

CONFIDENTIAL

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CHGM Bilaterals

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION WITH THE RT. HON. MALCOLM FRASER,
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, AT HORIZON HOUSE, LUSAKA, ON 31 JULY 1979
AT 1830

Present

The Prime Minister

The Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

The Rt. Hon. Andrew Peacock

Mr. B.G. Cartledge

Notetaker

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After an initial discussion of the internal political situation in Nigeria, Mr. Fraser said that the line on Rhodesia in Lagos was still tough. Commissioner Adefope, however, was pleasant to deal with and would say rather little at the CHGM. Mr. Fraser said that he had only learned a few minutes before his departure from Lagos of the rumour that the Nigerian Government intended to nationalise BP in Nigeria. He had put it to the Nigerians that this would be an unhelpful step to take on the eve of the CHGM. The Nigerians had retorted that this step was being taken because BP had been selling oil to South Africa; they insisted that the measure was unrelated either to the CHGM or to the Rhodesia problem.

The Prime Minister told Mr. Fraser that, despite a vitriolic local press about Bishop Muzorewa and herself, the atmosphere of her private talks had been quite different. The same applied to the line which President Nyerere had taken with the press on the previous evening after the Front Line Summit. The moderate Africans now accepted that only the UK could give Rhodesia her independence constitution while maintaining that this must lead to genuine black majority rule. The Prime Minister said that the Africans to whom she had spoken clearly expected that events would now move quickly, almost as if they had had

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enough of the present situation. Many Africans now accepted that the Rhodesia elections had been a significant advance and could not be ignored. There was also general agreement that some parts of the constitution required amendment and that it was important that Rhodesia should be recognised by other countries than the UK.

In response to a question from Mr. Fraser, the Prime Minister said that the British Government had taken no final decisions. The proposals which the Government would eventually make would be addressed to all the parties to the conflict: the war simply had to be stopped. The Prime Minister said that she hoped that if a right and reasonable constitution could be devised, the grounds on which the Front Line States played host to the guerrillas would be removed.

Lord Carrington said that he had already asked President Nyerere whether, if there were to be general agreement on an amended constitution, the Patriotic Front would then stop the war. Nyerere had said that he would try and that the Patriotic Front could not continue their activities without the support of the Front Line States. Mr. Fraser recalled that General Obasanjo had told him that if Ian Smith were to be elected in Salisbury on the basis of a genuinely democratic constitution, he would send him a telegram of congratulations. The General had urged that changes should be made to the present constitution and that this should lead to supervised elections; supervision by the present government in Salisbury would not be trusted. Mr. Peacock told the Prime Minister that President Nyerere had said to him that Tanzania

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trusted the British, who had carried out these independence operations before. Nyerere had suggested that the UK should send observers to a new round of Rhodesian elections and that these need not all be British. President Nyerere had admitted that he might have difficulty in selling this approach to the Patriotic Front.

Lord Carrington commented that this approach seemed to ignore the difficulty, which had so often proved insuperable, of what was to be done about the Rhodesian security forces. Mr. Fraser said that President Kaunda (whom he had just seen) had not raised this problem. Kaunda had taken the line that there were two essential preconditions. These were that there should be no recognition of the Muzorewa regime and no lifting of sanctions until the whole process of making and accepting proposals had been completed. These proposals should be put by the UK to a constitutional convention. Kaunda had taken his usual line about the inevitability of Soviet, Cuban or East German intervention if the war were to continue much longer.

The Prime Minister said that President Nyerere had agreed that there could be no sanctions against a genuinely democratic constitution. Mr. Peacock said that if President Nyerere were to be satisfied, during the next few days, with the Prime Minister's approach - of discussing, consulting, consulting again and then deciding - the British approach to the CHGM itself might be critical.

Lord Carrington said that it was now planned to begin the discussion of Southern Africa on the morning of Friday, 3 August, and to conclude it on Monday, 6 August. The Prime Minister and he would then fly home to consult their colleagues and then would get on with their proposals. Mr. Fraser said that he thought it very important that the Africans at the CHGM should go home to their countries prepared to testify /that the

that the UK was now on the right track so far as Rhodesia was concerned. Mr. Peacock pointed out that, in this context, they might like to see something included in the Communique to tie the UK down. The Prime Minister suggested that the press should be told that she and Lord Carrington were to get down to the working out of proposals as soon as they returned to the UK. They could give an indication of the broad timescale. Mr. Fraser said that it would be very helpful to know more about the time-scale of the UK scenario. If the time-scale were to be very short it might not be necessary to meet President Kaunda's precondition that recognition should not be given nor sanctions lifted until proposals on the constitution had been put and accepted.

The Prime Minister said that it was essential to get into a position in which Africans would be encouraged to say that it did not matter who reached the top so long as the constitutional basis was right.

Mr. Peacock recalled that President Nyerere had once told him that he would be happy to work with Bishop Muzorewa.

The Prime Minister said that the UK had given "reasonable" constitutions to all her former colonies. What they did with these constitutions subsequently was their own business. The main difficulty would be with the whites in Rhodesia. Bishop Muzorewa was anxious not to lose his credibility.

Mr. Peacock said that President Moi of Kenya would, he thought, present no problem. Mr. Fraser said that the key would be what the Africans needed in order to live with their own public opinion, while the UK continued her process of negotiation. The Prime Minister and Lord Carrington agreed that the UK advisers should be put to work on possible formulations for inclusion in the Communique.

/ Mr. Peacock

Mr. Peacock expressed the view that if the revised constitution were to enshrine the basic essential elements, the Patriotic Front would be out-maneuvred. It should be borne in mind that Nyerere was faced with acute problems as a result of the cost of stationing his troops in Uganda. It seemed clear that he intended to keep them there for some time yet. Mr. Fraser said that one card for the UK to play would be to offer to arrange independent supervision of new elections in Rhodesia, rather than leaving it to the present regime there.

Lord Carrington said that he very much doubted whether the Patriotic Front would agree to anything which the UK could propose. Nkomo knew that he would have no chance of victory in a "free and fair election", since he was not a Shona. Equally, Mugabe would be doubtful of victory and ideologically opposed to the process. Mr. Fraser said that changes to the constitution were essential in order to detach the Front Line States from their support of the Patriotic Front. The Prime Minister said that the worst problem still remained that of how to get rid of Nkomo and Mugabe; the Prime Minister commented that they had nowhere to go other than Rhodesia.

Lord Carrington said that if the UK could get President Nyerere and President Kaunda to accept that the UK Government were being very reasonable, the two Presidents might perhaps be screwed down into abandonment of the Patriotic Front if the Front were to reject the UK's constitutional proposals.

The discussion ended at 1930.

31 July 1979