tendency, as had certain other countries, to send troops to friendly countries for occupation purposes or for repelling rebels, regardless of the distance.

*Mr. Lee Kuan Yew* said that he did not think that the Chinese had either the logistic capability or the political will to become involved in such a way but that they would want to ensure that no super-power took the place of the US in any of the countries on their borders. They did not object to an interplay of regional forces but were opposed to regional forces which were dependent on the Soviet Union, as they had been earlier to those dependent on the US.

*Mr. Spyros Kyprianou*, Cyprus, said Mr. Lee Kuan Yew's conclusion appeared to be that the international situation was rather gloomy; he agreed. In various areas in the world there were unresolved problems or new problems arising. There were both political problems and economic problems but the latter had recently become more serious in view of the oil crisis. Countries individually—particularly those with the capacity—and collectively could contribute towards the solution of existing problems. He drew attention to the gravity of the situation in the Far East, the Middle East, in his own country, Cyprus, and in Africa. There were, too, other more specific instances of concern. The reason why those problems persisted was either because various world powers, in defending their own interests, had not allowed them to be resolved or because new powers had been created. Another cause was the failure to adhere to the decisions, or more precisely the verdict, of humanity.

The UN could still play a very important role in resolving those problems. The Security Council, in particular, was of great importance, but if the UN was to succeed, its members must have the will to make it succeed. Governments had already established certain standards and certain criteria, enshrined in the Charter of the UN, in the Declaration and Covenant on Human Rights and in the Helsinki Final Act, which was supposed to represent the culmination of an effort to improve the world political situation and encourage detente. While the SALT II agreement might have been a step forward in the effort for detente and for further limitations in the arms race, it was not enough. In terms of disarmament very little had been achieved up to the present. If disarmament were to be achieved, all countries, both big and small, must first learn to live by the standards which had been laid down and which all had accepted after two world wars.

He believed strongly that the Commonwealth could be one of those organs which would cease to be a forum for theoretical speeches and become instrumental in solving various international problems, at least those which affected its own members, or a large number of members, like, for example, Southern Africa. Small countries had no alternative, but to abide by and insist on the implementation of internationally agreed principles and rules, such as the Charter of the UN, its Resolutions and the Helsinki Final Act which regulated international relations.

Turning briefly to the African situation which he understood would be discussed separately at a later stage, Mr. Kyprianou said everyone knew why those problems existed and why they would continue to do so unless the proper answers were given to them; for example, in respect of Namibia the proper answer was for South Africa to cease to have anything to do with it, for majority rule to be established, and for full independence to be granted.

There was also the serious problem of Rhodesia, which was becoming more acute. Governments would not solve it by being passive, or by forgetting or postponing it. It was through the postponement of political problems that more crises were created. Commonwealth Heads of Government should do whatever they could, collectively and in the UN to press for real majority rule and to state that they would not recognise any type of regime in Rhodesia which did not guarantee majority rule in every respect. If the problem were ignored, the political climate would worsen further.

Turning to the Middle East, he said that despite recent developments, the central aspect of the problem had not been touched upon, that was, the creation of a state for the Palestinian people whose fundamental privileges, rights and freedoms must be recognised. The resolutions of the Security Council on Palestine and the Middle East must be implemented, which meant the withdrawal of Israel from the areas occupied since the 1967 war. No one challenged the existence of Israel as an independent state, but at the same time, what was equally important was recognition of the Palestinian people through the creation of a state.

#### IV. CYPRUS

Referring to the problem of Cyprus which had been of concern to the Commonwealth and had been thoroughly discussed in past years, Mr. Kyprianou appraised Heads of Government of recent developments. After a long impasse, his Government had finally managed to reach an agreement with the leader of the Turkish Cypriots on 19 May, 1979, an agreement which he believed was a sound basis for negotiation and provided a good framework for a lasting solution. It included the implementation of UN Resolutions. It excluded the union of Cyprus or part of Cyprus with any country; it excluded the secession of any part of Cyprus and partition of any kind. It took into account an agreement which had been reached by the late President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, with Mr. Denktash. It provided for the full respect of fundamental freedoms and human rights for all the citizens of Cyprus. His Government had hoped to hold an uninterrupted dialogue in an effort to reach agreement or at least make a breakthrough. Unfortunately the talks had lasted for only a few days because the other side had started to put forward conditions and to explain philosophies which, in fact, amounted to partition and nothing else. For the fifth year Turkish troops continued to occupy almost 40 per cent of the territory of Cyprus. They had at the time of the invasion uprooted one third of the population of Cyprus making them refugees in their own country and bringing in settlers from Turkey for the purpose obviously of changing the demographic character of Cyprus for the first time in its centuries of history.

