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FM FCO 111830Z JUNE 81

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER 298 OF 11 JUNE 1981.

REPEATED TO (FOR INFO) IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON,  
TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDAH, KUWAIT, ALGIERS, TUNIS  
ABU DHABI, PRIORITY ADEN BAHRAIN CAIRO DOHA DUBAI JERUSALEM  
KHARTOUM MUSCAT RABAT SNAAA TRIPOLI AND EC POSTS.

ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQ

1. THE AMBASSADORS OF THE UAE, IRAQ, JORDAN, LEBANON, ALGERIA  
AND KUWAIT CALLED ON THE LORD PRIVY SEAL ON 11 JUNE (NOT ON  
INSTRUCTIONS).
2. THEY HANDED OVER A STATEMENT BY THE ARAB AMBASSADORS IN  
LONDON (COPIES BY BAG) CONDEMNING THE ISRAELI ATTACK, JUSTIFYING  
IRAQ'S PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAMME AND CONDEMNING ISRAELI POLICIES  
IN LEBANON. IT CALLED FOR MEASURES, INCLUDING SANCTIONS, TO  
PREVENT REPETITION OF ISRAELI AGRESSION. IT ALSO CALLED ON  
BRITAIN TO USE HER INFLUENCE WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER  
GOVERNMENTS TO SUSPEND ALL MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO  
ISRAEL.
3. THE AMBASSADORS ALL SPOKE IN SIMILAR TERMS (ALTHOUGH TOUCH-  
ING LITTLE UPON LEBANON). THEY WELCOMED OUR CONDEMNATION OF THE  
ISRAELI ATTACK BUT STRESSED REPEATEDLY THE INADEQUACY OF  
SUCCESSIVE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS MERELY CONDEMNING ISRAEL.  
THIS WAS NO LONGER ENOUGH AND EFFECTIVE ACTION WOULD HAVE TO BE  
TAKEN BOTH BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND BY THE US BILATERALLY. THE  
UAE AMBASSADOR  
SPOKE OF PRESSURE ON THE STREETS FOR ACTION WHICH COULD AFFECT  
THE STABILITY OF ARAB REGIMES IF NOTHING EFFECTIVE WERE DONE. AND  
THE PEOPLE WOULD QUESTION WHY OIL SUPPLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO GO  
TO THE WEST IF THE WEST FAILED EFFECTIVELY TO SUPPORT THE ARABS.
4. THE LORD PRIVY SEAL SAID THAT BOTH THE FCO AND THE PRIME  
MINISTER IN PARLIAMENT HAD FORTHRIGHTLY CONDEMNED THE ATTACK. IT

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WAS UNJUSTIFIED AND UNLAWFUL AGRESSION. BUT IF THE ARABS WANTED A UNANIMOUS CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL THEIR SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WORDED AND NOT INCLUDE SANCTIONS. THE US WOULD VETO ANY REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS AND OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD ALSO HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH IT. ASKED ABOUT THE UK ATTITUDE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE HE SAID THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO SEE WHAT SORT OF RESOLUTION WE WOULD BE ASKED TO SUPPORT. BUT OUR POSITION ON SANCTIONS GENERALLY WAS THAT WE WERE OPPOSED ON THE GROUNDS THAT, OTHER CONSIDERATIONS APART, THEY WERE UNLIKELY TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES.

5. THE LORD PRIVY SEAL URGED THE MERITS OF A UNANIMOUS RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL. IF THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION, WHICH WAS PRO-ISRAELI, SUBSCRIBED TO THIS IT WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENT. AND IT WOULD ENABLE THE ARABS TO BUILD ON THIS IN THEIR PRIVATE PRESSURE TO PERSUADE THE US TO REDUCE HER SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL (FAR BETTER TO PRESS THEM PRIVATELY THAN CONFRONT THEM PUBLICLY). IT WOULD ALSO SPLIT THE US ADMINISTRATION FROM ISRAEL TO BEGIN'S ELECTORAL DISADVANTAGE. BUT IF THE ARABS PRESSED FOR SANCTIONS WHICH WOULD BE VETOED THEY WOULD LOSE ALL THIS AND BEGIN WOULD GAIN.

6. AS FOR PRESSURE BY OURSELVES ON THE AMERICANS, THE US ADMINISTRATION KNEW OUR VIEWS. BUT WHEN WE SPOKE PRIVATELY TO THE AMERICANS OUR HAND WOULD BE IMMEASURABLY STRENGTHENED BY A UNANIMOUS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND BY THE ARABS PUTTING THEIR OWN CASE FOR EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL DIRECT TO THE US ADMINISTRATION.

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