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TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 159 OF 30 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW WARSAW UKDEL NATO UKMIS GENEVA OTHER EC POSTS  
TOKYO LISBON MADRID UKDEL STRASBOURG OSLO STOCKHOLM HELSINKI.*M**LM*  
*3/12***POLAND: INFORMAL MEETING OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIRECTORS  
OF THE TEN, 30 DECEMBER.**

1. THE FOLLOWING SUMMARISES THE OUTCOME OF THIS MEETING ON THE POLITICAL SIDE: FOR ECONOMIC ASPECTS, SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM.
2. IT WAS AGREED THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE TEN SHOULD MEET UNDER BELGIAN PRESIDENCY ARRANGEMENTS IN BRUSSELS ON 4 JANUARY TO CONSIDER THE POLISH EVENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TEN. THIS HAS SINCE BEEN ANNOUNCED.
3. ON THE PRESENT SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN POLAND, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE NEXT PHASE OF MARTIAL LAW IS LIKELY TO BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE REGIME TO IMPLEMENT THAN THE FIRST THREE WEEKS HAVE BEEN. SOME DIFFERENCE OF EMPHASIS BETWEEN FRG AND ESPECIALLY GREECE, WHO WERE DISPOSED TO SUSPEND JUDGEMENT AND GIVE JARUZELSKI THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT FOR A BIT LONGER, AND OTHERS, ESPECIALLY FRANCE, WHO WERE INCLINED TO QUESTION HIS FREEDOM OF ACTION IF NOT HIS SINCERITY. AGREEMENT THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS COULD NOT NECESSARILY AFFORD TO TAKE SUCH A LONG-TERM VIEW AS THE CHURCH AND THE VATICAN APPEARED TO BE DOING.
4. **NO DISAGREEMENT ON THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES:**
  - A) SHORT-TERM: GET MARTIAL LAW LIFTED, DETAINEES RELEASED AND INTERNAL DIALOGUE RESUMED.
  - B) LONG-TERM:
    - NOT ACCEPT SITUATION AS IRREVERSIBLE.
    - KEEP INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF POLISH CRISIS UNDER CONTROL.
    - PREVENT FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION.
    - ENSURE THAT PROCESS OF REFORM AND RENEWAL, ALTHOUGH SET BACK, IS RESUMED.
    - MAINTAIN UNITY AMONG THE TEN AND (FOR THOSE WHO BELONG TO IT) IN THE ALLIANCE.
5. **MADRID.** AGREED TO RECOMMEND THAT ON 4 JANUARY MINISTERS CONSIDER THE FULL RANGE OF OPTIONS IDENTIFIED IN NATO, INCLUDING THE ONE (EARLY RECONVENING) ALREADY PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES: OBJECTIONS SEEN TO THE LATTER, ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT COULD PREJUDICE AGREED DATE OF 9 FEBRUARY FOR THE SAKE OF AN UNATTAINABLE TARGET (EARLIER RESUMPTION).
6. **RELATIONS WITH POLAND.** MINISTERS TO BE INVITED TO CONSIDER HOW BEST TO CONTINUE THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH THE REGIME IN WARSAW, EG BY FURTHER DIPLOMATIC CONTACT, HIGH-LEVEL MESSAGES AND/OR THROUGH A SPECIAL EMISSARY: THE LATTER WOULD NEED TO BE ASSURED OF ACCESS TO CHURCH AND SOLIDARITY LEADERS AS WELL AS TO

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THE REGIME. MINISTERS TO CONSIDER DESIRABILITY OF IMPOSING RETALIATORY RESTRICTIONS ON POLISH EMBASSIES IN CAPITALS OF THE TEN (EXCLUDING DENMARK WHICH HAS DIFFERENT TRADITIONS IN THIS MATTER). IF MINISTERS AGREE, INSTRUCTIONS TO BE SENT TO MISSIONS IN NEW YORK AND GENEVA TO FOLLOW UP POSSIBILITIES OF ACTION THROUGH ILO AND POSSIBLY OTHER UN SPECIALISED AGENCIES. NO SUPPORT FOR IDEA OF WITHDRAWING AMBASSADORS FROM WARSAW, WHETHER BRIEFLY FOR CONSULTATIONS OR INDEFINITELY AS A MARK OF DISAPPROVAL.

7. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. AGREEMENT, NOT LEAST FROM THE FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR, THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS INTERPRETED CONSULTATION IN A CURIOUS MANNER AND GIVEN A LEAD IN A DIRECTION WHICH EUROPEAN ALLIES WILL FIND IT HARD TO FOLLOW. GENERAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF DIFFICULTY OF MAINTAINING WESTERN UNITY, GIVEN THE AMERICAN STARTING POINT. AGREEMENT ON THREE LINES, SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION BY MINISTERS ON 4 JANUARY:-

A) AVOID ACTION OR COMMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE WESTERN DISUNITY WORSE OR SEEM WORSE THAN IT IS: SOME DEGREE OF COMPLEMENTARITY INEVITABLE AND EVEN DESIRABLE IN WESTERN REACTIONS.

B) MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THE POSSIBILITIES IN THE POLITICAL FIELD, WHERE THE TEN ARE LESS CONSTRAINED THAN IN ECONOMIC. USE MADRID LEVER IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER, ARGUING THAT POLISH EVENTS UNDERMINE ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH EAST/WEST RELATIONS HAVE DEVELOPED SINCE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT ISSUED AFTER FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON 4 JANUARY SHOULD BE SUITABLY FIRMER THAN THOSE MADE BEFORE CHRISTMAS. NOT UNDERRATE SOVIET SENSITIVITY TO WELL-JUDGED DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE.

C) EACH OF THE TEN SHOULD LOOK FOR NATIONAL WAYS TO REFLECT DISAPPROVAL OF THE SOVIET ROLE IN POLAND, EG BY

- POSTPONING/CANCELLING POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION  
- ADVISING PARLIAMENTARIANS TO POSTPONE/CANCEL THEIR CONTRACTS WITH MOSCOW

- REDUCING OR ENDING WORK OF SOVIET OCEANOGRAPHIC VESSELS IN WATERS OF THE TEN (SUGGESTED BY ITALY, WHICH IS TO CIRCULATE A NOTE).

8. I JOINED THE MEETING FOR HALF AN HOUR AT THE END, AND MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

A) I HAD PROPOSED A MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS THIS WEEK PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE CRITICISM OF THE INACTIVITY OF THE TEN DURING THE AFGHAN CRISIS TWO YEARS AGO. IT WOULD BE HARDER ON 4 JANUARY THAN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TODAY OR TOMORROW TO RESERVE COMMENT ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION ANNOUNCED ON 29 DECEMBER. GIVEN THAT WE HAD BEEN SAYING FOR MONTHS THAT WE HAD PLANS FOR AN EMERGENCY IN POLAND, WE FACED A PROBLEM OVER WHAT TO SAY NOW.

2  
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B) I UNDERSTOOD FROM SIR N HENDERSON THAT THE AMERICAN REACTION TO REAGAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT HAD BEEN VERY POSITIVE AND THAT AMERICAN EYES WERE NOW TURNING TOWARDS EUROPE TO SEE WHAT WE WERE DOING. IN TAKING OUR DECISIONS WE MUST THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT THE LIKELY EFFECT ON RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE ALLIANCE.

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