There were no encouraging signs at present. His Government had been encouraged when the agreement had been reached but suddenly the position had changed. He ventured to suggest that the agreement had been arrived at at a point when Turkey needed to have an agreement for the purpose of influencing other countries outside Cyprus, in order to get military, economic and other assistance, and that now Turkey no longer felt it could go along with the agreement. For its part, his Government stood by the agreement, but at the same

time they could not merely await developments. The time had come for some more specific action by the Security Council which was already seized of the problem; it had a peace-keeping force in Cyprus. The Secretary-General of the UN had offered his good offices by virtue of the UN Resolutions on Cyprus.

Mr. Kyprianou suggested that the Commonwealth might consider upgrading its Committee on Cyprus to the level of Ministers, because he believed it could in that way play a more effective and important role in assisting a solution of the Cyprus problem. It might be questioned why the Cyprus problem, in particular, should be so highlighted. The reason was that Cyprus was the only member of the Commonwealth 40 per cent of whose territory was occupied illegally and one-third of whose population were refugees. After five years, Cyprus was still looking for 2,000 missing persons; also despite an agreement reached with the Turkish side, on 19 May, there had been no reply from them so far as to whether they were going to honour the agreement. And that despite repeated requests and messages from the UN Secretary-General and from other countries. The most tragic aspect of the Cyprus drama was the 2,000 missing persons and the agony faced by their many thousand more relatives who did not know whether they were alive or dead.

He wished to emphasise one point: the problem of Cyprus was not really a problem between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. If the people of Cyprus had been left alone under the UN guarantees, they would have been able to solve their internal problems within a matter of weeks. The problem of Cyprus was a question of occupation from outside, an intention from outside to impose a solution which was unacceptable. Partition of any kind would mean the end of Cyprus, its destruction as an independent state.

He had proposed at the Special Session of the General Assembly of the UN on Disarmament that all foreign troops including Greeks and Turks, should withdraw from Cyprus and all Cypriots should be disarmed so that Cyprus should have only one small mixed Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot police force under the supervision, guidance and control of a UN police force, with as many powers as they wished. That would have been a contribution to disarmament, and at the same time it would have provided an answer to the question of security if there was such a question, because he strongly believed that if the people of Cyprus were allowed to re-unite they would have learned from experience the need to live together in peace and in harmony. The Commonwealth had a role to play, and he hoped it would take some collective action to assist in the achievement of a united Cyprus.

A way ahead had been forged, his Government had accepted federation as a solution, despite the fact that Cyprus was a very small island and despite the fact that all the British constitutional experts, including Lord Radcliffe, had ruled it out. Cyprus was not made for federation yet his Government accepted it; but when they said "federation" they meant "federation". They meant that people could move freely; to establish themselves where they liked; to work where they liked; to have their property where they liked. However, they found that when the other side used the same term, "federation", they meant borders, with visas or permits for a citizen of Cyprus to go to the north to his own home. That was a situation which really could not be tolerated.

If the problem was not resolved soon it might again become a very serious international conflict, in the same way as other problems, through lack of action. The international community must act, and act in time. Time was of the essence. The substance of the solution to their problem was to apply the same standards and principles as should be applied to all situations. His Government accepted those standards and principles, embodied in the charter of the UN and the Helsinki Final Act. The resolutions of the UN on Cyprus contained all the necessary elements for a viable solution and a lasting peace. Those who were in a position to influence Turkey should do so in the interest of peace.



Before concluding, Mr. Kyprianou referred to the Commonwealth Ministerial Committee on Belize, which had been doing very useful work, and urged its continuance. Cyprus was alarmed by the international situation, but governments must not give up their efforts, individually and collectively, to find solutions. The Commonwealth had acquired such prestige that it could play a very important role by assisting the Security Council of the UN to fulfil its task, or by assisting those who were involved in the conflicts to find a right solution in conformity with the principles and the resolutions of the UN.

*Dr. Kaunda* sought clarification on the Committees which Mr. Kyprianou had referred and asked whether he was suggesting that the Committee dealing with the Cyprus problem should be raised in status to ministerial level, and that the Committee on Belize (which was at the ministerial level) should be continued.

*Mr. Kyprianou* replied in the affirmative.

*Dr. Kaunda* asked whether there were any objections to the proposal.

*Mr. Ziaur Rahman*, Bangladesh, suggested that, while recognising the seriousness of the Cyprus situation, it would be difficult for Heads of Government to make a decision on the matter unless the views of the other side were made known. More time was needed for that and he therefore requested the Chairman to postpone a decision on the matter.

*Mr. Kyprianou* did not think anybody should be afraid of such a Commonwealth committee and, in any case, Turkey was not a member of the Commonwealth. The composition of the Committee was satisfactory but his Government was ready to discuss any changes other members might want.

*Mr. Ziaur Rahman* pointed out that the good offices of the Secretary-General of the UN were involved in the question and he wondered if it would be worthwhile for the Commonwealth to become further involved at present. He would rather leave it to the UN to pursue in the light of their earlier discussions and agreements. He was only querying the upgrading of the Committee, not suggesting that it be discontinued.

*Dr. Muscat*, Malta, supported the request made by the President of Cyprus. Malta was a member of the Commonwealth Committee on Cyprus. The problem was that the Committee had remained dormant for the past two years. To up-grade it to ministerial level would be an advantage for it would enable the Committee to listen to both sides.

*Dr. Kaunda* suggested that the Meeting continue with discussion of the broader agenda item, and that a decision on the Committee's status be taken later.

*Mr. Ziaur Rahman*, Bangladesh, referred to Para 28 of the communiqué of the 1977 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, which supported "through the intercommunal talks to reach freely and mutually acceptable political settlements" the efforts of the UN to achieve a lasting solution. As the UN was already on the job there was no need for the Commonwealth to up-grade its Committee.

*Mr. Moi*, Kenya, pointed out that the present Meeting had the potential to benefit mankind. All international conferences dealt with human problems, but the politicians attending them were frequently cautious, even on very clear problems. For his part, he could see nothing preventing the present Meeting from creating a Ministerial Committee to supplement and assist the Secretary-General of the UN. If they were going to be cautious he presumed that even Zimbabwe might be similarly treated, even though human life was being lost every day.

*Mr. Jackson*, Guyana, said he had not intended to intervene, but lest his silence might be misunderstood, he wished to indicate his support for the proposal made by the President of Cyprus for the up-grading of the Committee from official to ministerial level. Guyana did not see any essential difficulty in the Commonwealth at a level it deemed appropriate trying to assist both the people of Cyprus and the UN Secretary-General in finding a just and lasting peace in that country. Guyana had participated in another group, established by the Non-Aligned countries, and he recollected that the UN Secretary-General himself had valued its assistance in the performance of his tasks. If the meeting could accept the proposal made by the President of Cyprus, and if the Committee so formed approached its task on the basis of Resolutions that each and every member of the Meeting had supported in the UN, they would have established a basis for intervening in a cause that touched all of them. He suspected that there might be other delegations from the Caribbean who shared that view and he suggested that the Meeting did not try to reach a decision at that time, but that they used the opportunities of informal contact to eliminate any misgivings or misunderstandings.

*Mr. Ziaur Rahman* reiterated that more time was needed before the question of upgrading the Committee was considered. The existing Committee might be sent to Cyprus to look into the latest situation and report.

*Mr. Rithaudeen*, Malaysia, supported the view that the matter should be pursued in informal discussions in order to find out the pros and cons of upgrading the Committee, but he wished to point out that Foreign Ministers were busy and for that reason the Committee should not be upgraded.

*Dr. Kaunda* suggested that the Meeting postpone a decision on the question of the status of the Committee and that Heads of Government exchange views informally on it so that a decision could be taken at a later stage.

*Mr. Kyprianou* pointed out that he was not proposing anything revolutionary. He was simply proposing that the same terms of reference be retained but that Ministers or their representatives be included in the Committee.

*Dr. Kaunda* then suggested that the Meeting adjourn and that Mr. Fraser, Australia, should continue discussion of the Item the following morning.

Before adjourning, he mentioned that a large number of subjects had been remitted to the Committee of the Whole for initial consideration and he sought the Meeting's concurrence for the Committee to begin its work the following morning from 10 a.m. with a view to reporting back before the weekend, if possible. Thereafter the Committee could concentrate on the Communiqué.

The meeting adjourned at 5.45 p.m.